



CASE STUDIES IN POLICY MAKING & IMPLEMENTATION

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POLICY MAKING

&

IMPLEMENTATION

6th Edition



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Naval
War
College

Edited by
WILLIAMS

National Security
Decision Making



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Case Studies in

Policy Making & Implementation

(6th Edition)

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

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Preface

Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation (PMI) is an executive level text in its sixth edition and is used in a master's degree granting program of study at the Naval War College (NWC). It represents the imagination and creative effort of the PMI faculty here in the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department of the NWC, as well as the experiences shared by seminar participants and the leadership of many of the organizations depicted in the case studies.

The PMI curriculum is aimed at a seminar composed of senior and middle level U.S. and international military and governmental leaders, who are already proven performers and are by every standard, already successes in their careers. They are selected for attendance at the NWC, by their organizations and nations, based upon their bright future promise as senior leaders in government and the military. The course, therefore, is designed to increase these senior level leader's understanding of political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena which are relevant to national security decision making at the highest levels of government and the military. To achieve this purpose, the course is comprised of two parts. The first part of the course introduces a framework to consider the factors that influence national level policy decision making. The second part builds upon the first and uses a different framework to consider more directly the challenges of leading and implementing change in large and complex organizations.

The cases in this edition have been significantly updated from previous editions to ensure that students are presented with a broad selection of national policy and organizational change cases that will challenge them to apply course concepts and to develop their own skills of critical analysis. Though the underlying events, issues, and organizational challenges are factual; the cast of characters, their personalities, and relationships have often been fictionalized to enhance readability. Time is compressed and issues are condensed to enhance the educational usefulness of the case study in a program that involves an extensive graduate level reading load.


Many thanks to my colleagues, the PMI faculty, for providing great content and advice—they made the editing job easy. I also gratefully acknowledge the continued assistance of Karla Bakos, Susan Meyer, and Samuel O. Johnson. Their creative eye, editorial advice, and publication savvy have been instrumental in putting the best possible product into the hands of our students, on time.

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January 2002

Part One:

The National Security Environment and Institutions



Anti-Personnel Landmines: A U.S. Policy-Making Minefield

GEORGE E. TEAGUE

Commander Jimmy Lemkis just couldn't believe it. Despite all the stories he had heard throughout his twenty-one years of service, and especially during this past year at the Naval War College, he still was not prepared for what was happening to him. Reporting for duty at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) only a few hours earlier, he was now sitting in the office of his new boss, Air Force Colonel John Rockets. He had gone there expecting to get the typical welcome aboard speech and an overview of his new duties. Instead, he was met with a brief, but friendly, introduction and then quickly given the particulars of his first tasking.

"Sorry I can't give you more time to get your feet on the ground, Jimmy, but we've got to move on this fast and everyone else is already tied up with multiple missions. As I am sure you are aware, OSD has been going like gangbusters ever since President Bush took office. With all the attention paid to high profile issues like the attacks on Iraqi air defense sites, the EP-3 aircraft incident with China, and especially our on-going war on terrorism, a lot of other important work has been left somewhat unattended. However, the administration is continuing to review and modify many of the policies that were put in place during the Clinton years. One such policy currently under review involves anti-personnel landmines (APLs), and Secretary Rumsfeld needs some information from us pretty quickly before he weighs in with a formal Department of Defense (DoD) position."

Colonel Rockets paused for a moment to take a quick sip of coffee, then continued, "Basically, what the boss needs from us is a clear understanding of how the current U.S. policy on APLs came about. He also needs a summary of how we have done to date on implementing the policy and what's changed since it was first announced. Finally, he wants to know 'who's got a dog in this fight'...that is, what interested parties may try to influence the current review, why, and how." He reached across the desk to hand Jimmy a thin folder, stating "I jotted down a few names and phone numbers of folks you may want to talk with to help you get started. In case you are wondering, you got this mission for three reasons. First, since you just got here you don't have any other assignments yet and can give this your complete attention. Second, as a Navy construction expert, or Seabee, you are the closest thing I've got to a subject matter expert on landmines. Third, and most important, your Policy Making and Implementation (PMI) instructor up at the Naval War College was a classmate of mine when I was there in 1999, and he told me that you were one of his star pupils, so I

know you've got the requisite skills to handle this mission. I'll need an initial brief tomorrow. Great to have you on-board," he said as he shook Jimmy's hand and ended the meeting.

Back in his office, Jimmy began looking over the rather sparse list of names he had gotten from Colonel Rockets. One grabbed his attention right away – an Army colonel named Jack Warden from the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The notes beside Colonel Warden's name indicated that he had done some sort of review of the landmine policy back in 1999. Jimmy smiled as he dialed the colonel's number, thinking that this call might save him a lot of legwork. A female voice answered the phone, "Colonel Long speaking. May I help you?"

"Yes, Ma'am. This is Commander Lemkis from OSD. May I speak with Colonel Warden, please?" asked Jimmy.

"I'm sorry. He is no longer assigned here. May I help you with something?" replied Colonel Long.

Jimmy was immediately disappointed, but took the time to explain why he was calling in the hope that perhaps Colonel Long or someone else she knew might have worked with Colonel Warden on his review. "Do you, by any chance, know anything about the landmine policy briefing that he prepared for Secretary Caldera in 1999?" he asked.¹

"You're in luck, commander," she replied. "I remember the project. I even helped him a little bit with it. If you will leave your number, I'll try to locate a copy of it for you and I will call you back."

As he waited for her call, Jimmy dialed another number from the list, this one to the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships at the State Department. He explained what he was working on to a secretary, who then forwarded his call to Ms. Laura Beccam. After a brief discussion, Ms. Beccam agreed to meet with him later that afternoon. As soon as he hung up, the phone rang and he was pleased to hear Colonel Long's voice on the line.

"Commander Lemkis? Patty Long here. Although I hate to admit it, I cannot find a copy of Jack's briefing. Now that I think about it, I'm not sure he ever produced a final version. However, I did locate his working file and it is full of notes and articles that I think you will find very useful. You are welcome to come look at it and even make copies of stuff, but I'm afraid I cannot let the file leave the office. Would you like to come by sometime today?"

"Yes," Jimmy said quickly. "Can I come over now?"

"No problem. I'll keep the file on my desk. If I get called out before you get here I'll leave it with the secretary up front and let her know you are coming."

After getting directions, Jimmy thanked her and headed for the door feeling much better about this project than he had when he left Colonel Rockets' office.

Colonel Warden's file was a gold mine of information about U.S. policy on APLs, at least up to the point where his work apparently ended in 1999. Jimmy had news articles, interviews, e-mail messages, hand-written notes and other documents spread all over a table near Colonel Long's office in the Army staff spaces. In addition to the workspace, Patty had given him a code for the copy machine and even offered to discuss the issue with him once he had reviewed the material. He quickly organized the paperwork into several distinct piles and then began to sketch out a timeline of events and a synopsis of current U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy.

Although elements of the policy were announced at various times in 1996 and 1997, the key decision seemed to be President Clinton's 17 September 1997 declaration of anti-personnel landmine policy.² In announcing his decision, the president stated that the United States would not sign the *Ottawa Treaty* banning APLs due to our nation's "unique responsibilities for preserving security and defending peace." He further added that, "there is a line I simply cannot cross, the safety and security of our men and women in uniform." He then reviewed his APL policy, a multi-faceted approach to the problem. This included a commitment to renew efforts to negotiate a global ban on landmines through the United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, an approach he originally announced in January of that same year. He also directed the Defense Department to develop alternative technologies to replace APLs outside Korea by 2003 and within Korea by 2006, and he committed to significantly increase funding for all aspects of U.S. demining programs. In addition, he made permanent a moratorium on the export of APLs by the United States and capped the U.S. inventory of self-destructing landmines at existing levels. Finally, he appointed General David Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as special advisor to the president and the secretary of defense for issues related to this policy.³

Just one month later, Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen further clarified the policy by introducing the president's initiative called *Demining 2010*, a program intended to eliminate, by 2010, the threat to civilians posed by landmines already on the ground. The first step in this program involved appointing Assistant Secretary of State Karl F. Inderfurth to serve as the special representative of the president and of the secretary of state for global humanitarian demining. "Looks like the major focus of this policy is going to be on the demining component," Jimmy thought to himself. "I wonder why . . . visibility? . . . likelihood of success? . . . powerful forces at work who favor this approach? . . . doing what no one else can do as well? Hmmm."

Next, Jimmy decided to prepare a brief summary of the historical facts he had derived from the folder. Since before WWII, the rules of war and international law have defined mine warfare as a *defensive strategy*. Minefields were normally placed between countries or occupied territory, and APLs were invented to inhibit breaching of these barriers. These rules generally held through the Korean War, after which both North Korea and the UN Command used APLs to help establish the Demilitarized Zone. To this day, the U.S. defense treaty with South Korea rests in part on our policy of maintaining defensive mine

warfare to protect U.S. forces. Then in Vietnam the Viet Cong started to use mines as psychological weapons, often building crude “home-made” mines from tin cans and scrap metal. In that same time frame, the United States introduced a technological breakthrough—*smart* mines capable of self-deactivation and self-destruction.

These remotely delivered smart mines were called by their acronym—FASCAM—which stands for the “Family of Scatterable Mines” and they contained both anti-armor and anti-personnel mines. Developed for both the Army and Air Force, FASCAM was widely viewed as an important force enabler to the military. Except for the dumb mines retained for use in Korea and for training, the United States currently only uses FASCAM. However, the rest of world’s major arms producers—particularly China, Russia, and Italy—continue to focus on producing *dumb* mines. Though labeled “dumb,” these mines are actually sophisticated weapons that are noted for their ease of construction, cheap cost, and lack of metal parts to foil detection. These types of mines were used extensively in the wars in the 1980s and 1990s and now constitute the problem.⁴

Patty interrupted his thoughts to offer him a cup of coffee, adding, “I’ve got a few moments if you would like to discuss any of this.”

“Sure,” said Jimmy, “and thanks for the coffee. I hope the Army’s coffee is better than the stuff we make over at OSD.”

“I wouldn’t count on it. If you don’t mind my saying so, I think this issue is potentially more explosive than you may think. DoD feels itself under attack from all sides on this issue. Although in the big scheme of things APL policy may appear to be a small-potato policy, it is anything but that! It has direct connections to debates about international law, traditional diplomacy versus new processes of arms control, rules of war and sovereignty, and what role other states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the public should play in driving U.S. security policy. It is a confusing issue unless you have the timeline down.”

“I have the key dates broken out here,” said Jimmy. (See Chronology at end of case study.)

Patty took a long look at the timeline and said, “Wow, I’m impressed! You’ve gotten this together pretty quickly. Did you know our policy efforts were supported by several NGOs, and in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, during the Cold War period? In the last several years, however, the situation has changed somewhat and new forces have emerged to attempt to force a change in our APL policy. Let’s talk about some of those forces.

“In the early 1990s the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) initiated an international effort to ban landmines and managed to enlist the support of several other NGOs. They hired an outspoken activist, Ms. Jody Williams, to serve as the coordinator of what became known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).⁵ Ms. Williams championed the ICBL cause and led it from its infancy into ‘super-NGO’ status. She eventually brought together over thirteen hundred groups and organizations from ninety

countries to create a force to pressure governments into changing their landmine policies. She calls this concept for world change the use of ‘civil society.’⁶ For their efforts, she and the VVAF were co-recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, an event that generated a great deal of favorable publicity for the cause and undoubtedly enhanced the ICBL’s credibility.

“I can understand how the ICBL might be effective in pressuring individual countries into changing their landmine policies,” Jimmy said, “but how did they manage to generate an international treaty?”

“Actually, they did not generate the treaty, although they were certainly instrumental in promoting it and pressuring countries to join,” replied Patty. “The international treaty was largely the result of efforts by Canada’s foreign minister, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, who created the ‘Ottawa Process’—a fast-track negotiation of a convention banning landmines.

“At the conclusion of the First Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva in May 1996, many delegates were disappointed at the failure to achieve consensus on an outright ban of APLs. Mr. Axworthy decided to radically change the process of negotiating a landmine treaty and announced Canada’s sponsorship of a new and different kind of conference in Ottawa in October of that same year. At the end of the Ottawa Conference, Mr. Axworthy then challenged the world’s countries to come back by the end of 1997 with their respective government’s approval for a treaty to ban landmines. The Ottawa Process surprised many governments, not only because of the speed with which it operated, but also because Canada chose neither to follow the lead of their superpower neighbor to the south, nor rely upon an existing diplomatic forum. Instead, Canada formed its own process and rapidly changed the face of international diplomacy. The result was the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, more commonly called the *Ottawa Treaty* or the *Landmine Ban Treaty*.⁷ For his active support and leadership in this process, the VVAF recognized Mr. Axworthy with the Senator Patrick J. Leahy Humanitarian Award in December 2000.⁸

“Would that be Senator Leahy, the Democrat from Vermont?” asked Jimmy. “I think I saw an interview with one of his congressional staffers in Colonel Warden’s folder. Yeah, here it is. He must have been a pretty active supporter of the cause to get an award named after him.”

“Senator Leahy has been impacting this process for years by continually introducing congressional legislation to limit U.S. production, export and use of APLs,” Patty replied. “He seemed to get pretty close with President Clinton on this issue . . . the details are probably in that interview.

“What about DoD—do you have any insight as to their role or inputs into the process?” asked Jimmy.

“Not a lot of specifics,” replied Patty. “I know there were many factions within DoD with strong emotions and what I think were parochial mindsets on the policy during that time

frame. The Joint Staff apparently didn't want to run afoul of their civilian leaders at OSD so they wouldn't touch it. They wanted the Army to carry the ball. The folks over in OSD actually wanted to see the APL ban go into effect early in Mr. Clinton's first term, so they weren't very happy with us because the Army took a go-slow approach.⁹ Since Secretary Rumsfeld took charge, I haven't heard as much about the issue, perhaps because everyone has been tied up with all the other stuff going on around here. I did hear that one of the reviews he commissioned has recommended abandoning the 2003 and 2006 deadlines to replace all APLs with alternative technologies. As you might imagine, this is already causing a lot of anxiety among NGOs like the ICBL and Human Rights Watch, both of whom had hoped to convince President Bush to go one step further than Clinton and actually sign the *Ottawa Treaty*.¹⁰ Further exacerbating the issue, word has gotten around that the Army has zeroed the 2003-2007 spending plan funding that was targeted for the development of a dumb APL alternative, and the word also indicates that we are going to propose that the United States abandon its efforts to develop alternatives for FASCAM mixed-mine systems.¹¹ You should try to hit some of the NGO websites to get their latest views on these issues.

"Well, I've got to get back to work," Patty concluded. "Hope I've been of some help. One last piece of advice: there are lots of competing and complementary pressures exerting themselves on this policy. Don't draw any conclusions until you've looked at the full range of participants and issues."

Jimmy thanked her for all her help, then made copies of several documents and headed back to his office to begin organizing his thoughts and making notes. He selected copies of some e-mail messages and some interview notes from his "Warden file" and began to carefully read through them.

The first e-mail message that Jimmy read was from Jody Williams herself. Although Colonel Warden's message indicated that he had asked her about the ICBL's position on banning landmine use along the Arab-Israeli borders, her response did not answer that question directly. Instead, her reply explained that with the Cold War over, small countries could gain influence if they worked together to act on a policy. She went on to say that governments would come to see that they do not need landmines to secure their borders and that their civil populations would help to bring about this change. She also spoke of how the NGOs gained credibility with the public and with international organizations and states because they were initially the only ones with the data on the destruction APLs were causing. Ms. Williams added that NGOs were adept at using information to raise domestic awareness of the problem in countries all over the world. She ended by saying that her concept of "civil society" works to form new partnerships with governments, and that these open partnerships were not the old diplomacy of the nation-states.¹²

The next message contained notices from Canada's Foreign Ministry. One noted how Canada was being praised by the UN and other countries for leading the Ottawa Process, and for influencing the U.S. policy of 17 September 1997. Another showed Mr. Axworthy at the DMZ in Korea stating that the treaty might save forty thousand casualties worldwide per year and that South Korea should eventually renounce APLs.

“Interesting,” Jimmy thought as he turned his attention to a lengthy set of notes from an interview conducted with a Mrs. Anne Sears from the National Security Council.

Colonel Warden had begun the interview by asking Mrs. Sears if she could clarify the current U.S. policy on APLs. Her response read as follows:

“Without Senator Leahy there might not have been any action. The landmine moratorium he pushed through Congress in 1993 was due to expire in 1996. When he promised to renew it with even greater restrictions, the administration launched a formal review of its landmine policy. The outcome was published in February 1996 in the first National Security Strategy in which we laid out our commitment for APL control. The strategy clearly stated that long lasting ‘dumb’ APLs were the problem, *not* the U.S. ‘smart’ FASCAM mines. So our 1996 policy was to stop the use of ‘dumb’ APLs except in Korea and for training, to destroy U.S. stockpiles of these mines, to retain our ‘smart’ APLs until we can find alternative technologies, and to have DoD conduct demining programs. We would also seek to use the Conference on Disarmament process to control other nations’ use of dumb landmines. This was a positive statement of global leadership by the president. Our allies totally supported this policy.”¹³

When asked why the president announced new policy on 17 September 1997, Mrs. Sears had said, “The NGOs came together like never before on this issue and really carried the day. We believe that even the Canadian government was surprised at how fast and how far the Ottawa Process went. Mr. Axworthy personally believed in this cause when he announced the goal of a total landmine ban in October 1996 and took the unusual step of challenging the world community to come back to Ottawa in December of 1997 to sign the treaty. By 4 December 1997 there were 122 countries that had signed the actual treaty.¹⁴ With only forty countries needed to ratify the treaty, it went into effect on 1 March 1999, and by now most of the remaining countries have also ratified it.

“Our position was that we needed to keep our smart mines—especially our mixed-mine FASCAM systems—in order to protect our troops. Those countries attending the Ottawa Conference did not accept our position; they wanted to completely ban the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of all APLs. We bargained aggressively in the Ottawa Process but to no avail, so we did not sign the treaty. The treaty advocates just wanted everything to happen almost immediately. They didn’t fully realize that government policy takes time to develop, as do the alternative technologies needed to replace our smart APLs. Our deliberate efforts through the Conference on Disarmament may achieve success and thus we can have a greater impact on everyone. Several countries involved in the proliferation of dumb APLs didn’t attend Ottawa, but they do attend the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.”¹⁵

“The president knew he would have to publicly address his decision not to sign the *Ottawa Treaty* and was, therefore, pressured to pull the various aspects of U.S. landmine policy and practice together into a coherent and defensible alternative to the treaty. He received numerous inputs in coming to his decision, but the option that he chose was one that maintained U.S. leadership on this issue, protected our forces, and acknowledged values held by

the American public. The key new elements of his 17 September 1997 policy were the commitment to develop alternatives to APL use outside of Korea by 2003 and within Korea by 2006, and the appointment of General Jones, former CJCS and an APL ban supporter, as the president's landmine advisor. He also directed a significant increase in funding for demining operations, to include research and development, expanded training, and increased assistance for mine victims. And the last step was to renew our efforts to negotiate a global APL ban at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva."

After reading the interview and taking more notes, Jimmy took Patty's advice and visited several websites for nongovernmental organizations, international and national special interest groups, media coverage, and governmental agencies' reports. A quick scan showed him that there were a lot of confusing facts and opinion on this policy. He noted that several of the sites included phone numbers for points of contact, so he decided to try to arrange some interviews. Although unsuccessful in getting through to the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, he did manage to get appointments with the Human Rights Watch and the VVAF. He also tried to contact Will Davids, a reporter from the *Army Times* who had written an article on this issue that Jimmy had found in the file. Davids wasn't in, so Jimmy left a message and then headed to the State Department for his appointment at the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships.

On arrival at the State Department, Jimmy entered and found his way to the office of Ms. Laura Beccam. He was somewhat surprised to note that she was located in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. He made a mental note to ask about reorganization, then checked in with the secretary. She informed him that Ms. Beccam would be back in a few minutes and that he was welcome to wait in her office. As he did so, he picked up an unusual comic book and began leafing through the pages.

"Hi. I'm Laura Beccam, and you must be Commander Lemkis," a tall woman of about Jimmy's age stated as she entered the room. "Well, I see the Superman and Wonder Woman comic book caught your eye. We created the first one of these for use in Bosnia, and the first lady, Hillary Clinton, introduced it in 1996. The Spanish version you're looking at is for Central America and it was unveiled in 1998 at the UN by Kofi Annan and General Wilhelm. Our State Department coordinated with *DC Comics*, a division of Warner Brothers Entertainment, to create and publish them for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).¹⁶ The comic books are part of our efforts to educate the public about the dangers of landmines and to match government and private partnerships to bring support to our APL policy. The project has been a huge success."

"What a great idea," said Jimmy. "I really appreciate your meeting with me on such short notice, Ms. Beccam. As I said on the phone, I'm preparing a report on APL policy and would like to discuss the State Department's views."

“Well,” she began, “as you know, our APL policy is currently under review and we are prevented from talking about specifics of the review. However, I can give you some background information and fill you in on the role State played in shaping that policy, and I can discuss some of the things that we have done since.”¹⁷ Basically, the landmine problem began during the 1970s as the superpowers fought proxy wars in places such as Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Since the Cold War many of these locations and others, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya, have been embroiled in internal conflict and civil war. Cheap, effective, and easily obtained; APLs quickly became the weapons of choice in these conflicts, leading to their extensive and largely uncontrolled use. As a result, an estimated 70 to 110 million such mines were scattered in sixty-eight countries around the globe, causing death and serious injury to thousands of innocent civilians each year. Consider these statistics: in Cambodia one of every 236 civilians is a victim, and in Angola over 70,000 people are amputees—both are the highest proportions in the world. Our initial estimate was that 55,000 casualties were occurring yearly due to landmines. U.S. policy had to respond to these facts.¹⁸

“The State Department was the early leader among nations in advocating the control of landmines. In the late 1970’s we helped craft the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that were eventually signed by the United States in 1982. These Protocols codified customary humanitarian law about who is a combatant and the protection of non-combatants, and they outlawed the use of indiscriminate and excessive force in war.”

“I’m confused,” said Jimmy. “Isn’t that called international law?”

“Lots of professionals get this confused.” Ms. Beccam continued. “American and European views about landmines are tied by their history and culture to customary law, and the Protocols codified them into international law. In other countries customary law does not carry the same weight, and some of those same countries did not sign the Protocols.”¹⁹ Further compounding matters, international laws such as the Protocols often clash with the law of sovereignty when dealing with conflicts internal to a state. As a result, internal conflicts in places like Afghanistan and Nicaragua provided an open market for non-signatory countries to sell mines, and as I have already mentioned, the warring factions eagerly purchased and used them, usually in very irresponsible ways.

“During this timeframe the UN and several NGOs became very involved in efforts to limit the production, export and use of APLs and to minimize their impact on non-combatants. The State Department welcomed the NGO community involvement as well as the support of politicians and popular personalities. As I am sure you recall, arms control was a major priority in the 1980s due to Cold War tensions, and the State Department’s tool of choice for these negotiations was the international Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). At the 1980 CCW, the International Committee of the Red Cross pushed hard for a landmine ban. At this conference the delegates did negotiate Protocols to the Geneva Convention that included limitations on APLs, but the Protocols did not go far enough for many concerned parties. They did not call for an outright ban, did not cover internal wars, and lacked an important element of any arms control mechanism—strong verification and

enforcement standards. Worse for us, despite active U.S. involvement in developing the Protocols, our Senate did not ratify them until 1995! More recently, at the First Review Conference of the CCW in 1996, U.S. delegates helped amend the Protocols to address some of the landmine control, verification and enforcement issues. Not all of the parties to the CCW ratified the amended Protocols; even our own Senate did not do so until 1999.²⁰ Needless to say, these delays in U.S. ratification don't do much for our credibility when we try to influence other states during these types of negotiations.

"At the conclusion of the 1996 Review Conference, many delegations were frustrated with the lack of progress towards establishment of an outright ban on APLs. This is where Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy stepped in and announced his country's sponsorship of a conference in Ottawa dedicated to establishing a world-wide ban on APLs."

"I've already got a pretty good handle on the Ottawa Process," Jimmy stated. "But what can you tell me about the role of NGOs and Senator Leahy in shaping the current policy?"

"As I mentioned earlier, the International Red Cross was very involved in the process of establishing the landmine Protocols, and they were also supporters of the Ottawa Process. For its part, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines served a worthy cause in promoting the Ottawa Process, but I think the State Department's diplomatic efforts are more important. I don't want to minimize the NGOs' impact; after all, they were instrumental in getting over 140 countries to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*, and this has undoubtedly had a limiting effect on landmine use. However, the major producers of dumb APLs never joined the process, so although it may be popular and get good press, the treaty is less likely to have the same effects as efforts to negotiate APL reform at the CD and the CCW.

"Could you please explain the difference between the CD and the CCW?" Jimmy asked.

"Sure," replied Laura. "The actual name of the CCW is the *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects*. Easy to understand why most folks use the shorter name or just the CCW acronym. Basically this is an international forum in Geneva for negotiating the rules of war. The Protocols to the CCW currently represent the strictest international agreement on APLs to which the United States is a party. The Conference on Disarmament, on the other hand, is an international forum for negotiating arms control issues. Simply put, agreements reached at the CCW dictate what you can and cannot do when engaged in armed conflict, whereas agreements reached at the CD dictate the types and amounts of weapons participants can produce, manufacture, stockpile, and distribute. Got it?"

"Yeah, thanks," said Jimmy. "Now I get it."

"President Clinton's decision to pursue landmine reform at the CD seemed like a logical choice at the time because it was an established forum with previous success in negotiating international controls on chemical weapons. Further, while the world's top APL-producing nations never joined the ICBL or signed the *Ottawa Treaty*, they were all party to the CD. Unfortunately, despite our repeated and concerted attempts to add APL reform to the CD

agenda, these efforts have been blocked by states who were party to the *Ottawa Treaty* because they feel the issue properly belongs to that Process.”²¹

“Wow!” exclaimed Jimmy. “You’d think that anyone supporting a landmine ban would welcome the opportunity to address the issue at a forum that includes most of the major states who are *not* party to the *Ottawa Treaty*. Do you think they view the CD effort as redundant and unnecessary, or is this perhaps an attempt to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts out of anger or spite for not signing the treaty?”

“I’m not sure,” Laura replied. “All I know is that nothing is happening at the CD on landmine reform or anything else for that matter. However, on the good news side of things, our delegation just got back from another Review Conference for the CCW and we made good progress there. The conference resulted in an amendment to the Protocols extending their application to internal conflicts as well as international ones, and significant progress was made in negotiating controls over other unexploded ordinance such as cluster bomblets, collectively referred to as explosive remnants of war, or ERW. Our work at the CCW is one aspect of APL policy that never seems to get proper attention. We also continue to attend *Ottawa Treaty* meetings as observers to keep track of things. I think it is fair to say that U.S. leadership in humanitarian demining has deflected a lot of the criticism initially directed our way when we did not sign the *Ottawa Treaty*. In fact, some of our good NGO friends have even been overheard saying that Ottawa means nothing and that we should continue to focus on demining.”

“Even so, don’t NGOs, like the Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the ICBL, tend to overlook our contributions in demining and still beat us up on the Internet and in the press every chance they get for not signing the treaty?” asked Jimmy.

“You must remember, Jimmy, we at the State Department do state-to-state diplomacy, not popular campaigns. Those entities we deal with the most—other countries around the world and IGOs like the UN—recognize and appreciate the impact of our tremendous contributions in demining. Did you know that we have increased spending levels from \$7 million in 1997 to almost \$40 million in 2000 and 2001, for a total of almost \$142 million?²² Our worldwide demining and mine awareness education efforts are already bearing fruit, too. Remember, I said our initial estimate was that as many as 55,000 landmine casualties were occurring yearly? Later estimates suggested a much lower, but nonetheless significant, average of about 26,000 a year through the late 1990s. For the year 2000, however, the estimated number of casualties is less than 10,000 total for both landmines and ERW! This significant reduction is believed to be the combined result of fewer mines on the ground and better awareness among citizens of affected countries. Also, early estimates on the number of mines scattered around the globe ranged from 70 to 110 million; the estimates have since been reduced in part due to more accurate surveys, but also due to superhuman efforts being made to remove and destroy deployed mines. This data, as well as a lot of other useful landmine related information, is regularly made available to many audiences through our series of landmine publications called *Hidden Killers*.²³

“As for Senator Leahy’s influence, although the state that he represents—Vermont—is fairly small, it is also traditionally independent, and he has managed to be a pretty effective champion of landmine reform for years. I think it is safe to say that he is the recognized leader in Congress on this issue. President Clinton personally commended him for his dedication and moral leadership of the country on this issue, and in 1998 the VVAF even established an annual humanitarian service award named in his honor. In May of 1998 National Security Advisor Sandy Berger wrote a letter to Senator Leahy on behalf of President Clinton to let him know that if suitable alternatives are found, the United States will sign the *Ottawa Treaty* by 2006.²⁴ This commitment was well-received by the senator as well as by NGOs and many states party to the *Ottawa Treaty*, although some considered this ‘kicking the can’ since President Clinton obviously would not be in office to honor the commitment.

“You know, Senator Leahy really had more of an issue with DoD’s policy than with State’s, and most of his actions seemed to focus on changing DoD behavior. In pushing his *Landmine Moratorium Act* in 1993 he really caused a DoD policy crisis.²⁵ Interestingly, the Leahy amendment to the *Defense Authorization Act* in FY93 requiring demining operations actually helped the State Department by promoting the type of diplomacy we favor. We negotiate with countries to perform demining missions, and then you guys over at DoD, along with some NGOs and contractors, execute them. With the continued help of the Congress, DoD, and the NGOs, we here at the State Department can further the foreign policy objectives of America through our humanitarian demining programs.”

Jimmy sensed that his time with Ms. Beccam was growing short, so he quickly stated, “I know you are very busy and I don’t want to take up too much more of your time. I was wondering, though, if you could fill me in on any significant changes in landmine policy or related issues, to include any organizational changes, since the APL policy was announced?”

Laura smiled and said “No problem. There have been some organizational changes made under the new administration involving the offices charged with landmine policy, but I think the moves simply reflect a ‘better business practices’ approach to the organization rather than a shift away from commitment to the Clinton initiatives. The Office of Global Humanitarian Demining, established as part of the *Demining 2010* initiative, has been renamed the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships, and as you can see, we are now located within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Given the political and military components of the demining mission, I think this is a pretty good fit. My boss, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., was just given the additional responsibility of serving as the special representative of the president and the secretary of state for mine action on 30 November 2001.²⁶ In case you think that giving this job to an assistant secretary with other duties is somehow a downgrade of the position, I should point out that the first person to hold the special representative position, Karl Inderfurth, continued to perform his primary duties as assistant secretary for South Asia.

“As far as implementation issues, the only one impacting us at State seems to be the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. While we have not publicly stated so, our efforts

there have simply not panned out. Several other issues have been dominating the agenda, to include: nuclear arms control, the *ABM Treaty*, and ‘weaponization’ of space, so I do not expect much to happen at the CD with respect to landmine controls. Given the progress we made at the last Review Conference of the CCW, we will likely focus our efforts there, although I doubt that this will lead to a stated policy change.

“Other elements of the policy seem to be facing some serious challenges from your side of the house. The early word on DoD’s position going into the policy review is that someone there is pushing for abandonment of the Clinton policy commitments to eliminate the use of both dumb and smart APLs by the 2003 and 2006 deadlines. Further, I’m told that the Army has already cut back on some of its funding for alternative technology research and development, and that the Pentagon is looking at further cuts. Needless to say such changes would nearly eliminate half of the 1997 APL policy and any chances of signing the *Ottawa Treaty* by 2006, effectively breaking the commitment that President Clinton made in his letter to Senator Leahy. I’ve seen a number of NGO ‘Action Alerts’ on the Internet calling on U.S. policy makers and private citizens alike to weigh in and convince President Bush to adhere to the current policy. These actions have produced some support among retired senior military officers and in Congress. On 19 May 2001 six retired Army lieutenant generals, including two who commanded at the division-level or higher in Korea, joined ranks with a retired vice admiral and a retired rear admiral in sending a letter to President Bush urging him to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*.²⁷ Similarly, a largely partisan group of 124 members of Congress sent the president a letter expressing concerns over DoD’s proposed changes to the policy and encouraging the president to honor the current policy and work towards elimination of APLs.²⁸ Although only two of the letter’s signatories were Republicans, the current balance of power in Congress does not allow the president to take matters such as this too lightly. Remember, the Republican majority in the House is small, Democrats are in the majority in the Senate, and 2002 is an election year.”

Jimmy thanked her, left, and found a space in the lobby to type his notes. He called to confirm his NGO appointments and found out that the Human Rights Watch representatives would meet him over at the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. It was a short cab ride over to their headquarters, where he was shown in.

Jimmy couldn’t help being impressed as introductions were made and he discovered that he had the senior leadership of both groups in the room. While it was very convenient for him, he wondered why they would choose to meet with him this way. He came right to the point; “I would like your views on the current U.S. landmine policy.”

The room erupted with remarks from several of the veterans, including: “We don’t have policy! The State Department cooked the books when its second edition of *Hidden Killers* cut the size of the landmine problem in half to show progress! DoD has been outright stonewalling and now their trying to get Bush to blow off Clinton’s commitments to eliminate APLs! Relying on the CD process just kicks the problem down the road. We should have signed the *Ottawa Treaty*.”²⁹

After these initial outbursts, Bob Mueller, chairman of the VVAF, took the lead. “In the 1980s several of us were in Cambodia building prosthetics for landmine victims when the idea just suddenly came to me—what the world needed was a total landmine ban. Six NGOs came together and shaped the idea of the international campaign. Once formed, the ICBL grew to over one thousand NGOs and we knew we had a new mechanism for affecting policy. It was a cooperative security approach, influencing countries to declare a total ban on landmines. Canada certainly helped us, but our disappointment is with the United States.”³⁰

A VVAF member broke in. “Bob is being too modest. He struck paydirt when he was able to get key retired generals to sign a letter endorsing the ban. Generals Schwarzkopf and Galvin signed up. Even General Powell agreed with us, but wouldn’t sign. We heard General Shalikashvili actually had to call and ask generals to stop supporting our ideas, as they were counter to the administration’s.”³¹

“Interesting,” thought Jimmy. “I wonder if this is an indication of how Secretary Powell will vote on the current policy review, now that he’s at State instead of DoD.”

Bob broke in, “Let me go on. We were close to getting all of the Joint Chiefs to agree on the ban until General Luck over in Korea said he had to have landmines and the tide turned. From what we could tell landmines were not even highlighted in most of the current war plans. We heard when Walt Slocumbe, then under secretary of defense for policy, found that out he hastily had them put that into the war plans so that his technology funding wouldn’t be hurt.

One of the HRW representatives broke in, “I would like to commend Senator Leahy. The Clinton administration tried to like to say that its interagency working groups worked this policy, but I think that without Senator Leahy there would be no U.S. policy. We feel he talked President Clinton into the policy and his office actually wrote the landmine speech the president gave to the UN in 1994.”³²

“What about the Nobel Peace Prize; how did winning it affect your efforts?” asked Jimmy.

This produced a chill in the room. Bob Mueller addressed the question. “You know the Nobel Prize probably hurt us as much as it helped us. We received tremendous recognition and thus it helped to power the ICBL’s support of the treaty. We are proud of the fact that with some help from the Ottawa Process, we had a significant impact on the international arms industry, reducing production and use of APLs in several countries, and in some cases eliminating it altogether.”

“Yeah, and now the generals over in the Pentagon are worried about us using our success to go after another class of their weapons, like blinding lasers and sub-munitions.”

“Don’t confuse the Commander. Let’s stick to his subject,” said one member who continued with, “Here’s what you need to know about Jody Williams. We here at the VVAF hired her to be the coordinator for the ICBL. She did a good job, but she is no longer affiliated with us. In fact we were not only paying her, but we were housing and heavily financing the ICBL, which was not even a legal entity at the time. Determining who would speak for the

ICBL was too difficult for some; that is why after the Nobel Prize was awarded Jody Williams left. We are no longer housing the ICBL; it has moved to Paris and, with its Peace Prize funding, has established itself as an international legal organization to allow it to continue its work. For others in the campaign the movement just lost its glamour and they went on to new issues.”

Bob Mueller spoke up once again, stating “There really is no reason for the United States not to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*. President Clinton directed DoD in May 1998 to find alternatives for their mixed mine systems as well as all their APLs. He also decided at that time to commit the United States to signing the treaty by 2006 if alternatives can be developed. The truth is, suitable alternatives already exist. Our military advisor, retired Army Lieutenant General Robert Gard, Jr., wrote an excellent monograph that discusses seven viable alternatives to mixed anti-tank and anti-personnel mine systems that the DoD already has access to.³³ We know that the Clinton policy is under review by the Bush administration and that some in DoD want out of the commitments to replace APLs. We have already initiated a lobbying campaign to pressure President Bush, Congress, the State Department and especially DoD to not only honor President Clinton’s commitments, but also to sign and ratify the *Ottawa Treaty* as soon as possible. Maybe you can put in a good word as well.”

Jimmy checked his watch and realized he needed to get moving if he hoped to catch the *Army Times* reporter before the end of the day. He thanked everyone for their candid discussion and excused himself, saying, “I really appreciate the information you have given me. I promise to include your concerns in my report.”

He next placed a call to Will Davids of the *Army Times*. “Mr. Davids, this is Commander Jimmy Lemkis from the Defense Department. I’m working on a landmine policy report for the secretary and would like to include some media insights. I read a couple of interesting articles you wrote a few years ago about landmines and was hoping you might be willing to share your thoughts about the U.S. landmine policy. Can you take a few minutes to talk to me about this over the phone?”

“Sure, Commander. Just make sure I get your phone number before we are done so I can let you return the favor sometime. What would you like to know?”

“I’d like to pick your brain about this whole landmine issue, especially anything you can tell me about goings-on within DoD during the decision-making process for the current policy. And please, call me Jimmy.”

“Okay, Jimmy. First of all, everyone has been defining this issue in their own terms in order to promote their own policies and programs. There has been a real dogfight going on about this for years within DoD. The Army and Air Force both have a stake in this with their FASCAM systems. The policy issue was beginning to heat up just as General Shelton first came on board as CJCS, so the vice-chairman, Air Force General Ralston, was a big player while Shelton got his feet on the ground. Ralston was personally for the ban. I’ve spoken with a lot of Pentagon insiders about this, and some say Ralston’s support was politically motivated because a lot of this was happening as he was being nominated to be the next

chairman. Others accused him of not playing joint and of supporting the ban on APLs in order to gain more technology funding for the Air Force to pursue alternative technologies. And finally, some implied it was just the traditional Army-Air Force rivalry. This really plays itself out in the high stakes game of South Korea's defense. The Air Force strategy for the "Halt Phase" has them doing the major destruction of any North Korean attack, while Army force-planners see their ground forces at the DMZ doing the bulk of the killing.³⁴ In any case, it was clear that money and influence were potentially up for grabs on this one at the time the policy was established, and I suspect that this is still true to some extent."

"Okay," said Jimmy. "What about the media?"

"Well, naturally the Ottawa Process got a pretty good amount of press, but much of it was outside the United States. Naturally, when the ICBL won the Nobel Peace Prize they got tons of coverage, about the most attention they got at any one time. Some of the best media coverage involved Princess Diana. She was a champion of the ban with worldwide popularity and constant access to the media. Who can forget her widely televised and very brave act of walking along the minefields in Africa and talking with child victims of landmines? Her death on 31 August 1997 sparked an emotional upsurge in the demand for a solution in the Ottawa community. She is now generally viewed as a martyr for the cause. Queen Noor of Jordan, a human rights celebrity in her own right, took over Princess Di's role, and with the subsequent death of her husband, King Hussein, she has also become something of a 'martyr.'³⁵

"Have you seen very much current coverage?"

"Not a lot," Davids replied. "Periodically I see or read about another horrific landmine tragedy, usually involving children. But frankly, there really isn't a lot of public interest in the issue right now. Even when one of our Marines lost his foot to a landmine in Afghanistan, an event that got wide coverage on television and in newspapers across the country, the focus was more on the inherent dangers associated with the war on terrorism than on the fact that his injuries were caused by the type of APLs that the Ottawa Process seeks to ban.

"I do recall a pretty good *Los Angeles Times* article that discussed the administration's policy review and reservations about the APL phase-out plan. I thought they did a pretty fair job of remaining objective and giving adequate coverage to both sides of the issue. The article included an interesting quote by Colin Powell taken from a CNN interview broadcast earlier in the week; I jotted it down for future reference. Speaking about U.S. objections to some international treaties, Secretary Powell stated, 'Just because they are multilateral doesn't mean they are good.'³⁶

"More recently," Davids continued, "the *New York Times* printed an interesting piece on India's establishment of minefields along the border with Pakistan. The article highlighted the plight of the many civilians displaced from their farms and homes, and it described a number of mine-related accidents involving civilians, soldiers, cattle and dogs.³⁷ While not directly related to U.S. policy, it serves to remind the world of the many problems associated with APLs. It is also worth noting that India, like the United States, is one of only fifty-one

countries that have not yet signed the *Ottawa Treaty*. Others include China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria. Did you ever think you would find the United States on the same side of an issue as those countries?”

With that as a closing comment, Jimmy thanked the reporter for his input and headed back to his office to begin compiling his report for the secretary. It looked as though he was in for a long night. “Thank goodness I hand-carried my PMI notes with me,” he mumbled in the backseat of his cab. “I’m definitely gonna need them tonight!”

LANDMINE POLICY CHRONOLOGY

1982	United States signs Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) which limits landmine use through broad language and a weak enforcement mechanism. It does not call for a total ban.	Sep 1997	President Clinton announces United States will <i>not</i> sign <i>Ottawa Treaty</i> and outlines a new U.S. APL policy.
1991/2	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and five NGOs form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Ms. Jody Williams hired as coordinator.		States that were party to the <i>Ottawa Treaty</i> block the U.S.' efforts to add landmines to the agenda at the Conference on Disarmament.
1992	Leahy amendment for one-year moratorium on APL exports signed into law by President Bush.	Dec 1997	<i>Ottawa Treaty</i> signed by 122 countries.
1993	Leahy moratorium amendment extended for three years; passes Senate 100-0	May 1998	President Clinton states that the United States will sign the <i>Ottawa Treaty</i> by 2006 if alternative technologies can be found.
April 1994	State Department's first edition report on landmines, <i>Hidden Killers</i> , sparks worldwide interest.	Mar 1999	The <i>Ottawa Treaty</i> enters into force.
Sept 1994	UN General Assembly adopts President Clinton's resolution to strive for complete APL elimination.	Sep 1999	Conference on Disarmament ends with no progress on landmines or other issues.
1995	Formal negotiations begin to amend the 1980 CCW governing use of APLs.	May 2001	Eight retired U.S. general/flag officers write letter to President Bush urging him to join the <i>Ottawa Treaty</i> .
Jan 1996	United States and fifty-one states sign Protocols amending CCW to strengthen rules governing APL use, but Protocol does not call for an outright APL ban.	Aug 2001	Bush administration signals reservations about U.S. APL policy and initiates a review.
Oct 1996	Canada's Foreign Minister, Mr. Axworthy initiates the Ottawa Process.	Nov 2001	Army cancels funding of program to develop alternatives for 'dumb' APLs; Pentagon proposes cancellation of program to develop alternatives for FASCAM mixed-mine systems.
Dec 1996	UN votes 156-0 for United States initiative to negotiate a ban all APLs "as soon as possible."	Dec 2001	124 members of Congress write letter to the President Bush urging him to support APL ban.

Notes

1. Colonels Jack Warden and Pattie Long are fictitious characters from a 1999 case study titled "The Landmines," written by COL Edward W. Sullivan of the Naval War College Faculty and published in *Case Studies in Policy Making & Implementation*, 5th Edition, Naval War College Press. E-mail messages and interview transcripts from Colonel Warden's working file, as well as dialogue with other characters in this case study, unless otherwise noted and cited, represent paraphrased material from interviews Colonel Sullivan conducted in July 1998.
2. President Clinton, 17 September 1997, transcript of remarks given upon announcing landmine policy, White House, Washington D. C., Office of the Press Secretary, daily press releases, 17 September 1997. Several Presidential Decision Directives cover the actual policy; the most critical one for DOD and arms control is PDD 64.
3. U.S. State Department, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program," issued 20 May 1998, available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0798/ijpe/pj38lmfx.htm>> [accessed 3 January 2002].
4. Mark Hizney, *Background Paper On APL Control Measure*, (Alexandria Virginia: Defense Special Weapons Agency, report prepared under contract DSWA001-96-G-0061), May 1998, page 1.
5. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Temptative statutes to register ICBL in France," available from <<http://www.icbl.com.html>> [accessed: 27 May 1998].
6. Ms. Jodie Williams, speech presented at St George's School, Middletown Rhode Island, 23 October 1998, author's notes.
7. Stuart Maslen and Peter Herby, "An International Ban on Anti-personnel Mines; History and Negotiation of the 'Ottawa Treaty,'" *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 325, 31 December 1998, pp. 693-713.
8. Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, "Lloyd Axworthy Receives Senator Patrick J. Leahy Humanitarian Award," 1 December 2000, available at <http://vvaf.org/media/pr_120100.shtml> [accessed 10 January 2002].
9. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the internal DOD perspectives represents paraphrased material based on interviews with officers in the Pentagon while conducting research for this case study during July 1998.
10. Human Rights Watch Press Release, "U.S.: Pentagon Mine Policy Rollback," 21 November 2001, available at <<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/usmines1121.htm>> [accessed 2 January 2002].
11. Human Rights Watch Press Release, "U.S.: Pentagon Mine Policy Rollback," (Washington D.C., 21 November 2001), available on <<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/usmines1121.htm>> [accessed 2 January 2002].
12. Ms. Jodie Williams, speech presented at St George's School, Middletown Rhode Island, 23 October 1998, author's notes.
13. U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, (U.S.IA, Washington D.C., July 1998; issued by DoS 20 May 1998), available at <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0798/ijpe/pj38lmfx.htm>> [accessed 3 January 2002].
14. Anthony Depalma, "As U. S. Looks on, 122 Nations Agree to Landmine Ban," *New York Times*, 4 December 1997, page 1-2.
15. Canadian Press, "Russia Sees Continuing Need For Land-Mines," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 May 1998, as published in the *Early Bird*, 2 June 1999, page 8. Interestingly enough even with the animosity between the ICBL and the U.S. government, Ms. Williams and a representative of the Canadian government went to Russia to attempt to have that government renounce the use of landmines and join the international community legal venues for their control.
16. D. C. Comic Books, "Superman and Wonder Woman The Hidden Killers," New York, 1998. This comic book has been translated into languages for use in Central American and Bosnia. Copies of the English and Spanish versions are in the author's possession.

17. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, the dialogue with Ms. Beccam represents paraphrasing of material obtained in interviews and correspondence with State Department personnel by the author in January 2002 and by Colonel Sullivan in July 1998 during research for the original version of this case study.
18. U. S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, (Washington D. C., September 1998), available at <<http://www.state.gov/global/arms/rpt-9809>> [accessed 26 October 1998].
19. Kofi Annan, "At Last, A Court To Deter Despots And Defend Victims," *International Herald Tribune*, 28 July 1998, as published in the *Early Bird*, 28 July 1998, page 11. Mr. Annan makes the point through relating a quote from the famous Roman lawyer and scholar, Cicero, who declared that "in the midst of war, law stands mute." Another Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali makes much of the same argument in his September 1994 article in *Foreign Affairs*. An effective treatment of many of the legal aspects is covered in chapter 6 of the book *The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel Weapons*, ISBN 1 85649 357.
20. Ambassador Michael J. Matheson, *International Law and Antipersonnel Land Mines*, available at <<http://137.52>> [accessed 24 March 1999]. On 24 May 1999 the Senate finally ratified the Amended Protocols, President Clinton took this opportunity to again recognize Senator Leahy and others. White House, Washington D. C., Office of the Press Secretary. An executive summary and the text of the CCW can be found at <<http://acq.osd.mil/treaties>>.
21. Conference on Disarmament, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 59, July-August 2001, available at <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd59/59cd.htm>> [accessed 3 January 2002].
22. U.S. Department of State, "Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) Funds for Humanitarian Demining Programs," Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, 2 January 2002, available at <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/index.cfm?docid=7010>> [accessed 10 January 2002].
23. U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers 2001—The World's Landmine Problem*, (Washington D.C., undated), available at <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/2001/index.cfm?docid=6961>> [accessed 10 January 2002].
24. U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, "Facts: Anti-Landmine Chronology," available on Senator Leahy's web site at <<http://leahy.senate.gov/text/issues/landmines/facts.html>> [accessed 3 January 2002].
25. Mr. Tim Reiser, Congressional staffer for Senator Leahy, interviewed by Colonel Ed Sullivan, Middletown, Rhode Island, July 1998, author's notes. Mr. Reiser offers that Senator Leahy was a critical influence in shaping Mr. Clinton's perspective on landmines, and that he also has had a continuing impact on DOD, where he feels they have been slow to respond to the landmine crisis. Similarly he also feels Senator Leahy impacted Mr. Berger's policy direction on the issue. Evidence of this is the exchange of letters between the two which shows the Senator's influence in having President Clinton publicly state that the United States is in favor now of signing the *Ottawa Treaty*.
26. U.S. Department of State Press Release, "New U.S. Landmines Official Appointed," (M2 Communications, 10 December 2001), available at <<http://www.banminesusa.org/news/977.htm>> [accessed 3 January 2002].
27. Ban Mines U.S.A., "Action Alert! Make the Military Argument!" available at <http://www.banminesusa.org/urg_act/990_generalsltr.html> [accessed 2 January 2002].
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29. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the NGOs represents paraphrased material based on interviews

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Haiti

RICHARD J. NORTON

In 1991 the impoverished Caribbean nation of Haiti held free elections for the first time in decades. Many Haitians had not voted more than once in their lifetimes. This time they swept a fiery orator, Jean Bertrand Aristide into office. Aristide, a Catholic priest was a champion of the poor and leader of the populist *Lavalas* movement.¹ In a country where the elites, who numbered less than one percent of the population, controlled more than forty-four percent of the national wealth, support of the powerful for Aristide's brand of government was less than enthusiastic.² Nor was it certain that the newly elected president would even complete his term of office. In its two hundred years of independence, Haiti has had 41 heads of state. Of these 29 were either assassinated or forcibly removed from office; nine declared themselves heads of state for life, and seven served for more than ten years.³ In the nineteenth century, only one Haitian leader left the presidential office alive.⁴ In the two centuries of its existence, Haiti has experienced twenty-one constitutions.

On 30 September 1991, a military junta, led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, deposed the president in a quick, successful coup. Cedras, the coup's titular leader, was a military aristocrat, had initially risen to power during the Duvalier regime.⁵

The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) refused to formally recognize the Cedras regime. That the OAS did so was not surprising. Democracy had swept South America during the latter half of the 1980s. By 1991, only Haiti and Cuba had non-democratic governments. Furthermore, on 5 June 1991 the OAS passed *Resolution 1080*, which called for an emergency meeting any time there was an overthrow of a democratic state in the region.⁶ On 4 October, an OAS delegation met with Cedras in an effort to convince him to relinquish power. The attempt failed and by November the OAS had embargoed all shipments of weapons and oil to Haiti.

President Bush embarked on essentially a two track policy toward Haiti. One track was designed to make General Cedras and his cronies step down. The other track was to manage the tide of boat people that were coming to the United States. To accomplish the first track's objectives the United States initiated diplomatic overtures and supported similar moves by the Organization for American States (OAS). An embargo on certain essential materials bound for Haiti was initiated. It was hoped that such actions would be enough to convince the Cedras junta to leave.

In handling the other track, the administration was aided by the Alien Migration Interdiction Operation (AMIO). AMIO was a treaty, signed during the Reagan years, between Haiti and the United States. It gave the United States the right to return Haitian refugees to Haiti without recourse to a legal screening process. However, this generated considerable domestic unrest and several court challenges. On three separate occasions the Bush administration was forced by court injunctions to suspend direct repatriation of Haitian refugees until they could win the domestic legal challenges to the policy. As an interim measure, Haitian refugees began to be quartered at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba.

An additional problem for the Bush policy on Haiti was presidential candidate Bill Clinton. After emerging as the democratic candidate the former governor of Arkansas attacked the president on a wide variety of topics, including repatriation. Not only did candidate Clinton condemn the president's policy, but he also took pride in being "...the first person running for president... to speak out against the Bush administration's handling of the Haitian situation."⁷

Candidate Clinton's domestically oriented campaign produced highly successful results. In November 1992 he reiterated his opposition to the forcible repatriation policy and promised to overturn it when he was president.⁸ This promise was not lost on the Haitian population.⁹ Throughout October and November boat building boomed along the Haitian coast. Some of the wood used in the construction came from houses that people had torn down in their eagerness to escape. Nervous Coast Guard officials began predicting refugee flows as large as two-hundred thousand people.¹⁰

By mid-January 1993 President-elect Clinton, faced with overwhelming evidence of impending massive Haitian refugee flows was faced with a dilemma. If he kept his words, waves of boat people would put to sea. He then announced that he would temporarily continue the Bush policy of forcible repatriation. At the same time he reiterated his support of UN diplomatic efforts to find a way to restore democracy to Haiti.¹¹ The response did not go over well with the Haitian or the human rights communities.

Clinton's words also failed to resonate with the detainees at Guantanamo. Although the detainees had praised the U.S. military officers in charge of the camp, there was a riot on 14 March. The reason for the outburst was said to be irritation with the pace "with which U.S. officials are deciding their fate."¹² The riots also brought a visit from the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who compared the living conditions at the camp to those of a prison.¹³

On 15 March there was a rally in Manhattan protesting the Government's Haiti policy. Forty-one people were arrested. Among the marchers was actress Susan Sarandon. Among the arrested was the Reverend Jesse Jackson. Reverend Jackson's arrest was photographed and was printed in *The New York Times* for two consecutive days.¹⁴ Sarandon later made a controversial plea for the Haitian detainees during the nationally televised Academy Awards.

Haiti was far from being the only item on the president's agenda. It was even far from being the most important item on the agenda. Deprived of even the traditional "honeymoon

period,” the Clinton administration found itself embroiled with Congress from the outset. In part this was because the president had chosen much of his staff at the last minute and according to one noted Washington columnist had seemed to prefer inexperience.¹⁵

The president allowed foreign affairs and national security issues to be looked after by key cabinet members and advisors. When it came to Haiti, National Security Advisor (NSA) Tony Lake, Assistant National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Lawrence Pezzullo, a foreign service officer who had been named special envoy to Haiti were among the most important of the inner circle.¹⁶ These men formed the core of the “Haiti hawks.” Lake and Berger controlled and dominated the National Security Council staff and managed the NSC schedule and agenda. As a result, even if the president’s attention were elsewhere, there would always be a spot on the NSC calendar for Haiti.¹⁷

The most encouraging aspect of the spring of 1993 in regards to Haiti came from traditional diplomatic efforts. Things seemed to be on the verge of a breakthrough. A series of visits to Port-au-Prince had been made by UN envoy Dante Capote, and Lawrence Pezzullo, special envoy and special advisor to the president on Haiti. Pezzullo had carried the message that the United States was “determined to restore democracy quickly.”¹⁸ This determination was echoed by U.S. Air Force General Raymond O’Mara, who was addressing a regional Caribbean security meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad later that week. The general warned Caribbean military leaders to prepare themselves for action in Haiti if the situation worsened.¹⁹

Details of the plan began to emerge both in the hallways of power and in the press. Cedras would step down. Within six months Aristide would return. A new prime minister, acceptable to both sides would have to be found. A UN mission of as many as five hundred persons would oversee the reconstruction of the Haitian judiciary and the creation of an independent police force. The mission would work with the 140 UN human rights observers already in Haiti.²⁰

There seemed to be three key components to the rapid progress of the talks. One was that the United States seemed to be taking a dedicated interest in the problem. Another was that President Aristide seemed to be softening his long held position that General Cedras had to be exiled or punished. This was important as the junta considered it non-negotiable. The third was that the United States and the UN were holding out the prospect of a massive infusion of aid to Haiti. President Clinton pledged a billion dollars as a start.²¹

Despite the optimism, there were also counter-indications, suggesting that agreement might not be as close as some would wish. Representatives of the Haitian business sector had told Pezzullo it would take U.S. military forces to reinstate Aristide. Cedras and his cronies had a monopoly on weapons and on violence. No one, including a restored Aristide could “make” them behave. As prospects for peace grew stronger, so did the unease of the Haitian elite. They saw the return of Aristide as a return to class struggle, the possibility of being held accountable for the violence of the Cedras regime and, worst of all, and erosion of their wealth position and power.²²

Other warning signs that all was not well with the negotiations included Cedras' insistence that the coup participants be given amnesty or pardon. In addition these guarantees had to extend to businessmen and politicians who had supported Cedras. While the Cedras camp focused on these issues, Aristide's support base began showing signs of friction. Long-time allies and supporters began "bickering" over what the new government of Haiti should look like.²³

Domestically, right wing Democrats were demanding action and resolution. Chief among these was Senator Bob Graham (D-FL). Concerned about an increase in the size of the Haitian refugee flow as would be boat people tried to beat the approaching hurricane season, Graham called for a 31 May deadline.²⁴

As the negotiations continued, "After Action Reports," of U.S. interventions in Grenada, Panama and Somalia were being widely circulated in the Pentagon. Secretary Aspin worried that failure to get the Defense Department actively involved in the Haitian interagency planning process could have a significant negative impact on his department.²⁵ He accordingly directed the Department of Defense to commence interagency planning. The secretary had correctly diagnosed reluctance on the part of the Defense Department and the military to participate in any operations having to do with Haiti. The opposition consisted of two major elements. The first was a reluctance to get into another "nation-building exercise." The Army had gone through that in Panama and Grenada and was involved in just such an operation in Somalia. The second reason for the resistance was that based on an analysis of Haiti's conditions, senior defense leaders firmly believed that the U.S. military could not solve Haiti's problems.²⁶ Frequently reference was made to the thirty-five year long occupation of Haiti by U.S. military forces.

Nevertheless, in support of the United Nations sponsored negotiations with Haiti, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directed to plan a "nation assistance" operation to help restore democracy to Haiti.²⁷

The negotiations that had led to such high hopes collapsed when General Cedras and the junta broke off talks.²⁸ This began a three-month period of varying diplomatic initiatives.

The Cedras regime's refusal to find a solution drew fire from both the UN and the United States. The secretary-general placed the blame squarely on the junta.²⁹ Inside the United States the Aristide caused was helped and promoted by a talented lobbying team. The team was led by Michael Barnes, a former congressman with a savvy understanding of Washington, DC. Barnes had also been a key Clinton fundraiser as well as a former partner in Sandy Berger's old law firm. The White House denied that Barnes had any special connectivity.³⁰ Mr. Randall Robinson of the lobby group "TransAfrica" helped Barnes in this effort. Robinson had been a member of the same public relations firm as Barnes and was also well acquainted with Tony Lake.³¹

After torturous negotiations it was agreed that talks between Aristide and Cedras would be conducted under UN auspices on Governors Island, just off Manhattan on 27 June.

Although the talks lasted several days, Aristide and Cedras did not actually meet. Dante Caputo served as intermediary between the two groups. The two sides reached agreement on 3 July. The terms of the agreement were relatively simple. There would be a meeting of all Haitian political parties. A prime minister would be nominated by Aristide and confirmed. At this point the UN, OAS and United States would suspend, but not end the embargo and start a program to modernize the armed forces and create a new police force. Aristide would then issue an amnesty for all the officers who acted against him in the coup and Cedras would resign and take early retirement. Aristide would return.³²

Unbeknownst to the participants, the U.S. operatives had most carefully monitored both delegations. And what the United States knew was that neither side had any intention of honoring the agreement.³³

Still, just because the signatories were contemplating cheating did not mean that they could not be maneuvered into compliance. Or that as the months moved along that the contending parties might not come to see real value in following the course of action laid out in the agreement. At least these assumptions are what the administration began to base its policies on.

Although it was known that the Cedras regime was planning to break from the agreement, Pezzullo and others believed that once the trainers were in place, Haitian resistance would be futile. Construction personnel would also be sent in to assist the Haitians in starting civic action projects. Further, President Clinton, proposed a five-year, \$1-billion international development program for Haiti.³⁴

On 18 August, after weeks of debate and strife among Aristide supporters and opponents, the Haitian senate, with Aristide's approval, officially named Robert Malval as prime minister. Malval declared that he would only serve as an interim leader and would be replaced no later than 15 December 1993. Interim prime minister or not, Malval's acceptance as prime minister indicated to most that the agreement was on track.

One of Malval's first official acts was to appeal for an early end to the international economic embargo of Haiti. The confirmation of Malval as prime minister and the appeal to lift the embargo were enough to convince the OAS and the UN to recommend lifting the sanctions. Madeline Albright, U.S. ambassador to the UN agreed with the idea. Haiti was starting to be touted as a rare example of sanctions being powerful enough by themselves to be successful. Some analysts attributed this to Haiti's unusual degree of vulnerability.³⁵

Although Malval was now in place, political violence continued to escalate in Haiti. Beatings, kidnappings and shootings were common. Political opponents frequently assaulted pro-Aristide demonstrators as Haitian military personnel watched, making no move to intervene. Most of the assailants were known to be "attaches," civilian auxiliaries of the Haitian police force.³⁶

On 16 September, Coretta Scott King wrote a hard-hitting editorial. The widow of the country's most famous civil rights leader claimed that the UN sanctions had been lifted

prematurely. She recommended delaying any further payments or shipments to the island until the return of Aristide as the Governors Island agreement required.³⁷

On 27 September the UN Security Council voted to send more than 1200 police and military personnel to Haiti. 567 would be UN police monitors and the rest would be U.S. and UN military trainers. Most of the U.S. troops would be Navy construction battalion personnel, known as "Seabees." Most of the police monitors were expected to be in Haiti by 30 October.³⁸

As September wore on the United Nations threatened to reinstall sanctions. On the last day of September 1993 the USS *Harlan County* (LST 1195) set sail from Charleston, South Carolina having embarked the initial group of U.S. monitors. The ship stopped in Puerto Rico en route to Haiti.

Secretary of Defense Aspin had argued against landing the monitors, fearing that once a presence in Haiti was established, it would be difficult to terminate. Should the animosity between the Cedras and Aristide camps turn violent, U.S. forces could be "caught in a civil war."³⁹

Tony Lake, Sandy Berger and Warren Christopher felt that the United States needed to get the monitors into Haiti. They made the case that reversing U.S. policy was "not an option." The interventionists carried the argument, without it ever reaching the level of the president

There was also opposition from Capitol Hill. In a display of bipartisan concern Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) warned against sending U.S. forces into the country.⁴⁰

Then, half a world away, events unfolded that would directly impact the administration's handling of Haiti. On 3 October, in Mogadishu, Somalia, a force of U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force soldiers attempting to capture warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid found themselves in an intense firefight. The eventual casualty report would list eighteen soldiers killed, seventy-four wounded and one captured. The Cable News Network (CNN) was on the scene and every television station in the United States showed the CNN video of a dead Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Public and congressional reaction was immediate and negative.

Mogadishu would have a profound impact on the Clinton national security team and on every decision potentially involving military intervention made after 3 October 1993, and most strongly on what to do with the *Harlan County*. As George Stephanopoulos said, "So soon after Somalia, no one had the stomach for another fight."⁴¹

Tony Lake admitted that the fight in Somalia had an impact, but denied that it had made him, or other members of the administration "less interventionist. Rather it had the effect of imposing a more critical cost-benefit analysis into the decision making process."⁴²

The Haitian government had agreed to allow *Harlan County* to berth at a pier in Port-au-Prince. As *Harlan County* approached it quickly became apparent that the pier was blocked by another vessel. Furthermore a large and angry crowd stood upon the pier, waving clubs and pistols. Mob spokesman claimed that they would turn Port-au Prince into another Mogadishu.⁴³ The *Harlan County* stopped in the Port-au-Prince Harbor, reported the situation and waited for guidance

In the White House a battle quickly developed between advisors in favor of forcing a landing and those that recommended the ship withdraw. On the one side were Ambassador Albright and NSA Lake. Albright claimed that U.S. prestige was at stake and would be harmed if *Harlan County* withdrew.⁴⁴ On the other side, Secretary Aspin argued that the troops embarked in *Harlan County* were not equipped for serious combat operations.⁴⁵

Deliberations over what to do consumed the next day. The specter of the dead Rangers in Mogadishu hung over the deliberations.⁴⁶ Lake, Albright and Berger argued for intervention. Aspin was still opposed. Chief of Communications David Gergen recommended that it was time to “cut our losses.”⁴⁷ In the end, Secretary Aspin’s position prevailed. There would be no forcible landings. *Harlan County* withdrew. Larry Pezzullo was outraged. He had pushed hardest of all for a display of will, insisting that what the cameras were capturing was “theater, not threat.” In the end Secretary Aspin prevailed.

The *Harlan County* incident, as it came to be known in some circles, marked a major development in the U.S. involvement with Haiti. For several days there was an intense debate about what to do next. Lake, Berger and Albright favored a rapid return to Haiti, followed by a forced entry if necessary. The president began asking close advisors whether the United States should “go in and take them?”⁴⁸ The answer, in part, was that the military continued to oppose invasion and there was no public support for such an action.⁴⁹

In the wake of the *Harlan County* debacle, several new and disturbing facts and allegations came to the attention of the White House, the Congress and the American people. For example it was discovered that the mob which had demonstrated on the pier in Port-au-Prince was not a spontaneous expression of public determination. It had been organized by the “Front Pour L’Avancement et le Progress Haitien,” (FRAPH). FRAPH was definitely a right-wing organization, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ties, but leaders in Washington were unsure whether to view it as a political party or merely a creature of the Cedras regime.⁵⁰

There were also allegations made concerning President Aristide. A CIA personality profile of Aristide that had been provided to the White House was leaked to the press. The report claimed that Aristide had been treated for a mental disorder and was suffering from manic depression. Equally disturbing was the translation of a speech in which Aristide seemed to be voicing support for the use of violence against political opponents.⁵¹ In Congress Jesse Helms referred to Aristide as a “psychopath” and even though the president dismissed the report, he too referred to Aristide as “flaky.”⁵²

It was later revealed that the information reported in the personality profiles was false.⁵³ The issue of supporting violence was more problematic. Aristide's supporters claimed he had been poorly translated.

On 14 October, the United States and the UN re-imposed sanctions on Haiti.

President Clinton ordered the United States Navy to take up blockading duties. Prior to this decision, the Coast Guard had performed this duty. Within days of the order six naval warships were on station off Haiti. Several Canadian and one British ship would also participate in the blockade.⁵⁴

It was clear to all that the planned 30 October return of President Aristide to Haiti was not going to happen. Cedras and the junta remained firm in their defiance. For his part, Aristide returned to his old position of no amnesty for junta leaders. At this point, a discovery involving the junta leadership was made. It was reported and confirmed that both Cedras and Francois had at one point been paid by the CIA to be informers and agents.

The failure of the Cedras regime to conform to the Governors Island agreement convinced many people who had been unaware that there had never been any intention of conforming, that the junta was not to be trusted under any circumstances. Although some individuals and agencies, such as the Department of Defense, remained opposed to military intervention, others, such as members in the human rights directorate of the State Department, reevaluated their positions.

While the UN debated whether or not to impose an even tighter embargo on Haiti, reports began to emerge that the sanctions were taking their toll. Among the hardest hit were Haiti's poor. Many were out of work. Other than private volunteer organizations (PVO) and religious societies, there was nowhere to turn to for relief. Death rates among children rose. Broadening the sanctions would clearly deepen the impact, but this course of action was seen as the only alternative to combat.⁵⁵

As this was occurring, Secretary Christopher was becoming increasingly marginalized where Haiti was concerned. As his power waned, the power of the Haiti hawks increased.

On 27 January 1994 the United States further tightened the economic screws on Haiti. In a series of moves designed to impact the Haitian elites, the United States revoked visas and froze additional Haitian financial assets.⁵⁶ At a meeting of the "friends" it was also decided to press the UN for a total trade embargo.⁵⁷

Proponents for greater economic pressure being applied to Haiti received a boost when the Commerce Department reported that both imports to and exports from Haiti rose in 1993. It was also reported that the Haiti-Dominican Republic border was a sieve. Although the total amount of trade was small, only \$370 million, it was seen as sufficient to help the junta maintain their grip on the country.⁵⁸ Further indication of the failure of the embargo came when observers in Port-au-Prince reported the price of black market gas had dropped from nine dollars a gallon to six dollars a gallon.⁵⁹

While the international diplomatic battles raged, domestic events were unfolding that would intrude into the Haiti calculus. Lawton Chiles, governor of Florida had been impacted by the refugee flows as no other state leader had. Legal immigrants, bona fide refugees and illegal immigrants tended to stay in Florida, and placed heavy burdens on the state's social systems and budgets. Efforts to get the federal government to pick up the additional costs had not been successful. The governor turned to other methods and sued the federal government.⁶⁰ If the suit was successful, Chiles anticipated recouping significant amounts of money. The governors of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, New York and California were closely watching this pending legal action. Chiles was also a power in the Democratic party and his state was going to be crucial in the upcoming congressional November elections.⁶¹

However, President Aristide managed to keep in the public eye. On 19 March he launched his most telling and harshest criticism of the Clinton administration to date. During an opening meeting of the Congressional Black Caucus, Aristide compared the treatment of Haitian refugees with Cuban refugees. Aristide maintained that the U.S. policy toward Haiti was racist. Several members of the Caucus immediately agreed.⁶² Few statements could have aggrieved or angered the Clinton administration as much.

In a nearly full page advertisement in *The New York Times*, more than eighty-five religious leaders, actors, politicians and other well known personages signed an open letter to the president, claiming that the repatriation policy was driven by "considerations of race."⁶³ The ad included a form which one could use to make a donation to TransAfrica.

Aristide's supporters now focused on Special Envoy Pezzullo as being part of the problem.⁶⁴ Special interest groups began to demand his removal. Following a series of increasingly confrontational meetings, the Congressional Black Caucus called for his removal.⁶⁵ Although arguably filling no more than forty congressional seats, the impact of the Caucus was significant. They represented large numbers of Democrats. The Caucus members were highly articulate and dedicated. Their support was seen as essential to many of the president's social programs. Furthermore, this was a unified position among Caucus members. "We are hoping that the White House understands on this issue that the Congressional Black Caucus speaks with one voice," said Caucus Chairman Kweisi Mfume (D-MD).⁶⁶ The White House was listening and the White House did understand.

Proof of this came on 26 March 1994 when the administration announced that it was implementing a new plan that would be much more in tune with that favored by Aristide.⁶⁷ The new plan also included the potential for increased sanctions.

On 7 April, President Aristide formally served notice on President Clinton that, as the recognized leader of Haiti, he was canceling the current AMIO Accord. In keeping with the terms of the Accord, the cancellation would become effective in six months. Although the State Department would not comment on the cancellation, the repatriation policy remained in effect.⁶⁸

Randall Robinson, the director of TransAfrica, was so adamantly opposed to the policy that he embarked on a highly publicized hunger strike on 12 April 1994. He made it clear that the strike would last until he died or Haitian refugees were given a hearing. In a powerful op-ed article he accused the Clinton administration of lacking deep convictions, Pezzullo of accommodating the Haitian military while holding Aristide in contempt, and failing to include FRAPH among the State Department's annual listing of human rights abusers.⁶⁹ The initial response of the White House was to announce a policy review.

As Robinson began his hunger strike, additional congressional members began to call for a military solution to the Haitian dilemma. David Obey (D-WI), chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, publicly endorsed such an option. Although Obey stated that he would prefer an international military force be used, he would support a unilateral U.S. invasion. Not surprisingly, many Representatives, especially Republican Representatives, found the idea unacceptable. Others, notably Charles Rangel (D-NY) supported a "show of force," but not the "use of force."⁷⁰

As Randall Robinson continued to fast, supporters of Aristide continued to attack Special Envoy Pezzullo. On 27 April, he tendered his resignation. The special envoy had become increasingly ignored by the administration.⁷¹

Robinson's fast entered its 17th day and President Clinton admitted that his Haiti policy to that point had failed. He was personally troubled by the continuing violence. The president gave additional moral validity to the Robinson hunger strike when he stated that Mr. Robinson should "stay out there."⁷²

The number of voices clamoring for military invasion increased. Columnists Mary McGrory of the *Washington Post*, Richard Cohen, also of the *Post* and Cathy Booth of *Time* all came out in favor of military action.⁷³

On April 21st six Representatives were arrested after chaining themselves to the White House fence in protest of the president's Haiti policy. All were Democrats. The protest was well covered by the press and photographs of Joseph Kennedy (D-MA), Ron Dellums (D-CA) and the other four were on the front page the next day.⁷⁴

By the end of April, the refugee issue was still receiving heavy play in the papers, Randall Robinson was gradually starving to death and California and Arizona had followed Florida's lead and filed lawsuits against the Federal government. The governor of New York announced that New York was going to pursue similar action while the attorneys-general in Texas and New Jersey were deliberating whether or not to join the Florida litigation.⁷⁵ More than \$3 billion were at stake.

On 4 May, the 23rd day of his hunger strike, Randall Robinson was hospitalized. Robinson's strike and physical condition had been closely monitored by the White House, and perhaps most closely of all by Tony Lake. When asked if the hunger strike had an impact, Lake answered, "Of course. I was worried Randall might die."⁷⁶

Behind the scenes, military contingency planning for the use of force in Haiti was activated. Admiral Paul David Miller, commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) directed General Hugh Shelton to develop a plan to forcibly remove Cedras from power. The forcible entry option would be known as Operations Plan 2370 (OPLAN 2370). The U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps would provide the combat power the plan required. Simultaneously the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began developing its own plan for assisting and democratic forces and training a Haitian police force.⁷⁷

On 6 May the UN Security Council voted for more sanctions. Private flights in and out of the country were banned. Police and military officers, prominent civilian supporters of the Cedras regime and their families were prohibited from leaving Haiti. A worldwide freeze on these individuals' assets was also recommended.⁷⁸

On 7 May, President Clinton once again changed U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees. Forcible repatriation would no longer be practiced. Haitians would now be given interviews either at sea, or in third party countries. Those determined to be ineligible for asylum would be returned to Haiti.⁷⁹ This change of policy was enough to cause Randall Robinson to end his hunger strike. The decision came after a presidential discussion with General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During this discussion the president said he had come to believe that the only way to resolve the situation was through intervention. The general countered by laying out the opposing viewpoints and invasion plans were put on hold.⁸⁰

The Clinton administration also announced the appointment of Larry Pezzullo's replacement. William Gray, former congressman (D-PA) and president of the United Negro College Fund was named U.S. special envoy to Haiti. Gray immediately announced that his goal was to "end the suffering of the Haitian peoples at the hands of their military leaders."⁸¹

During the second week in May large-scale military maneuvers were conducted in the Caribbean. Many observers believed these were precursor operations to a Haitian invasion. The Clinton administration dismissed such speculation as incorrect. The sense that the nation was edging closer to conflict also energized Congress. Led by Bob Dole (R-KS) a proposal to require congressional authorization for any use of military force involving Haiti was introduced.⁸²

As Congress debated and the junta continued to defy the UN, one of the fears of the Clinton administration began to be realized. As news of the revised refugee policy reached Haiti the numbers of Haitians putting to sea steadily increased. In an effort to cope with the rising demand the U.S. government chartered the Ukrainian flagged liner *Gruziya* to serve as floating staging area and site of immigration hearings.⁸³

As rumors of a possible invasion continued to abound, congressional members slowly coalesced into groups supporting and opposing the use of military force. On 22 May Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) returned from a two-day trip to Haiti and announced that he now supported invasion.⁸⁴ Bob Dole continued to lead the opposition.

The shifts and reversals that had marked the Clinton policy on Haiti were also having an impact on public opinion. In May, a *Washington Post - ABC News Survey* showed that only 40 % of the U.S. public approved of the president's handling of foreign policy as opposed to 53% of those polled who did not.⁸⁵

Yet another voice was added to those calling for invasion, when, on 1 June 1994, President Aristide claimed that economic sanctions would not restore him to office and called for "action." In his speech, he made it clear that he was talking about military action. "The action could be a surgical move to remove the thugs within hours," Aristide said of the kind of intervention he would support.⁸⁶

On 10 June President Clinton further increased sanctions on Haiti. U.S. commercial flights to Haiti were banned and most financial actions between the two countries were canceled. Concurrently the State Department announced that it was pulling all embassy dependents out of Haiti and recommended that U.S. citizens in Haiti leave at the earliest opportunity. Other nations were expected to cancel their commercial flights as well.⁸⁷ In Haiti the Cedras government declared a "state of emergency." Junta-appointed President Emil Jonassaint stated there was a threat of "invasion and occupation." In response to this announcement, Clinton administration officials noted that thirty Caribbean and Latin American nations had expressed support for a U.S. intervention if all else failed.⁸⁸

While the international community may have been coming to grips with the possibility of an invasion, the U.S. public was not. On 23 June, an *Associated Press Poll* found only twenty-eight percent of the populace approved on an invasion.⁸⁹ This was not lost on the administration. Years later Tony Lake admitted that public opinion was never on the side of the administration.⁹⁰

By 28 June, the ocean-going exodus the administration had been waiting for materialized. In an explosive surge of interdiction, Coast Guard vessels gathered in more than thirteen hundred Haitians in one day. It quickly became apparent that, despite the precaution of moving additional vessels into the area, the flow would overwhelm the preparations to meet it.⁹¹ Within a day, President Clinton decided to reopen the refugee center at Guantanamo Bay. The combination of increased regime repression in Haiti, the disproportionate impact of sanctions on the poor and the reversal of the U.S. forcible repatriation policy were believed to explain the dimensions of the flow.

The refugee flow continued to build. The CIA estimated that as of early July, 1,000 Haitians were leaving by boat every day and that the number would soon rise to 4,000 each day. Boat building in Haiti was at such a fever pitch that houses again were being torn down to provide raw construction materials. In Haiti, it was believed that as many as one third of the refugees intercepted at sea were being allowed into the United States.⁹²

In the midst of changing policies and mounting congressional debate, the United States sent four amphibious ships carrying the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the waters off Haiti to conduct exercises and to be available if a noncombatant evacuation operation of embassy personnel had to be carried out. Although Special Envoy Gray assured the

press that no invasion was “imminent,” speculation ran rampant.⁹³ The MEU had only just returned to its home base of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina from duty in the vicinity of Somalia.

The next increase in the pressure being applied to the junta came when Special Envoy Grey announced that General Cedras and the members of the coup had six months to leave, or face possible military action. The threat may have gained credibility when Panama declared that it would no longer serve as a third party host to Haitian refugees. Efforts by the United States to reach a compromise solution failed.⁹⁴ UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced that only 2,000 to 3,000 of the 9,000 to 12,000 strong peacekeeping force had been identified. Potential contributors were said to be reluctant to commit until they knew if the United States intended to oust Cedras by force.⁹⁵

At this point in the confrontation, the Cedras regime took action that could not have been more beneficial to the Clinton administration than if it had been planned for that purpose. On 10 July 1994 all OAS and UN human rights observers were ordered to depart Haiti within forty-eight hours. The observer force, numbering one hundred individuals was declared to be “undesirable aliens.” To external observers it seemed that the junta was removing potential witnesses to what many feared would be a wave of orchestrated violence and terror.⁹⁶

In Guantanamo, more than sixteen thousand Haitians awaited screening and transportation to a safe haven not in the United States. Some, tiring of the conditions or disappointed at being denied entry into the United States opted to return to Haiti.⁹⁷ The ever-increasing number of Haitians at Guantanamo was exerting an inexorable pressure on the administration to find some solution to the confrontation.

President Aristide amplified his earlier remarks on 15 July. Explaining that Haiti’s constitution did not “allow” him to call for an invasion, he still called for “swift and definitive action against the leaders of the coup.

The U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division was ordered on 28 July 1994 to begin planning for a permissive entry into Haiti.⁹⁸ This plan would be known as OPLAN 2380 and was an entirely separate operation from OPLAN 2370. There was almost no overlap in the forces assigned to each plan.

On 31 July the UN Security Council authorized the United States to “use all means necessary” to restore President Aristide to power in Haiti. The vote was 12 to 0 in favor of the resolution, with China and Brazil abstaining. A UN observer force would accompany any invasion force.⁹⁹ The stage was now set for an invasion. All the component pieces were in place.

On 2 August the Dominican Republic agreed to allow an international force to patrol the Dominican-Haitian border. The force’s purpose was to report cross-border smuggling to the Dominican authorities, which would then intervene.¹⁰⁰ The force, initially numbering

only eighty individuals from the United States, Argentina, and Canada could be said to be more symbolic than utile, yet still presented an image of an internationally isolated Haiti.

Several Latin American countries, led by Venezuela expressed concerns with the prospect of yet another U.S. military intervention into the Caribbean and Latin America. In the U.S. on 3 August the Senate unanimously declared the UN authorization to use force, did not justify the use of U.S. troops. However, the measure was nonbinding and when Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) offered an amendment blocking the use of force in Haiti unless U.S. lives were endangered, the amendment was defeated 63 to 31. Even some opponents of the use of force in Haiti felt the amendment, if passed, would set a dangerous precedent.¹⁰¹ The president reiterated that he already had constitutional authority to use military force as needed.¹⁰²

Inside White House decision-making circles, Secretary of Defense William Perry argued against Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's desire to impose a deadline by which the junta leaders had to leave or face invasion. Perry, echoing the sense of his department wished to explore alternatives that could buy off the Haitian leadership. Talbott found this idea "repugnant" and favored an early invasion. Perry's counter was that it was preferable to spend money than lives.¹⁰³ Through the duration of the Haiti confrontation the Defense Department had been adverse to any application of military force and Strobe Talbott had consistently been in favor of intervention.¹⁰⁴

As Guantanamo filled with Haitians and Lawton Chiles continued to sure the federal government and fall elections drew closer, Fidel Castro allowed an outpouring of Cuban refugees to brave the Windward Passage and head by sea to Florida. As the old operating rules remained in effect, the Cubans were initially granted political asylum. The expatriate Cuban community welcomed them to Florida. Not surprisingly the flow evoked memories of the Mariel Boat Lift.¹⁰⁵ As the Cuban refugee flow swelled in size to more than two thousand individuals a week, the comparisons between the treatment they received vice that meted out to the Haitians came under harsher criticism.

For the president recollections of the Mariel Boat Lift were not pleasant ones. While Clinton was governor, Cubans being held in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas rioted. There were several deaths and the riots were a major issue in the next gubernatorial campaign, which Clinton lost. He now made it clear that such events were not going to happen again.¹⁰⁶

The refugees continued to flow and Guantanamo continued to fill. By 24 August, the Navy was planning to remove civilian dependents of base personnel back to the United States. It was announced that the base would be used to accommodate up to forty thousand refugees.¹⁰⁷

While the United States grappled with Cuban and Haitian refugees, the Cedras regime once again were thrust into an unflattering limelight. On 28 August 1994, Father Jean-Marie Vincent, Catholic priest and long time friend of President Aristide was killed. More precisely, Father Vincent was gunned down just a few feet from the door of his order, the Congregation of Montfortin Fathers. It was "the first political killing of a priest in

memory..." in Haiti. Vincent was credited with having saved Aristide's life in the past.¹⁰⁸ When President Clinton learned of the killing he was "outraged."¹⁰⁹

As August gave way to September, four Caribbean states pledged to provide forces the any upcoming invasion of Haiti.¹¹⁰ UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also announced that he was "giving up" any attempt to try and persuade the leaders of the junta to step down. The UN had sent a high level mission to Haiti during the last week in August, but the Haitian military leaders had snubbed the diplomats and refused to talk with them.¹¹¹

Newspapers ran story after story speculating as to when U.S. forces would be used. The Pentagon announced that an invasion would cost \$427 million dollars in addition to the \$200 million already spent on interdiction operations as well as building and running the refugee facilities on Guantanamo.¹¹²

Unlike most preparations for operations involving the potential for combat, much of the invasion preparations took place in an overt fashion. The press coverage was extensive. This was clearly done in an effort to impress the junta to abdicate. U.S. military overflights of Haiti were increased and the international contingent of the invasion force trained openly in Puerto Rico.¹¹³ Some administration officials explained that due to conflicting signals in the past and a possible perception of President Clinton being indecisive, General Cedras and the other coup leaders might not understand how resolute the U.S. position was.¹¹⁴

But opposition leaders were also making statements. Bob Dole continued to argue against any invasion arguing no U.S. interests were at stake. On 6 September, political cartoonist Gary Trudeau announced that the Clinton presidential icon was going to be a "waffle."

What did not get reported was an NSC meeting on the Haiti situation in the White House on 7 September 1994. Tony Lake chaired the meeting. General Shalikashvili briefed the state of the Haitian Army, and the U.S. plans to deal with them. As soon as the briefing was over the president thanked him for the briefing and said, "It's a good plan; let's go."¹¹⁵

Although it would take an additional eighteen days during which U.S. forces moved to position, the press indulged in a frenzy of speculation and U.S. public opinion never moved to a point favorable to the president, the decision had been made.

Just prior to the invasion the president gave former president Carter, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Collin Powell, and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) permission to fly to Haiti in order to make one last effort to convince Cedras to step down. Former President Carter argued that, as he had known Cedras personally he would be successful. He had convinced Powell and Nunn to add their arguments to his. Although there was concern that the three men could be taken hostage, they were allowed to go. The mission's initial efforts were not successful, and negotiations were in progress when planes loaded with U.S. paratroopers lifted off and headed for Haiti.¹¹⁶

That fact, relayed to Cedras by a Haitian intelligence asset in the United States, was enough to convince him that the time had come to quit. The Carter mission gave him a face-saving way out and he took it. As the paratroopers' aircraft moved steadily to the jump points, Carter reported Cedras' "surrender" to the president. In a remarkable display of military discipline and precision the invasion was halted. Aircraft were turned around in mid-air and headed home. OPLAN 2380 was activated. In less than twelve hours, U.S. troops walked ashore. Five years later, Cedras was living comfortably in exile, the Haitian population was preparing for its second consecutive free presidential election and U.S. soldiers still walked the streets of Port-au-Prince.

Notes

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- let Aristide return," *Houston Chronicle*, 17 April, 1993, A21.
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Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

VALERIE J. LOFLAND

On a bright, hot summer morning in July 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Stevens got up at dawn to get ready to head out for his new job working at the National Security Council (NSC). Just one month earlier, he had been a student at the Naval War College and had graduated with honors. Rick was a C-141 pilot and had flown humanitarian aid airlift missions into Kenya and parts of Somalia in 1992 in support of Operation Provide Relief. The Air Force considered Rick a dynamic officer and following his stint at the Naval War College, he was assigned to work at the National Security Council in the African Affairs branch.

Over the last decade, Africa had become a continent rife with civil wars, extreme poverty and immense human suffering. More recently, the Clinton administration had debated sending humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, and so Africa was on the NSC's agenda again. Rick's new boss at the NSC, John Preston, was aware of Rick's experience in Africa. He asked Rick to prepare a comprehensive analysis concerning President Bush's decision to initiate Operation Restore Hope, the United States led U.N. intervention in Somalia in December 1992.

Preston handed Rick numerous NSC files dating back to the early 1990s. Then he told Rick "Look these over to get a good understanding of what transpired in 1991 and 1992." Then he gave Rick his take on the Operation Restore Hope. "You see Rick, Operation Restore Hope was a milestone in the history of the United States as well as the United Nations. For the first time, the U.N. was involved in peace enforcement, that is the armed intervention into a conflict without the prior consent of the state authorities involved in the hostilities. Operation Restore Hope expanded the role of the United States as well as the U.N. in the post Cold War era."

With this backdrop, Rick began to read the old NSC files, which gave him a good foundation to begin his analysis. Rick also dusted off a joint military operations paper he had written at the Naval War College on the airlift operation in Somalia. In the early 1970s Somalia had been a client state of the Soviet Union, but had switched over to the West during the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in 1977. During the 1980s, Somalia received large amounts of military and economic aid from the United States. Somalia had strategic value during the Cold War in maintaining open access to the Gulf's oil fields. Located on the Horn of Africa, Somalia was near the arc of the crisis of Middle Eastern oil fields and strategic sea-lanes.

After the Cold War and even more so after the Gulf War, Western access was available directly through the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) nations, and Somalia ceased to be of geostrategic interest to the United States.

At this point in his research, Rick decided to visit an old friend who now worked at the State Department. Jeff James, a retired Army colonel, had worked at the NSC from 1991 to 1993 and witnessed the Somalia crisis first hand. Jeff was now in the State Department's East Africa division. Jeff also arranged to have Sam Jameson, a former staff officer who had worked at State during the Somalia crisis, at the meeting.

When Rick arrived at Jeff's office, Jeff made introductions and then got down to business. He began by describing events in 1991 and 1992 that eventually led to President Bush's decision to initiate Operation Restore Hope.

"In early 1991, the situation in Somalia deteriorated quickly after the overthrow of the repressive dictator of twenty-one years, President Mohammed Siad Barre. Then the rebels who expelled Barre started fighting among themselves. Violence and drought ensued and brought on a terrible famine throughout the country. On 6 January 1991, the United States vacated the embassy in Mogadishu, and United States officials and relief experts fled the capital of Mogadishu. Without a presence in country, we miscalculated the severity of the famine and United States intelligence was limited. We did not realize the degree of horror the warring factions were creating as they ripped apart the country's very fabric. Armed clansmen took over food production and distribution, and the internal government ceased to function. Nearly one million Somalis were forced into exile in neighboring countries and an additional one million flocked to urban centers where NGOs (non-governmental organizations) such as the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society attempted in vain to stabilize the situation and provide food and other humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), through the work of Audrey Hepburn, publicized the plight of the dying Somali children. As you may have seen on television, she worked with the international media to build a global awareness of this immense human tragedy.

"Meanwhile, within the Bush administration in early 1992, there were growing calls for some form of humanitarian intervention into Somalia, but nothing really got off the ground. Andrew Natsios, the assistant administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), spoke bluntly to the House Select Committee on Hunger. Natsios claimed Somalia was the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. He told the committee that mass starvation and violence against civilians had been going on since the fall of 1991. Natsios was quoted as saying 'the real tragedy was that of the starving Somali children where up to ninety percent of the children under age five were malnourished.' Natsios praised the work of the NGOs such as the International Red Cross, International Medical Corps, Save the Children, and Doctors Without Borders, but he admitted they alone could not get food to the starving people."¹

At this point in the discussion, Sam Jameson added an important note. "As convincing as Natsios' statements were, I'm afraid in the pecking order of agencies, the USAID was not

one of the more prominent foreign policy players in Washington. In case you haven't heard of the USAID, it is a rather small agency that used to be independent but has since been placed under the policy supervision of the secretary of state. USAID runs the United States foreign aid program and our foreign disaster relief program. USAID is often the main source in the United States government of information about humanitarian crises. It gets a lot of its information from its field officers, those USAID representatives in country."

Jameson continued, "At the time of the Somalia crisis, my boss Herman Cohen was the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and I can tell you it was hard to get the secretary and the department as a whole to focus on the tragedy. After all, Somalia was just not as important to United States national interests as it once was. We fought tooth and nail to gain the attention of Secretary of State James Baker III, but with no success.² One of the problems with State was that after we closed the embassy in Mogadishu, the foreign service officers working in Somalia were reassigned to other posts. Therefore, the pressure that they would have normally kept on Washington from the in-country team ceased to exist.³ Foreign service officers are our eyes and ears around the world and we've cut back substantially on funding embassies since the end of the Cold War.

"I'd also have to admit that throughout 1992, Secretary of State Baker was also heavily involved in the reelection campaign for President Bush, his good friend. I don't believe Somalia was on his radarscope all that much. As a matter of fact, later on that year on 14 August, he left his post as secretary of state to head up the troubled presidential reelection campaign. Larry Eagleburger became acting secretary of state then. Eagleburger had been the deputy secretary of state."

Jameson then cleared his throat and raised a crucial point. "You could say that as far as the Bush administration was concerned, Somalia represented a house divided. While certain agencies such as the USAID were vocal in support of Somalia, other advisors cautioned the president against embarking on a massive peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton warned U.N. officials of the administration's opposition to footing large peacekeeping bills for Somalia, due to perceived voter and congressional objections to expensive peacekeeping bills in an election year.⁴

"By the fall of 1992, during Bush's last few months as president, certain key advisors within the administration became much more vocal about intervention and that's when things really began to change. We'll go over this portion of the decision at length with you later, but let's first back up and we'll give you a more detailed overview as to how things progressed throughout 1992.

"On the international scene, Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the secretary-general of the U.N. in January 1992. Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian by birth, was very concerned with events in Africa, particularly in Somalia. He was also more of an activist than his predecessor Javier Perez de Cuellar who was from Peru. The Egyptian embassy had stayed open in Somalia, and Boutros-Ghali was getting accurate information on the devastation due to the famine. On 23 January 1992, shortly after he came to the U.N., the U.N. Security Council voted

unanimously to increase humanitarian aid United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 733 to Somalia. Then the U.N. augmented aid in April 1992, with UNSCR 751, which authorized a fifty man UNOSOM (U.N. Operation Somalia) mission for food distribution. You could say things were starting to happen on a global scale but much too slowly.

“Unfortunately, the UNOSOM mission could not overcome the vast food distribution problems imposed by the warring factions. During the summer months of 1992, international pressure from NGOs, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States as well as the U.N. secretary-general was growing for the Western powers and the Bush administration to do something. Then on 24 July, Boutros-Ghali chastised the U.N. for a European tilt, while people starved in Somalia. He accused Western leadership of being racist, and this really shook up quite a few people.”

Jameson then added, “In addition, in July, the United States ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, Jr. wrote a dramatic State Department cable on the suffering in Somalia entitled “A Day in Hell” that caught President Bush’s attention.⁵ Ambassador Hempstone said the USAID estimated that 25 percent of Somali children under age 5 were already dead. Hempstone concluded that the UNOSOM mission as a military operation had been largely ineffectual and something drastic needed to be done.

Jameson continued “Especially significant at the same time, appeared to have been an assessment trip to Somalia led by Jim Kunder, the director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is within the USAID. This trip coincided with the cable received from Ambassador Hempstone, and both are believed to have greatly influenced President Bush, as reported later by Andrew Natsios at congressional testimonies on 16 September.”⁶

Rick then decided to see where Congress fit in with all the action. “I know the summer months can be quiet in Washington D.C., but what was happening on the Hill?”

Jeff chimed in because he had worked the interface with the congressional staffers on the Somalia crises. “Congress picked up the tempo over the summer months and things really started heating up. The International Committee of the Red Cross declared that one-third of all Somalis, or about 1.5–2 million people were in imminent danger of dying from starvation. Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) had visited Somalia in July and testified to the House Select Committee on Hunger on the urgent need for stepped up aid. Both Senators Kassenbaum and Paul Simon (D-IL), as members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sponsored resolutions demanding urgent action. As you know, these resolutions are not binding. In fact, during the 1991-92 time frame, there were more congressional hearings, bills, resolutions and floor statement about Somalia, than any other country.

“Also during the early summer months, the media increased their reporting of events in Somalia. The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* began reporting on the tragic suffering and death of the Somalis. The networks were showing photos of starving children. Pundits called this the CNN factor because it wasn’t until the nightly news reporters began their vivid portrayal of events on the news, that the American people seemed to take notice.

That's the way the American public and the media work—it's a chicken and egg kind of thing. You're never sure which comes first—the activity in Washington that creates the media feeding frenzy or the media that creates the wake up call. In my opinion, the national media followed the action in Congress and there was plenty of it concerning Somalia.⁷

“Then in July 1992, the *New York Times* published a story by Jane Perlez about how the current airlift efforts were failing to feed the starving Somalis.⁸ Her story made an impression at the White House as President Bush read her piece and was very upset by the reports.⁹ He wanted something done and gave the crisis increased focus. He also instructed the State Department to be forward leaning on Somalia and told the national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft to begin exploring an enhanced airlift effort. At about the same time, I started attending NSC interagency meetings and it soon seemed apparent to me that a consensus on an airlift effort was not going to happen. When the president found out the interagency working group process was not cutting it through reports from the national security advisor, he decided to get a food airlift operation going despite the haggling.

“On August 12th, the president met quietly with Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Brent Scowcroft to hammer out the details of Operation Provide Relief. President Bush had finally decided to shore up the current UNOSOM mission and authorized humanitarian relief airlift missions. This announcement occurred on a Friday, 14 August, just days before the Republican National Convention in Houston was to begin on 17 August. As you might have guessed, certain Democratic members of Congress thought Bush's decision was pure election year politics. But I sincerely believe the administration wanted to help but did not want to get involved in a huge peacekeeping effort in Africa at least at this stage in the game. The airlift missions that Operation Provide Relief promised was the next logical step. Hence, direct involvement in the Somali crisis began on 28 August when the airlift of relief supplies into Somalia was launched from bases provided by the Kenyan government.”

Rick then wondered where the military stood on the increased taskings coming from the White House. “What was the position of the Pentagon on all this?”

Jeff continued, “From the military standpoint, we were spread pretty thin at that time and bogged down providing humanitarian relief to the Kurds in northern Iraq. We were also working numerous issues with Haiti and there were concerns over the refugee camps at Guantanamo Bay. On top of that, the military units were busy cleaning up the damage from Hurricane Andrew in August 1992 which destroyed portions of Florida and the east coast. You could also say, there was a pervasive sentiment that if we got involved in Somalia, it could lead to a quagmire, similar to what Lebanon had been in 1983 when 241 marines died in Beirut during the Reagan administration. All you heard from NSC staffers was the following phrase, ‘if you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.’¹⁰

“The Pentagon's reluctance was echoed by Stephen J. Hadley, the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. He really summed up the potential hazard with Somalia and said United States forces would become the object of attack and of a guerrilla

war that could have no end.¹¹ Hadley and the Pentagon's fear resulted from the confusion about the military's humanitarian and combatant roles in Lebanon, where United States troops were placed in a fight without giving them the means to control its outcome. Another concern of the Pentagon with humanitarian missions was not just the confusion of roles but that the small size of the relief missions did not give troops an overwhelming advantage of forces. This was what the Powell doctrine was all about."

Rick had learned a lot about the Powell doctrine at the Naval War College, a product to guide the proper use of military forces in the future due to the protracted Vietnam War and the Lebanon fiasco. The doctrine supported the use of military ground troops only when vital interests were threatened. In addition, it recommended using an overwhelming number of troops to maintain a distinct advantage. Lastly, the doctrine mandated clear objectives and an exit strategy.

Then Rick asked Jameson, "Where was the support from our allies in Europe on this issue?"

Jameson knew this was coming. "Western European countries were as preoccupied as we were with the breakup of the Soviet Union which occurred in late 1991 and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, maybe even more so. After all, Eastern Europe and Russia were a lot closer to our western European allies than Africa was. Things were beginning to erupt in the former Yugoslavia with the breaking down of sovereign authority and continued ethnic cleansing. We were hearing a lot about Bosnia-Herzegovina then if you recall."

Rick interrupted and asked, "So why did we pick Somalia and ignore Bosnia at the time?"

Jeff replied, "That's another story but most analysts believe the Bush administration ultimately found Bosnia too hard to grapple with or maybe the administration felt that Bosnia was a problem that Europe could and should handle. I also believe President Bush wrestled with the role of the United States in the post Cold War world, the supposed New World order that he spoke about so often. I think he was worried about the role of moral concerns in United States foreign policy and of course, the administration's own place in history. Somalia played heavily in this respect. We on the NSC staff also believed we could get in and get out of Somalia in a relatively short period of time. That is, feed the starving masses, work to stabilize the situation, and then exit. We did not think that we could get out of Bosnia as quickly.

"By mid-November, despite enhanced airlift efforts from Operation Provide Relief, massive distribution problems on the ground still remained. The clans were hoarding the humanitarian supplies and there was extensive looting once supplies left the ports. The clans were using food as a weapon and as a result, there was widespread violence. NSC staff members knew something else was going to have to be done. The Pentagon, for example, typically opposes humanitarian intervention because of tight budgets. There are no readily available accounts to pay for such crises as Somalia.¹² In addition, the military was downsizing and the brass was not looking for another mission.

“Nonetheless, President Bush was determined to exit his presidency in glory when it came to the Somali. Politically, he was somewhat depressed due to the loss of his reelection campaign. Plus the death of his mother in November that year must have touched an inner cord. Perhaps Somalia was a way to leave a legacy and feed the starving masses.

“Inevitably, as the problems in Somalia continued despite the airlift and UNOSOM, the idea to intervene with a massive force started gaining momentum. By mid-November, certain civilian advisors were becoming more amenable to some sort of plan to have a massive force distribute food and supplies. At one of the first Deputies Committee meetings that month, Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense for policy and planning, suggested using United States ground troops, but the JCS were noncommittal.

“Then at a second Deputies Committee meeting on 21 November, Admiral Jeremiah, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff startled the group by suggesting the ground forces might be able to do the job.¹³ Admiral Jeremiah wanted to use a large force—a division level of United States troops at least twenty thousand strong. His suggestion was also consistent with the Powell doctrine, in that United States troops should not be placed in a risky situation unless their numbers were overwhelming.

“Apparently, a sea change had occurred at the Pentagon. General Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs supported deploying United States troops. Powell had visited Somalia in October and his influence affected senior Pentagon leadership. The brass began to believe Somalia was ‘doable’ on the ground and much less risky than Bosnia. The terrain in Somalia was relatively flat, unlike Bosnia, where thick woods and mountains would cause new challenges. Some in the Pentagon felt that Somalia was the lesser of the two evils, and by taking on Somalia, we might shake Bosnia off our backs. Eventually, the Pentagon came up with three plans to offer up to the NSC for the Somalia effort.

“The first option was to continue the status quo and stay with the existing U.N. plan to deliver food and supplies by air and sea, but at the same time also enhance the U.N. security presence. The United States contribution would involve transportation and financial support, but no United States ground forces in country. There were not many strong advocates for this position, because the status quo was not working. Then a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report made it clear that this option would not work since Somali warlords could easily massacre the lightly armed U.N. forces.

“Next, a bolder option was offered by Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Frank Wisner. He recommended the United States organize a coalition of international forces under a United Nations command. The United States would provide logistical, airlift, sealift and communications requirements and United States forces could be based off shore if an additional threat surfaced. By operating under a U.N. command, the U.N. would be bolstered with the troops into a larger role in the post Cold-War.¹⁴

“While Wisner and the State Department argued for more United States action, they did not argue for a direct United States military intervention, nor for the use of United States ground troops, fearing the Pentagon would be staunchly opposed to this route.

“At the same time, Brent Scowcroft believed that only the United States could provide the international community with the leadership it needed with regards to Somalia and other humanitarian tragedies. Scowcroft hinted at the idea of using ground troops directly and thus began plans for a third option for a United States led U.N. ground operation. If United States troops were to be used, General Powell wanted to retain United States command and control over the U.N. forces, and also determine the appropriate size of the force.”¹⁵

Jeff remembered working the three plans during Thanksgiving week. “Politically, things were pretty quiet in Washington during the week before Thanksgiving, with Congress in recess and Washington winding down. The presidential race was over on 2 November, but the White House was busier than a beehive working on the three Somalia options.

“Two more NSC Deputies Committee meetings occurred on the Monday and Tuesday, 23 and 24 November before Thanksgiving; however no consensus was reached as to which of the three options would be best. Also on 24 November, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to all members of the U.N. Security Council once again requesting help with the Somalia crisis. President Bush read the letter and I believe it pushed the president to the final decision to intervene.”¹⁶

“In addition, media pictures of starving children were again all over the network broadcasts and the reports from Somalia were dire. Here we were in the United States getting ready to celebrate Thanksgiving with all the food and bounty the holiday conveys and the starving masses in Somalia were dying by the hundreds each day. These images connected with President Bush’s past experience when he witnessed the Sahelian famine in the Sudan during a visit in 1985. Andrew Natsios, mentioned this event in his book:”

In December 1992 I sat through a discussion between President Bush and Phil Johnson, president of CARE who was then acting as the director of humanitarian operations in Somalia, in which Bush described his visit with the First Lady and Johnson to a CARE feeding center for starving children during the Sahelian famine. He said that he and his wife would never forget the scenes of death, a memory, he said, that had clearly affected his decision to send troops into Somalia.¹⁷

Jeff continued, “The next morning, on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, President Bush held a National Security Council meeting to hash out the options for Somalia. Most of the NSC players supported a United States led U.N. peacekeeping force by this point in the game. To sell option three to the U.N., the United States had to provide the vast majority of the forces. Once agreed upon, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was dispatched to New York later that day to discuss the plan with the secretary-general. Boutros Boutros-Ghali worked hard to get the U.N. Security Council to swiftly approve the massive United States led U.N. coalition, an operation that the United States defense officials called Restore Hope (U.N. Security Council Resolution 794). The Council approved the resolution on 3 December. Finally on 4 December, President Bush announced in a speech to the nation, the details dealing with the United States involvement and support of Operation

Restore Hope. The first U.S. Marines landed on Mogadishu beaches on 9 December. President Bush's final days in the White House were ones of great achievement concerning humanitarian efforts."

Rick suddenly looked at his watch and realized he had been at Jeff's office for over two hours. He thanked Jeff and Sam for their assistance, as he knew their first hand experience gleaned from Operation Restore Hope would greatly enhance his final analysis. Jameson had to be going as well to get back to a symposium at Georgetown University.

Before the three parted company, Jameson hesitated and remarked: "Rick, make sure you address these questions before you write your final analysis:

- Just how did the dynamics of the State Department, the DoD and the White House staff affect the final decision on Somalia?
- Do you think the decision to support Operation Restore Hope would have happened without the media sensationalism?"

Then as he walked out the door, Jameson added one final comment. "As you recall our stated aim of Operation Restore Hope was that of humanitarian intervention. Do you also think Somalia might have represented a new robust era of multilateral cooperation and thus an expanded role for the U.N. as well as the United States as the only superpower in the post Cold War era?"

As Rick headed for the Metro entrance at Foggy Bottom, he wondered just what Jameson had meant with his last remark.

CHRONOLOGY

Feb 88	Civil war erupts in Somalia among rival clans.		leaders, Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Farah Aidid. UNSCR 746 urges compliance.
Jan 91	President Mohammed Siad Barre overthrown, NEO commences for diplomatic personnel and United States citizens (six days prior to start of Desert Storm).	Apr 92	UNSCR 751 authorizes 50-man UNOSOM mission.
		Jul 92	Senator Kassenbaum visits Somalia.
Nov 91	Atrocities and starvation in Somalia spark international concern.	Aug 92	President Bush announces Operation Provide Relief airlift operation just prior to Republican National Convention. UNSCR 775 authorizes 3,500 additional troops.
Dec 91	Senators Simon and Kassenbaum demand urgent action, including use of troops.		
Jan 92	Boutros Boutros-Ghali becomes secretary-general of the U.N.. U.N. Security Council votes unanimously for increase in humanitarian aid (UNSCR 733).	Nov 92	Bill Clinton wins election. Series of NSC Deputies Committee meetings on Somalia.
		Dec 92	President Bush decides to take action with United States led intervention of U.N. forces. Announces Operation Restore Hope.
Mar 92	U.N. brokered cease-fire agreement signed in Mogadishu by clan		

SOMALIA MAP



Notes

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Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: A Rational Decision?

JOHN E. STOCKER, III

As Lieutenant Colonel Joe “Gonzo” Gordon, U.S. Air Force was escorted through the Pentagon security system, he was struck at how far removed he was from the enjoyment of spending the past year as a student in beautiful Newport, Rhode Island attending the Naval War College. The Air Force considered Joe a “mover and shaker” and following school assigned him to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) working missile defense issues.

Upon checking in, Gonzo was sent to see his boss, Colonel Jake Connell. Colonel Connell was a no nonsense kind of guy and after a brief handshake, got straight to the point.

“Gonzo, for the past several years, United States policy makers had struggled with what to do about the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Here’s a copy of the speech that Bush gave to the National Defense University on 1 May 2001 when he said, “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the thirty-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines us in the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies, is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.”¹

“Since President Bush took office he has been adamant about getting rid of the ABM Treaty. He has obviously evaluated over time this treaty and came to the conclusion that it is a hindrance to our national security and the protection of our citizens. He is a realist with a focus on defining national interests in terms of the survival of our nation and he supports the power of our military in achieving its security. The president knows there are many technological challenges ahead but believes they can be solved through new technologies, aggressive testing and time. Look at the selection of people he brings to this administration. Don Rumsfeld, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, and Colin Powell who all had previous knowledge with other administrations in identifying rogue threats and the constraints in working from Russians on the ABM Treaty. It is obvious that he knows that the international community is not supportive of the withdrawal from this treaty but has decided we must move forward and deploy a missile defense system, regardless,” Colonel Connell emphasized.

“I’m sure you know on 13 December 2001 the president made the decision that the United States will withdraw from the Treaty in six months, the very first time in modern

history that the United States has renounced a major international accord.² As your first assignment at OSD, I want you to provide me a point paper on the President's decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Your emphasis should be on why the 13 December decision was made. This will give you an opportunity to learn about all the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty, missile deployment, future missile testing and meet some contacts over at the State Department, the Pentagon, and Congress working the missile defense issues. My secretary will give you some points of contact and I'd like to see your work in the next day or two. Good luck!"

Colonel Connell's secretary provided Gonzo three points of contact, a copy of the 1972 ABM Treaty, a couple news clippings and showed him to his cubicle. Gonzo had expected a different lifestyle than at Newport and, so far, events had certainly lived up to his expectations.

He figured he needed to get "up to speed" on the ABM Treaty before calling his points of contact, so he quickly took note of the treaty. The treaty was written during President Nixon's time in office when both the United States and Russia had thousands of inter-continental ballistic missiles pointing at one another. Gonzo highlighted one particular point of the treaty that allowed either signatory to withdraw with six months' notice. That would mean the Pentagon would be free to conduct aggressive testing of ground-based, sea-based, and space-based interceptors as well as begin construction of a future ABM site by mid-June 2002.

Well, Gonzo thought, "I guess by mid-2002 the Pentagon will be able to conduct whatever tests it wants since the treaty would be null and void."

One of the news clippings Gonzo read was a *New York Times* article dated November 16, 2001 when President Bush and President Putin ended their three-day summit meeting in Crawford, Texas. The article addressed the fact that the two men had a difference of opinion on the ABM Treaty but that President Putin commented that the abrogation of the treaty would "not threaten the interests of both countries and of the world."³ The article went on to quote Dr. Rice, the national security adviser (NSA), as saying, "The president has made clear that one way or another the United States will have to get out of the constraints of the missile defense treaty."⁴ Gonzo thought that the Russians should not have been too surprised with the 13 December announcement.

With an understanding of the ABM Treaty, Gonzo looked at his list of points of contact and decided to start with the Department of State's, Ms. Alice Worth. He called her office and she was free to see him in an hour.

After a brief introduction, Alice said that she had a tight schedule and suggested they get right to the issue at hand.

"I can give you a fairly accurate account from the State perspective on that decision. First, the decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, which we can legally do, came after Secretary Powell had visited Russia on 3 December. The secretary tried but was unable to fix the

differences with President Putin on how to deal with the arms control treaty that President Bush repeatedly called a “relic” of the cold war. At the time, Secretary Powell felt it was possible to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would allow the Pentagon to do its tests. Initially NSA Rice had been supportive of Secretary Powell in seeking greater compromise with the ABM Treaty testing limitations. Both Powell and Rice wanted ‘to do everything we need to do with testing and accomplish all the other objectives within the ABM Treaty constraints with Russia all at the same time.’⁵

“But since the 11 September terrorist attacks, she eventually sided with Secretary Rumsfeld on the need to pull out of the treaty. I heard from a friend in the National Security Council that she had been leaning towards doing away with the treaty once our war on terrorism was moving forward so smoothly. I guess you could surmise that the Russians were not agreeing with our issues of the treaty but cooperating in the war on terrorism—implication being no big cost for abrogation.”

Alice continued, “It should not surprise you that many see the president’s decision to abrogate the treaty as a major policy defeat for Secretary Powell who feels strongly that he should be the official spokesman for foreign policy matters and initiatives within the administration. But I’m here to tell you that Secretary Powell is a team player and the key point he has made is that an arms race between Russia and the United States is not taking place. In fact, he is encouraged by the discussions of significant levels of reduction in nuclear warheads between both countries.

“Additionally, the 11 September terrorist attacks have offered opportunities to President Putin and President Bush to battle a common enemy. President Putin’s strong support for American intervention in Central Asia allows President Bush to promote a greater role for Russia in Western security and a possible trade-off for abrogating the ABM Treaty. President Putin’s decision to align Russia with the fight against the Al Qaeda has been hailed as a significant turn in Russia’s post-cold-war policy toward the West. The Russian leader characterizes the Chechnya campaign as Moscow’s battle against terrorism, and since Putin has already agreed on the existence of the threat and on the desirability of defenses, the United States could argue that it had no choice but to abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to counter new missile threats. The State Department continues to work well with the Russians and we do not see the treaty abrogation as a problem.”

Alice went on, “Since President Bush entered office, the reactions of our allies in his statements to abrogate the ABM Treaty have been a concern of ours. In fact, a number of United States European allies have suggested that United States deployment of national missile defense (NMD) might lead to a “Fortress America” mentality among Americans.⁶ Many of the citizens of Europe’s four largest countries disapprove of President Bush’s policy on a national missile defense. A poll was taken by the Pew Research Center, the *International Herald Tribune* and the Council on Foreign Relations found that Britons (49%), French (59%), Italians (46%) and Germans (65%) opposed Bush’s decision to develop a national missile defense system. Europeans have been largely critical of Bush since he came to office in January, accusing his administration of being “new unilateralist” and of a failure to

consult with United States allies in Europe on the missile defense issue.⁷ It should come as no surprise if this retreat from the ABM Treaty had a negative impact on future efforts by the United States to obtain support from other nations in negotiating new multinational agreements.

“Here are some of the attitudes Europeans have expressed towards national missile defense:

- The U.S. government acted unilaterally by presenting its allies (and others) with essentially a *fait accompli* on NMD, without real concern for allied reactions.
- The very term “rogue state” that has been the foundation for the United States characterization of the new ballistic missile threat is evidence of an arrogance that is dismissive of other countries’ real strategic concerns.
- NMD is a technological response to what is essentially a political and diplomatic problem.
- The United States is in search of 100 percent security, an ideal that is unattainable.
- Underneath everything else, the U.S. drive for NMD is motivated by pressure from the U.S. defense industry and a desire to maintain a technological lead over the rest of the world.
- The United States is locked into an outdated model of international relations in which military power is the decisive element.
- The U.S. NMD program is a strategically and financially disproportionate response to an admittedly changing strategic situation.⁸

“The Europeans generally recognize that the decision to proceed with a deployment to protect United States territory against ballistic missile attack is a sovereign decision for the United States to take. But European governments believe that their interests will be affected by this decision and that it may have adverse effects on Alliance relations.”

Alice continued, “We can’t forget the reaction of our Asian allies either. What’s interesting to note is that the Asian reactions have not changed since the 11 September terrorists attack. The attitudes of Asian governments toward the NMD program and the ABM Treaty vary in direct relation to their ties with the United States. The closer the relations, the greater the support for missile defense and President Bush’ decision on the treaty. America’s friends—Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—see NMD linked to their own theater missile defense (TMD) systems against potential adversaries they believe also concern the United States. Their TMDs could be integrated into United States NMD’s early warning and command and control satellites. Those countries identified as potential adversaries, principally North Korea and China, oppose United States-sponsored missile defense, whether labeled theater or national, and they see the connection between TMDs of America’s friends and NMD. In the middle are India and Pakistan. Both countries are neutral to United States NMD because of their own interests in nuclear programs.

“Ballistic missile defense has been less controversial in Japan than in Western Europe. The Japanese government generally shares Washington’s perspective about the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. North Korea’s August 1998 test of the Taepo Dong-I ballistic missile, which overflowed Japan, made missile defense a vital Japanese security concern. Because the North Korean threat is perceived to be real and immediate, Japanese officials are not preoccupied with the implications of United States NMD for arms control or the ABM Treaty. Japanese officials remain supportive of arms control and improved relations with Russia, but they tend to view Japanese missile defense as an issue of vital national security. Japanese leaders are sensitive to the possibility that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might respond negatively to increased Japanese collaboration with the United States in creating missile defenses yet the threat posed by North Korean ballistic missiles and the fear that these could someday be armed with nuclear warheads overshadow the concern with the PRC reactions.”⁹

Alice noted, “As you have probably heard, NMD received harsh criticism from Pyongyang. North Korea does not like to be labeled as a rogue, a state sponsor of terrorism, or designated as a rationale for NMD. In addition, the closer that United States-South Korean military ties grow, the greater the confidence given to the southern government to push for reunification on its terms and under its leadership.”¹⁰

“The Chinese are not a signatory to the treaty and China’s arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons is very small but many fear that the president’s decision will prompt them to speed the modernization of their nuclear forces. China has previously responded to renewed United States interest in NMD by working to prevent any change to the status quo as embodied in the ABM Treaty. China and Russia co-sponsored a resolution of the 54th United Nations General Assembly on preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty, which China deemed a collective appeal by the international community to the United States.”¹¹ Perhaps anticipating the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, China decided prior to the 13 December announcement to spend an additional \$9.7 billion to boost their second strike levels in an effort to overwhelm the United States NMD structure.”¹²

“The treaty announcement comes at a difficult moment for China’s leaders and the Communist Party. The prospect of a United States NMD system gives new influence to the hard-line elements in the policy process, especially those in the People’s Liberation Army and the defense industries, who favor an increase in military spending. A leadership troubled by these various challenges may look toward increase spending on nuclear forces and modernization of conventional forces. We’ll be watching this situation closely but the State Department’s view is that the argument that withdrawal may cause a new arms race is probably over stated because China is preoccupied with its economic development.”¹³

Alice glanced at her watch and continued, “As you know, the prospect of ballistic missile defenses in Taiwan is deeply unsettling to the Chinese. Operationally, Beijing appears fairly confident of its ability to overwhelm any defenses that Taipei may deploy at this time. The PRC allegedly is well on the way to deploying between 600 and 800 short-range missiles

across the strait from Taiwan by 2005. Beijing knows that if the United States is protected by NMD it will not have to worry about China and would defend Taiwan in times of crisis.¹⁴

“Of the seven states identified by the State Department as the principal sponsors of terrorism, five (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea) do have ballistic missile programs and are seeking longer-range weapons. States with nuclear capability may feel that they can get away with sponsoring terrorism. That’s one of the reasons that President Bush has concluded now is the time to abrogate the ABM Treaty.”

Gonzo interrupted, “What you’re telling me is that President Bush made the treaty decision without consulting his allies from Europe and Asia? I thought since the “9-11” attacks the Bush administration has put new emphasis on the importance of allies and coalitions. It seems to me that diplomatic relations with Russia, Pakistan, and even China were likely to improve because of their help with combating terrorism. Is that not true?”

Well, Alice said, “We did in fact consult our allies over quite a long period of time. President Bush visited several of our allies shortly after taking office and he made it clear the ABM Treaty was a relic of the Cold War that prevented our security as well as our allies.”

Alice continued, “The whole idea that the war is fought by a coalition is comical. What exactly has Egypt contributed? France sent troops into Mazar-e Sharif after the fighting had stopped. There is a coalition office somewhere in Islamabad, I think. The coalition consists of little more than United States aircraft, U.S. Special Forces, and Afghan friends-of-the-moment on the ground. Like the Gulf War, the Afghan war is unilateralism dressed up as multilateralism.”¹⁵

Gonzo thanked Alice for her time and insight into the international reactions to Bush’s decision and headed over to his meeting with Colonel Frank Trust at the Air Force Legislative Liaison Office. Frank had been in Legislative Liaison for over two years and worked missile defense issues on the Hill. As usual Frank’s hair was on fire and he had only thirty minutes to spend with Flash. They met in the Pentagon’s cafeteria and Frank quickly brought Gonzo up to speed on why he felt the 13 December decision was made.

Frank noted, “Congressional support of President Bush’s missile defense plan was strengthened after the 11 September terrorist attacks. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), chairman of the Budget Committee, said, “what we see here is that we are much more vulnerable to terrorism than to missiles. We’ve got to use our resources to defend against this sort of attack.”¹⁶ And an aide to a House Democrat who opposes missile defense explained, “What happened Tuesday [11 September] was just so terrible that people are rallying round, saying we have to let the president lead us. So we’re going to give him a lot of leeway on national missile defense.”¹⁷ What is interesting to note is that in reading major news media shortly after “9-11,” such as the *L.A. Times*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and others, were not overly supportive or non-supportive of the issue of missile defense. One reason may be the emphasis on finding the terrorists and establishing the Office of Homeland Security.”

Frank continued, “Before and after 11 September terrorist attacks, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Union of Concerned Scientists issued statements urging Congress not to fund missile defense because it will squander resources. FAS went even further when it wrote additional letters to Congress to act vigorously against the ABM Treaty withdrawal and to call on Russia, China, and other states to renew their commitment to multilateral arms controls and nonproliferation. It said that Bush’s decision to withdraw from the treaty is both unnecessary and unwise.¹⁸ Greenpeace, the anti-war environmental group, was also among the groups publicly opposing NMD.¹⁹

“However, some groups supported the 13 December decision. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that lobbies Congress, wrote a letter to Congress on 20 December 2001 stating, that under the treaty, we cannot test some of our most promising missile defense systems and that we’ll be safer without the ABM Treaty.²⁰ Additionally, the Center for Security Policy report stated that there can be no longer any disputing the fact that the ABM Treaty impedes the development and testing, as well as the deployment, of effective missile defenses.”²¹

Frank paused for a moment and then continued, “Everyone on the Hill knew in December that the public was very supportive of the administration. The polls show that since 11 September, more Americans believe in the need for missile defense, even though the attacks used airplanes, not missiles. In the days following 11 September, the approval ratings for the president reached record highs and general trust in government achieved levels not seen since the 1960s. A poll conducted on 11 December gave President Bush an 87% approval for his handling on terrorism and an 86% approval to his overall job.²² With these incredibly high marks for the president, I think the Bush administration was pretty shrewd to select the waning days of our highly successful Operation Enduring Freedom to pull out of the ABM Treaty.

“President Bush has also certainly worked hard to fulfill his campaign promise to defend the American people against ballistic-missile attack as soon as possible—even if it meant withdrawing from the Treaty.²³ I think he learned a great deal from his father’s presidency when promises had been made to American public that were perceived to have not been kept. There’s one thing you can say about Bush, he does not plan to make the same mistake.”

Frank continued, “Also, I heard from some of the House staffers saying one reason that the decision was made in December was that Congress’ winter recess was fast approaching and the president felt that those opponents of NMD would not be as vocal in denouncing his decision to withdraw. You have to remember that winter recess was fast approaching. However, the timing of the president’s ABM announcement did not go over too well with many of the Democrats because they were not consulted. Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) criticized by stating, “Shutting Congress out of the decision-making process involving agreements among nations is a dangerous and corrosive course of action. It effectively undermines the intent of the framers of our Constitution.”²⁴ Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del), and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented shortly after the decision was announced that the president, “has not offered any convincing

rationale for why any missile defense test it may need to conduct would require walking away from a treaty that has helped keep the peace for the last thirty years. A year ago, it was widely reported that our intelligence community had concluded that pulling out of the ABM would prompt the Chinese to increase their nuclear arsenal tenfold, and when they build up, so will the Indians, and when the Indians do, so will the Pakistanis. And for what? A system no one is convinced will work. Senator Biden was pretty worked up since he learned of the decision by reading it in a newspaper.”²⁵

But as you are aware, Frank continued, “Republicans have long supported missile defense. Senator John W. Warner (R-VA), and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said immediately after the 11 September attacks, I think the recent attack on New York and Northern Virginia has strengthen the argument in favor of a missile defense and this will require us to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The treaty has outlived its purposes and a new framework should be put in place.”²⁶ Additionally, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) said after the President’s remarks at NDU on 1 May 2001, “I greatly admire President Bush for his commitment to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack.”²⁷

Frank continued, “But I think despite opposition from Democrats and some arms control groups, the White House’s decision will not be challenged openly—in part because patriotism is still running very high. The Washington Post-ABC News poll conducted on 18-19 December 2001, indicated that 86% of those interviewed either strongly approved (64%) or somewhat approved (22%) of the way President Bush is handling his job as our president.”²⁸ I talked with the arms control guys in both OSD and the Joint Staff and their reaction to Bush’s announcement was basically a large yawn. They said the groundwork had been laid months before and it was just a matter of time for the abrogation to take place.

“A few of the interest groups, such as Greenpeace and the Federation of American Scientists, are trying to influence members of Congress right now on the Bush decision but as long as the missile testing results are favorable, the groups should keep quiet.”²⁹ However, if the tests fail then criticism will likely increase since the price tag is estimated to be \$60 billion.”

Gonzo thanked Colonel Trust for his time.

His next stop was to see Mr. Jim Claus in the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) to find out about the Pentagon role in the decision to abrogate from the treaty.

After a quick handshake, Jim invited Gonzo into his cubicle and explained his thoughts on why the president made the decision in December.

“Let me tell you that we were pushing the secretary of defense hard to get the president beyond that ABM Treaty. But it was an easy sell. As you probably know, back in 1998 a blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission reported that a significant danger of devastating attacks via long-range missile could emerge at any time and with little warning. Well, the study was

chaired by Secretary Rumsfeld. We're lucky to have him as secretary since he knows the capability of rogue states and terrorists as well as anyone else in the administration.

Jim further responded, "You have to admit that Secretary Rumsfeld's stock has hit an all-time high with the military's success in the war on terrorism, the latest successful missile defense test, and with having the national security advisor supposedly in his camp on the ABM Treaty issue. Just look at the latest *Gallup Poll* conducted from 6-9 December 2001 and the public shows the secretary with an 82% approval rating of his handling of the war on terrorism."³⁰

"One of the reasons we needed the decision to pull out of the treaty right now was for us to begin spending the \$273 million for construction and breaking ground for a missile defense command center at Fort Greely, Alaska in late April or early May. You can imagine the weather conditions for construction up there and we only have three to four months of spring thaw to begin this massive effort. Secondly, we have some multiple test launches planned in 2002 and the treaty does not allow many of these tests. You may know that after the 13 November 2001 summit in Crawford, Texas, it appeared the Russians were inclined to allow us to conduct some antimissile tests despite the treaty restrictions. But the Russians wanted the right to approve each and every test of the system. Do you have any idea how long that approval process would have taken? We just could not live with those constraints and were concerned that the Russians would have us curtail, or maybe even terminate our developmental tests thereby significantly slowing down our progress.

"Our latest test occurred on 3 December 2001, was the second successful intercept of a dummy warhead for a ground-based system. We know the importance of each of these tests to our program and soon we plan on using sea-based and air-based platforms for intercept."³¹ Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), made comment that the successful test on 3 December increased our confidence in the missile defense system and underscores the importance of the \$8.3 billion for such programs.³² Defense contractors from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, TRW, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. They have sent numerous white papers to Congress explaining that this is an engineering issue, that we are getting our arms around it. If the ABM Treaty had not been abrogated, we would seriously jeopardize the deployment of our missile defense system."

Gonzo pulled out a press release dated 4 December 2001 and said to Jim, "According to this article from the Council for a Livable World, I see the test conducted on 3 December resulted in a successful intercept but this press release says to remain cautious because the conditions for the test were not realistic. The fact is that this test does not show that hit-to-kill technology works in the real world today."³³

Gonzo asked Jim, "Is it not true that when we know such things as when the target missile is launched, where it is coming from, and where it is going to, we should be able to intercept each time? How feasible is this technology?"

Jim went on to explain, "Well, Lieutenant General Kadall, director of BMDO, has said these are tests where we continue to learn and not tests to be judged as pass-fail."³⁴

Jim continued, “You are correct that we have many technological challenges, but we, in BMDO, believe we are progressing well. Now that we have pulled out of the treaty, we need to press forward with good test results and deploy a missile defense system.”

Gonzo thanked Jim for his time.

Gonzo certainly collected a lot of information and now needed to sort out and put on paper his rationale for why the president announced on 13 December 2001 to abrogate the ABM Treaty. It was time to start putting pen to paper for Colonel Connell’s tasker.

1972 ABM TREATY CHRONOLOGY

1972	ABM Treaty signed	1993	Clinton administration reversed course on NMD and the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty.
	United States and Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear weapons and each feared retaliation of a launch would result in the destruction of the other’s country (the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)). This rationale was clearly reflected in the ratification surrounding the ABM Treaty and the language of Article I of the Treaty was explicit, committing each side “not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of its territory.”		National missile defense programs were downgraded in priority, and funding was significantly reduced. The ABM Treaty was seen as “the heart of its arms control policy”.
1983	President Reagan announces the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)	1997	Congress established a bipartisan commission to assess the emerging missile threat.
	Proposes a long-term goal for development of a national missile defense to render “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Saw ABM Treaty as an obstacle to effective missile defenses because it inhibited research, development, testing, and deployment.		Headed by Donald Rumsfeld, the Commission estimated that countries such as North Korea and Iran could threaten the United States within five years after deciding to acquire long-range ballistic missiles.
1991	Bush administration announces to deploy GPALS—Global Protection Against Limited Strikes	1999	National Missile Defense Act
	End of Cold War and demise of Soviet Union brought in new era in security policy. Sought renegotiation of the ABM Treaty on both sensors and the right to deploy additional ABM interceptor missiles beyond the one site allowed by the Treaty.		“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.”
		2001	George W. Bush abrogates ABM Treaty on 13 December 2001.

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Panama—The Enduring Crisis 1985–1989

RONALD E. RATCLIFF

Prologue

On 20 December 1989, the United States launched its largest military operation since the Vietnam War against Panama. Operation Just Cause employed over twenty-six thousand servicemen, including the largest parachute drop since WWII, to depose and capture Panama's military dictator, Manuel Antonio Noriega and to restore a democratic government to the country.¹ In his address to the American people the next day, President George Bush stated the reasons for the invasion were: "to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty."² While the operation was generally a success, a greater question arises. Why did the United States find it necessary to employ overwhelming military force to remove the leader of a sovereign country that was ostensibly one of America's strongest allies in Central America?

1968 - 1984: NORIEGA, THE NECESSARY EVIL

Noriega was the product of a military junta led by General Omar Torrijos that overthrew the Panamanian government in 1968. He was instrumental in helping Torrijos survive his own coup in 1969. His loyalty was rewarded and he eventually rose to command of the Panamanian military forces in 1983. Shortly after assuming command, he illegally influenced the 1984 national elections in a move to strengthen the military's influence over the Panamanian government. He engineered the election of President Nicolas Barletta, the military's candidate and one who was considered personally loyal and subservient to Noriega. Some observers believe that the United States turned a blind eye to Noriega's election fraud because it put in place a government that was considered sympathetic to American interests.³ While Panama had an elected government, real power rested in the hands of the military, and Noriega was the man in charge.

Noriega was long known to the U.S. government as an unsavory character whose excesses included drug trafficking, money laundering, and murder. However, the United States ignored his transgressions in order to secure national interests considered more vital than policing his corrupt practices in Panama. American foreign policy was focused instead on two strategic threats emanating from the region: Communist inspired insurgencies against U.S. backed governments in Central America and drug trafficking that was causing serious domestic concern.

During the 1980's, Nicaragua and Communist encroachment dominated U.S. regional focus. Although secondary to those interests, the United States recognized it also had critical security interests in Panama, including: access to U.S. bases and facilities in Panama, implementation of the Panama Canal treaties, support for the Contras (anti-Communist military forces) operating in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and continued operation of intelligence gathering facilities targeted against Cuba and other Latin American countries.⁴ Noriega was considered an essential asset in securing those interests. He was used by several U.S. agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and later by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to further American interests.⁵

1985 - 1987: YEARS OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

Serious problems with Noriega began for the United States in 1985 when a well respected political opponent of Noriega, Dr. Hugh Spadafora, was brutally tortured and murdered by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). Spadafora had made credible and extensive accusations that had drawn significant international attention to Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and other illegal activity. Spadafora was well known and highly regarded by most Panamanians. When his death was discovered, Panamanian outrage was immediate and extensive. With the public's outcry too loud to ignore, Panama's President Barletta called for Noriega to step aside as the PDF commander while the crime was investigated. Noriega responded by forcing Barletta to resign, repressing all attempts to investigate or report the crime, and installing a more reliable puppet as president.

The murder of a popular anti-Noriega figure and the ousting of an elected president elicited significant press coverage of Noriega for the first time in America. The U.S. media portrayed Noriega as a corrupt dictator who was sending drugs into America, protecting drug cartel leaders, supporting terrorists, laundering illicit drug profits, and brutally suppressing democracy in his homeland. These accusations led to congressional hearings where the administration, and the DEA in particular, were forced to defend its continued, albeit reluctant, support of Noriega citing greater American security interests in the region.⁶

Senator Jesse Helms, an arch conservative who had resisted the return of the canal to Panama, was especially critical of the administration's support of Noriega. He felt strongly that Noriega was too corrupt to be entrusted with the Panama Canal.⁷ As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms tried to build support for a harder look at Noriega, but his stance against relinquishing control of the canal left him with little or no support for his position against Noriega. The administration's point man on Central America, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, was also able to blunt much of the criticism by emphasizing the benefits of continued American support of Noriega. Senator Helms found little public interest in Panama and, lacking congressional support for his anti-Noriega position, U.S. criticism of Noriega quickly died away.⁸

The press, however, did begin to take greater interest in Noriega and his involvement in drug trafficking in 1986. The *New York Times* ran an investigative series detailing his extensive connections to drug traffickers and to the CIA. These accusations struck a resonant

note in an America starting to come to grips with its serious and growing drug problems. The *New York Times* revelations precipitated further coverage by other news agencies which began to raise American public sentiment against Noriega.⁹ Those concerns were further heightened in early 1987 when Noriega's second in command, Colonel Diaz Herrera, went public with numerous charges of corruption against Noriega. Herrera was motivated by Noriega's refusal to step down in 1986 and pass the reins of the PDF on to him as previously agreed. His charges led to large public demonstrations as Panamanians took to the streets to vent their anger against Noriega and his reign of PDF brutality and corruption. As calls for Noriega's removal continued into the spring of 1987, he struck out against his opposition by brutally crushing demonstrations using special riot police and declaring a state of emergency that precluded further public demonstrations.¹⁰

As the Panamanian situation grew worse, command of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) changed in June 1987. SOUTHCOM, whose headquarters was inside Panama, was responsible for all military matters that affected Panama. General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., the incoming commander, had extensive experience in Latin America, was fluent in Spanish, knew Noriega, and understood the issues that afflicted Panama. In his remarks upon assuming command of SOUTHCOM, he made it clear that Noriega needed to return governance of Panama back to civilian control. Noriega was incensed by General Woerner's remarks and responded by stepping up the harassment of U.S. servicemen and women in Panama. It did not take Woerner long to realize that Noriega would never step aside of his own will and that force likely would be necessary. He directed his staff to begin planning for a U.S. military intervention.¹¹

The U.S. Congress also had become energized about Panama by mid-1987 as their Iran-Contra hearings revealed details of illicit U.S. activity in Panama. It learned that members of the National Security Council (Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North) had used Noriega to circumvent congressional restrictions on aid to Nicaraguan Contras imposed in 1983. Noriega had been used to help the administration purchase and deliver arms to the Contras using drug profits from various schemes including transport and sale of cocaine from Panama into the United States.¹² These revelations, and continued negative press about Noriega himself, forced a review of U.S. policy in Panama, and led the Senate to pass overwhelmingly a resolution calling on Noriega and his senior advisors to step down immediately. Noriega angrily reacted by accusing the United States of interfering in Panama's internal affairs and instigated mob attacks on U.S. installations and the U.S. embassy itself. Noriega stepped up his brutal crackdown on domestic demonstrations and suspended the free press.¹³ The United States responded by suspending all military aid to Panama and curtailing all contact between the U.S. military and the PDF. Significantly, the CIA cut its ties with Noriega, severing a relationship that had lasted over twenty years.¹⁴

By this time, the Reagan administration had reached the conclusion that Noriega had to be removed. There was, however, no consensus about how to achieve that goal. President Ronald Reagan was known for his reluctance to resolve policy disputes among his senior advisors and the means and manner of Noriega's removal were no exception. The State

Department, led by Elliot Abrams, and the NSC staff wanted Noriega out immediately and were prepared to use strong diplomatic pressure to force Noriega into a corner while supporting a coup from within the ranks of the PDF to depose him.¹⁵ The Department of Defense and the CIA did not support a rapid overthrow of Noriega. They did not see a capable replacement that could keep the PDF in check and hold the country together while a democratic leader could be elected. They also feared that Noriega would react violently to any hard push to remove him, which endangered approximately fifty thousand Americans living in Panama.¹⁶ In the DoD's and CIA's view, while Noriega had his drawbacks, there were no real alternatives to him. They felt any U.S. action should wait for the Panamanians to take serious steps to oust Noriega.

In 1987, the American media was not forcing the administration's hand on Noriega either. It was focused on the Iran-Contra hearings and the roles that senior administration officials had played in that situation.

Absent any clear consensus among his senior advisors, President Reagan was persuaded to attempt to cajole Noriega to step down. Those efforts proved unsuccessful due to a lack of a clear and strong message to Noriega that he had to go. During late 1987 and early 1988, no fewer than three senior emissaries were sent, but each communicated a slightly different spin on when, or even if, he had to leave. As a result, Noriega gained the impression that there was no consensus within the administration that he had to leave.¹⁷ Absent forceful U.S. intervention, Noriega saw no compelling reason to abandon his lucrative situation.

1988: RUNNING OUT OF OPTIONS

In February 1988, the Reagan administration's predicament with Noriega grew even worse, when the U.S. Justice Department indicted Noriega in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. Those indictments linked him directly with the drug cartels that were smuggling cocaine into the United States. They were also a distinct source of embarrassment to the U.S. government and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which considered Noriega to be one of its best assets in its war on drugs. Noriega had always complied with DEA requests, and nurtured an appearance that he was a strong advocate of America's war on drugs, but it was clear that he had used that cooperation to his personal advantage.¹⁸

To the even greater embarrassment of the administration, however, was the total lack of coordination between the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the administration on the issuance of the indictments. The Justice Department has a culture of operating independently and staying clear of political considerations in the pursuit of bringing criminals to justice. As a result, neither President Reagan nor Secretary of State George Shultz were advised in advance that the leader of a sovereign nation was to be indicted on charges of drug trafficking.¹⁹ The Florida indictments, coupled with the administration's failed attempts to get Noriega to step aside voluntarily, made it clear that more forceful action was now required to remove Noriega. Matters were only made worse when polls revealed Reagan's declining approval figures, showing that less than thirty percent approved

of his handling of the Panama situation in July 1988.²⁰ Something needed to be done, but once again, the administration was split on how to accomplish that goal.

The Department of State became the earliest proponent of using military force to remove Noriega from power in Panama. Elliot Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, largely shaped that policy. Abrams was a personal favorite of Secretary of State George Shultz, but his abrasive and arrogant manner caused him to be disliked by most other senior presidential advisors. Shultz, however, was content to let Abrams set State Department policy towards Panama and Central America, since his attention was focused on more pressing problems in the Soviet Union and the Middle East.²¹

Abrams attention to Panama came late. His initial focus in Central America had been squarely on Nicaragua and its Communist inspired Sandinista government that had taken power in 1979. Many felt that Abrams had been obsessed with the overthrow of the Sandinista government. When illegal U.S. operations there were exposed and stopped as a result of the Iran-Contra scandal, his personal role came under severe criticism. His reputation and credibility with the Congress were badly damaged by his lack of veracity during testimony before them about the administration's support of the Contras.²² Critics charged that his focus on Panama and Noriega was an attempt to rebuild his standing with the Congress and others.²³ As Noriega demonstrated obstinate resiliency in staying in power, Abrams became convinced that U.S. military power was the best, perhaps the only, instrument to push the troublesome Noriega aside. He convinced Secretary Shultz that military intervention was the best course of action.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral William Crowe, solidly opposed Abrams and Shultz in the use of military force in Panama. His reasons were compelling.

- Military action staged from U.S. bases inside Panama to remove the ruling regime would jeopardize the U.S. basing rights in other countries where the United States had sensitive issues with the host.
- Fifty thousand Americans lived in Panama, and all would be at risk to Noriega if the United States started military action.
- Use of military force against Panama would reinforce the perception of "Yanqui" abuse of power at a time when Communist ideologues were making strong inroads into the region.²⁴

Among the stronger reasons for Crowe's reluctance was the fact that Noriega permitted the U.S. military to use its bases in Panama to spy on neighboring countries, and to train other regional military forces, all in direct violation of the Canal treaties. Another leader may not be so passive in permitting such operations.²⁵

When the State Department and Abrams proposed any form of military action, Crowe and the JCS countered with details of the costs, risks, and obstacles inherent in such action. One telling example was the questionable defense estimate that evacuation of noncombatants

from Panama preparatory to U.S. military action would cost of over \$100 million and take at least seven months to complete. Crowe's position was further strengthened by the elevation of the chairman's role under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act. He was now the principal military adviser to the president and no longer had to build a consensus for his personal opinions from among the other service chiefs or the secretary of defense. Crowe held strong reservations about getting involved militarily in Panama and regularly clashed with Abrams. He purportedly considered him "a dangerous man pursuing perilous policy . . . an ideologue out of control."²⁶ Abrams, for his part, considered Crowe's reluctance to use military force as "ill-guided, post-Vietnam military caution."²⁷

The Reagan administration remained split over employing a military option throughout 1988 to resolve the Panamanian problem. State, led by Elliot Abrams, argued for at least a limited use of force to capture Noriega and bring him to justice in the United States. Defense, however, pointed out practical problems of such an operations and raised the issue that the PDF might respond by taking American hostages to recover Noriega.²⁸ The CIA was also reluctant to support any military operation against Noriega having just endured the fallout of its dealings in the Iran-Contra scandal. Its new director had little interest in or knowledge of Panama and wasn't interested in getting involved in any potentially controversial action that would bring further discredit or attention to the agency.²⁹ President Reagan's national security advisor, Frank Carlucci, who had replaced the disgraced Admiral Poindexter, also opposed State's desire to use military force in Panama. The Tower Commission investigation of the Iran-Contra affair had just reported its findings and had severely chastised the National Security Council for violating normal national security decision making processes. As a result, Carlucci was not willing to support another military adventure in Central America.³⁰ When General Colin Powell replaced Carlucci, who moved across the Potomac to become the secretary of defense, the Pentagon was effectively in a position to block any presidential support for military action throughout 1988.

Any desire by Washington to take strong action against Noriega was mitigated by the presidential elections of 1988. The Republican administration needed to put a lid on Panama so that it did not become an issue that could be used by the Democrats against Vice President Bush. Although the military option was ruled out, President Reagan recognized that he had to take some action against Noriega. As a consequence, economic sanctions were authorized against Panama.

Panama was highly susceptible to U.S. economic pressure. Its economy was closely tied to the U.S. economy and it used the American dollar as its currency. Unable to win support for military action, the State Department argued for invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in order to economically isolate Panama. By blocking the transfer of funds into and out of the country, the United States could deny Noriega the money he needed to pay his military and civil servants, the last vestiges of his support. Without that support, the theory went, Noriega would be forced to leave by the Panamanians themselves.

The administration was sharply divided over the use of stringent economic sanctions. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker was adamantly opposed to employing economic sanctions in Panama. He described the use of the IEEPA as “using an atomic bomb to kill a fly.” Baker was further influenced by his concerns for the numerous American banks and businesses that operated in Panama and which would bear the brunt of the sanctions. Even Secretary of State Shultz personally doubted the effectiveness of economic sanctions characterizing them as difficult to enforce and rarely effective. Those Panamanians who opposed Noriega were also reluctant to embrace economic sanctions, noting Noriega and his associates got most of their money illegally and weren’t dependent on the local economy.³¹ Secretary of Defense Carlucci argued that IEEPA would only serve to stiffen Noriega’s resolve to remain in power. He was joined by General Powell and White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker, both of whom argued for less drastic measures.³²

Despite the many reservations voiced, President Reagan forged ahead with sanctions, but permitted a modified plan to be implemented. Sanctions were initially delayed as the bureaucracy struggled with the many practical problems of implementing a complete economic sanction of Panama. First, there was the issue of how to pay several thousand American and Panamanian employees of the Panama Canal. To stop paying them would risk shutting down the canal. Further, there were numerous American government offices and facilities (the embassy and SOUTHCOM to name two) that had to pay utility bills or be shut-down. And finally, as Baker had feared, numerous American businesses and banks lobbied hard for exceptions to avoid the huge expected losses that would be felt by the banks if full-blown economic sanctions were put in place. In the end, the sanctions were delayed for over two months and not fully employed as the bureaucracy waded through numerous requests for exceptions. The net result was that the sanctions had much less effect than they might have had.³³

As the last days of the Reagan administration drew to a close, it was determined that the United States needed to wait for a Panamanian solution such as a popular uprising like the one which had forced Marcos from power in the Philippines or a coup d’état. Some held out hope that the 1989 Panamanian elections would force Noriega from power.³⁴

1989: BAD GETS WORSE

In 1989, after George Bush’s election as president, CINCSOUTH was summoned to Washington to testify before the House Appropriations Committee regarding the defense budget. General Woerner had grown increasingly frustrated as he was forced to sit back and avoid confrontation with Noriega at all costs. The PDF had grown increasingly brazen as it illegally detained U.S. servicemen, physically assaulted others, stopped mail deliveries, and stole U.S. material including diplomatic dispatches. During nine months in 1988, over one thousand incidents of harassment by Panamanian forces against Americans were documented.³⁵ The decision to go slowly with Noriega had exacted a heavy toll on the morale of U.S. troops in Panama. While adhering to the administration’s desires, General Woerner became the target of their frustrations and SOUTHCOM became known “WIMPCOM.”³⁶

During his testimony before the House, and in a subsequent visit to Washington, Woerner publicly aired his concerns and frustrations regarding the lack of a clear and comprehensive U.S. policy in Panama. Woerner had never served in Washington and his candor showed his political naiveté. His criticisms were widely reported and provoked a strong response by President Bush who admonished Admiral Crowe for Woerner's remarks.³⁷ Despite his first-hand knowledge of how bad the situation was in Panama, his remarks won him little support in Washington and numbered his days in Panama.

As matters continued to deteriorate in Panama, the Bush administration, like its predecessor, continued to look for a nonmilitary way to depose Noriega. The last viable option was to use the May 1989 Panamanian presidential elections. The United States funneled ten million dollars to the opposition party in an effort to install a democratic government that would throw Noriega out of his position as PDF commander.³⁸ Despite significant U.S. assistance to opposition parties and the presence of distinguished election observers (including several from the United States), those hopes disappeared when Noriega seized ballot boxes and manipulated the returns to give victory to his candidate. The press immediately reported the widespread fraud to the waiting world. Noriega attempted to prevent former President Jimmy Carter, the leading U.S. election observer, from conducting a press conference to raise his objections to the handling of the election. Outraged Panamanians took to the streets, but they were brutally repressed by the PDF and Noriega's paramilitary Dignity Battalions. When the opposition candidates dared lead demonstrations in protest, they were beaten and arrested in front of the international media.³⁹

These last acts removed all doubt in the Bush administration's mind that it could find a peaceful solution to the Noriega problem. President Bush recalled the American ambassador to Panama, reduced embassy staff, ordered an evacuation of American dependents, and placed the remainder inside secure American compounds. Further, he announced that the United States would enforce its rights under its treaties with Panama including the free and unfettered movement of U.S. troops through Panamanian territory, and sent a brigade-sized force to augment U.S. troops in Panama.⁴⁰

The Organization of American States (OAS) was drawn into the conflict as it watched events in Panama and Noriega's handling of the presidential elections. It had conflicting interests at stake - its desire to let Panama handle its own internal affairs juxtaposed with its duty to support free elections and the democratic process which Noriega had just trampled. Yet any intervention in Panama risked intervention in the future elections of other countries in the region. OAS was not prepared to censure Noriega, but it sent a delegation to Panama try to mediate a peaceful transfer of power from Noriega.

Between June and September 1989, Noriega received various OAS delegations, but as time passed it became clear that he no intention of stepping down.⁴¹ The reasons for Noriega's refusal to step aside, which escaped OAS and U.S. government officials at the time, were quite simple. He could not relinquish power without signing his own death warrant. His intimate knowledge of drug cartel operations, coupled with a long list of enemies made through a lifetime of crime, made him far too dangerous to be left alive.⁴²

The United States and Panama embarked on a war of words and nerves between the May 1989 elections and October 1989. On 3 October 1989, that tension was wound even tighter by a coup attempt led by a small group of officers in Noriega's inner circle. Despite U.S. hopes that a coup d'état would occur, the United States was caught woefully off-guard and poorly prepared to help the plotters. The plotting officers' request for U.S. support, which was minimal, came at a most inopportune time for the United States. General Maxwell Thurman had just taken command of SOUTHCOM three days earlier. He immediately feared that the coup was a Noriega hoax designed to embarrass him and humiliate the United States.⁴³ Not only was Thurman brand new, so too was chairman of the JCS. On the same day he assumed his duties, General Colin Powell was advised of the coup that was to take place the next day.

Information about the coup and its leaders was sketchy at best. The CIA and DIA had little reliable intelligence about the plotters or their likelihood of success. The situation was made even more confusing when the plotters delayed their coup by one day. As a result, despite the plotters' capture of Noriega, the United States failed to provide the minimal assistance required by the plotters to prevent Noriega's faithful soldiers from rescuing him. As the coup attempt unfolded, American support was largely paralyzed. Conflicting information flowed to the administration from SOUTHCOM and other intelligence sources regarding the status of coup. General Thurman was unable provide any clarity to the situation because he had largely purged the experienced and knowledgeable staff officers who had served under General Woerner.⁴⁴

Thus, during the most critical hours of the coup, American soldiers in Panama waited for guidance from Washington about what assistance they were to render to the coup. Yet, Washington was paralyzed by insufficient, and, oftentimes, conflicting information from the scene, which was necessary to form a decision.⁴⁵ As a result, Noriega narrowly survived the coup and exacted immediate vengeance on the plotting officers, who were tortured and executed for their efforts.

Congressional and media criticism of the administration and the military was swift in coming. Numerous government leaks from both the State and Defense Departments revealed the magnitude of the U.S. failure to help the Panamanians get rid of Noriega. Congressional and media criticism was so extensive and detailed that the administration ordered its agency heads to stop all leaks and implicit criticism immediately.⁴⁶ The Senate Intelligence Committee criticized the administration for "talking loudly and carrying a small stick." The national security advisor, who was the target of much of the criticism, responded by accusing the Congress of withholding the president's stick.⁴⁷ Senator Jesse Helms, who had sounded the alarm about Noriega a couple of years before, revealed embarrassing details to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. failure to support the coup d'état and described the administration as a bunch of "Keystone Cops."⁴⁸

While the administration scrambled to deflect attention away from its failings, it recognized that the criticism was richly deserved. It took immediate steps to determine how and

why it had performed so poorly and to prepare for the next opportunity to get rid of Noriega, once and for all. President Bush irritably declared, “Amateur hour is over.”⁴⁹

DECEMBER 1989: END GAME

For his part, Noriega was not content to let America’s embarrassment go unnoticed and continued his provocations against American personnel in Panama. To add insult to injury, on 15 December 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly appointed Noriega “Maximum Leader” and head of the Panamanian government. It further declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States.⁵⁰ The next day, PDF soldiers fired on an American vehicle and killed a Marine Corps lieutenant. A U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife observed the shooting and were arrested. The lieutenant was severely beaten and his wife was physically abused and threatened.⁵¹

On Sunday, 17 December, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, briefed the president and his closest advisors on the situation in Panama and the continuing risk to American lives, as evidenced by the death of the U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant. President Bush was particularly disturbed by the treatment of the Navy lieutenant and his wife.⁵² After a review of the events, General Powell made his recommendation. The time had come to use military force to remove Noriega from power and a large-scale operation was needed to do it.

President Bush inquired about the need for large forces. Powell responded that overwhelming force was necessary to reduce the risk to those involved. A smaller operation only reduced the chances of success without reducing the risk to U.S. forces involved. Secretary of State James Baker, the former secretary of the Treasury Department in the Reagan administration, who had opposed economic sanctions, voiced State’s support for the operation. He argued military force was needed to destroy the PDF so that a truly democratic civilian government could be installed.

Discussion continued for approximately two hours. Finally President Bush observed, “This guy is not going to lay off. It will only get worse.” He turned to General Powell and said, “Okay, let’s go.”⁵³

PANAMA CRISIS TIMELINE

	President Carter negotiates return of control of the Panama Canal to Panama to occur in the year 2000.		permit free elections of new government.
1979	Carter administration officials block federal indictments against Noriega for drug trafficking and arms smuggling.	Feb 1988	Federal Grand Juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, indict Noriega for racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering.
Aug 1983	Noriega assumes command of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF).		President of Panama fires Noriega, but he responds by ousting the president and replacing him with a more reliable politician.
May 1984	Noriega and the PDF intervene in presidential elections and rig results to produce a victory for Noriega's candidate.	Mar 1988	PDF officers stage unsuccessful coup d'etat against Noriega. Plotters brutally tortured and executed.
Sep 1985	Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a popular critic of Noriega, is brutally tortured and murdered after making serious and credible allegations about Noriega's illicit activities.		Noriega creates Dignity Battalions to augment PDF forces.
Jun 1987	Noriega announces he will remain head of the PDF for an additional five years. The next day, his planned successor goes public with details about Noriega's crimes. Panamanians stage a general strike which causes Noriega to shut down the media.		The Reagan administration considers military action, but the DoD and others oppose it. Economic sanctions are considered while the administration attempts to get Noriega to step down voluntarily.
		Apr-June 1988	Economic sanctions implemented against Panama.
		Nov 1988	George Bush wins U.S. presidential elections.
Jun 1987	The U.S. Senate approves a nonbinding resolution calling for Noriega to step down. Noriega supporters attack the U.S. embassy with rocks and cause extensive damage. The U.S. responds by suspending military aid to Panama and cutting contacts. Noriega is removed from the CIA payroll.	May 1989	Presidential elections held in Panama. Noriega steals election with widespread fraud. Dignity Battalions assault opposition candidates and crowds in front of world media.
	General Woerner assumes command of SOUTHCOM and criticizes Noriega publicly.	30 Sep 1989	General Max Thurman replaces General Woerner as CINCSOUTH.
		2 Oct 1989	General Colin Powell replaces Admiral Crowe as chairman, JCS.
Aug-Dec 1987	The U.S. tries to negotiate a deal with Noriega to step down and	3 Oct 1989	Noriega survives coup d'etat and executes plotters.

15 Dec 1989	Noriega declares himself “Maximum Leader” and declares a state of war exists with the United States.	17 Dec 1989	President Bush authorizes Operation Just Cause to remove Noriega from power and to destroy the PDF.
15 Dec 1989	PDF forces kill a U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant at a PDF road-block and then arrest and assault a U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife who witnessed the attack.	20 Dec 1989	Operation Just Cause commences. Noriega escapes capture and eludes U.S. forces.
		3 Jan 1990	Noriega surrenders to U.S. forces.

Epilogue

The invasion of Panama received much domestic and international criticism. One day after the invasion, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted overwhelmingly to censure the United States, stating that it “deeply deplored” the U.S. invasion. It marked the first time in the forty-two year history of the OAS that it formally rebuked the United States.⁵⁴ The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China introduced a resolution before the U.N. Security Council two days later condemning the United States. It was vetoed by the United States, but a similar resolution was passed a week later by the U.N. General Assembly by a wide margin. While there was criticism in the American press, the media was generally supportive.⁵⁵

Inside Panama, there was widespread support for the American invasion. Two weeks after the United States invaded Panama, a CBS opinion poll showed over ninety percent of the country supported the invasion.⁵⁶ Subsequent polling data gathered between 1991 and 1994 showed a decrease in support for the invasion to between 67 and 55 percent, but nearly three-quarters of those polled still supported Noriega’s ouster.⁵⁷

Notes

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4. Scranton, 3.
5. Kempe, 28.
6. Ibid., 92–94.
7. Ibid., 175–176.
8. Kevin Buckley, *Panama—The Whole Story*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 51.
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10. Scranton, 108–109.
11. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 11–12.
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14. Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol 110, n4), 539.
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16. Ibid., 117.
17. Gilboa, 544.
18. Scranton, 46.
19. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1052.
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22. William R. Farrell and Andrew E. Gibson, *The Panama Dilemma*, (NWC Press, 2000), p. 67. More than 125 House Democrats had called for his resignation after his admission that he had misled the Congress.
23. Kempe, 294–295.
24. Kempe, 297.
25. Ibid. 301.
26. Ibid., 294.
27. Ibid, 299.
28. Gilboa, 545.
29. Kempe, 297.
30. Ibid., 296.
31. Ibid., 307.
32. Scranton, 136.
33. Ibid., 307–308.
34. Ibid., 543.
35. Ibid., 334.
36. Scranton, 39.
37. Donnelly, 42.
38. Scanton, 157.
39. Ibid., 161–163.
40. Ibid., 165.
41. Buckley, 185–187.
42. Gilboa, 554.
43. Kempe, 381.
44. Ibid., 380.
45. Ibid., 386.
46. Ibid., 394.
47. Ibid.
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49. Robert Woodward, *The Commanders*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 127–128.
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51. Donnelly, 94–95.
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Madeleine's War: Operation Allied Force

DAVID T. BUCKWALTER

Secretary Albright, thank you for being able to redeem the lessons of your life story by standing up for the freedom of the people in the Balkans.

—President William J. Clinton¹

The president's words were included in a *Time* magazine article entitled "Madeleine's War." In the same article, Ms. Albright was asked about the reference to the conflict as "her war." She replied: "Well, I don't think it's solely mine. But I feel that we did the right thing, and I am proud of the role I played in it."² Certainly others were important on the road to Operation Allied Force, but the secretary's role is a good place to start.

Born Madeleine Korbelt to Jewish parents in Czechoslovakia in 1937, Ms. Albright would make two escapes from totalitarian dictators before her twelfth birthday. In March 1939, her father, Josef, took the family to London to ride out World War II.³ The war left deep impressions on Albright, and Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia was a seminal event in her family's life. She would later say: "My mindset was Munich [referring to Neville Chamberlain's 1938 appeasement of Hitler]; most of my generation's was Vietnam."⁴ During a 1998 foreign ministers' conference on Kosovo, an aide suggested that the United States could probably accept "softer" language being proposed for a communiqué to Slobodan Milosevic. Her retort was: "Where do you think we are, Munich?"⁵

Josef Korbelt and family returned to Czechoslovakia after World War II, and he was posted to Belgrade as the Czech ambassador from 1945-48. With the fall of Czechoslovakia to a Communist coup, the family traveled to New York in November 1948, and were subsequently granted asylum in the United States.⁶ They settled in Denver, where Josef would ultimately become the Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

Ms. Albright attended Wellesley College in Massachusetts, graduating with honors in political science in 1959. Three days after graduation, she married Joseph Albright, a wealthy member of a newspaper dynasty. In 1961, Joseph took a job with a paper in Long Island, *Newsday*, and between 1961 and 1967, Ms. Albright gave birth to three daughters, including a set of twins. She also enrolled in a graduate studies program at Columbia University, where one of her professors was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would later serve as President Carter's National Security Advisor (NSA). Ms. Albright earned a master's degree in 1968 and began studies for her doctoral dissertation on the role of the press in the 1968 "Prague

Spring” uprising. Later that year, Joseph was promoted to Washington bureau chief for *Newsday*, and the family moved to D.C.⁷

In Washington, Ms. Albright accepted the task of organizing a fund raising dinner for Senator Edmund Muskie’s unsuccessful 1972 presidential bid. By 1976, she had completed her Ph.D. from Columbia and had been hired as Muskie’s chief legislative assistant. Muskie was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and thus, Ms. Albright spent a substantial amount of her time dealing with foreign affairs. In 1978, she moved to the Brzezinski National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving as a congressional liaison focusing on foreign policy legislation.⁸ In 1983, Joseph and Madeleine were divorced, but a generous settlement left Ms. Albright comfortably ensconced in the nation’s capital.⁹

During the Reagan/Bush years, Ms. Albright ran the Women in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University, garnering four “teacher of the year” awards, a record for Georgetown. During those same years, she began hosting dinners in her Georgetown home for some of the leading Democratic politicians, including Bill Clinton, then governor of Arkansas.¹⁰ In 1989, Albright sponsored Clinton’s application for membership to the Council of Foreign Relations. In 1989, she was named president of a liberal Democratic think tank, the Center for National Policy, becoming a frequent talk show guest and Republican administration critic. She opposed the Gulf War, arguing that President Bush had unwisely “personalized” the conflict with Saddam, and Albright was quoted as stating: “All problems can’t be solved by bombing the bejesus out of some small country.”¹¹

During the summer of 1992, she worked with Warren Christopher, Anthony Lake, and Samuel Berger in developing foreign policy position papers for the campaign.¹² She also served on a commission sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to suggest directions for United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Ms. Albright’s fellow participants in the project included many prominent Democrats who would later serve in the Clinton administration, including Henry Cisneros, John Deutsch, Richard Holbrooke, Alice Rivlin, David Gergen, and Admiral William Crowe.¹³ The commission report, *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World*, suggested, among other things, that United States policy should seek to: “. . . establish a new principle of international relations: The destruction or displacement of groups of peoples within states can justify international intervention. The United States should strengthen the collective machinery to carry out humanitarian actions.”¹⁴ The general thrust of the commission report seems, in retrospect, to read much like the first Clinton *National Security Strategy* of “Engagement and Enlargement.” In the summer of 1992, candidate Clinton also seemed to echo elements of the report, calling for more forceful action in Bosnia, including possible use of force.¹⁵

It was no surprise that Madeleine Albright obtained a high-level appointment in the Clinton administration. Appointing Albright as U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., President Clinton restored that position to cabinet rank with a seat on the NSC, and Albright attended most Principals’ Committee meetings of the NSC.¹⁶ Veteran political correspondent for *The Washington Post*, Mary McGrory, praised her as “an intellectual . . . with a

heart” and asserted: “She is precisely the kind of woman everyone wished could have been in the room when the men were making their disastrous decisions about Vietnam.”¹⁷

Ms. Albright soon established a reputation as one of the new administration’s most “hawkish” members. An advocate of what she then termed “assertive multilateralism,” she reportedly confronted then-Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Powell with the question: “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”¹⁸ As early as April 1993, she sent a memorandum to the White House urging air strikes to protect Muslims in Bosnia, and she argued strongly to stay the course in Somalia as violence mounted in August 1993.¹⁹ The October 1993 debacle in Somalia apparently did not diminish her enthusiasm for a muscular United States foreign policy. Shortly after the deaths of the Rangers in Mogadishu, she remained an advocate for a forceful response in Haiti after the USS *Harlan County* had been prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince.²⁰ Ms. Albright claimed that she had also argued strongly for a more forceful role in Rwanda. Years later, she told Sunday talk show host Cokie Roberts: “I followed instructions because I was an ambassador, but I screamed about the instructions that I got on this.”²¹ Ironically, her Rwanda position seemed to have been closer to the “right answer” in retrospect and may have enhanced her standing in the administration.

When Polish-born General Shalikashvili became the JCS chairman in late October 1993, Czech-born Albright found a much more congenial colleague than Colin Powell, by virtue of both heritage and philosophy. Albright developed a close relationship with the chairman during her time at the U.N..²² The new chairman was also more flexible than Powell on use of force issues, and one pundit would later claim that the U.N. ambassador and chairman: “pushed the administration away from the doctrine of the former chairman . . . Powell.”²³

Another Albright ally came more by virtue of philosophy than personal congeniality. Richard Holbrooke was a natural Albright ally on both NATO enlargement and Bosnia. Holbrooke acted as the “enforcer” to shepherd NATO expansion through the bureaucracy, and he was also aligned with Albright’s position for more forceful United States action in Bosnia.²⁴

Despite parallel views, two dynamics served to distance Albright and Holbrooke. One source of friction between Albright and Holbrooke was reportedly Holbrooke’s obvious “self-aggrandizement.” Former press spokesman Mike McCurry relates: “It was amazing to behold how relentlessly self promotional Holbrooke was.”²⁵ Another, perhaps more severe, source of conflict was that Albright and Holbrooke found themselves in competition for the same jobs. In the first Clinton administration, Holbrooke was reportedly bitterly disappointed with netting only an ambassadorship. After the 1996 election, Holbrooke was on the “short list” for secretary of state and favored by Vice President Gore and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Madeleine Albright ultimately obtained that prize after several women’s groups lobbied Gore, noting that it was women who had delivered the election to the Clinton/Gore team.²⁶

No one can be sure exactly why President Clinton decided to nominate Albright as secretary of state. Certainly the legacy of appointing the highest-ranking woman to have ever served in the government must have been attractive, and it was reported that Madeleine was the favorite of the president's wife, Hillary. A Clinton confidant told reporters, however, that the "chemistry" of the 1996 National Security Team (Albright, Cohen, Berger) was part of the rationale for Albright's selection, as was her reputation as, "a smart, tough cookie who stands up and says her piece."²⁷

The new secretary of state lost no time in establishing herself as one of the superstars of the second Clinton administration. At her swearing in on 23 January 1997, she cautioned that the United States: "must not shy from the mantle of leadership, nor hesitate to defend our interests . . ."²⁸ Just weeks later she was being termed: "the most media-savvy secretary of state since Henry Kissinger," and former President Gerald Ford called her, "the Tiger Woods of foreign policy."²⁹ By early summer she was the most popular member of the Clinton administration, exceeding the president and vice president with over 65 percent of Americans reporting "favorable" ratings.³⁰ She also became a favorite with the U.S. Congress. She developed a close personal relationship with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), and they came to be called the "odd couple" of American diplomacy. That relationship paid off with Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997.³¹ Securing the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May and the invitations to enlarge NATO in July 1997 were further feathers in her cap.³² When the Senate, with surprisingly little rancor, ratified NATO expansion the following year, Albright achieved one of her greatest triumphs.³³

Of course, success was not without its detractors. Some White House officials thought that she "hogged credit" for diplomatic successes. One complained to a reporter: "Nobody minds when Madeleine throws out the first pitch at ball games or puts on Stetson hats, but what bugs people around here is her good press at the president's expense."³⁴ This friction resulted in some criticism that she let her rhetoric get ahead of administration policy. It was, of course, the same style that put her in a position to ultimately become associated with the Kosovo conflict as "Madeleine's War."

According to Serbian legend, on 28 June 1389 at Kosovo Polje (the Field of Blackbirds), the leader of the Serbian army, Prince Lazar, was offered a choice between a kingdom on earth or a kingdom in heaven. Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom, and the Serbs were subsequently slaughtered by the Ottoman Turks, beginning over five hundred years of Serbian subjugation to the Ottomans. Even in defeat, the Serbs came to view themselves as the people who had saved Europe, containing the Ottoman push north.³⁵

Both Albanians and Serbs have historic claims to Kosovo, but the twentieth century history is more pertinent to today's conflict. Serbia obtained control of the Kosovo region after the First Balkan War of 1912. After World War I, the state of Yugoslavia was formed, including Kosovo as part of Serbia. The Nazi occupation during World War II saw atrocities

committed on both sides, with Croats and Albanians generally aligned with the Axis and the Serbs aligned with the victorious Allies.³⁶ Josef Broz Tito established a communist state following World War II and managed to contain Yugoslavia's ethnic rivalries. Even with Tito's iron hand, there were violent Albanian student demonstrations in late 1968, leading to greater autonomy for Kosovo and, ultimately, to the 1974 constitution that granted wide autonomy to the province. After Tito's death in 1980, there were riots in Pristina in March 1981, with demands that Kosovo be granted republic status.³⁷

Over the years of 1966 to 1989, when ethnic Albanians enjoyed substantial autonomy, an estimated 130,000 Serbs left Kosovo because of harassment and discrimination by the majority Albanians.³⁸ The first organized protests of Kosovar Serbs took place in 1986 at Kosovo Polje, when 2,000 signed a petition to Belgrade demanding curbs to Albanian abuse. By April 1987, 60,000 Serbs signed another petition demanding greater rights for Kosovar Serbs.³⁹ In an effort to calm the protests, the communist leader of Serbia sent his trusted deputy Slobodan Milosevic to Kosovo to meet with the mostly Albanian party leaders. On 24 April, in what is widely believed to have been a carefully orchestrated event, a violent protest erupted outside the meeting hall. Milosevic emerged from the meeting and addressed the seething crowd who complained about beatings by the Kosovar police. He uttered the now-famous words: "No one will ever dare to beat you again."⁴⁰

Those words propelled Milosevic to the presidency of Serbia by September 1987 on a wave of Serbian nationalist pride. A prominent historian noted that: "by mid-1988 . . . Milosevic enjoyed a popularity greater than any Serbian political figure in this century."⁴¹ In March 1989, he gained further popularity by pushing through a new constitution, stripping Kosovo of the autonomy it had gained under Tito. Milosevic's meteoric rise to power, heavy-handedness in Kosovo, and extreme nationalist rhetoric were all key factors in the ensuing breakup of Yugoslavia.

The first Bush administration's reaction to the breakup of Yugoslavia, beginning with Slovenia and Croatia's declaration of independence in 1991, was that it was essentially a European problem. That attitude is perhaps best captured in then-Secretary of State James Baker's remark: "We don't have a dog in that fight." That attitude did not, however, extend to Kosovo, which was prominent in everyone's "nightmare scenario" from the very beginning of the breakup. The worst-case scenario for the Balkans was projected as: 1) the Albanian majority in Kosovo would attempt to break away; 2) the Serbs would quash the attempt causing massive refugee flows into Albania and Macedonia; 3) leading to a wider war involving Greece and Turkey on opposite sides; 4) that would cause the dissolution of NATO. This imagined scenario was credible enough by 24 December 1992 for President Bush to issue his famous "Christmas Warning" to Milosevic that stated: "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper." That warning was reiterated by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in February and July of 1993.⁴²

Meanwhile in Kosovo, the situation on the ground was evolving better than any of the policy makers might have hoped. Rather than armed defiance of the re-imposition of Serb

rule, the Kosovar Albanians initially chose passive resistance, thanks to the leader of the most prominent Kosovar Albanian political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The LDK was founded in 1989, and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, was committed to attaining Kosovo's independence through resistance rather than force. Establishing parallel state structures, with a president, parliament, taxation, medical, and education systems, Rugova was elected president in a unsanctioned referendum in 1992.⁴³ Rugova and the LDK apparently thought that demonstrating their ability to run the province would convince the West that they, too, deserved independence.⁴⁴

Kosovo could not have happened as it did without the agony of Bosnia. The war in Bosnia was inherited by the Clinton administration as its most intractable foreign policy problem. In early 1993, United States forces were limited to patrolling a no-fly zone termed Operation Deny Flight and a maritime exclusion zone called Operation Sharp Guard. The United States began to take a more active role after thirty-four civilians were killed in the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace in February 1994. Later that spring the Contact Group was formed, consisting of the United States, Russia, UK, France, Germany, and Italy, and diplomatic focus shifted from the EC/U.N. to the Contact Group. Thus the United States was now directly engaged with its prestige increasingly on the line. By the fall of 1994, the United States and NATO began to plan for a peacekeeping force that would enter Bosnia upon agreement by all sides. NATO continued planning for a variety of military actions, including extraction of U.N. peacekeepers and various air strike options to protect U.N.-designated "Safe Havens" or coerce the parties to the table.

As the spring of 1995 approached, conditions within Bosnia seemed to deteriorate. U.N. peacekeepers were sporadically held hostage, and Bosnian Serb advances threatened several *safe havens* and even the capital of Sarajevo itself. Although NATO aircraft did receive approval for some limited air strikes, the approval process through the U.N. administrators was seen as too cumbersome to be effective. The final straw came in July 1995 when Serb forces took over the Safe Haven of Srebrenica, with U.N. forces powerless to stop them and approval for air support coming too late to have any effect. To the embarrassment of all involved, Bosnian Serb forces methodically slaughtered at least seven thousand Bosnian Moslems.

Srebrenica, coupled with another mortar shell in early August in the same Sarajevo market as the 1994 disaster, provided the triggers for NATO Operation Deliberate Force, a series of strikes by aircraft and artillery lasting into mid-September. Deliberate Force occurred on the heels of a Croatian advance (with training and planning assistance from retired United States military personnel), which swept some two hundred thousand Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia near the northern border of Bosnia.⁴⁵ In the face of these attacks, Bosnian Serbs agreed to a ceasefire that eventually led to the Dayton Agreement in November 1995.

Bosnia seemed a foreign policy triumph for a president sorely in need of one. With the embarrassment over Somalia and Rwanda, an inconclusive and continuing engagement in Iraq, and an occupation in Haiti that seemed unable to restore health to the country, Bosnia

looked like the most successful gambit of the first Clinton administration. Moreover, for a president who by now favored NATO enlargement, NATO's effectiveness following U.N. impotence seemed to validate that initiative. Over time, "lessons" seemed to emerge from Bosnia, including the notions that Milosevic was susceptible to coercion by force (even though it was the Bosnian Serbs who were coerced) and that United States leadership was the "indispensable" factor in resolving international crises.

Whatever the rest of the world learned from Bosnia, there was at least one group—the Kosovar Albanians—who gleaned a very serious lesson indeed. The Dayton Agreement's failure to deal with Kosovo, while understandable given the difficulty and immediacy of Bosnia, may have been a trigger event of sorts for Kosovo. One Kosovar said:

We all feel a deep, deep sense of betrayal. We mounted a peaceful, civilized protest to fight the totalitarian rule of Milosevic. We did not go down the road of nationalist hatred The result is that we were ignored. [Dayton] taught us a painful truth, [that] those that want freedom must fight for it. This is our sad duty.⁴⁶

Another Kosovar put it this way: "We hope that NATO will intervene, like it did in Bosnia, to save us."⁴⁷ After Dayton, Ibrahim Rugova's movement for nonviolent change in Kosovo would slowly lose ground to more radical elements.

The *Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves* (UCK) in the Albanian language, or the more familiar Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), was founded by a small band of Albanian separatists in 1991. Their first armed attack killed two Serbian police officers in May 1993, and they claimed responsibility for attacks killing two policemen in April 1996. But until early 1998, the group consisted of no more than a couple of hundred fighters, some of whom had fought in Bosnia against the Serbs.⁴⁸ In January 1997, when the government of Albania began to crumble following collapse of a pyramid investment scheme, a new dimension was added to the mix. In the subsequent Albanian anarchy, thousands of weapons were looted from government armories, many of which ended up in KLA hands. By June 1997, a new government was formed and relative peace was restored to Albania following intervention by an Italian-led peacekeeping force. The deposed Albanian president retreated to his northern Albanian stronghold and offered his family farm as a base for the KLA.⁴⁹

In 1997, the KLA began to emerge from the shadows. On two nights in early September 1997, the most organized KLA attacks to date occurred, targeting ten separate police barracks and vehicles up to 150 km apart.⁵⁰ Uniformed KLA fighters first appeared in public on 28 November 1997 at the funeral of a school teacher killed by the Serbs, where the KLA men were cheered loudly by the crowd estimated at 20,000. The still-small band of fighters, drawn mainly from several clans, was concentrated in the Drenica region of central Kosovo. One of the clan leaders was Adem Jashari, who lived in the village of Prekaz. In the last days of February and first days of March 1998, a big step on the road to Operation Allied Force was taken when Serb forces massacred over eighty people in the Drenica region, including Jashari, twenty of his family members, and many other women and children.⁵¹ That focused

the world on Kosovo, but to understand United States decision making, one must also consider a couple of other stories that were unfolding in the early part of 1998.

One story centers around another nemesis of two United States administrations, Saddam Hussein. On 13 January 1998, Saddam denied entry to a U.N. inspection team, setting off another seemingly perennial crisis with Iraq. By early 1998, however, many Arab allies who had backed previous strikes were vocally opposed to military action. To make matters worse, in an effort to sell the idea of strikes to the American public, Madeleine Albright, William Cohen, and Sandy Berger appeared on 18 February 1998 on a live “town hall” meeting televised by CNN International. One reporter described it more like a “rumble,” with the national security team shouted down, booed, and generally received with skepticism.⁵² In the face of international opposition and public questioning, the administration seemed relieved when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was able to reach agreement with Iraq on 23 February. Of course, troubles with Iraq were far from over, and that crisis would run contemporaneously with Kosovo over the next year, as would the other “big story” of 1998.

Albright had been in front of the cameras a month earlier, but that appearance wasn’t about *foreign* affairs. On 19 January 1998, an internet gossip column first mentioned the name of Monica Lewinsky, and within two days it was carried by all news outlets, along with the president’s denial of any impropriety. President Clinton met with his cabinet on 23 January 1998, and after Clinton’s assurances, Secretary Albright led several cabinet members to a bank of microphones and declared: “I believe the allegations are completely untrue.”⁵³ The Lewinsky issue would also parallel the Kosovo crisis, and over a year later at least one reporter would claim of Ms. Albright: “She still resents that he [Clinton] allowed her to go before cameras early in the Lewinsky scandal and proclaim his innocence.”⁵⁴ By March 1998, however, Ms. Albright had more important matters in the Balkans on her mind.

On 23 February 1998, U.S. Special Balkans Envoy Robert Gelbard gave a press conference in Belgrade on his perspectives on the Balkan situation. After detailing progress in Bosnia and discussing the easing of several minor sanctions against Milosevic’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in recognition of FRY cooperation, he turned his attention to Kosovo. Gelbard said:

The violence we have seen growing in recent weeks and months is incredibly dangerous. The great majority of this violence we attribute to the police, but we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very strongly the unacceptable violence done by terrorist groups in Kosovo and particularly the UCK—the Kosovo Liberation Army. *This is without any question a terrorist group . . .* [emphasis added]⁵⁵

Some observers later accused Gelbard of giving Milosevic an excuse for the Drenica massacres that occurred less than a week later. In subsequent testimony before Congress, Gelbard “clarified” his statement a bit, noting: “while it [the KLA] has committed terrorist acts [it has] not been classified legally by the United States government as a terrorist organization.”⁵⁶

In the wake of the Drenica massacres, one Albright aide told a reporter she had consciously decided to: “. . . lead through rhetoric,” targeting: “European allies, United States public opinion and her own government.”⁵⁷ On 7 March 1998, on a stopover in Rome on her way to a Contact Group meeting, Albright declared: “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”⁵⁸ Two days later, in the same London conference room where many of the Bosnia deliberations were held, she told the Contact Group ministers: “History is watching us . . . In this very room our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not be kind to us if we do the same.”⁵⁹ The statement that came out of the 9 March 1998 Contact Group meeting sounded tough, expressing “shock, dismay, and deep concern,” and proposing an arms embargo on the FRY, denial of visas to senior FRY officials, and a moratorium on investment credits and trade.⁶⁰ Russia, however, had only agreed to the arms embargo, which was formalized in U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 on 31 March. Russia agreed to UNSCR 1160 only after all reference to: “threat to international peace and security” (which might be a justification for armed force) was deleted from the document.⁶¹

On the United States side, there was concern in some quarters, particularly the Pentagon, that Albright’s rhetoric might be getting ahead of policy. First there was the matter of the “Christmas Warning” that had threatened unilateral United States force. One defense official remarked, “the Christmas Warning was not on the table. We were not prepared for unilateral action.”⁶² Throughout the spring, Albright tried to build an administration consensus for a stronger challenge to Milosevic. She requested a mid-May 1998 meeting of the NSC Principals to discuss the problem. At the meeting, Special Envoy Gelbard presented the case for *threatening* air strikes against Milosevic. Gelbard noted that General Wes Clark, commander in chief, European Command (CINCEUR), had developed a list of targets that might be struck to force Milosevic’s cooperation. NSA Sandy Berger angrily rejected the idea, noting that NATO had not even begun planning for contingencies should air strikes fail to move Milosevic. After Berger’s outburst, not even Albright or her deputy Strobe Talbott came to Gelbard’s defense.⁶³

The Clinton administration found itself in a sticky position. On one hand, disaster in Kosovo with no effective NATO response could threaten the administration’s two seminal foreign policy achievements: the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia and NATO enlargement. On the other hand, those same two factors limited the administration’s options to those that could be sold to the allies. Even if Dayton seemed to create a *de facto* partitioned state, NATO used force to prevent (and continues to prevent through force) the *de jure* partition of the sovereign state of Bosnia. Support for partitioning Serbia and granting independence to Kosovo would create a precedent for partitioning Bosnia, not to mention precedent for similar ethnic claims throughout Europe, from Kurds in Turkey to Basques in Spain. Thus, there was no support for Kosovar independence, yet after Drenica, independence was the central goal of the Kosovar Albanians and the KLA.⁶⁴

Ironically, the meteoric rise of the KLA could only have occurred given the existence of Rugova’s LDK, the pacifist resistance that the KLA was about to supplant. Over the years of

“parallel government,” the Kosovar Albanians had organized effective internal structures, and as important, an external support network through the estimated 600,000 ethnic Albanians in Europe and 300,000 in Canada and the United States.⁶⁵ The “Homeland Calling Fund” and a “Republic of Kosovo In-exile” had been extracting a three per cent levy on the wages of the Albanian diaspora.⁶⁶ One source put the income from Germany alone at over one million dollars per month.⁶⁷ Thus there was a skeleton organization and financing for the KLA challenge, and the earlier anarchy in Albania provided access to weapons. All that was needed was manpower—the combination of the highest birth rate in Europe, a seventy percent Albanian unemployment rate, and forced repatriation by other European nations of some Albanians who had earlier fled the region provided that element.⁶⁸ The allied reaction to Drenica was rhetoric—the Albanian Kosovar reaction was a sort of *levée en masse*. By early summer, the KLA had swelled to several thousand with more joining each day. A reporter for *The New York Times*, claimed that the group’s nonnegotiable goals were independence and a “Greater Albania” and admitted the KLA were: “. . . poorly led, with no central command and little discipline.”⁶⁹ Over the next year, following Madeleine Albright’s lead, the United States would push the KLA toward greater cohesion and effectiveness.

While the KLA was burgeoning, Washington was still attempting to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. The “Hero of Dayton,” Richard Holbrooke, was dispatched to the region in early May, and ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill, was appointed as special envoy to negotiate directly with the parties. Hill (a 1994 Naval War College graduate) was a member of Holbrooke’s negotiating team at Dayton in 1995. Holbrooke and Hill faced the daunting challenge of finding a party to negotiate on the Kosovar Albanian side. Ibrahim Rugova, the pacifist, was certainly an attractive candidate, and Holbrooke succeeded in arranging a first-ever meeting between him and Milosevic in mid-May. Rugova understood that meeting with Milosevic might further weaken his rapidly eroding power base, and he agreed to the meeting only after Holbrooke promised that he would also arrange a meeting between Rugova and President Clinton.⁷⁰ Rugova got his meeting with Clinton on 29 May, where the president reportedly told his guest: “We will not allow another Bosnia to happen in Kosovo.”⁷¹ By the end of June, however, Washington came to the realization that Rugova’s credibility was waning, and the first direct talks with KLA leaders were conducted by Holbrooke in Kosovo and Gelbard in Switzerland.⁷²

In Brussels, NATO was determined, unlike Bosnia, to be involved in policy from the beginning of the crisis. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s political body, issued their first statement on 5 March 1998, and a series of partnership for peace (PfP) exercises were planned for Albania and Macedonia. In the wake of increased FRY action against the KLA in late-May/early-June, the defense ministers, meeting in Brussels on 11 June, directed an air exercise to be conducted over Albania and that military planning for “a full range of options” be undertaken. In July and August the NAC was briefed on the options developed by military planners. Planned military options (and anticipated required troops) included:

“A” Agreed ceasefire, with negotiations for a peace settlement to follow (50,000).

“A-” Enforcement of agreed peace settlement (28,000).

“B” NATO forced entry subjugating all of the FRY (200,000).

“B-” Forced entry into Kosovo only (75,000).⁷³

Consensus on conditions for the execution of the options was still far from assured. Throughout the summer, there was reportedly, “a furious internal debate,” over whether NATO could act without further specific U.N. authorization.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the situation in Kosovo continued to evolve.

On 16 June 1998, the day after NATO’s air exercise, Slobodan Milosevic traveled to Moscow to meet with Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin had no shortage of problems of his own at the time. The Russian economy was approaching “meltdown,” and by August, Russia would be forced to default on international loan payments. The substance of the discussions between the two is not known, but Milosevic returned from Moscow in what seemed to be a more cooperative mood. He expressed willingness to renew talks with moderate Kosovar Albanian factions and allow foreign diplomatic observers into Kosovo. FRY forces in Kosovo did seem to moderate their crackdown, and Milosevic reached agreement with Holbrooke on a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) that began operations in early July.⁷⁵ As FRY forces eased their assaults, the KLA moved quickly to fill the void. From late-June to mid-July the KLA made remarkable gains and claimed to control 30-40 percent of Kosovo. This turnaround put a new face on the crisis and gave NATO and United States officials pause. By mid-July, NATO and United States officials made it clear that there would be no support for a rebel conquest of Kosovo. Secretary of Defense Cohen let it be known: “. . . we will not be the air force for the KLA.”⁷⁶

Later, some accused the administration of issuing a “green light” to Milosevic for his summer 1998 repression of the KLA. An anonymous Western diplomat told reporters that: “. . . the West tacitly accepted the Serb offensive and did nothing to stop it.”⁷⁷ Whether a “green light” was ever issued, the subsequent FRY offensive did spur the KLA toward greater unity. The increased cohesion of the KLA gave negotiators not only another party to engage, but also other demands to be dealt with.

While the Serbs were violently reasserting themselves in Kosovo, the two other big stories of 1998 were heating up, and a “pop-up crisis” was added to the mix. On 5 August, Saddam again announced he was suspending cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors. This action set in motion a series of threats and high-level diplomacy culminating with Operation Desert Fox in December.⁷⁸ The Lewinsky matter was also reaching a critical juncture. On 17 August, President Clinton went before the grand jury, and then the American public, to admit an “improper relationship” with Ms. Lewinsky.⁷⁹ Several weeks later, former Senator Robert Dole returned from a visit to Kosovo to a meeting with the president. Dole recalls that after a brief discussion on Kosovo with the president and NSA Berger, Berger left the room and then: “We discussed impeachment. . . This was a critical time in the Monica

events.”⁸⁰ If those issues weren’t enough, United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed on 7 August, and the United States executed reprisal Tomahawk strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan on 20 August.⁸¹ By the time those tomahawks stopped falling, the West confronted a new dimension to the crisis in Kosovo.

The Serb summer offensive, begun in late July 1998, added another wrinkle to the Kosovo dilemma. By September 1998, approximately 300,000 Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes, with at least 50,000 believed to be hiding in the forest with no shelter. The prospect of tens of thousands of Kosovars starving or freezing during the coming winter, in the words of one pundit, “concentrated the minds in Washington and elsewhere.”⁸² On 23 September, Russia finally agreed to another security council resolution (UNSCR 1199) calling on the FRY to: cease action against civilians; withdraw additional security forces; allow international monitoring, return of refugees, and unimpeded access by relief organizations; and continue a dialogue to reach a political solution to the crisis. Russian acceptance of the resolution was contingent on no mention of force to impose the U.N. demands.⁸³

The next day, NATO defense ministers meeting in Portugal acknowledged that NATO’s credibility was on the line. NATO Secretary-General Solana told the group that an unnamed Serb diplomat had joked: “a village a day keeps NATO away.”⁸⁴ At the Portugal meeting, only the air options were seen as politically possible, and an “Activation Warning” (ACTWARN) was approved on 24 September 1998 for both limited air strikes and a phased air campaign. The ACTWARN allowed forces to be identified and detailed planning to continue, but it did not represent a decision to use force—the allies were still divided over the need for a specific U.N. mandate to take such a step.⁸⁵

Serbian forces in Kosovo were soon to provide another push on the road to war. On 26 September, reacting to continued KLA attacks in which a dozen Serb police were killed, Serbian forces slaughtered thirty-five civilians, including a seven-month pregnant woman whose stomach had been slit open. Twenty-one of the casualties were from the same family.⁸⁶ Richard Holbrooke happened to be in Washington and attended an NSC Principals Committee meeting on 30 September. He recalls the *New York Times* sitting in the middle of an oak table in the situation room like “a silent witness” to the tragedy.⁸⁷ Madeleine Albright argued strongly for air strikes at that meeting, but air strikes in October 1998 faced a number of obstacles.⁸⁸

First, the Monica issue was still on the front page, and congressional midterm elections were less than a month away. The Republicans were anticipating significant gains given the ongoing scandal. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott highlighted the political risk in a 4 October interview, arguing: “The Serbs have done what they wanted. Now they’re pulling back and now . . . three weeks before an election, we’re going to go in and bomb.” Both sides of the aisle in Congress saw the risk. Democratic Senator Joseph Biden who favored stronger action in Kosovo, was told by colleagues at a 6 October party caucus: “Don’t count me in, Joe, don’t count me in.”⁸⁹ Finally, there was the matter of allied consensus for forceful action. Russia announced in early October that it would veto any U.N. Security Council

resolution authorizing the use of force.⁹⁰ NATO was convinced that its credibility was on the line, but the legalities of threatening force without specific U.N. authorization were still a matter of contention.

On 5 October 1998, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported that the FRY was in breach of UNSCR 1199, and Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade to confront Milosevic. Holbrooke's aim was to achieve at least a temporary halt to the bloodshed and some mechanism to provide enough confidence to allow the refugees to return to shelter before winter turned Kosovo into a humanitarian catastrophe. Initially Holbrooke made no progress, and he reported to Ms. Albright on 7 October: "This guy is not taking us seriously."⁹¹

Fortunately for Holbrooke, on 10 October, NATO Secretary-General Solana told the NAC that there was "sufficient legal basis" for threatening force even without further U.N. authorization. Solana purposely did not specify that "basis," since members disagreed exactly what the legal rationale should be, but were fundamentally agreed on the threat of force. NATO's agreement enabled Holbrooke to tell Milosevic that the allies were nearing consensus on force unless Milosevic would agree to withdrawal from Kosovo and also to a verification scheme. After delivering that message to Milosevic on 12 October, Holbrooke traveled to Brussels and told the NAC that he needed the formal threat of force to obtain agreement from Belgrade. The NAC obliged in the early morning hours of 13 October, approving an "Activation Order" (ACTORD) that would allow strikes to commence within ninety-six hours. Holbrooke flew back to Belgrade that morning, and just before noon emerged from a meeting with Milosevic announcing that an agreement had been reached.⁹² The ACTORD remained in place, and the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1203 on 24 October, formally supporting the terms of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement.

By 27 October it seemed the crisis had been diffused, but even Holbrooke recognized the "October Agreement" was only an interim measure. He would later say: "... we predicted that if we didn't have a security force to enforce this, it would fall apart by the spring . . . It's a shame we didn't do it more aggressively, but that was not possible, given the mood of the congressional/executive branch dialogue on that week before I left in October."⁹³ The United States intelligence community agreed with Holbrooke's assessment. A November estimate concluded that: "Milosevic is susceptible to outside pressure . . . [but he would only accept a new status for Kosovo, if among other conditions, the West] threatened to use sustained and decisive military power against his forces." United States intelligence also warned that: "the KLA intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serb forces into further atrocities."⁹⁴

The "October Agreement" called for withdrawal of Serb security forces and established an Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The nearly 2,000 unarmed verifiers began to arrive in November, and NATO stationed a French-led 1,500-person "Extraction Force" (XFOR) in Macedonia in December, should the verifiers require armed assistance. The United States committed no ground troops to this effort, and throughout 1998 would not formally commit to ground troops, even in the event of agreement by both sides for a peace agreement.⁹⁵

December 1998 was a big month for Washington. The crisis with Iraq came to a head, with United States and British warplanes beginning four days of bombing on 17 December. Many would later point out that Milosevic must have noted the limited nature of these strikes. While the bombs were falling on Iraq, the House approved two articles of impeachment, and a Senate trial was set for January. Even Kosovo was beginning to heat up. The KLA was assumed responsible for the slaying of six Serbian youths at a cafe in Pec, Kosovo, on 14 December. Not long after, Serb forces began to redeploy into Kosovo in violation of the October Agreement and UNSCR 1203. Despite the existing NATO ACTORD, no retaliation was forthcoming. Any NATO strikes would have to consider the KVM verifiers on the ground, and as one administration official put it: "You're not going to get people to bomb over a specific number of [FRY] troops."⁹⁶ 1998 closed with the prospect that Kosovo would again be at the center of attention, at least by the spring thaw.

An NSC Principals meeting on Kosovo was held on 15 January 1999, and Albright again tried to make her case for stronger action against Milosevic. From the beginning of the crisis nearly a year before, she thought a solely diplomatic tact with Milosevic was bound to fail, but she realized that most in the administration agreed with Richard Holbrooke's belief that negotiations could lead to a reasonable solution. All year, she deferred to Holbrooke, realizing that he was supported by powerful voices at the White House and Pentagon. On the table at the 15 January meeting was a thirteen-page strategy paper on Kosovo recommending additional actions to build on and reinforce the October Agreement. Albright brought two pages of talking points to argue that more forceful action was needed—in her words, "decisive steps." While she did not outline specific military actions that might be part of these decisive steps, it was clear that she did not favor continuation of the status quo. Both SECDEF Cohen and NSA Berger were leery of her proposal, and in the end, reinforcing the October Agreement was the consensus recommended to the president. Albright was reportedly furious, exclaiming: "We're just gerbils running on a wheel," as she left the meeting.⁹⁷

Late in the afternoon of 15 January, the KVM received reports of fighting around the village of Racak. The next day, a team led by the KVM chief returned to Racak and found a scene that was described to reporters as a "crime against humanity" perpetuated by FRY security forces.⁹⁸ Ultimately the death toll was put at forty-five, including three women, a twelve year old boy, and several elderly men. Madeleine Albright heard the news at 4:30 a.m. when her alarm clock radio woke her with the morning news. She called NSA Berger and said: "Spring has come early to Kosovo."⁹⁹

Albright realized that she would have to act quickly before Racak faded from the attention of policy makers. One aide reportedly advised her: "Whatever threat of force you don't get in the next two weeks, you're never getting."¹⁰⁰ She set to work with her staff crafting a new strategy for Kosovo. At the heart of Albright's strategy was an ultimatum to be delivered to both Milosevic and the KLA for both parties to accept an interim agreement drafted by the allies. If they accepted, NATO would enforce a settlement with troops on the ground. If Milosevic balked, NATO would begin its air campaign.¹⁰¹

Albright unveiled her new strategy at a late-afternoon 19 January NSC Principals meeting, just prior to the president's "State of the Union" address. SECDEF Cohen reportedly argued that talk of ground troops was premature, but all participants soon agreed with the essentials of Albright's plan. The Principals agreed that a credible threat of force was necessary. Further, they agreed that all parties should be summoned to a meeting at which the core demands, decided by the Contact Group (ideally including Russia), would be nonnegotiable, including a NATO implementation force. NSA Berger took the new Principals' consensus to President Clinton the next day and he approved it. On 21 January, Clinton called British Prime Minister Tony Blair to discuss the new strategy. Both agreed on the general approach, Blair cautioning that the plan had to reign in both the KLA and the Serbs.¹⁰² With United States and UK acceptance, Albright set about implementing the strategy with vigor.

Albright's first task was getting both Europe and Russia on board with the approach. The NATO allies insisted that: 1) the threat or use of force had to be tied to a political objective beyond simply punishing Milosevic; 2) just as Blair had cautioned Clinton, any plan would have to modify the behavior of both the Serbs and KLA; and 3) United States troops would have to be a part of any peace enforcement scheme.¹⁰³ Ambassador Chris Hill's draft plan for Kosovar political autonomy and disarming the KLA addressed only the first two concerns. As early as 26 January, NSA Berger said: "We would have to look at that [United States ground troops] under those circumstances in consultations with Congress. Obviously, we've had no decisions along those lines."¹⁰⁴ It was not until 13 February 1999, the day after the Senate acquitted the president, that Clinton acknowledged in his regular Saturday radio address that: "a little less than four thousand [United States troops]" might participate in Kosovo peacekeeping.¹⁰⁵ The Europeans understood the president's reluctance to commit publicly to forces earlier, and by late January, Albright seemed to have the Europeans on board and traveled to Moscow to work on the Russians.

On 26 January, Albright delivered her pitch to the Russian foreign minister. The Russians were firmly opposed to use of force against their traditional ally Serbia, but understood that an ultimatum to Milosevic might have the desired effect.¹⁰⁶ Expressing this understanding (if not agreement) was good enough for the secretary of state. She and the foreign minister issued a joint statement condemning Racak, calling on Milosovic to honor UNSCRs and prior agreements, and also demanding a stop to KLA provocations.¹⁰⁷ With the Russians at least acquiescing to her strategy, Albright let the other foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries know that she would *not* attend their scheduled 29 January 1999 meeting in London *unless* they would commit to supporting her ultimatum strategy. On 27 January, after receiving assurances of support from the other members, Albright announced she would attend the London meeting, signifying all was in place for a carefully orchestrated rollout of the new approach.¹⁰⁸

The "rollout" began when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited the NAC on 28 January. Annan could obviously not sanction the use of force in the absence of Security Council authorization, but he made it clear where his true sympathies lay. He told the NAC:

"bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts . . . particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. But nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia."¹⁰⁹

The next day the Contact Group released a list of twenty-six nonnegotiable principles granting Kosovo considerable political autonomy, but under Serbian sovereignty, enforced by NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo, with final status of the province to be determined three years hence. The Contact Group summoned both sides to Rambouillet, France, by 6 February 1999. The belligerents would have one week to agree to a settlement, with a possible extension of a week if the Contact Group approved. Albright said after the meeting: "We have sent the parties an unmistakable message—get serious. Showing up is not going to be good enough."¹¹⁰

The final element fell into place the following day. NATO Secretary-General Solana announced: "NATO has agreed in authorizing airstrikes against targets in Yugoslav territory . . . I will take this decision in the light of both parties' compliance with demands that they begin negotiations in France by next Saturday . . ."¹¹¹ With the allies ready, the president met with the NSC on 1 February 1999 and told his advisers that he understood Kosovo was more important to Milosevic than Bosnia, and: "he may be sorely tempted to take the first round of airstrikes. I hope we don't have to bomb, but we may need to."¹¹²

Rambouillet might have gone differently if other players had shown up. Missing from the Serb side was Milosevic, and it soon became clear that the Serbs attending had neither the power nor expertise to conduct serious negotiations. Missing from the Kosovar side was Adem Demaci, the KLA's principal political representative, who was boycotting the talks because the West would not support independence of Kosovo as a possible outcome. In something of a surprise, the Kosovar delegation selected twenty-nine year old Hashim Thaci, whose *nom de guerre* was "the snake," as their head delegate, bypassing Rugova, the pacifist LDK leader. With little progress made in the first week, the deadline for the talks was extended to 20 February, and then again to 23 February.¹¹³

The main sticking point for the Serb delegation was the nonnegotiable requirement for foreign troops to enforce any settlement in Kosovo. One administration official told reporters at Rambouillet off-the-record: "We intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that's what they're going to get."¹¹⁴ As negotiations wore on, there did seem to be some flexibility in the Serbian camp for the political provisions of the proposed accord, but the Serbs were adamant about no foreign troops on their soil. Ambassador Chris Hill was dispatched twice to Belgrade on 16 and 19 February to meet directly with Milosevic on the peace enforcement issue. He gained no concessions on the 16 February trip, and on the 19th Milosevic refused to even meet with him.¹¹⁵ The Kosovar Albanians seemed just as reluctant to accept a settlement. They objected to the draft provision that the KLA would have to disarm and demanded a referendum on Kosovo's future at the end of the three-year interim period. The head of the Kosovar

delegation told one of his advisors: "You should realize that if I go back with something my people [don't] want, I may get a bullet in the head."¹¹⁶

On 20 February 1999, Albright arrived, black Stetson hat and all, hoping to move the talks through her personal intervention. She later told a friend that those three days were the worst of her career.¹¹⁷ At one point, she appeared at the door to the room of the Albanian delegation after midnight, and a delegate, believing she was the cleaning lady, told her: "Give us five minutes. And please go away."¹¹⁸ On 21 February, she told reporters: ". . . if the talks crater because the Serbs do not say yes, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians have not said yes, we will not be able to support them, and in fact, will have to cut off whatever help they're getting from the outside."¹¹⁹ Albright's aides were frustrated; one told a reporter: "Here is the greatest nation on earth pleading with some nothing-balls to do something entirely in their own interest . . . and they defy us all the way."¹²⁰ As the last extended deadline approached, a statement was prepared stating that the Albanian delegates had: "voted in favor of [the] agreement," and "could sign the agreement in two weeks after consultations with the people of Kosovo, political and military institutions."¹²¹ The conference was adjourned on this note and scheduled to reconvene on 15 March in Paris.

In the intervening weeks, Albright convinced both former-Senator Dole and billionaire George Soros to lobby the Kosovars to ensure they would sign the agreement, and on 12 March she received word that they would sign.¹²² That day was an especially good one for Albright for another reason. She officiated at the signing ceremony on 12 March that officially brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO.¹²³ The treaty signing meant that all was now in place for the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, scheduled for 22 April in Washington. NATO allies, still squabbling over what to do in the Balkans, would certainly spoil that long-anticipated party, but a triumphant celebration of NATO's effectiveness, having coerced Milosevic into relinquishing Kosovo after a couple weeks of bombing, would make the event even more memorable. Madeleine could envision both of those possibilities, but she probably did not expect that the summit would become a council of war for an ongoing conflict.

The next day, Ms. Albright was in the Situation Room of the White House with the other NSC Principals when Ambassador Hill phoned in his assessment of the chances that Milosevic would cave in to the nearly complete threat of war. Hill said the chances were: "Zero point zero percent," and one official recalls stunned silence in the room. Two days later, the CIA delivered a report that Milosevic was apparently massing forces to begin the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. CJCS Shelton followed this grim news with the Pentagon's assessment that, at least in the short run, the air campaign would likely make the situation in Kosovo worse, and massive flows of refugees were to be expected.¹²⁴ This dire prediction did not come as a complete surprise to Albright. Earlier she had commissioned Morton Halperin, head of her policy planning staff, to prepare a list of possible adverse scenarios for Kosovo. Halperin came back with a five-page memo titled "Surprises" that included: 1) KLA would launch military operations; 2) Milosevic would put forth a false "peace

offensive;" 3) NATO would balk at the end of the initial air campaign; 4) Russia would vigorously oppose, perhaps even aid the FRY; and 5) a massive ethnic cleansing offensive would be undertaken by the FRY (termed "the hardest" of the possible "surprises").¹²⁵ By 13 March, however, the road to war was heading in only one direction.

The Serbs returned to Paris on 15 March apparently decided on war. They rejected many of the concessions they had agreed to during the earlier session and demanded changes to the initial "nonnegotiable" principles issued by the Contact Group. The Kosovars, as anticipated, signed the agreement on 18 March, and the Contact Group adjourned the conference, declaring: "We will immediately engage in consultations with our partners and allies to be ready to act. We will be in contact with the secretary-general of NATO."¹²⁶ Some critics later argued that the Rambouillet process had been a failure, and perhaps a more accomplished negotiator like Holbrooke might have been more successful (some of these stories were alleged to have come from Holbrooke himself).¹²⁷ Others described the "essence" of Rambouillet somewhat differently and perhaps closer to the mark: "For some in the Clinton administration, as indeed in key allied capitals like London, the purpose of Rambouillet was not so much to get a deal that few thought obtainable. Rather it was to create a consensus in Washington and among NATO allies that force would have to be used."¹²⁸

Two days later the OSCE withdrew the Kosovo Verification Mission and Serb forces began to pour into the province. Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade on 22 March in a last-ditch effort to convince Milosevic to back down. Holbrooke described Milosevic in that meeting as resigned to his fate. Milosevic's response to Holbrooke's question if he understood what would happen when the United States diplomats left was simply: "Yes, you will bomb us."¹²⁹ Forty-eight hours later, bombs were falling on the FRY. Madeleine Albright went on *NewsHour* that evening and told Jim Lehrer: "I don't see this as a long-term operation. I think that this is something . . . that is achievable within a relatively short period of time. But . . . I'm not going to be pinned down on this."¹³⁰

Albright's boss was also on TV that night announcing the beginning of Operation Allied Force. In the address, the president stated that he did: "not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." That phrase was inserted into the speech just before airing by NSA Berger. Berger would later assert that: "we would not have won the war without this sentence." He argued that allied consensus would have been damaged without such assurance and the ensuing congressional debate would have further weakened the coalition.¹³¹ Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Naumann, held a different view. After the war, he asserted: ". . . all those politicians who ruled out in public the use of ground forces made it easier for Milosevic to calculate his risk . . . and by this we prolonged the war."¹³²

The length of the war seemed a surprise to all the policy makers. The day the bombing stopped, Ms. Albright tried to put her earlier "relatively short period" statement in the context that seventy-eight days was, after all, relatively short.¹³³ One of the more comprehensive political analyses of the war, however, reported the widespread NATO prewar belief that Milosevic would probably give up after a few days, with a likely maximum duration of

the war as two to three weeks.¹³⁴ It seems probable that Milosevic was counting on this belief and reasoned that NATO would lose cohesion if he could simply hold on.

It is even possible that Milosevic saw the war as a “win-win” situation. The NATO bombs would provide a good cover for altering the ethnic balance in the province by force. Even if Milosevic lost control of some of Kosovo, the conflict could seem a victory so long as he retained the northeastern section comprised of the Trepca mines (estimated to be the most valuable asset in Serbia, worth \$5 billion), Kosovo Polje, and Grachanitsa Monastery. In this event, Milosevic would have rid himself of an insurgency problem without the (possibly fatal) political cost of turning it over without a fight. He might have achieved this result if he had moderated his zeal along the “ethnic realignment” dimension.

With nearly 800,000 refugees either internally displaced or in Macedonia and Albania, the character of the war changed. Even though many had warned Milosevic would step up his campaign against the KLA, an administration official admitted all had underestimated: “the velocity and ferocity of the campaign to shift the ethnic balance of Kosovo.”¹³⁵ Following the refugee exodus, United States public support for the air war jumped to sixty-one percent (from only forty-three percent in February), and there were even fifty-two percent who supported ground troops should the strikes not work.¹³⁶ Europeans were at least as enthusiastic for action as their United States counterparts.¹³⁷ With refugees in the hills of Kosovo or camps in Macedonia and Albania, NATO faced a situation where stopping the war short of victory could lead to humanitarian disaster and a wider Balkan War. At the NATO summit in April, the allies made what seemed to be the only possible decision—they would win no matter what.¹³⁸

“No matter what . . .” meant that an invasion began to be more seriously considered. SACEUR, General Wes Clark, was directed to update the plans that had been on the shelf since the previous summer, and he briefed President Clinton on the preliminary results during the president’s trip to Europe in early May. On 20 May, Clark brought the completed plans to Washington and briefed the president and his top advisors in the “Tank” in the Pentagon.¹³⁹ Clark’s plan, an upgrade of the “B-Plan” of August 1998, called for a “fail-proof” force of 175,000 troops, 100,000 from the United States. Clark reportedly did not minimize the dangers; there was discussion of fighting “ridge-to-ridge” and the likelihood of numerous casualties. Clark indicated that a decision would have to be made by early-to-mid-June if the force were to be deployed to be ready for combat by 1 September. By 2 June NSA Berger was having what he called: “the longest night of my time in this job.” Berger was drafting the final memo to be sent to the president recommending approval of Clark’s plan. Berger believed the president would approve it the next morning. Fortunately, early the next morning, the White House received word that Milosevic had accepted the deal offered through Russian Envoy Chernomyrdin and EU Envoy Ahtisaari. It would take another week to work out the details, but by 10 June, NATO Secretary-General Solana announced the suspension of Operation Allied Force.

The same day, a column of Russian troops left Bosnia headed for Kosovo. For several tense days, it appeared that Russia was attempting to establish a “Russian Sector” in

northeastern Kosovo. The Russian troops occupied Pristina airfield on 11 June, in advance of KFOR troops, and on 12 June a contingent of 2,500 Russian paratroopers was readied to fly into Pristina. The Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian governments all denied overflight rights for the Russians. Following intense diplomatic discussions between United States and Russian officials, an agreement was reached on 18 June for Russians to be incorporated into KFOR, but without a specific Russian sector. By then, Kosovar refugees were already pouring back into the province, and it appeared NATO had won its first war.¹⁴⁰

It would seem that Allied Force should have been a great personal triumph for Madeleine Albright. While the war was still very much in doubt in April, any number of pundits asserted that her influence within the administration was waning.¹⁴¹ Particularly biting criticism came from a former colleague at Georgetown, Peter Krogh, who asserted: "I can recall no time in the past 30 years when American foreign policy was in worse shape, or in less competent hands."¹⁴² Even after the war, Washington watchers observed that Albright had been "eclipsed" by NSA Berger, and a year after the war, another asserted: "she wields less influence than any secretary of state since the Nixon administration . . ."¹⁴³ Whatever the truth about Albright's later influence within the Clinton administration, it is likely that her part in "Madeleine's War" had a substantial impact on it.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE TIMELINE

28 Jun 1389	Serbian Prince Lazar is defeated at the Field of Blackbirds, ushering in 500 years of Ottoman domination of Serbia.	11 Oct 93	<i>Harlan County</i> turned away from docks at Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
1912	Serbia asserts control over Kosovo. Independent Albania created.	21 Nov 95	Participants initial Dayton peace accord.
1918	State of Yugoslavia created.	4 Nov 96	Clinton elected for second term.
1945	Josef Broz Tito assumes power of communist Yugoslav state.	23 Jan 97	Madeleine Albright sworn in as secretary of state.
4 May 80	President Tito dies.	Jan-Apr 97	Albanian pyramid investment scheme collapses; Albania descends into anarchy.
24 Apr 87	Slobodan Milosevic speech in Kosovo: "No one will dare to beat you again."	14 May 97	NATO-Russia Founding Act clears way for NATO enlargement.
Mar 89	New Serbian Constitution strips Kosovo of autonomy.	9 Jul 97	Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic invited to join NATO.
2 Jul 91	Slovenia and Croatia declare independence; war ensues.	28 Nov 97	KLA appear in public in uniform at funeral.
15 Jan 92	EC recognizes Slovenia and Croatia.	13 Jan 98	Saddam Hussein refuses entry to U.N. inspection team.
3 Mar 92	Bosnia declares independence; fighting erupts.	21 Jan 98	Monica Lewinsky story breaks; president denies impropriety.
7 Apr 92	United States recognizes Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia.	23 Feb 98	Kofi Annan secures agreement with Tariq Aziz.
May 92	Ibrahim Rugova elected "president" of Kosovo.		Robert Gelbard says KLA is "terrorist group."
3 Nov 92	Bill Clinton wins United States election.	7 Mar 98	Albright: "not stand by and allow . . . what they can no longer do in Bosnia."
24 Dec 92	President Bush issues "Christmas warning" concerning Kosovo to Milosevic.	31 Mar 98	UNSCR 1160 imposes arms embargo on Belgrade.
Feb/Jul 93	Warren Christopher reiterates commitment to "Christmas warning."	30 Apr 98	Senate ratifies NATO enlargement.
May 93	First armed KLA attack kills two Serb police officers.	29 May 98	Rugova meets with President Clinton.
4 Oct 93	United States Rangers killed in Somalia firefight.	15 Jun 98	Operation Determined Falcon, "Balkan Air Show," exercise takes place.

23 Jul 98	Alleged "green light" to Milosevic to contain KLA advances.	31 Oct 98	Iraq halts all cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors.
Late Jul 98	Serb offensive begins to reverse rebel gains.	Nov 98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) begins deploying.
5 Aug 98	Iraq suspends cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors.	5 Nov 98	Congressional midterm elections—Democrats fare better than expected although Republicans retain control of both houses.
7 Aug 98	Bombing of United States Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.	17 Dec 98	Operation Desert Fox begins four days of air strikes against Iraq.
17 Aug 98	Clinton testifies before grand jury; admits to "inappropriate relationship" on TV.	19 Dec 98	House approves two articles of impeachment against President Clinton.
20 Aug 98	Cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan.	24 Dec 98	Serb forces begin to redeploy into Kosovo, escalating attacks against the KLA.
23 Sep 98	UNSCR 1199 demands Serb withdrawal, refugee return.	14 Jan 99	Senate impeachment trial begins.
24 Sep 98	NATO defense ministers give permission for Activation Warning (ACTWARN).	15 Jan 99	"Status Quo Plus" approved at NSC Principals Meeting.
26 Sep 98	35 civilians slain at/near Gornje Obrinje.		"Racak massacre" claims 45 Kosovar civilians.
5 Oct 98	U.N. Secretary-General Annan reports FRY violations of UNSCR 1199 and	19 Jan 99	Principals approve "Rambouillet Strategy" favored by Albright.
	Richard Holbrooke travels to FRY.	29 Jan 99	Contact Group meets in London, summons parties to Rambouillet.
6 Oct 98	Russia says it will veto any U.N. authorization for force.	6 Feb 99	Rambouillet peace talks begin.
8 Oct 98	House votes for impeachment inquiry.	12 Feb 99	Senate acquits president in impeachment trial.
10 Oct 98	Solana asserts there is "sufficient legal basis" for NATO to act.	13 Feb 99	Clinton pledges up to 4,000 troops in event of cease-fire.
13 Oct 98	NATO approves Activation Order (ACTORD).	20 Feb 99	Albright arrives at Rambouillet in attempt to salvage talks.
	Holbrooke reaches "October Agreement" with Milosevic.	23 Feb 99	KLA expresses intention to sign but must confer first.
24 Oct 98	UNSCR 1203 endorses "October Agreement."	12 Mar 99	Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic join NATO.
27 Oct 98	Serbs begin withdrawal of forces from Kosovo.	15 Mar 99	Peace talks reconvene in Paris.
		18 Mar 99	Kosovar Albanians sign accords; Serbs refuse.

22 Mar 99	Last-ditch Holbrooke mission fails.	20 May 99	Clinton briefed on invasion plans: 170,000 total (100,000 U.S.) troops.
24 Mar 99	Operation Allied Force begins.		
27 Mar 99	F-117 shot down; pilot rescued.	27 May 99	NATO defense ministers meet in Bonn to discuss invasion.
1 Apr 99	Three United States Soldiers captured on Macedonia border.		
22 Apr 99	NATO 50 th Anniversary Summit begins.	2 Jun 99	Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari present G-8 principles to Milosevic. Berger drafts invasion memo.
2 May 99	Jesse Jackson secures release of three United States POWs.	3 Jun 99	Milosevic accepts settlement principles.
5 May 99	Clinton briefed on ground plans in Brussels; first NATO deaths in non-combat helo accident.	10 Jun 99	NATO Secretary-General Solana suspends NATO bombing.
7 May 99	Chinese embassy bombed.	20 Jun 99	Serbs complete withdrawal; Solana formally ends bombing campaign.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND KOSOVO



Yugoslavia 1918-1992



Kosovo June 1999



FRY 1999

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The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

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I**ntroduction.** The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the Ramadan War in Arab countries, was a watershed event in Arab-Israeli relations. It also stands as perhaps the most examined example of *strategic surprise* in history, with the number and breadth of studies of the war exceeding even other such classic examples as Pearl Harbor and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II. Thus, it is an excellent case to help explore the effects of human factors in national security decision making.

PROLOGUE TO WAR

The seeds of the 1973 war were sown with Israel's stunning six-day victory in 1967. The Arab forces suffered a humiliating defeat, which was felt most severely by Egyptian President Nasser. Nasser tendered his resignation immediately after the 1967 defeat, but a demonstration of popular support within Egypt and much of the Arab world caused him to withdraw this resignation.¹

It was clear in the wake of the 1967 war that the Arabs could not soon regain their territory by directly attacking Israel. Nasser's strategy evolved to one of increasing military pressure along the Suez Canal with the aim of reclaiming the Egyptian land by making continued occupation too costly for Israel. His "War of Attrition" from March 1969 to August 1970 consisted mainly of artillery and commando raids designed to impose this unacceptable cost on Israel.²

The fundamental weakness of the "attrition" strategy was Israel's ability to escalate the conflict when costs grew onerous and make the Egyptian costs too great to bear. One example was in January 1970, when Israel began deep air raids against strategic Egyptian targets. Following this escalation, Egypt sought and obtained increased assistance from the Soviet Union in the form of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and additional Soviet fighter aircraft (with Soviet pilots to fly them). There was a direct Soviet-Israeli air battle on 30 July 1970, resulting in five Soviet aircraft downed with no Israeli losses. Shortly after, Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire, and the "War of Attrition" ended in August 1970. The war cost Israel over 700 dead and 2700 wounded, but the Arab losses were three to five times greater.³

In September 1970, President Nasser died of a heart attack and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat exhibited greater flexibility than Nasser in pursuing diplomatic solutions, but he retained the option of improving the status quo by force. He accepted U.S.-mediated negotiations, but proclaimed 1971 the "year of decision" if diplomacy failed to dislodge the

Israelis from the Sinai. When 1971 passed with no Egyptian action, Sadat's proclamation was seen as a mere bluff. Later in July 1972, when Sadat expelled over twenty thousand Soviet advisers, Egypt seemed even less able to impose a military solution. Few realized that the expulsion of the Soviets, by providing more freedom of action for Sadat, was a precursor to war. Despite this expulsion, Sadat was able to obtain agreement for increased Soviet arms deliveries in late 1972, and arms and advisors began to flow in early 1973—arms that helped make war more feasible.⁴

For Sadat, the status quo of “no war - no peace” was intolerable. Facing a crumbling economy, deprived of Suez Canal revenues since its closure following the previous war, and still shouldering the humiliation of 1967, Sadat felt he had to do something. In October 1972, Sadat called a fateful meeting of Egyptian military leaders. At this meeting, Sadat stated his desires for a limited war with Israel as soon as Soviet weapons deliveries provided sufficient strength. The minister of war, General Sadeq, argued vehemently against limited war, believing Egypt was ill prepared to challenge the Israelis. Two days later, General Sadeq was replaced by General Ahmed Ismail who supported Sadat's plan for limited war. Sadat had decided to change the status quo by force.⁵

From the Israeli perspective, “no war - no peace” was a favorable outcome. The 1967 war gave Israel reasonably defensible borders and some strategic depth for the first time in the young state's history. It would be a long time (if ever) before the defeated Arabs could hope to match Israel's prowess in air combat and mobile armored warfare. The apparent cooling of Egyptian-Soviet relations was also a favorable development; Israel would be free to conduct strategic operations without the likelihood of direct Soviet confrontation. Moreover, the pursuit of détente by the superpowers favored continuation of this favorable status quo.⁶ The environment seemed to provide Israel with a greater range of choices for a national security strategy.

The national security strategy chosen by Israel was “total deterrence” (threatening massive retaliation for any attack). Operationally the strategy relied on three essential elements, in addition to superior combat forces:

- Prepared defensive strong points along the hostile borders, which would enable Israel's small standing ground force (supported by a qualitatively-superior, largely-regular air force) to blunt any initial assault.
- Rapid mobilization of well-trained reserve ground forces to execute crushing counter-attacks (Israel's ground forces more than tripled to over 350,000 upon full mobilization).
- Sufficient strategic warning (minimum 24 to 48 hours) to both properly deploy regular forces into the border defenses and mobilize the reserves.⁷

In October 1973, all three elements of the Israeli strategy failed to some extent—the most critical failure being lack of strategic warning. The Israeli high-level post-war investigation committee (Agranat Commission) found that the Israeli surprise was due in large measure to their “concept” of a future Arab-Israeli conflict. This “concept” held: 1) Egypt

would not attack prior to solving their “air superiority problem” (inability to strike deep into Israel or protect Egypt and her forces from air attack), and 2) Syria would not attack without Egypt.⁸ The “concept” was not merely a set of Israeli assumptions about Egypt; it was also the *Egyptian* assessment of the strategic situation, known through an excellent intelligence source, prior to Sadat’s replacement of General Sadeq in late 1972.⁹

The “concept” served Israel well right up to October 1973. In the previous three years there were at least three times the Egyptians were prepared to go to war: December 1971 and 1972, and May 1973. In the May 1973 instance, Israeli decision makers did not heed the advice of the director of military intelligence that war was not imminent. They responded with a partial mobilization that cost over \$11 million.¹⁰ Moreover, an October 1973 mobilization would have political as well as economic costs, with an Israeli election approaching in late October.

By October 1973 the “concept” had been “proven.” It was a given that Egypt would not go to war while still inferior in the air. Therefore, although the Israelis believed Syria was preparing for some sort of military action, by the tenets of the “concept,” Syria would not attack. Ironically, the “concept’s” elements actually still applied in October 1973. The Arabs had solved the “air superiority problem,” not with long-range aircraft to attack Israeli airfields, but by acquiring Soviet SAMs and SCUD missiles. In the 1967 war, the Israeli Air Force was decisive in the lightning victory, nearly destroying the Arab air forces in the opening salvo and providing effective air support for the subsequent Israeli armored thrusts. By 1973, however, the Egyptian SAM umbrella provided air cover for their ground troops, and their SCUDs could threaten deep strikes. Air was important in the 1973 war, but certainly not the decisive factor Israel believed it to be. The second part of the “concept,” Egyptian-Syrian cooperation, also was present in October 1973. Syrian President Assad consolidated his power in early 1971 and proved more amenable to conventional military action than his predecessor who had favored guerrilla action. Coordination between Egyptian and Syrian military staffs began in early 1973, and on 6 October Israel faced a fully-coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack.

NO LACK OF INFORMATION—THE RUN UP TO WAR

It is October 3d today and it is four in the afternoon. I believe that they will reveal our intention any moment from now and this is because our movement henceforth cannot leave any doubts in their minds as to our intentions. Even if they know tonight, even if they decide to mobilize all their reserves and even if they think of launching a pre-emptive attack, they have lost the chance to catch us up.¹¹

—Anwar el-Sadat, October 3, 1973

Sadat overestimated his enemy’s acuity by some sixty hours (the Israelis were not fully convinced war was coming until 0430, 6 October), but the Israeli failure to see war on the horizon was not due to lack of information. Even allowing for clarity of hindsight, the indicators during the run up to war were striking.

Most accounts of the run up to war begin with a 13 September 1973 air battle over the Mediterranean in which Syrian fighters attacked an Israeli reconnaissance flight, to their peril as it turned out, losing twelve planes with only a single Israeli loss. There is no evidence that this engagement was part of a coordinated plan, but it did provide a convenient explanation for subsequent Arab deployments. Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) expected some sort of retaliation for the incident, and in this light, Syrian deployments could be seen as either preparation for a limited retaliatory strike or defense against any Israeli reprisals. Subsequent Egyptian deployments were seen as normal for an announced exercise ("Tahrir 41," scheduled to begin on 1 October), but also might be defensive for fear of being caught up in Israeli-Syrian conflict.¹² The expected Syrian strengthening opposite Golan was observed over the next week, and Israel did take the precaution of adding some forces on the Golan heights.

On 25 September, King Hussein of Jordan requested an urgent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. He flew his personal helicopter to Israel and delivered the message that Syrian deployments were actually the precursor to war and that he expected, if war were to come, Egypt would cooperate with Syria.¹³ Meir asked for an assessment of this information from the director of AMAN, Eli Zeira, who argued that Hussein was acting on Sadat's behalf in an effort to bluff Israel into concessions on returning the canal. Hussein's warning did result in further increases of Israeli forces on the Golan but did not dissuade Ms. Meir from departing on a planned trip to Europe the next day.¹⁴

On 27 September, Egypt mobilized a large number of reserves, announcing that they would serve until 7 October. This was the twenty-third time they had mobilized reserves in 1973. On 30 September, they mobilized another large group, and to maintain their deception plan, announced demobilization of the 27 September call up (although only a small number were actually released).¹⁵ Mobilizations, troop movements, and even credible human intelligence, or HUMINT, warnings of war (as in the May 1973 Israeli mobilization) had become a common occurrence. The "cry wolf" factor certainly operated on the Israeli decision makers. Ms. Meir later said: "No one in this country realizes how many times during the past year we received information from the same source that war would break out on this or that day, without war breaking out. I will not say this was good enough. I do say it was fatal."¹⁶

While Egypt had orchestrated a well-constructed deception plan, there is still argument whether the next critical element in the path to war was part of it or just plain bad luck for Israel. On 28 September, Palestinian terrorists from a previously unknown organization based in Syria took over a Moscow-to-Vienna train carrying emigrating Soviet Jews. They demanded closure of a transit center for Soviet Jews at Schonau castle that had processed over sixty thousand émigrés in the previous two years. The Austrian chancellor, himself a Jew, quickly acceded to their demands to save the hostages.¹⁷ All Arab leaders quickly praised Austria for the action.

Many thoughtful analysts of the war doubt that this incident was part of the deception plan, but the effect was dramatic.¹⁸ The Schonau incident, as it came to be called, caused

Ms. Meir to delay her return to Israel until after she could make a personal (and unsuccessful) plea to the Austrian chancellor to reopen Schonau (she did not return until 3 October). Moreover, Schonau was the lead story on all Israeli newspapers right up to the day before the war, accompanied by public demonstrations, petitions, and meetings, and it provided another possible explanation for the Arabs' threatening preparations (Syria and Egypt could be reacting in fear of an Israeli attack over Schonau).¹⁹ Schonau was also the lead Middle East story in *The New York Times* from 29 September through 5 October.

U.S. intelligence agencies were not oblivious to the Arab build up—as early as 24 September the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) passed a warning to Israel noting discrepancies in Egyptian preparations from previous exercises. Israeli intelligence was not alarmed. On 30 September and again on 4 October, Henry Kissinger asked for specific assessments of the region, and both the State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) and the CIA, apparently relying on assessments they had received from Israel, termed the possibilities of war “dubious” to “remote.”²⁰ Kissinger later told reporters: “We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions. . . There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. . . obviously, the people most concerned, with the reputation of the best intelligence service in the area, were also surprised, and they have the principal problem of answering the question which you put to me.”²¹

Israeli intelligence did indeed have an excellent international reputation. The Israeli intelligence apparatus consists of four separate organizations. AMAN, as noted, deals with military intelligence, the *Mossad* operates in foreign nations much as the U.S. CIA, the *Shin Beth* is concerned with internal security like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and a small research department in the Foreign Office deals with political intelligence akin to INR. Unlike the United States, only AMAN (military intelligence) had responsibility for national estimates. Additionally, in Ms. Meir's government, decisions were often made in a smaller forum known as “Golda's Kitchen Cabinet,” comprised of Meir, Deputy Premier Allon, Defense Minister Dayan, and Minister without Portfolio Galili. For any national security issues, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Elazar and Director of AMAN Zeira were usually included. Thus, AMAN not only had responsibility for intelligence estimates, but a rather central *de facto* role in the most crucial policy decisions.^{22 *}

Late in the evening of 30 September, AMAN Director Zeira received word from Mossad that a reliable HUMINT source warned the Egyptian exercise would end in a real canal crossing (ironically, this was the same day that Egypt passed the “go” code, “BADR” to their Syrian allies). Zeira waited until the next morning before passing the information to his superiors Elazar and Dayan and said that his experts considered the report “baseless.” In

* The Agranat Commission later recommended that the intelligence structure should be revised to provide more diverse advocacy in national estimates and distance intelligence somewhat from the policy formulation function, but the central position of the director of AMAN prior to the war meant he played a critical role in the Israeli surprise. (Source: Hassan el-Badri, Taha el-Magdoub and Mohammed Dia el-Din Zohdy, *The Ramadan War, 1973* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1978), 58.)

addition, at an IDF General Staff meeting that day, Zeira voiced the opinion: “the Syrians are deterred by the IDF’s ability to defeat the army in one day.”²³

Reports received on 2 October included Syrian movement of bridging equipment, fighter aircraft and SAM batteries. In the south, Egyptian bridging equipment was also observed advancing and crossing spots were being prepared in the Egyptian Third Army sector.²⁴ An article was also published that day by the Cairo-based Middle East News Agency that the Second and Third Armies were on full alert (the article was one of the very few breaches in Arab security and deception plan; another was the premature cancellation of flights and dispersal of Egypt Air commercial aircraft on 5 October).²⁵ It was only at this late date (2 October) that the precise hour for the attack was agreed between Egypt and Syria, and the next day, the Arabs directly informed the Soviets that war was imminent.

The combination of indicators led Defense Minister Dayan to recommend a “Kitchen Cabinet” meeting on the morning of 3 October, just after Ms. Meir’s return from Europe. At the meeting,

Zeira’s deputy (Zeira was ill) related that the probability of war was still “low” because, “there has been no change in the Arab’s assessment of the balance of forces in Sinai such that they could go to war.” At a full Israeli Cabinet meeting later that day, Ms. Meir did not even discuss the Arab build up. Rather, the “hot topic” remained the Schonau incident.²⁶

Not everyone in AMAN was as wedded to “the concept” as those at the top. On 1 October, a young intelligence officer in IDF Southern Command, LT Siman-Tov, produced a document that argued the build up opposite the canal was preparation for actual war. The lieutenant revised and strengthened his argument with a follow-up document on 3 October. Both of the reports were suppressed by the senior Southern Command intelligence officer because, as that officer later recounted, “they stood in contradiction to Headquarters’ evaluation that an exercise was taking place in Egypt.”²⁷ +

Some of the most dramatic warning indicators of the run up to war were provided on 4 October. A special air reconnaissance mission in the Sinai revealed an unprecedented build up of Egyptian forces. Fully five divisions and massive numbers of artillery were now positioned on the west bank of the canal.²⁸ In the late afternoon, it was learned Soviets were preparing to evacuate dependents (but not advisers). Late that evening, AMAN detected a Soviet airlift heading for the region, presumably to execute the evacuation.²⁹ At 0200 the next morning, Mossad’s best HUMINT source gave his case officer the codeword for imminent war (“radish”) and requested an urgent meeting. The chief of Mossad himself elected to fly to Europe to meet with the source personally and notified Zeira of the development.³⁰

+ AMAN Director Zeira only learned of Siman-Tov’s reports during the Agranat Commission testimony months after the war. Upon learning of the reports and Siman-Tov’s subsequent removal from his post at Southern Command, Zeira invited the lieutenant for an office visit and promoted him to captain. (Source: Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), 47.)

By the morning of 5 October, AMAN also reported that Soviet Naval vessels were departing Arab ports.³¹

In the face of these indicators, IDF Chief of Staff Elazar, with Minister of Defense Dayan's concurrence, increased the alert status of the regular armed forces and instructed logistics centers to prepare for the mobilization of reserves. At a subsequent 1100 meeting with Ms. Meir, Dayan, Elazar, and Zeira, discussion turned to what was seen as the most ominous of the indicators—the evacuation of Soviet dependents. Zeira outlined three possible explanations for the evacuation: 1) Soviets knew war was coming; 2) Soviets feared an Israeli attack; and 3) there had been a serious rift in Soviet-Arab relations. He admitted that only the first explanation squared with all the indicators, but he did not change his opinion that there was a low probability of war.³² Zeira did mention that he anticipated additional information to be forthcoming shortly, although he did not mention the Mossad HUMINT source by name. He was explicitly asked if “all sources were open and being used,” and he told his superiors that this was the case. It was learned later that at least one highly valued SIGINT source was not activated on Zeira's specific orders. It is presumed that he feared compromise of the source, but the fact that he essentially lied to his superiors indicates how strongly he still believed in the low probability of war.³³ At the end of the meeting, Ms. Meir decided to convene a full Cabinet meeting, but many ministers had already departed for the Yom Kippur holiday.

The “rump” cabinet met around noon to consider the situation. After brief discussion, it was agreed that authority to mobilize reserves would be delegated to Dayan and Elazar, but that steps already taken by Elazar would be sufficient for the present. The final AMAN report prepared before the war was ready shortly after the “rump” cabinet dispersed. Thirty-nine paragraphs of alarming indicators were recounted in the report, but the AMAN Egyptian desk officer appended his own final paragraph. The paragraph read:

Though the actual taking up of emergency positions on the canal appears to contain indicators testifying to an offensive initiative, according to our best evaluation no change has occurred in the Egyptian assessment of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF. Therefore, the probability that the Egyptians intend to resume hostilities is “low.”³⁴

At about 0400 on 6 October, AMAN Director Zeira received a phone call from the Mossad with the warning provided by their best HUMINT source (the information was actually received by the chief of Mossad the previous evening and another Mossad officer allegedly phoned the information to Israel—the delay in getting to the decision makers remains unexplained).³⁵ Zeira telephoned Elazar with the information that the Arab attack would come at 1800 that very day. Elazar in turn called Dayan who already had the same information (it is unknown how Dayan got word, but possibilities include the earlier Mossad phone call and the U.S. CIA). By 0600 when Elazar and Dayan arrived at IDF headquarters, signals intelligence, or SIGINT, sources had already reported Syrian officers phoning relatives in Lebanon telling them not to return to Syria anytime soon. There was no doubt at this point that war was imminent.³⁶

Elazar and Dayan disagreed on how to respond. Elazar favored a preemptive air strike and full mobilization to be ready for a rapid counter-attack. Dayan opposed the preemptive air strike for political reasons and thought a full-scale mobilization was unnecessary since in-place forces should be able to hold their lines. At a subsequent 0900 meeting with Ms. Meir, the preemptive strike was conclusively ruled out and only a partial mobilization was authorized. Mobilization actually began only at 1000, and full mobilization was authorized later that day as the magnitude of the attack became apparent.⁴⁷ In addition, movement into the prepared defensive strong points in the Sinai was not rapid enough to occupy them all by the actual 1400 start of the war (some believe because the warning specified an 1800 H-hour).³⁸

Israel's reactions, even after all doubts concerning the attack had been removed, have evoked a number of competing explanations. It is clearly the case that Israel was mindful of the political necessity to not appear to be the instigator of the conflict. Ms. Meir spoke with the U.S. Ambassador to Israel the morning of the attack and was told diplomatically that: "If Israel refrained from a preemptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, *then* America would feel morally obliged to help. . ." (this statement was also the "moral lever" that Ms. Meir used later to argue for increased military resupply from the United States).³⁹ Some scholars argue that Israel feared even full mobilization might be perceived as Israeli aggression or trigger an Arab attack even where none was actually planned.⁴⁰ Others have argued that the Israeli "concept" and mindset continued to affect their thinking even after any doubts about Arab intentions were resolved. These scholars argue that complacency and overconfidence in their own capabilities versus the Arabs caused less than optimal response by the Israelis.⁴¹ No matter which explanation is closer to the truth, it is clear that Israel paid dearly for both her surprise and limited initial reactions in the ensuing war.

THE WAR

The first forty-eight hours of the Arab attack sent Israel reeling. On the Syrian front, three infantry and two armored divisions stormed into the Golan Heights, defended by a single Israeli armored division. Although Syrian losses were extremely heavy, by the afternoon of 8 October, the Syrians had achieved a major break-through and had nearly overrun a divisional head-quarters. Syrian tanks stood on the hills overlooking the Sea of Galilee and pre-1967 Israel. The situation was so desperate that arriving Israeli tanks were committed to battle in "ad hoc" platoons, formed whenever three tanks could be assembled.

In the south, the Egyptians sent two field armies (five infantry and two armored divisions) across the entire length of the Suez canal and through the Israeli front-line strong points. The crossing must be considered one of the best-orchestrated obstacle crossings in history. The Egyptians achieved major bridgeheads east of the canal (Second Army in the northern half, Third Army in the south). The Egyptians estimated the possibility of up to 10,000 killed in this operation—the cost was a mere 200 killed.⁴² By 7 October, the defending Israeli regular division had lost two-thirds of its 270 tanks, most to infantry antitank weapons.

On 8 October 1973, the first two reserve armored divisions arrived in the Sinai and were committed to a major counter-attack of the Egyptian positions. One of the divisions was badly mauled by the entrenched Egyptian infantry. The other spent the day maneuvering due to confusing reports on the progress of the battle. By the end of the day, the Israeli army suffered what noted military historian Trevor Dupuy called: “the worst defeat in their history.”⁴³

The low point of the war for Israel came on the evening of 8 October. Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan told Prime Minister Golda Meir, “the *Third Temple* [the state of Israel] is going under.”⁴⁴ Some speculate that if ever Israel considered seriously using nuclear weapons, it was on the night of 8 October 1973, and at least one author has claimed that a decision to ready the weapons was actually made.⁴⁵ It is known that on 9 October Ms. Meir was concerned enough to propose the drastic step of traveling personally to Washington to speak face-to-face with President Nixon but discarded the idea upon receiving reassurances of U.S. resupply.⁴⁶ Several days later on 12 October, Golda Meir transmitted a personal letter to Nixon. That letter reportedly hinted Israel might soon be forced to use “all available means to ensure national survival” if U.S. military resupply was not immediately forthcoming. This subtle nuclear threat was less credible by 12 October, when the gravest danger to Israel had already passed, but U.S. arms began flowing the next day. Years later, Henry Kissinger indicated to a trusted colleague that an implicit nuclear threat was involved over the arms resupply issue.⁴⁷

The tide began to turn by 9 October. In the south, the Israelis eschewed further counter-attacks as the Egyptians elected to reinforce their positions. The Israeli reserves arriving on the Syrian front stabilized the situation and restored the prewar lines by the evening of 10 October. A major Israeli counter-attack was prepared for 11 October. The counter-attack in the north was aimed at threatening the Syrian capital of Damascus. The intent was to knock Syria out of the war so Israel could concentrate on the Sinai. The attack succeeded in pushing the Syrians some ten miles past the prewar lines, but it stalled approximately 20 miles from Damascus. At this point, the Syrian defensive lines held, aided by the arrival of troops from Iraq and Jordan. By 14 October, the northern front stabilized, with both sides facing force ratios more suitable for defense than offense.⁴⁸

The counter-attack in the north did not knock Syria out of the war, but it did affect the southern front to Israel’s advantage. On 11 October, Syria urgently requested Egyptian action to relieve Israeli pressure in the north. Egypt had achieved success thus far by remaining under their SAM umbrella and fighting a defensive war. Not all Egyptian commanders were convinced that switching to the offense was the best course of action; notably, Minister of War Ismail was opposed. However, the Syrian plea strengthened the position of other key Egyptian leaders who had argued that Egypt should exploit her gains. Thus, on 14 October, the Egyptians launched the equivalent of a two-armored-division thrust along a broad front against the now-prepared and reinforced Israelis. The Egyptians were repulsed with extremely heavy losses. This was the last major Egyptian offensive operation, but it did disrupt plans for a major Israeli attack scheduled for 14 October.

The Israeli offensive in the south began on the afternoon of 15 October as a two-division thrust toward the Suez Canal. The attack was directed near the junction of the Egyptian Second and Third Armies just north of Great Bitter Lake. Lead elements of the Israeli force, maneuvering through lightly-defended terrain, reached the east bank of the canal late on 15 October and began crossing in the early morning of the 16th. The Israelis had secured a bridgehead, but for the operation to succeed they would also have to clear two main east-west roads to allow movement of bridging equipment and supplies. These roads were held in force by elements of the Egyptian Second Army. In a pitched battle over the next three days, the Israeli forces secured a twenty kilometer wide corridor to the canal, with heavy losses on both sides. By 18 October, an Israeli pontoon bridge was spanning the canal and a two-division force was crossing into "Africa."

Beginning on 16 October, the first Israeli operations west of the canal consisted of small raids against vulnerable SAM sites, supply depots, etc. These continued until 19 October when the main force was in position to breakout and accomplish its main objective. The purpose of the Israeli operation was to cut off the Egyptian Third Army by sweeping south to the Gulf of Suez. By 22 October, elements of the Israeli force were within artillery and tank range of the main Suez-Cairo road, threatening communications with the Third Army.

Initially the Egyptians believed the offensive as an attempt to roll up the right flank of the Second Army. The Egyptians did not appreciate the true purpose of the Israeli thrust until late on 18 October, when satellite photography confirmed the size of the Israeli force west of the canal (the photography was provided by Soviet President Kosygin, who had traveled secretly to Cairo on 16 October).⁴⁹ When the intentions of the Israelis became clear, Sadat became much more receptive to Soviet suggestions to press for a cease-fire. On 20 October, Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow to hammer out the terms of a UN-mediated halt to the fighting. The result was UN Security Council Resolution 338 (UNSCR 338), adopted in the early morning hours of 22 October. The resolution called for a cease-fire beginning at 1852, 22 October.

Henry Kissinger stopped by Tel Aviv on his way back to Washington at Israel's request to discuss the negotiations (Kissinger had not communicated with the Israelis prior to agreement on the draft UNSCR). The "cease-fire in-place" portion of UNSCR 338 was criticized by Israeli officials who complained it would not allow them to "finish the job" in the Sinai. Kissinger responded by asking how long it would take to complete encirclement of the Egyptian army. Upon hearing "two or three days," Kissinger is reported to have responded: "Well, in Vietnam the cease-fire didn't go into effect at the exact time that was agreed on."⁵⁰

Although both Egypt and Israel accepted the terms of UNSCR 338, fighting continued unabated past the designated cease-fire time. Both sides claimed that the other had violated the cease-fire, and both sides were probably correct. With many Egyptian units encircled behind the Israeli line of advance on the west bank of the canal, some continued fighting was inevitable. It is clear that Israel went beyond consolidating gains and used the continued fighting to complete their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Israeli forces reached the Gulf of Suez by midnight, 23 October.

By 24 October the final positions of the opposing forces were essentially established, but fighting continued on the west bank of the canal. The Soviets, who had guaranteed Sadat the cease-fire would hold and that the Third Army would be saved, responded to the continued fighting by placing up to seven airborne divisions on alert and marshalling airlift to transport them to the Middle East. At 2125, 24 October, President Nixon received an urgent note from Brezhnev suggesting joint U.S.-Soviet military action to enforce the cease-fire. The note threatened unilateral Soviet action if the United States were unwilling to participate.⁵¹

Nixon and Kissinger saw deployment of U.S. troops so soon after Vietnam, possibly to fight along side Soviets against Israelis, as impossible. Similarly, unilateral Soviet action was unacceptable. Early on 25 October, Nixon cabled Brezhnev voicing his strong opposition to superpower military involvement, especially unilateral Soviet action. Nixon also placed U.S. military forces world-wide on an increased state of alert (DEFCON THREE), and an urgent warning was sent to Israel to cease fighting. By the afternoon of 25 October tension was relieved, with the Soviets dropping their insistence on superpower participation in cease-fire enforcement. Fighting along the Suez front subsided to minor skirmishes, but the war had produced the most serious superpower confrontation since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵²

It took until 18 January 1974 to reach a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. The agreement created a UN buffer zone approximately ten miles east of the Suez Canal with limitations on Egyptian and Israeli forces in areas adjacent to the buffer zone. Disengagement negotiations with Syria were more difficult. An agreement was finally reached on 31 May 1974, including a UN buffer zone approximating the prewar border with force limitations in the adjacent areas.

WINNERS, LOSERS, AND LESSONS

Both sides claimed victory, and both sides had a reasonable case. Israel, after being nearly overwhelmed, staged a remarkable comeback, conquering new territory in the north and isolating an entire field army in the south. By the “numbers,” Israel won the war. Israel suffered over 11,000 total casualties (2,800 killed) and lost over 800 tanks (400 of which were later repaired) and over 100 aircraft. The Arabs combined suffered over 28,000 casualties (8,500 killed), losing over 1,850 tanks and 450 aircraft.⁵³ While the Arabs lost more men and equipment, the impact on Israel with a smaller population was arguably more severe.

Despite the losses, Arab claims of victory are not farfetched. In the north, the Syrians and their allies had fought the Israelis to a standstill. In the south, Israel had isolated the Egyptian Third Army, but it is not clear that the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. In the final settlements, Syria essentially maintained the status quo ante, and Egypt regained the Suez Canal. Unquestionably the best argument for an Arab victory is the changed political situation. The Arabs had accomplished their goal of upsetting the status quo, and the 1973 war was a direct antecedent of the 1979 Camp David Accords. Trevor Dupuy sums up the issue well:


Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory.⁵⁴

The 1973 War has been extensively studied for both its military and political lessons, but it is equally revealing as a study in human decision making. The disastrous 14 October Egyptian offensive, which was resisted by Minister of War Ismail, is one example. The Syrian call for help, coupled with the euphoria over initial Egyptian successes felt by many in the senior Egyptian staff, prompted this poor decision. Parallels to the revision of objectives in Korea after Inchon are discernable, as is an appreciation for the discipline it must have taken to hold to the original objectives in Desert Storm. The case also graphically points out the human tendency to "fight the last war." Israeli reliance on mobile armored warfare, supported by air, was key to the 1967 victory, but also the precursor to the 8 October defeat. The most striking lesson, however, is the aspect of lack of appreciation for the opponent's point of view.


The Israelis were genuinely surprised in October 1973 mostly because they viewed Egypt's resort to war as an irrational act. By their calculations, there was no chance for Egyptian victory, thus no rational reason to resort to force. From Sadat's perspective, continuation of the status quo was intolerable, and even a military defeat (so long as it could be limited) was preferable to surrender without a fight. The parallels to U.S. evaluations of Saddam Hussein's calculations are evident. The technology of war may change, but the calculations (and miscalculations) of national leaders remain a constant element of international conflict.



Source: USMA Military History Atlas
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm>



Source: USMA Military History Atlas
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm>



Source: USMA Military History Atlas
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm>

1973

13 Sep - Air battle with Syria; 23 Sep - Syria deploys in defensive positions/calls up reserves; 24 Sep - Israel begins strengthening Golan; 25 Sep - King Hussein warns Ms. Meir of Syrian intention to attack; Egyptian deployments noted; 29 Sep - Ms. Meir to Europe (previously planned trip); 27 Sep - Egypt mobilizes reserves (23d time in 1973); 28 Sep - Terrorists attack train in Austria, Schonau transit facility closed

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat
Sep 30	Oct 1	2	3	4	5	6
Mossad HUMINT says war coming Egypt to Syria: "go" CIA/INR report calms Kissinger	LT Siman-Tov warns war coming Egyptian exercise "Tahrir 41" begins Syria deploys more	Bridging equipment moves, both fronts Syria calls reserves 1400 time of attack agreed Ms. Meir to Vienna	Soviets informed Ms. Meir returns from Austria Siman-Tov's 2d Rpt Kitchen Cabinet briefed "low"	Sinai recon reveals artillery/ammo Soviet evacuation Soviet Navy leaves Mossad source requests meet	Israel cabinet meets: Alert IDF, but no mobilization and prob. still "low" Mossad Chief warned by source	0400 - War at 1800 0930 - Mobilize/not preempt 1400 - War begins <i>Yom Kippur</i>
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Egypt establishes bridgehead Syria threatens southern flank	Israel's "worst defeat" in Sinai Syria near-break-through "3d Temple" falling	Meir proposes visit to United States Sinai stabilizes Tide reverses in Golan	Israel regains ground lost in Golan	Counter-attack into Syria Syria requests Egyptian attack	Israel would accept ceasefire in-place Meir letter to Nixon	U.S. airlift begins Syria offensive begins to stall
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Egyptian attack defeated Syria lines harden	Israeli thrust toward canal begins	First Israeli forces to west of canal Kosygin travels to Egypt	Battle for corridor to canal	Bridge over canal secured Sadat agrees to ceasefire	Israeli breakout west of canal aimed at Suez	Kissinger to USSR
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Kissinger in USSR	UNSCR 338 calls for ceasefire Kissinger visits Israel	Fighting continues; Israel closes toward Suez	USSR threatens unilateral action United States to DEFCON III	Ceasefire observed by both sides		

Notes

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6. Michael I. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” *International Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (September 1977): 498–9.
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16. Shlaim, 356.
17. Insight Team, 101.
18. Handel, 497.
19. Insight Team, 107.
20. Ibid., 92, 104, 112.
21. Shlaim, 361.
22. Ibid., 366–9.
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24. Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Wealth of Information and the Poverty of Comprehension: Israel’s Intelligence Failure of 1973 Revisited,” *Intelligence and National Security* 10, no. 4 (October 1995): 232.
25. Handel, fn. 3, 467.
26. Insight Team, 108–9.
27. Shlaim, 353–4.
28. Cohen and Gooch, 107.
29. Bar-Joseph (October 1995), 233.
30. Bar-Joseph (Spring 1995), 595–6.
31. Op. Cit.
32. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 74.
33. Bar-Joseph (Spring 1995), 601–2.
34. Insight Team, 114–9.
35. Bar-Joseph (October 1995), 236.
36. Insight Team, 121.
37. Ibid., 122–4.
38. el-Badri, et al., 59. The actual time for attack was only decided on 2 October, probably after the Mossad HUMINT source had learned of the attack.
39. Insight Team, 125.
40. Handel, 482–3, Jervis et al., 76.
41. Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 227–42; “The Dynamics of Surprise: The Defender’s Perspective,” *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 113–44; Cohen and Gooch 126–31.
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“Blood Diamonds are Forever”

BRIAN W. STORCK AND RICHARD J. NORTON

Colonel Rico?”

Lieutenant Colonel Juan Rico, USMC, glanced over his shoulder to the door of his Pentagon office and sprang to attention as he recognized his visitor. It was none other than the deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD) for international security affairs, recently appointed by the Bush II administration. “Yes sir. How may I help you?”

“I was going through some of the briefing papers on Sierra Leone last night, and I saw you are the point of contact for Operation Focus Relief (OFR), the West Africa training initiative. Is that right?”

Juan nodded. “Yes, sir. OFR is in my portfolio. Would you like to know something in particular about it? It looks like everything is on track to begin training the battalion from Ghana.”

“So I read. What I’d like to know is how we came to be involved in this project in the first place. What were the issues and arguments? How did it come to pass? I barely remember seeing anything about it. I’d like a quick briefing this afternoon.”

As Juan began to pull out his OFR files, he realized he didn’t have a complete answer for the DASD. Thus far the initiative had attracted little attention in Washington.

On the surface, OFR was simple. Beginning in October 2000, a small number (less than a hundred) of U.S. Army Special Forces personnel had begun rotational training of seven battalions of West African troops for peacekeeping duties. Five battalions would be from Nigeria and one each from Ghana and Senegal. The United States was providing the troops with basic equipment, including weapons and uniforms. Once trained, the seven battalions would not only provide the nucleus of a regional peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone, but also be able to respond to any future West African crisis. The total price tag was going to be less than \$90 million.¹

Luckily, Juan knew some of the mid-grade players involved in the initial decision. He called Carl Jenkins, who had been on the Clinton NSC staff and had worked the Africa desk.

"Carl, I owe the new boss a brief on how we came to approve OFR. You were there. What happened?"

Carl considered the question. "It's a bit complicated, Juan. You're going to have to give your new Republican master a history lesson first. And you're going to have to make sure he understands the impact of Mogadishu and Rwanda. Remember, after Mogadishu in 1993, everyone in the government—well almost everyone—wanted nothing more to do with Africa. Any problems that flared up on the continent were labeled as civil wars or internal matters, and we stayed out. Those eighteen dead Rangers cast a very long shadow. But then there were the Rwandan massacres in 1994, a clear-cut case of genocide. When all the dust cleared it was evident that there had been a successful effort by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other senior officials to keep the United States from getting involved in Rwanda. I think Christopher did not want to get involved in Rwanda for a variety of reasons. First, Africa was not his area of expertise. Second, from his point of view, there were more important things happening in the Balkans, with the Russians and with NATO. Third, Secretary Christopher had been badly burned by the Somali intervention. In the wake of the deaths of the eighteen Rangers at Mogadishu it was rumored that both he and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin were in danger of losing their jobs.² One of the conclusions many analysts drew from Somalia was that the United States had no business putting 'boots on the ground' in the middle of an African conflict. And while there was genocide occurring in Rwanda, it was also a civil war.

"The result of our inaction in Rwanda in 1994 was, for the remainder of the Clinton era, a strange combination of aversion and guilt. On one hand the U.S. government remained averse to getting directly involved in Africa—especially in an open-ended commitment or a shooting war. On the other hand, many still felt guilty over not stepping in and stopping a crime against humanity that the United States government knew was in progress. You may remember, in 1998 President Clinton publicly stressed the failure of Western nations to recognize and respond to the genocide in Central Africa. He vowed that such an event must never happen again.³ Moreover, in 2000 Madeline Albright admitted she had been in favor of intervention in Rwanda in 1994, but was compelled to follow the administration's line in her role as U.S. ambassador to the UN.⁴

"As you know, before OFR the Clinton administration had already taken some action in regards to these messy African situations. In 1996 the U.S. initiated a program called the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). We agreed to provide some basic peacekeeping training and equipment for eight battalions from Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Ivory Coast and Kenya. The idea was that these units would then form the nucleus of a force, which could respond to any kind of crisis in Africa. Despite some initial skepticism, ACRI has generally been a success. Special Operations Command ran the program, and they are very good at this sort of thing. All eight battalions have been trained, and two of the eight units were used as peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in 2000.⁵

"The trouble is, ACRI hasn't been effective in halting the violence in Sierra Leone and the rest of West Africa. This is what I call Kaplan country. In 1994 a reporter named Robert

Kaplan had written an article for the *The Atlantic Monthly* magazine titled 'The Coming Anarchy.'⁶ In it he predicted that all of West Africa was going to sink into chaos, misery and despair as pressures from population, disease, civil unrest and other forces destroyed governments that were essentially corrupt and fragile.

Carl continued, "Kaplan gave a great excuse for some people to avoid any commitment in Africa. They argued that because West Africa was doomed, there wasn't anything that could be done and any attempts to do so were a waste of resources. Liberia had been gutted by a decade-long civil war. There were border clashes and insurrectionist movements in Guinea, and Nigeria certainly saw some turmoil. The repeated United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the area hadn't worked.

"Here's a quick summary. Sierra Leone is a former British possession that was granted full independence in 1961. After a succession of weak governments and military coups, it went into the firm grip of a one-party government. In 1991, the civil war in neighboring Liberia spilled into Sierra Leone. The so-called Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, began an insurrection. The RUF was led by a Sierra Leonean named Foday Sankoh, who was a puppet of the Liberian dictator Charles Taylor."

Juan interrupted. "I thought Sankoh and the RUF were Marxists?"

Carl laughed. "If that's true then so were Al Capone and his gang. The RUF were crooks, plain and simple. Nigeria saw itself as the regional hegemon and sheriff, and it is certainly a pivotal state in West Africa. The Nigerians had intervened multiple times in Liberia and Sierra Leone, fighting the various factions and trying to keep the peace. Nigeria claimed they spent more than \$10 billion and lost thousands of soldiers in the process, and they felt that the world owed them a debt."⁷

Carl continued before Juan could object. "I know. For almost all the period in question Nigeria was run by a dictator, their peacekeeping tactics were more than a little harsh and their motives were very questionable. But Nigeria did convince the UN Security Council to approve a peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone in 1998. The Nigerians also convinced their fellow members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to provide troops. The ECOWAS members* realized that nothing was going to be done to help West Africa unless they did it themselves. To that point, the big ECOWAS success had been forcing Liberian dictator Charles Taylor to hold free and fair elections in 1996. Unfortunately, the Liberian people turned around and elected Taylor! Once he was legitimate he stepped up his attacks in Sierra Leone and added the ECOWAS states to his list of enemies."

Lt Col Rico next called over to the State Department to catch Dr. Charlie Zim, a Foreign Service officer who was working on the Africa desk.

* ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Zim said, "Sierra Leone is all about diamonds, Juan. They have nothing like the fields of South Africa, but they have enough. If there were no diamonds, there would be little in Sierra Leone worth fighting over. At one time or another the Sierra Leone government, Nigerian 'peacekeepers,' the RUF and international mining companies' security personnel have all been in possession of the diamond fields."

"Security personnel? You mean mercenaries," said Rico.

"Not exactly. Of course almost all the security personnel were former South African military, and their parent companies, *Executive Outcomes* and *Sandline*, have been accused of being mercenary fronts. Once the world press started making a stink about them, the security personnel were withdrawn." Zim mused, "They were, however, very good at restoring order, if a little loose with human rights standards. Not that any combatant was paying attention to such things. This struggle was incredibly brutal. One of the RUF's calling cards was to hack off the limbs, especially the hands, of people they didn't like. Children as young as five years old were forced to fight in the various factions, and numerous young girls were kidnapped to provide sexual entertainment for the rebel fighters.

"There was some meddling from outside as well. Libya was widely suspected of having its fingers in the pot. Qaddafi has long had an interest in extending his influence in West Africa. Both the Liberian Taylor and the Sierra Leonean Sankoh attended terrorist training camps in Libya at the same time in the 1980s.⁸ Taylor supposedly traded diamonds to the Libyans for weapons. In fact, some locals believe that Qaddafi was pulling Taylor's and Sankoh's strings the whole time.

"And then, in May 1999 there seemed to be a breakthrough. After taking and sacking much of the Sierra Leonean capital of Freetown, the RUF agreed to a ceasefire. In talks held by the UN it was decided that Sankoh would be vice president, President-in-exile Kabbah would return, and 6,000 UN peace keepers would go in to keep things under control. The RUF would be disarmed and the Sierra Leone army would be reduced in size. There was some international media criticism of the idea of letting Sankoh walk away from his crimes, but that was just the way it was.

"The United States endorsed the idea. Madeline Albright, then secretary of state, even flew to Sierra Leone in October 1999. She reaffirmed our support for the peace plan and visited with children who had been maimed in the fighting. You may have seen the video of her holding a small girl who had lost both arms in a RUF attack.⁹

"The U.N. sent in their peacekeepers as promised, and the peace agreement held for several months. Then things went badly out of control. The RUF and the other factions did not disarm, and the RUF refused to leave the diamond fields. Fighting escalated between the RUF and the forces of the Sierra Leone government. Eventually 'Vice President' Sankoh called for the UN to withdraw. The UN peace keepers were attacked and several hundred were taken hostage by the RUF.

“At this point British Prime Minister Tony Blair had enough. The British historical connection with Sierra Leone made the situation there especially embarrassing. Plus, London may have wanted to protect the interests of several British mineral companies who were actively cultivating the Sierra Leone leadership for diamond mining contracts.

“In early May 2000 the British sent in approximately eight hundred paratroopers and Special Air Service troops. They got back the UN hostages, performed a non-combatant evacuation and served as advisors to the Sierra Leonean army. In the process, they also engaged the RUF and captured Sankoh. While this was going on someone in the DoD got the idea for OFR.”

Zim concluded, “You’ll need to talk to my assistant Yvette Deladrier about the Inter-agency Working Group aspects of the decision. I’ll transfer you to her number.”

Deladrier was brisk and to the point. “I’m sure Charlie mentioned that the idea for OFR came from Defense. Here’s what happened: The Africa Interagency Working Group, or IWG, consisted of representatives from State, Defense, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.* The IWG was meeting at least once or twice every week, as it had since the Rwanda crisis of 1994. It was clear that the situation in Sierra Leone was awful, but there seemed nothing we could do that did not involve U.S. ‘boots on the ground.’ No one, and I mean no one, thought the president was going to buy that as an option. At the same time there was a lot of interest on the part of Secretary of State Albright. She demanded weekly briefings on the area.¹⁰ That may not seem like much, but given her schedule and demands on her time, that level of interest made the region pretty much of a hot spot. You could sense she wanted us to do more. Sandy Berger, the national security advisor at the White House, also wanted the U.S. to be part of a solution to the problem of Sierra Leone and West Africa.

“Of all the options, direct aid to Nigeria’s ongoing peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone seemed to be the most effective strategy. Unfortunately, throughout the 1990s Nigeria was basically an international pariah. We simply couldn’t be seen giving direct aid to a brutal military dictatorship that had an extremely poor human rights record. Both Congress and the American public would be outraged. So we were limited to aiding the Nigerians indirectly through ECOWAS.

“Then in June 1998 the Nigerian dictator General Abacha suddenly died. Nigeria subsequently established a transitional government and held a free election in December. By 1999 Nigeria was rehabilitated in our eyes as a potential recipient of direct U.S. aid. In July, the IWG representative from DoD, who was from your international security affairs shop, suggested the idea of training additional peacekeeping battalions specifically for West

*USAID is not technically part of the Department of State, although since 1999 the director of USAID reports to the secretary of state.

Africa.¹¹ We at State saw several potential benefits to such a program, which eventually became known as OFR.

"We wanted to show tangible support for the new democracy in Nigeria as fast as possible, but didn't want to overplay it. After all, democracy is a delicate thing in that region. We also wanted to send a strong signal of support to ECOWAS, which can become a major stabilizing factor in West Africa. OFR would do both. It would also be cheap. We knew from our experience with ACRI that these infantry battalions didn't need a lot of expensive gear. The program would also let us help the United Kingdom. The British could train the Sierra Leone Army for the rough stuff, and we could train the peacekeepers that would move in behind them. OFR would give Secretary Albright a reasonable option to offer to the president.¹²

"Nonetheless, throughout 1999 OFR seemed to be low priority and moved slowly due to our own bureaucratic inertia and Nigerian internal disputes.¹³ Then, in late Spring 2000, Albright sent UN Ambassador-nominee Richard Holbrooke to Nigeria to spin up the U.S. ambassador there and get the Nigerians on board. I'm sure the fact that things were falling apart in Sierra Leone during this period led to her decision to send him. As usual, Holbrooke was very aggressive and made things happen. Some of his detractors at State complained that Holbrooke was obviously in search of a new crisis. Although I agree he's a bit of an adrenaline junkie, Dick has a great track record for producing success in tough situations. Sure enough, he got the ball rolling on OFR.¹⁴

"The White House was also on board. OFR had been a popular idea at the NSC since DoD first proposed it. Sandy Berger has always been a champion of greater U.S. efforts in Africa. He felt OFR would make us proactive contributors to a lasting solution, and there was next to no chance that an American soldier would get killed."

Juan interrupted, "What about within DoD?"

"Some DoD analysts worried that we might be training a palace guard for a future dictator. But by rotating the training sites not only between Ghana, Senegal, and also different ethnic areas in Nigeria, and carefully screening the troops who got the training, we thought such an outcome could be avoided. European Command (EUCOM) made a bit of a fuss at first. West Africa is their area of responsibility and they made the usual excuse about how their theater Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel were too busy for yet another mission. The training portion of OFR was later assigned to stateside-based SOF personnel, and EUCOM stopped complaining.¹⁵ Special Operations Command never protested. But then again, the OFR mission is in their job description. They do this sort of thing all the time, and it was very similar to the mission they had been doing for ACRI."

"Was anyone else upset? Our allies?"

Yvette answered, "The French don't like us or the British being involved. They see most of West Africa as being in their sphere of influence. They think the renewed British presence in Sierra Leone is weakening their influence. They've grumbled in particular about us enrolling a Senegalese battalion in OFR. Training in Senegal has always been their job as

the former colonial power. Of course, Paris didn't particularly appreciate our earlier cooperation with the Senegalese on the ACRI either, for much the same reasons."¹⁶

Now Juan called Professor Frankel, who taught a political science class for journalists at Georgetown University. Juan explained his task and said, "I know the DASD is already wondering why he didn't hear about OFR when it was being decided. I don't remember seeing much publicity about it either."

Frankel said, "Not surprising. There wasn't a lot of interest here at home. Most Americans couldn't find Sierra Leone on the map if they tried. Foreign media, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), were more aggressive in covering the Sierra Leone story than their U.S. counterparts. Some of the stories and images that were shown in the U.S. were really gruesome, but that didn't translate into U.S. public support for direct intervention. In a Gallup poll in May 2000, when the news of the hostage taking of UN troops was at its height, only 10 percent of U.S. respondents thought Sierra Leone was vitally important. By contrast, over 60 percent thought it was not important or had no opinion whatsoever."¹⁷

"Some analysts explain this lack of interest in terms of compassion fatigue. There had been simply too many humanitarian disasters, civil wars and stories of suffering from Africa. Despite all previous efforts, nothing seemed to get better. Other experts felt that the public attitude was due to the simple desire to avoid involvement and U.S. casualties in another nasty civil war. Moreover, the news from West Africa wasn't all bad. Over time, the level of violence rose and fell. When the fighting stopped, the atrocities stopped. When the atrocities stopped, the news stories stopped. For a while the diamond campaign had a chance of keeping the media interested, but it fizzled too."

"Diamond campaign?" asked Rico.

Frankel explained, "Diamonds fueled the fighting. The stones were being sent by the RUF to Liberia, which by 2000 had become a major diamond exporter in less than two years—despite having *no* diamond fields. During the last couple of years, NGOs like the British Oxford Famine Relief (Oxfam) and Amnesty International began exposing just who was buying these so-called 'blood diamonds'.¹⁸ Some of the guilty parties were reputable dealers in Europe, New York, Los Angeles, and so on. The bad publicity impacted the legitimate diamond exporters like De Beers, who were anxious to avoid any kind of negative press. Of course, they pushed the idea that respectable dealers should buy only 'clean' diamonds from De Beers! The diamond industry has tried developing ways to identify clean diamonds using laser tagging and other means, but a workable technology has yet to be found. Nonetheless, for a while there was real international pressure to stop the purchase of blood diamonds. In fact, by early 2001 the diamond industry had pretty much agreed on a worldwide warranty system to certify clean diamonds. Unfortunately, the diamond smugglers are already working on ways to forge these warranties.

"But diamonds or no diamonds, no one in the U.S. media really cared about OFR. The few reporters who looked at the program soon lost interest. Green Berets training foreign armies is not news, especially since no one was getting shot at. The price tag is also pretty small. The result? Not a lot of public scrutiny."

"But what about Congress and the African-American community?" asked Rico. "I can't believe the Congressional Black Caucus wasn't engaged."

"There's some history there," replied Frankel. "Both Congress and private activists have been involved in the Liberia and Sierra Leone issues for some time. The trouble is, they got burned. Reverend Jesse Jackson was appointed a special envoy for the president back in 1997 to help work the issue. He made several trips to the area to try to advance the peace process, but he became associated with the RUF rebels' side of the argument. One time during the negotiations, he even publicly compared the rebel leader Sankoh to Nelson Mandela, an international hero. The legitimate government of Sierra Leone was outraged. By the time the peace agreement finally fell apart in May 2000, Jackson was so despised in Freetown that the government side refused to guarantee his safety if he ever came back. They even called him a 'RUF collaborator' when he tried to explain himself."

"The same sort of thing happened with U.S. Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ), the ranking Democrat on the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He was probably the leading expert on African issues in the Black Caucus. Unfortunately, Payne had a personal connection with the Liberian dictator Taylor that goes back to the 1980's. He denied that he supports Taylor, but there's no question that Taylor manipulated his relationship with Payne to advance his own agenda. In fact, the perception of Payne's bias got so bad that the Freetown government stopped dealing with the Congressional Black Caucus and began to approach Congress via senators like Jud Gregg, a white Republican from New Hampshire."

"Both Jackson and Payne were harshly attacked for their actions involving Sierra Leone in an article that appeared in *The New Republic* in July 2000.¹⁹ The article also accused the Clinton administration of having a policy 'to *appear* to care' about Africa and of 'coercive dishonesty.' And this was in *The New Republic*, a liberal magazine that had been a major supporter of many Clinton policies. Since then, both Jackson and the Black Caucus have been pretty quiet on West African issues."

Juan thanked Professor Frankel and turned to his computer. There were obviously many factors influencing the OFR decision, and he had more than enough material to build a briefing for his new boss. So far, the training program appeared to be a business-as-usual, low-profile success story. . . .

“Blood Diamonds are Forever” Epilogue

Brrrrreeeeep!

Colonel (Select) Juan Rico, USMC, reached for the STU III secure telephone without looking away from the *Early Bird* on his computer screen. He was engrossed in a *Washington Post* article on a possible connection between Sierra Leone diamond smugglers and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist organization.²⁰ But Juan straightened abruptly as he recognized the caller. His boss the DASD had obviously been reading the same article.

“Juan, the secretary wants me to update him on Sierra Leone right away. This al Qaeda diamonds story has got the whole Pentagon E-Ring buzzing. What’s your take on the article, and where does Operation Focus Relief (OFR) currently stand? I’ll initiate secure.”

As the phones synched up, Juan hastily reviewed the article. The reporter cited intelligence sources and claimed that al Qaeda was buying blood diamonds from Sierra Leone via Liberia and selling them for large profits in Europe. The article alleged that a Senegalese front man with ties to several radical Islamic organizations was coordinating the contacts between RUF diamond smugglers and buyers from al Qaeda and Hezbollah, the Shiite terrorist group. Al Qaeda was estimated to have earned millions of dollars from the smuggled gems. The phone clicked.

“Okay, sir, I’ve got you secure. I can’t speak to the intelligence reports, but the article squares with what I’ve seen in open sources. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) just reached its full strength of 17,500, and the program to disarm the RUF and other elements is continuing.²¹ The countryside is pretty quiet, but the RUF fighters around the diamond mines have so far refused to disarm and are apparently mining diamonds more aggressively than ever. The border between Sierra Leone and Liberia is still a sieve, and the Liberian government is being accused of actively participating in the smuggling.”

“Understood,” the DASD replied, “but what happened the international effort to control illicit diamonds?”

“An agreement to implement a system of diamond certification and tracking will probably be signed in Botswana by the end of November 2001.²² The diamond industry, human rights organizations, and more than thirty countries will be involved. They expect the scheme to be fully in place by the end of 2002, but there are some big questions over monitoring and compliance measures. The U.S. Congress is also developing legislation called the Clean Diamond Trade Act, which would sanction nations that do not comply with the

new standards. The president is expected to sign it despite some earlier concerns over his discretionary powers."²³

"I'm sure he's seen this al Qaeda story," said the DASD. "So where do we stand on OFR?"

"No major problems, sir. The third training mission to Nigeria is just getting underway, and the Nigerians seem happy with the program. We haven't had any political difficulties with them after the Nigerian president forced the retirement of the heads of his army, air force, and navy last spring. The Senegalese and Ghanaian battalions have been trained, and the whole program is coming in under budget."²⁴ The first two Nigerian battalions and the Ghanaian battalion have already been deployed to Sierra Leone, and the UN is pleased with their performance."

"Sounds like a good-news story", allowed the DASD, "but why can't they stop the diamond smuggling?"

"In fact, sir, the OFR-trained battalions aren't stationed around the diamond mines. A Pakistani unit controls the area along with armed RUF elements."²⁵ It's a bit confused. . . ."

"Yeah, yeah," sighed the DASD, "I can still see us getting blamed somehow. So are our friends over at State pushing for an expansion of the OFR program?"

"They aren't, sir. The Africa IWG is still meeting on a weekly basis, but the current focus is on Burundi and Congo. I'm afraid Sierra Leone is no longer a high priority. There's even talk of using some of the OFR-trained units in other contingencies outside of Sierra Leone."

"We'll see about that," said the DASD. "I'll let you know how it goes with the secretary. Out here."

ABBREVIATED TIMELINE

- | | | | |
|------|---|------|--|
| 1961 | Sierra Leone granted independence from UK | 1998 | Nigerian dictator General Abacha dies, free elections held |
| 1991 | Revolutionary United Front (RUF) begins civil war in Sierra Leone | 1999 | May - Sierra Leone ceasefire signed
July - West African Training Initiative (WATI) proposed
October - Secretary of State Albright visits West Africa |
| 1993 | Eighteen U.S. soldiers killed in Mogadishu, Somalia | | |
| 1994 | Rwandan civil war and genocide | 2000 | April - Sierra Leone agreement fails, UN troops taken hostage
May - UK intervenes in Sierra Leone
June - Richard Holbrooke visits Nigeria
October - WATI training begins in Nigeria |
| 1996 | African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) begins
Charles Taylor becomes president of Liberia | | |
| 1997 | Jesse Jackson appointed special envoy | 2001 | November - Diamond industry agrees on warranty system |

MAP OF WEST AFRICA



Notes

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12. Interview with Mr. Tim Ryan, Desk Officer, West Africa, U.S. Department of State, conducted in Washington DC, 4 December 2000.
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Jets for Chile – A Risk Worth Taking?

LAURENCE L. MCCABE

Colonel Cameron “Cam” Hall, USAF, was understandably nervous as he entered the State Department building on his way to his job on the staff of the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. This was only his third day as the military executive assistant to the office with State Department oversight responsibility for most political and diplomatic issues that have a direct or indirect military connection including the sale of United States military defense articles to international customers, the humanitarian demining programs, and peacekeeping security operations among others. As Cam walked through the door and took his place in line at the security checkpoint, he reflected on his first meeting only two days ago with his new boss, Richard Enron, a prominent attorney from Texas who had been quite helpful to the Bush campaign during the 2000 November election. Richard Enron had only recently been confirmed by the Senate and was eager to make a good impression on Secretary Powell as well as his friends on the White House staff.

“Cam” the secretary said, “I have my first marching orders from the top and I need your help to get some fast answers. As an F-16 fighter pilot, you seem like the right guy to take the lead on this issue. As you know, since 11 September the White House has been focused like a laser on the war against terrorism. Secretary Powell, however, has been looking a little further down the road and sees some thorny issues that need some immediate attention to ensure the administration does not get caught flat-footed. One of these issues is the president’s decision to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Latin American countries, specifically the F-16 to Chile. I know this has been a controversial issue for several years, going all the way back to the early days of the Clinton administration. I also know that on 13 June (2001), the Pentagon—specifically the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—officially notified Congress of the president’s intent to sell the aircraft to Chile.¹ The White House staff is now in a hurry to update the president on issues and decisions that have fallen off the front burner due to the war on terrorism—decisions that could still get him in hot water later down the road.”

The secretary continued, “Secretary Powell has asked me to be the Department’s point man on the Chilean F-16 sale and to give the president a background ‘update’ brief next week at Camp David. I probably don’t have to remind you how strongly President Bush feels about our relationship with Latin America, so we want to get this right. What I need from you is simple: put together a paper that includes a short history of the issue, a summary of who is promoting the sale, who is against the sale and an analysis of their respective

positions. Do the best you can in the short time we have. From what I know about the issue, we are talking about two different, but related decisions. First, as I understand it, President Clinton made the initial decision in 1997 to allow the United States aerospace industry to compete for the Chilean fighter aircraft buy—with the intention of selling a United States fighter to Chile if we won the competition. We then competed with several other countries for over three years—until recently, when the Chilean government announced its preference for the Lockheed Martin F-16. President Bush essentially endorsed the Clinton decision with his notification to Congress in June of this year of his intent to sell the F-16 to Chile. I understand there are some individuals and groups pretty upset with this deal. I want to be able to remind the president who he has made happy and who he has made unhappy with his decision to re-enter the advanced arms market in Latin America.”

The secretary smiled, and said in a more decidedly Texas drawl, “Cam, this first one is important to me. I don’t want to be an ‘all hat and no cattle’ member of this organization—I know you can do it. Please brief me in three days.” With that, Cam shook hands and walked out of the office slightly dazed with the daunting task, yet excited with the prospect of working on an issue with such high-level visibility.

Following the initial meeting with his boss, Cam reflected on his current predicament. He had spent most of his career flying jets, not too concerned with the political or diplomatic overtones of his profession. Fortunately, he had just completed a year at the Naval War College where he had been exposed to the complex interaction between diplomatic, political, and military forces and the profound impact of these forces on the realities of United States foreign policy implementation. He specifically remembered comments from his War College professors who, on academic trips to Chile, had been pestered continuously by senior Chilean government officials as to the status of the F-16 sale. While it was not a hot topic in the United States, the issue was front-page news in much of South America. As an accomplished F-16 pilot, Cam knew that many allies of the United States had either purchased various versions of the F-16 for use in their own military or were very interested in purchasing what he considered to be the best fighter aircraft available on the market today—even at the cost of \$35 million per plane.² Cam had detected and appreciated a certain degree of anxiety in his boss over this issue. He knew that a relatively small ten to twelve airframe sale to a close ally of the United States had the potential of creating enormous tension in the international community.

Cam discussed his next step with his State Department colleagues. They suggested he begin his research with Janet Rios, a former White House staffer, now a lobbyist for the Lockheed Martin Political Action Committee, located with a consortium of defense contractors in Crystal City. She had experience as a White House staffer in the Clinton years. It was also suggested that he talk to Bill Garza, a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that oversees foreign military sales. Garza had been on the committee for fifteen years and understood the issue from a congressional perspective as well as anyone on the Hill.

Following the advice, Cam scheduled back-to-back meetings with Janet and Bill for this afternoon in Crystal City and on Capitol Hill, respectively.

Cam emptied his inbox and answered his emails before he left his office for his first appointment at a Crystal City restaurant. He stepped off the yellow line train at the underground Crystal City Metro stop and hurried into the Southern Cone Grill where he joined Janet at a corner table. Following a brief introduction, Cam quickly turned the conversation to the subject at hand, “Janet, I very much appreciate your time so I will be brief. Would you please provide some insight on the sale of the F-16s to Chile from the perspective of the Clinton administration? What decisions did Clinton make and what were the influencing factors?” Cam continued, “On the surface, this seems like a simple, straight forward decision. Why has the process dragged on for so long and become so controversial?”

In a condescending—yet friendly—manner, Janet rolled her eyes and smiled at the Air Force colonel. “There was never anything simple or straightforward about selling war planes to Chile,” Janet said. “When the issue surfaced in 1997, we in the White House thought we were doing the right thing by permitting the United States aerospace industry to compete in the Chilean jet fighter competition. As it turned out, we grossly underestimated the buzz saw of resistance waiting for us just around the corner. Overnight, many of our traditional supporters became adversaries, and many of our adversaries became our supporters. This was a true case of politics making strange bedfellows.”

Janet continued, “First you have to understand the history of this issue. During the Cold War, the United States would freely sell or transfer arms directly to those states that supported our national security policy. Simply put, if a state was anti-communist, they qualified as an arms customer. Latin America, being a Cold War hot spot for communist and leftist flare-ups, was a recipient of large amounts of United States weaponry in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Unfortunately, many leaders of Latin America who we supported with arms to fight communist insurgency turned out to be pretty unsavory characters who were not reluctant to use these weapons on their own people to stay in power. This led to Congress taking much tighter control of the process by linking a state’s human rights record with their eligibility to buy or receive arms from the United States.³ The capstone event to this trend occurred in 1977 when President Carter issued *Presidential Directive(PD)-13* which required that all arms transfers be directly linked to United States security interests and tied them closely to the human rights record of recipient governments.⁴ Moreover, PD-13 prohibited the United States from introducing weapons more sophisticated than weapons already in the region. We did not want to give any particular state a significant technological edge in military hardware over that of their neighbors in the region. What with the authoritarian governments with poor records on human rights and the low tech military forces of Latin America in the 1970’s, Carter’s PD-13 essentially cut off all significant arms sales to the region.”⁵

Janet paused, sipped her water and continued, “Following President Carter, Ronald Reagan viewed the world a little differently. As I am sure you know, President Reagan was very much in support of providing weapons to governments to help put down communist insurgencies within their borders. Latin America was a windfall benefactor of this philosophy in the 1980’s—including Guatemala, El Salvador, and particularly Venezuela, where in 1982 President Reagan essentially waived President Carter’s PD-13 and sold F-16’s to

Venezuela to provide a regional counterbalance to Cuba's acquisition of Soviet MiG-23's. Though the flow of less advanced arms continued to Latin America during the Reagan years, the Venezuelan F-16 deal was the last sale of United States advanced fighters to the region—that is until now."⁶

Before Janet could continue, Cam jumped in, "But when the Cold War ended, I thought we opened the spigot for arms sales and transfers—sort of 'to the victor goes the spoils' type of thing. I would think United States military hardware would have been in high demand."

Janet responded, "We did. From 1989 to 1990, United States arms sales doubled—just not to Latin America. Former President Bush wanted the Latin American governments to stabilize as democracies without the economic drain and threat of well-armed militaries. Most of the Latin economies could not support large defense expenditures and sufficiently fund critical social programs. Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Bush's priority in Latin America focused primarily on strengthening regional democracies and promoting economic and social reform. A renewed emphasis on these priorities combined with the trend towards tighter control over military forces by democratically elected governments resulted in many Latin American militaries actually decreasing in size from 1989 to 1993."⁷

Cam then asked the obvious question, "So what happened when the Clinton administration took office? I would think President Clinton would have been very much against selling large numbers of weapons to the world. He did campaign on a strong domestic agenda."

Janet smiled, "Not so fast. Let's look at the political realities of the issue. It's true that during the campaign, Clinton indicated he would reduce the sale of United States weaponry to other countries, but it wasn't long before our campaign mantra of 'it's the economy, stupid' became the driving force in much of our domestic policy. The defense industry was very important to the economy and it was taking some serious hits in the defense downsizing that followed the Cold War. The economic realities of a shrinking defense industry and the associated job loss combined with serious congressional pressure resulted in Clinton issuing *Presidential Directive-34* in early 1995. PD-34 was important for two reasons. First, it clearly stated that conventional arms transfers should be used as a 'legitimate instrument of foreign policy.' Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the directive implied that a strong, sustainable defense industrial base is an important national security concern, not just a commercial concern of importance to the domestic economy."⁸ This was a significant change in arms transfer policy. In essence, the White House supported the sale of expensive weapons systems to other countries if the sale contributed to the strengthening of the domestic military industrial base. Needless to say, United States weapon manufacturers were pleased with the directive."

Janet took a deep breath and continued, "In August of 1997, President Clinton shocked much of the Washington establishment when he ended the twenty year moratorium on the sale of advanced military equipment to Latin America."⁹ It was not an easy decision for him to make. The White House staff had begun to look very closely at the issue two years earlier

immediately following PD-34. In fact, there was a strong difference of opinion between the State and Defense Departments on the issue of selling advanced weapons to Latin America. Before his tenure ended in January 1997, Secretary of State Christopher was not enthusiastic at all about President Clinton's decision to renew high-tech arms sales to Latin America.¹⁰ He had reservations concerning the policy shift in PD-34 and cautioned the president to go slow. He was concerned with both the corrosive impact the arms sale might have on fragile Latin American democracies as well as with the anticipated protests from some countries in the region fearing a renewed arms race. I vividly remember a high profile letter to Secretary Christopher, signed by twenty-nine non-governmental organizations (NGO) and special interest groups, strongly urging him not to promote the sale of advanced weapons to Latin America.¹¹ The signatories were an eclectic bunch ranging from domestic groups such as 'Women's Strike for Peace' and the United Methodist Church to international groups such as 'Peru Peace Network' and the 'Guatemala Partners' organization. Different groups from all over the world were working together to pressure the Clinton administration to abandon the policy shift. As I said earlier, many of these groups were former supporters of the administration.

"As you might expect, the Defense Department had less of a problem with the decision to end the moratorium. The State Department was particularly furious with the Pentagon when, in 1996 at an air show in Chile, the U.S. Air Force, with the enthusiastic help of the Commerce Department, flew our best, most advanced aircraft to the show with the not so discreet goal of impressing the Latin American militaries.¹² Mind you this was before the 1997 policy shift to allow United States companies to legally compete! There was still a ban on the sale of these aircraft to Chile at the time of the air show. At an interview with the Chilean press during the air show, then-Secretary of Defense Perry said 'he hoped the new (arms sale) policy will be more liberal'.¹³ By the way, Perry's successor, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, was also a strong supporter of the sale—both during his time as a Republican senator from Maine on the influential Senate Armed Services Committee, and later after he became the secretary of defense."¹⁴

Fascinated with the history and context of the issue, Cam asked, "What about the aerospace industry? Was there a significant lobbying effort on its part?"

"Glad you asked", Janet replied. "The defense industry, particularly the aerospace industry, has always had significant impact in Washington. While the industry's total campaign contributions have been on the decline relative to other sectors, they are very good at targeting donations to candidates who are in a position to do the industry the most good.¹⁵ Since we are talking about the F-16, which of the major United States aerospace companies do you think has been the most generous in political campaign contributions for the last seven election cycles, going back to 1992?"

Not being naïve, Cam replied, "Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-16?"

Janet grinned, "Exactly. The Martin Marietta and Lockheed Corporations were always number one and two in total campaign contributions before the 1995 merger.¹⁶ Now, after

the merger, the Lockheed Martin Corporation has been number one by a significant margin since the 1996 election. To be fair to President Clinton, he never was the darling of the defense industry, even as an incumbent. Both George Bush in '92 and Bob Dole in '96 received a great deal more in contributions from the aerospace industry.¹⁷ Now reasonable people can disagree on whether or not the campaign financing system is productive or corrosive. However, regardless of your position on campaign contributions, the aerospace industry certainly lobbied senior officials in both the executive and legislative branches of our government. As such, some very persuasive economic arguments in favor of the arms sale were presented to the administration as well as Congress at a time, again, when the Clinton governing mantra was 'it's the economy, stupid.'

Janet hesitated, and then added, "The congressional piece of the story is also very revealing, but I will leave that for your visit this afternoon to the Hill."

Cam thought about what Janet had said. He assumed there had to be individuals or groups who had tried to influence the president to maintain the ban on the sale of fighter aircraft to Latin America. Janet had mentioned the State Department resistance, but who else had joined the Foggy Bottom bandwagon?

As if she was reading his mind, Janet continued, "I don't want you to think this was an easy call for President Clinton. There was plenty of pressure on him to maintain the ban and not sell the advanced weapons to Latin America—the F-16s to Chile in particular. There was strong domestic as well as international pressure not to change the long-standing policy. Several senators, including Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) were quite vocal against the arms sale—and they were from our own party! Both held positions of leadership in the Congress. In fact we received a bipartisan letter in January 1998 signed by fifty congressional representatives strongly urging the president to reverse his decision and not approve the sale of the advanced fighter aircraft to Latin America.¹⁸ I must say their position was compelling. They argued that the sale would contribute to the destabilization of the region and possibly trigger a destructive arms race. Moreover, they argued that the high-tech aircraft would do little to combat the new security threats emerging in the region, including narcotrafficking, leftist guerilla movements, social inequalities, and various forms of 'white collar' crime such as money laundering and corruption. Simply put, they argued that the large amounts of money—we are talking up to \$600 million—would be put to better use if Chile invested the resources in law enforcement, education, health-care, and job creation programs."

With hardly a pause, Janet continued, "Congress was not the only source of dissent. The Council for a Livable World—a powerful and sophisticated special interest and Washington lobbying group—worked very hard to organize NGOs and other interest groups to act *against* President Clinton's policy shift in general and the sale of the F-16 to Chile in particular. In fact, as we speak, they are working hard to influence President George W. Bush to reverse Clinton's decision and *not* sell the F-16 to Chile. I have seen a copy of a letter, signed by twenty-four domestic and international NGOs, urging President Bush not to support the arms transfer.¹⁹ Many of the signatories had signed a similar letter to the Clinton

administration. Their main concern is the diversion of limited funds away from social programs and into defense related purchases. It remains to be seen what impact these groups will have on President Bush.

“Cam then asked, “What about the Latin American reaction? I would think they would generally be pleased that the United States had abandoned the moratorium in favor of the high-tech arms sales. Didn’t the United States appear to be a bit patronizing in refusing to sell the same aircraft to Latin America that we were eagerly selling to other regions of the world?”

“You might be surprised,” Janet responded. “For the most part, the Latin American response—with the exception of the Chilean government—was very much against the arms sale. One of the most influential protesters was the former president of Costa Rica and Nobel peace prize laureate Oscar Arias. In fact, shortly after the decision was made in 1997 to authorize United States firms to participate in the Chilean jet fighter competition, Mr. Arias joined with former President Jimmy Carter and the heads of state of most Latin American countries to call for a two-year continuation of the moratorium on arms transfers to allow time to study the regional impact of introducing a new, high-tech weapon system.”²⁰

She continued, “Interestingly—and to some extent a paradox—while Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela never endorsed the Carter/Arias initiative, all of these countries vigorously protested the potential sale of F-16’s to their Chilean neighbor.”²¹ It appears some countries might have been hedging their bets out of their own future national security interest! They unanimously cautioned President Clinton, as well as Chile, of the possibility that the arms sale would ignite a regional arms race in the Southern Cone of South America. Coincidentally, at about the same time as President Clinton announced his shift in policy on advanced arms sales to Chile, the United States awarded *Major Non-NATO Ally* status to Argentina as a reward for their support in Desert Storm and numerous UN peacekeeping missions.²² This provides Argentina, among other things, special access to certain military hardware, selected intelligence, and most importantly, bidding rights to NATO equipment maintenance contracts. Even though this *special status* is primarily symbolic in nature, Argentina was the first Latin American country to receive this prestigious and coveted recognition from the United States. It is debatable whether or not there was a Chilean-United States aerospace industry connection to Argentina’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally. What is certain though is that Argentina did not protest the F-16 sale quite as loudly as did Peru and Brazil. Rest assured however, that if Chile acquires modern fighter aircraft, most regional militaries would want to follow suit.”²³

Janet looked at her watch, “Have to run,” she said. “Lobbyists never rest in DC! You need to hurry if you are going to make it to the Hill.” Cam thanked her again for her time and did not protest when she insisted on picking up the check for lunch. He now had a better idea of the history of the proposed F-16 sale to Chile and the various positions different groups had taken on the issue.

Cam arrived at the Crystal City Metro station just in time to catch a blue line train to the Smithsonian Mall and then take the short, pleasant walk to Capitol Hill for his meeting with

Bill Garza, a senior staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Passing through the security checks, Cam continued into the Dirksen Senate Office Building and headed directly for Bill's office.

Bill greeted Cam at the door, "Good afternoon colonel. Janet called ahead to tell me you were on the way. We're old friends from her days at the White House. I know you want to talk about the sale of F-16s to Chile, but we have to talk fast. The Chairman has called an emergency nomination hearing in fifteen minutes—White House is pushing us hard for a confirmation. Let's walk and talk."

Bill talked as they rushed through the crowded hallways, "This issue provides a perfect example of the struggle our congressional representatives have in trying to balance the extraordinary pressure received from various domestic and international interest groups—particularly industry lobbyists and foreign governments—with the never-ending requirement to continually raise funds for the next campaign. What makes this issue so perplexing is that everybody has a good argument—and everyone sincerely believes they are doing the right thing. The conundrum is having to choose between national security and domestic defense production—read jobs—and what the United States believes is best for a developing country thousands of miles from the United States. To complicate the matter, the United States position on what is best for the developing world is different from what other industrialized states believe is best for the developing world. As Janet probably told you, arms trade issues were relatively non-controversial in Latin America until 1997 when President Clinton lifted the ban on selling high-tech weapons to Latin America. The policy shift ignited a firestorm of activity, from both domestic and international organizations with a stake in the region. Janet probably mentioned the strongly worded letters from Congress and NGOs to President Clinton requesting he reverse his decision.²⁴ Powerful special interest groups, particularly human rights organizations, also intensified the pressure on congressional members citing the human rights abuses committed in Chile during the Pinochet regime. The Federation of American Scientists and the Foundation for National Progress, both high profile Washington special interests groups, were two of the most vocal organizations involved in a well-orchestrated letter writing campaign designed to stop the weapons sale to Chile."²⁵

Bill paused to answer a cell phone call, then continued, "Janet might not have mentioned that there was an equal and opposite reaction by other Congressmen who were very much in support of the policy reversal and wanted to sell the planes to Chile. There was a strong bipartisan effort to support the sale of the F-16s to Chile citing the 'if we don't sell the weapons somebody else will' argument. No one was pushing this argument harder than the aerospace industry, particularly the lobbyists from Lockheed Martin.²⁶ Critics of the president and those members of Congress who were supporting the sale of the F-16s continue to claim the defense industry lobbyists 'bought' the policy change with campaign contributions. The industry has responded with an economic-based, realist argument that is essentially this: the United States needs to compete in the process of Latin American military modernization programs because Europe is knocking the door down to sell their high-tech

military hardware to the region. Why let the Europeans make all the money? Moreover, the supporters claim, selling United States weapon systems to Latin America will enhance our military to military relationship and increase the United States diplomatic and economic influence in the states that purchase our weapon systems.”²⁷

Bill continued, “As a former political party fund raiser, I would be remiss if I did not mention that Lockheed Martin has—at least since 1992—consistently contributed two to three times more than any other aerospace company to political campaigns.²⁸ Moreover, they have been an equal opportunity contributor. The Democratic and Republican Party received about the same amount, with a slight majority of contributions going to whichever party was in control of the House or Senate in any given election year. They are a smart lobbying group. The defense industry does not—by a long shot—contribute the most money to political campaigns. For example, since 1990, labor organizations have contributed \$345 million to political campaigns compared to the defense industry’s \$66 million.²⁹ That said, the defense industry is arguably smarter in targeting the contributions. They target those congressional members assigned to committees who have jurisdiction over their issue of concern as well as those members representing states and districts where the industry has a large number of employees. As an aside, most labor political action committees have also directly or indirectly supported the sale of United States arms to our allies. The sale of advanced arms not only provides jobs for the United States defense industry, this market also helps counter a threatening trend by foreign competition of moving weapons factories and jobs to the country that is making the arms purchase. To be fair, competition has recently forced the United States defense industry to allow some aircraft ‘final assembly’ to occur in selected foreign markets. European companies in particular, however, have used this *factory export* concept as a bargaining tool to win arms sale contracts with Latin American countries.³⁰ Regardless, congressional representatives from Texas and California have always done well by the labor and defense aerospace industries as have influential members of Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services and the Intelligence Committees. You would probably find a similar pattern in the House.”

Bill continued, “Another interesting sideshow of this issue is the alliance that has formed between the Pentagon and the Department of Commerce. The Pentagon wants to sell more F-16s because it is not only good for one of their most important industrial suppliers (Lockheed Martin), it also makes the F-16 program less expensive for the U.S. Air Force—an ‘economy of scale’ sort of thing. One of the main charters of the Department of Commerce is to promote the sale of United States products to overseas customers—essentially build markets for United States manufactured products. Commerce views Latin America as an untapped market for advanced United States defense items. It is not surprising that Defense and Commerce have worked together closely to push the sale of the F-16 to Chile, a policy that has not always been in alignment with the State Department.”³¹

While the current Bush administration has endorsed the Clinton policy—Secretary Powell has personally said very little with respect to the specifics of the case. Cynics on the Hill argue that President Bush’s support is no surprise considering he is a Texan with a

strong affection for Latin America as well as the former governor of the state where Lockheed Martin's headquarters is located. I don't know if these cynics have it right or not, but it is something the Bush administration has to deal with. To complicate this even more, President Bush has to consider the strong reaction coming from the Chilean media as well as many other Latin American countries protesting the F-16 sale on the grounds that it will trigger another regional arms race.³² It is not only the Chilean media that has weighed in on the potential transfer. While the issue stayed below the radar horizon during the Clinton administration, the domestic media has been more vocal with President Bush. Both the *Washington Post*³³ and *Christian Science Monitor*³⁴ have written strong editorials and op-ed pieces directed at the Bush administration pointing out negative aspects of the sale. Deciding to proceed with the sale was anything but an easy decision for President Bush."

Bill was about to end the conversation when he grinned and said, "Remember I said I was in a hurry to get to a confirmation hearing? Well you might be interested in this particular nominee. President Bush has nominated Mr. Otto Reich for assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs—essentially the president's number one Latin American guy. Most of the Republicans are inclined to support the president's nominee—he appears to be well qualified in terms of regional experience. The Democrats however, in coordination with some special interest groups—particularly the Coalition for Latin American Policy (CSLAP)—are strongly protesting the nomination. The CSLAP is an informal—but influential—coalition of church groups, think tanks and advocacy organizations ostensibly committed to promoting a democratic United States foreign policy. Among the many objections to his confirmation is the claim that Mr. Reich should not have such a prestigious position because of his recent actions as a lobbyist for a major defense aerospace corporation—Lockheed Martin.³⁵ They believe Mr. Reich would have a conflict of interest—what is best for Latin America versus what is best for Lockheed Martin. Your guess is as good as mine as to his confirmation chances, but this is an interesting twist to the Chilean F-16 saga.

"Finally," Bill concluded, "You have to understand the fine line Congress walks on this issue. This is not a hot button issue to most Americans—and as such, it is often shoved aside on the Hill by other domestic issues of interest to the constituents. I am here to tell you, however, that I have taken many congressional delegate, or CODEL, trips to South America and have seen how important and controversial arms sales are for our neighbors to the south. This *is* a hot button issue in South America and could significantly impact our foreign policy in the region—a region that is growing appreciably in economic importance to all Americans. We get this wrong and it could affect middle America much more than many realize."

Cam thanked him for his time as Bill rushed into the hearing room. He continued to assimilate the information he had received from Bill and Janet as he walked across the mall to the Metro stop. This was indeed a complicated issue. Cam realized he simply did not have sufficient time to talk to all the parties who had a 'dog in this fight.' However, as an Air Force officer, and an F-16 pilot to boot, he owed it to his own organization to at least get their side of the story. Stepping onto the yellow Metro line, Cam found an empty seat, closed his eyes and relaxed as the train rumbled towards his Alexandria home.

Cam was up early the next day in time to make his 0800 Pentagon appointment with Colonel Barry “Buzz” Brackett an action officer on the staff of the secretary of defense for international security affairs. Buzz was the secretary’s liaison with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the defense organization with direct oversight responsibility to administer and supervise the sale and transfer of arms to international customers.

Buzz sat down and quickly moved to the point of Cam’s visit, “Cam, I am really glad we have you over at State. They don’t always see things very clearly at Foggy Bottom. This F-16 sale is very important to us. While it is not a large sale in terms of dollars, it is more symbolic in the sense that it allows us a forum to finally refute all the counter-productive arguments circulated by many in Congress, by NGO’s and special interest groups, and by individual countries with their own security agendas and self interests. Right now the Air Force has the Bush administration’s support for the F-16 sale, but we know this is an ongoing battle that could turn on us at anytime, particularly considering the unpredictability of world events after ‘9-11.’

Buzz continued, “Let me sum this up for you: the ban put in place by President Carter in 1977 was designed to keep high-tech weapons out of Latin America. Simply put, the ban did not work. While Presidents Reagan, Bush and—prior to 97—Clinton were for the most part supporting the 1977 ban imposed by President Carter’s PD-13, other countries were establishing lucrative military hardware markets in Latin America. These included France, Israel, Canada, and Russia.³⁶ While there were restrictions on what advanced weapon systems United States firms could sell to Latin America, their foreign competitors had no such constraints. You might know that as recently as 1995, Belarus sold MiG-29s to Peru.³⁷ Because of Clinton’s 1997 policy change, the United States is now competing with the Russians, Swedes, Italians, and French to sell a high-performance fighter to the Brazilian Air Force.³⁸ We want our F-16 to win the Brazilian competition. You cannot overestimate the influence the United States has with foreign governments whose militaries choose to fly our airplanes. Right now, it appears the French have the inside track to sell up to 24 Mirage fighters to Brazil for \$700 million dollars—but at least we can now compete!³⁹ In Chile, the French and the Swedes have been pushing the Mirage 200 and the Jas 39 Gripen, respectively, as an alternative to the F-16. Chile has recently indicated they want to buy our F-16.⁴⁰ All three candidate aircraft are excellent choices—but there is more at stake here than simply selling airplanes. It is clear that Chile has decided to buy a high-performance jet fighter—if not from us, then from some other country. We want Chile to buy a U.S.-built airplane.”

Cam inquired, “But what about the social and economic development arguments used by so many to drum up support to continue the ban on the weapons sale? Many smart people, particularly on the Hill, are taking this position. The Air Force has to develop a persuasive response to this line of reasoning.”

Buzz nodded in agreement, “I think you’re right. This is probably the most persuasive argument against the sale of the weapons. They are expensive and the purchase might very well divert money from other programs. I would respond in this way: it is not a decision for the United States to dictate security requirements to sovereign states. While we might

suggest the resources would be better spent in other areas, like health care or education—and believe me, your friends at state department have suggested this many times—when a sovereign state makes the decision to upgrade their military, it is in U.S. economic and political interest to be the supplier of the hardware. Let's face it, there is insufficient data to prove that this is a zero sum game. That is, we cannot be sure that money not spent on defense would necessarily be spent on social and education programs. Moreover, not only would the F-16 sale help create stability in the F-16 production line, it would also provide United States diplomatic leverage to influence foreign policy in states and regions that rely on our support for security hardware and maintenance. It could be a win-win-win from the defense, state, and industry perspectives. Of course our ace-in-the-hole is the domestic jobs issue. While the components for the F-16 are manufactured in many different states, the plane is assembled in Texas. Let's face it, it takes a lot of people to assemble an F-16—people who vote and live in Texas, President Bush's home state."

Buzz's argument was persuasive, but Cam knew there were many who strongly disagreed with the Pentagon line of reasoning. "What about the arms race issue? Are we setting off a trip wire that will push Latin America back to the days of strong militaries and weak democracies?" Cam asked.

Buzz shook his head emphatically, "Not at all. It is clear that many Latin American countries have made the decision to upgrade their military forces—with U.S. assistance or without it. If the United States is a player in the process, we have a greater opportunity to influence policy formulation and continue to push the region toward the development of strong democracies with civilian control of the militaries. We do not see the arms race scenario materializing. In fact, only a few months ago, Chile and Argentina signed an agreement to adopt a standard system to measure military spending—a strong move toward transparency in military hardware acquisition.⁴¹ The agreement was promoted by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Considering Argentina's current economic woes, it might be some time before they invest heavily in military modernization. To be fair, Peru continues to protest the F-16 sale to Chile.⁴² It is encouraging, however, to see a productive regional dialogue underway to manage military modernization programs. The current political trend among states in the Southern Cone is one of cooperation, not conflict."⁴³

Buzz continued, "As I said earlier, the F-16 decision could very well set a precedent that will have a lasting impact on future sales of high-tech arms to other developing regions of the world. We need to work hard to convince the president, Congress, State Department, special interest groups, and the countries themselves that, if properly managed, the purchase of United States military equipment can be an economic and diplomatic force multiplier—not a failed policy inevitably damaging and corrosive to our allies whose only 'crime' is wanting to increase their national security.

"You can help us with this Cam," Buzz concluded.

Cam smiled, stood up and shook Buzz's hand. "Thank you for the time, Buzz. I now have the unenviable job of putting the whole picture together for my new boss, a new political appointee, fresh off his Texas ranch. Buzz, I have to tell you, there are a lot of people who think differently from the Pentagon. If you want the F-16 sale to go through, you have your work cut out for you."

With that, Cam made the long walk to the Pentagon concourse for a quick cup of coffee with some old friends. He then hurried down the escalator to the Metro to catch a train back to his office at the State Department. As the train rumbled over the Potomac River, Cam tried to think of a way to organize the results of his research and present the many diverse and conflicting views to his new boss. President Bush had endorsed President Clinton's decision to sell the F-16 fighter to Chile—he now had to be reminded of the political minefield created by the controversial endorsement.

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Somalia II

RICHARD J. NORTON

CDR Jim Sherman, USN stared at the piles of documents and notes on his desk and sighed. It was going to be a long night. Still, he told himself, there was no real grounds for complaint. He had been given four days to put this brief together—that was almost a luxurious amount of time. Especially with his current boss.

BGEN Hamlin was known in the Department of Defense (DoD) for being a “go-getter” and a “forward thinker.” He got that reputation by keeping his staff hopping, reacting to ideas that flew from the general’s mind in a steady stream. Three days ago the general had caught Jim coming out of the men’s room and delivered a classic “on the fly” tasking.

“Oh, Jim! I was hoping to see you.” The general had beamed. “I’ve been thinking about Afghanistan. With the Taliban defeated and al Qaeda coming apart, it seems clear that we may wind up in some post-war, nation-building program. To me, it sounds like Somalia and mission creep all over again. I need you to first put a briefing together on what happened in Somalia. Tell me who was involved, tell me why the mission grew. Then we’ll compare the two situations. I’d hate to see us make the same mistake.”

At first Jim found the going easy. There was a lot of material on Somalia. The intervention had happened far enough in the past that more than a few books had been written about the operation, but yet recent enough that most of the participants were alive and ready to talk about things. Jim was also lucky in being able to track down some fairly knowledgeable personal sources of information. The first person he sought out was Dr. Marti Van Buren, who had once been in his company at Annapolis. Marti had left the Navy as soon as her obligated service was up, got a Ph.D., and plunged into the world of D.C. think tanks. She was currently a senior researcher at the Brookings Institute. They spent a half day walking about the mall discussing Somalia.

“The first thing to remember is that Bill Clinton inherited Somalia from George Bush. I know you’re not looking at the Bush decision to get us involved in the first place but there are a few vital points to bear in mind.¹ Both President Bush and United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali believed that the end of the Cold War offered a golden opportunity for the UN to live up to the promise of its charter and take a much more proactive role in peace operations.² In order to make this work, the United States was going to have to shoulder major leadership responsibilities in such matters. Somalia, a failed state, caught in the grip of warlords and famine, seemed tailor-made for action. In December 1992, under

cover of UN Security Council Resolution 794, Bush sent in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF had UN blessing, but was a United States led operation all the way.³ It was a classic George Bush operation—a highly polished and efficient effort.

“In accordance with the Powell doctrine, overwhelming force was landed on the beaches of Mogadishu. Within days relief supplies were flowing to distant refugee camps and the local warlords hunkered down and got out of the way. Matching the show of military muscle was a polished diplomatic effort. The United States military commanders, most notably Marine Corps Generals Robert Johnson and Anthony Zinni, were extremely sensitive to local conditions and in executing their stated mission. Accordingly, senior U.S. leaders on scene actively resisted doing anything that might diminish their claim to neutrality.⁴ Together with Ambassador-at-Large Robert Oakley, who was serving as a U.S. special envoy to Somalia, senior U.S. leaders made contact with the various warlords and faction leaders. A “Joint Military Committee” (JMC) formed an essential part of the U.S. diplomatic effort.⁵ The committee consisted of senior United States and UN officials as well as the leader of each of the various clans and factions. Although the daily JMC meeting frequently took up a lot of time and often discussed rather trivial matters it was an important avenue of communication. The JMC also provided a way to defuse several potentially troublesome situations, some of which concerned occasions when UN forces had to fire on armed clansmen.⁶ Back in Washington, a senior Policy Coordination Committee, (PCC) met often to discuss events in Somalia and Somalia was frequently discussed at the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee meetings.⁷

Jim looked puzzled for a moment, then brightened. “Oh yeah, PCC was the Bush term for an interagency working group.” He realized Marti had stopped speaking. “Sorry. Go on.”

Marti continued. “By January, there was no doubt that the Somalia intervention was a success. Wherever UNITAF forces went, there was order. Food distribution was on-going.⁸ Famine had been averted and planting crops had begun. Private markets reappeared and ships began calling at the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Somali refugees began to return to from neighboring states.⁹

“Marti, this is old news. I’m interested in mission-creep.” Jim complained.

“Keep your shirt on. We’re getting to that. Enter the Clintons. The fact that the Somalia intervention was being well conducted did not stop the Clinton team from criticizing aspects of the operation, even after Candidate Clinton became President-elect Clinton.¹⁰ While generally approving the Bush decision to intervene, the in-coming national security team argued that a greater role should have been played by the UN. Their preferred solution would be to turn the operation over to the UN and then get the maximum number of U.S. troops out of the country. This was precisely what UN Resolution 794 had called for from the beginning but Clinton spokesmen made it clear that they felt the transition was taking too long.¹¹

“So, the Clinton team’s plan for Somalia was to turn it over to the UN and get out as quickly as possible, leaving only a small ‘footprint’ of U.S. troops behind. UNITAF would

become UN Operations in Somalia II (UNISOM II). Originally, it was hoped that the turn-over could take place shortly after the inauguration, but getting the UN forces identified and prepared took longer than anticipated and UNISOM II was not actually stood up until March 1993. But even then the United States maintained nearly eighteen thousand troops in country assigned to the U.S. Joint Task Force in Somalia.

“There were several reasons for the delay. There were the usual difficulties in logistics. But there were also concerns that were continually raised by the secretary-general. From the beginning, Boutros Boutros-Ghali saw UN action in Somalia as a nation-building exercise. As the former Egyptian deputy foreign minister for the upper reaches of the Nile, Boutros-Ghali believed he had exceptional insight into what was required. He had long argued that the warlords would have to be disarmed and that UN troops would have to carry out this mission.¹² This was a very sensitive topic. The UN had facilitated such efforts before, notably in South America. But those disarmament campaigns had been carried out with a limited number of actors who had agreed to the program. In Somalia, none of the clans were willing to voluntarily give up their weapons. The Bush team, fearing a radical change in the scope and nature of the mission, had flatly refused to get involved in disarming any Somalis except those that posed a direct threat to relief columns or UN troops.¹³ This arrangement had worked reasonably well. The warlords got to keep their guns, but only if they kept them out of the way of the Americans.

Marti glanced at a group of tourists heading for the Smithsonian, then continued. “With Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s prodding them along, the Security Council approved UNISOM II. Its mandate was authorized under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*, making it, in Boutros-Ghali’s words “the UN’s first peace enforcement mission.”¹⁴ As you should know, UN forces which carry out operations under Chapter VII are permitted to use force to accomplish the mission, thus the blue helmets in Somalia would be equipped and ready to fight. UNISOM II’s assigned missions specifically included disarming the clans; punishing anyone who violated the required cease-fire; conducting a massive de-mining campaign; and facilitating the return and resettlement of Somali refugees. All of these conditions, and much more, were spelled out in UN Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993.¹⁵ As a member of the Security Council, Madeline Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, voted for the resolution.

“The level and nature of United States participation in the operation was also a matter of political negotiation and importance. The secretary-general wanted the United States deeply committed to this effort. However, the Clinton team was reluctant to place U.S. combat forces under UN leadership, even though the administration’s first *National Security Strategy* would admit to such a possibility.¹⁶ At its height UNISOM II fielded 29,284 troops from twenty-nine countries, but only a small section of U.S. logistics personnel were assigned to UNISOM II.¹⁷ However, 17,700 U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S. Joint Task Force in Somalia, remained in country. Although not under UN command, this force operated in conjunction with UNISOM II personnel and contained a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that was supposed to respond to any emergency situation that might arise.¹⁸

“It was also decided that the second in command of UNISOM II forces should be from the United States. The secretary-general wanted this arrangement because he thought it would ‘lock in’ United States support and participation. It would also provide him with a valuable channel of communication into the heart of the Clinton White House.¹⁹

Marti shook her head. “The Clinton team didn’t see it quite the same way. They believed that the second in command would be able to keep the UN reined in. He could also facilitate the hoped for draw down of U.S. forces. His presence would also alleviate some United States concerns about the UN chain of command and the possibility that U.S. troops would be under foreign commanders. Basically both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and President Clinton believed they would have a man on the inside.²⁰

“National Security Advisor Tony Lake hand-picked retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN to serve as deputy UN commander.²¹ Renowned for a keen intellect, Howe had distinguished himself as Ronald Reagan’s deputy national security advisor, however, he had no significant experience working with the UN, with Africa or with Somalia.²² Howe was also often described as imperial and autocratic. After the UN took over in March, one of the first things Howe did was suspend the JMC.²³ Another thing was to initiate attempts to disarm the rival clans.

“On 27 March 1993 a document known as the *reconciliation agreement* was signed at a UN sponsored meeting in Addis Abba, Ethiopia. Fifteen of the main Somali factions were present, as were Somali clan elders, leaders of Somali community and women’s organizations.²⁴ All present agreed to a two-year transition plan that would result in the establishment of a new central Somali government. Key to the plan was agreement that substantial disarmament would have to take place within the next ninety days.²⁵

“This proved to be easier said than done. It seemed as though every armed Somali resisted being disarmed. The clans claimed they required weapons to protect their power and many individual Somalis felt they needed weapons to protect themselves.²⁶ As the resistance to UN-led disarmament grew, some of the local UN military commanders began receiving specific instructions from their home governments, forbidding them to conduct offensive or disarming operations against the Somalis.²⁷ Yet Boutros-Ghali and Howe insisted that this needed to be done. The United States Quick Reaction Force (QRF) provided an answer to the problem. Not only were the Americans allowed to perform the missions, but they were among the very best troops available to the UN commander. Accordingly, the QRF shouldered an ever increasing share of the “disarming burden.”²⁸ The forces of Mohammed Farah Aidid were among the first clans targeted. While there were logical reasons for this, it was also true that Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Aidid had a long-standing history of enmity dating back to Boutros-Ghali’s days with the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. In fact, they hated each other.

“Aidid protested that the disarmament of his forces placed him at an unfair advantage and made it clear he would not accept unilateral disarmament. Soon after, several Italian soldiers attached to UNISOM II were killed when they inadvertently approached a hidden

heavy arms cache belonging to Aidid.²⁹ In an effort to avoid further such confrontations, the Italians began direct negotiations with Aidid's forces.³⁰

"As U.S. forces became more and more active, allied contingents became more and more annoyed. The Americans were perceived as being unwilling to listen to other military opinions, as well as arrogant and condescending to their allies. The French and Italians were especially aggrieved.³¹

"On 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani troops were killed in an attack by Aidid's troops.³² The Pakistanis had one of the largest military contingents in the county, as well as most of the armor at the UN's disposal. The attack was conducted in response to the searching of one of Aidid's heavy weapons storage sites.³³ The attack was a incontrovertible signal that Aidid did not see the UN force as neutral and was serious about resisting being disarmed. Later that month an independent investigation of the situation, led by Professor Tom Farer of the American University in Washington, D.C., concluded that only Aidid's forces had the motive, means and opportunity to carry out the attack.³⁴

"The United States and the UN reacted swiftly. The UN Security Council, passed Resolution 837 calling for all necessary measures to be taken against those responsible for the attack.³⁵ The resolution also reaffirmed the need to disarm the factions and to "neutralize" radio stations urging resistance to UNISOM forces.³⁶ Once again the United States voted for the resolution. This was met with support from Tony Lake.³⁷ In fact, the U.S. Department of State provided most of the resolution's wording. No one in the administration disagreed with the resolution, including President Clinton, who was briefed on the issue.³⁸ In an unprecedented move, the UN placed a price on Aidid's head, offering \$25,000 to anyone who brought him in. Although the offer originated in Admiral Howe's office, the decision to authorize this move was the secretary-general's³⁹

"Initial moves against Aidid were quickly carried out by the QRF. They appeared to work so well that the president publicly spoke about Somalia. On 17 June 1993, he declared that operations against Aidid had been successful. In an address to the press the president stated that the United States had "crippled the forces in Mogadishu of warlord Aidid."⁴⁰ The words sounded good, and the president may well have believed them, but they were wrong.

"Aidid's forces were far from broken. Howe requested additional U.S. troops be made available, including the highly lethal and secretive Delta Force. The request caused considerable debate among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although the NSC staff was strongly in favor of the idea.⁴¹

"On 8 August 1993, four U.S. servicemen were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a remotely activated mine. The attack took place in an area controlled by Aidid's forces. The Joint Staff now recommended sending in a Special Operations Task Force which would include members of Delta Force. General Powell endorsed the request and recommended approval to Secretary Aspin. Powell also called Lake who agreed that Delta should go in, just as the NSC staff had wanted.⁴² Although no meeting was held, the geographically scattered principals discussed the issue through a series of phone calls and decided that the Task

Force should be sent. The president, who was on vacation in Martha's Vineyard was informed of the discussion by an NSC staffer who was in his entourage. The president allowed the decision to stand.⁴³

"The presence of Delta operators and U.S. Rangers, collectively identified as "Task Force Ranger," complicated matters for the forces already in Somalia. For one thing, Task Force Ranger was not under local command, but reported directly to General Hoar, the commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).⁴⁴ Local commanders frequently had no idea what Task Force Ranger was up to. Another problem was that both the Task Force Ranger had different cultures and attitudes than the rest of the peace-keeping forces. Finally, the first two operations that Task Force Ranger carried out were embarrassing failures. In each case the target house was incorrectly identified. Rather than attacking Aidid strongholds, Task Force Ranger hit a UN villa and the home of a friendly former chief of the Mogadishu police.⁴⁵

"Failure to bring Aidid to task began to sour the Clinton foreign policy team's attitude toward the effort. Accordingly, the Clinton administration began pursuing a different avenue in regards to Somalia.⁴⁶ They began to press for a UN-led diplomatic solution. The military option did not seem to be working, or more precisely didn't seem to offer a way out and it had begun to look as though twenty thousand U.S. troops might be required to deploy to Bosnia as part of a comprehensive peace package. UN Ambassador Madeline Albright, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and eventually the president himself began putting pressure on Boutros Boutros-Ghali to find a political solution.⁴⁷ The secretary-general assured the U.S. leaders that he was working hard for just such solution. To observers in Washington, this appeared to be typical bureaucratic inertia. In reality it was a deliberate effort by the secretary-general to give Task Force Ranger more time to kill or capture Aidid.⁴⁸ Thus a strange, almost schizophrenic, series of actions ensued with military forces trying to bring Aidid to justice, while at the same time he was being approached with an eye to negotiation. Tony Lake and others publicly explained that this was a deliberate effort to apply "pressure all across the spectrum."⁴⁹ And, even at this late date, Aidid was seeking some method that would allow him to rejoin the nation-building effort, and avoid punishment for actions that he claimed were taken in self-defense.⁵⁰

"Task Force Ranger raids continued through August and September, netting the occasional Aidid lieutenant, but getting no closer to the man himself.⁵¹ Then came the 3 October raid in which eighteen members of Task Force Ranger were killed, and one taken prisoner. The Quick Reaction Force also had an additional two soldiers killed and two Malaysian soldiers also lost their lives in the ensuing battle.⁵² When the dust settled, all you heard were cries of outrage at mission creep.

Jim reviewed his notes on their way to the Metro stop. "Marti, tell me when it became inevitable. When was U.S. policy doomed to failure in Somalia?"

She stopped. "Tough question. Some will say when George Bush said "go." I think that's wrong. The Bush experience with Somalia has to be rated a success. Others would point to

the moment when the UN took over and initiated disarmament, but I have reservations about that too. Just because the UN was running the show, didn't mean the United States had lost all ability to act. Most would say it was when we began going after Aidid—when the price was put on his head. That's pretty defensible, although the fact that Aidid was trying to work something out at the end indicates to me that, even then, we didn't have to wind up with eighteen dead Rangers and a policy failure. So I'd say the point you're asking about happened pretty late in the game. But I do know this. The president could have turned it all off with a single phone call. All he had to do was order the secretary of defense to have our forces stand down from offensive actions. That never happened."

The next day, Jim had lunch with Charlie Fairbanks. Charlie worked for the *Washington Post*, covering Capitol Hill. Each had a child in the same pre-school and they had initially met through their wives. Charlie had agreed to keep the conversation off the record, in return for the understanding that he might write something comparing Somalia to Afghanistan if he thought there was any merit in doing so. He promised to keep any mention of Jim, or military efforts along the same lines, out of his story. After providing Charlie a copy of his unclassified notes, Jim asked why the press had stopped covering Somalia after Clinton took over the White House.

"I know people, even people who were on the ground in Mogadishu, think we did stop reporting on Somalia.⁵³ But the truth is, if you go back and take just three major papers—the *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, you will find that there is usually one story about Somalia per day. The coverage gets even deeper when you include other U.S. papers and the international press.⁵⁴ I'll be the first to admit that there was less total coverage than during the Bush invasion and the famine, but the notion that the world press failed to document changes of mission and events in Somalia just isn't so."

But you can't say U.S. public opinion was energized after January." Jim interrupted.

Charlie agreed. "That's so. You can lead a reader to an article, but you can't make him think. Still, look at it from the point of view of John Q. Public. Somalia is a success story. We moved in, stopped the famine and cowed the warlords. Publicly, the UN said everything was going okay. Publicly, the president and his foreign policy wonks say everything was going okay. The common denominator between "feed the starving of Somalia" and "build the nation of Somalia" is that "warlords are bad." And we are easily able to handle them—that's what DoD was saying. Besides, there is no large Somali-American contingent in the United States. Somali supermodel Imam and other celebrity spokespeople who had help publicize the famine apparently lost interest after we went in, and there was absolutely no United States economic interest in Somalia."

Charlie then held up his hands and ticked points off on his fingers." One, there were less than twenty thousand U.S. soldiers in Somalia and hardly any were getting hurt. Unless you happened to be related to one of them, it was nothing to fret about—not like the World Trade Center. Two, no one was feeling the Somalia story in their pocketbook. Three, there were no more pictures of starving babies. Food was flowing, crops were growing. Four,

we were going after the bad warlords who were standing in the way of peace and prosperity. These guys were why we went in the first place and were seen as no match for the heroes of Desert Storm. Five, the Clinton team was shooting itself in the foot almost every time it turned around and that was a lot more fun to watch. We had everything from Nanny-gate to the \$200 dollar haircut to the Vince Foster suicide.⁵⁵ Result? Somalia was a ho-hum issue. Until they killed eighteen of us at one time and dragged U.S. bodies through the streets of Mogadishu. That got the public's attention."

Jim had to agree. Charlie was abrasive and arrogant, but usually made sense. "What about Congress? Why didn't they do anything?"

Charlie cracked his knuckles. "Who said they didn't? But, don't forget that the congressional herd is motivated by the same basic influences as their constituents. If the folks back home don't care about Somalia, your average congressman isn't going to either. But there were some who did. For example, about the time that the UN was putting a price on Aidid, Robert Byrd (D-WV), Sam Nunn (D-GA) and others were starting to make critical noises about Somalia looking like an open-ended commitment.⁵⁶ Still, it's not all that surprising that about that same time, Clinton started pushing for a diplomatic solution to the Aidid problem.

"But I digress. Congress was also looking at Bosnia. Byrd and others were saying in so many words, "You get one big peace operation Mr. President. You want 20,000 troops in Bosnia, you get 20,000 troops out of Somalia." But all in all, Congress was pretty quiet until after Mogadishu. Then they unloaded on the White House and Aspin.

The two friends parted company, Jim feeling a little disappointed that Charlie couldn't provide more information. It was as if the U.S. public and its congressional representatives had simply not bothered to read or understand what was happening in Somalia after January 1994.

A day later Jim spent a couple of hours with Schuyler Colfax. Colfax had been on the Clinton NSC staff through both terms. Jim and he had worked on a classified project during an earlier tour in Washington. Now retired, the formerly reserved Colfax proved exceptionally forthcoming. Jim had once again explained his tasking and asked Colfax how the Clinton administration had allowed themselves to be surprised by what was happening on the ground in Somalia.

Colfax exploded with a snort. "Surprised!? Listen, Jim, in the wake of Mogadishu everyone from the president on down ran around yelling "Oh, why didn't I know?" and "If we only had known." Let me tell you, they did the same thing with Rwanda and it wasn't any more true then. At this point, forcing himself to calm down, the former staffer started over.

"To understand Somalia, you have to understand the Clinton administration during the first year in office. In fact, you have to start before that. During the campaign, the Clinton team was spectacularly effective. Their instincts were sure, their tactics powerful and their cohesion enviable. A measure of how good they were is seen in the kinds of obstacles they

dealt with on the way to the White House. They were also young and mostly lacked real D.C. experience. Those who had once held real jobs in government had been away from them for a long time. Above all, they were so focused on getting into office, that they didn't prepare what to do when they actually got there.⁵⁷

"So, rather than hitting the ground running as most observers expected, they hit the ground fumbling. In part this was because there was a huge, multi-faceted agenda the president, the first lady and the Clinton team wanted to get at. These included such massive challenges as providing universal, national health care. And there were still the familiar, less exciting, but still critical, tasks like filling presidential appointments.⁵⁸ The administration's lack of experience showed as members of the team began moving in a lot of different directions at once. It was like a three ring circus without a ring master. Since we're on the subject of Somalia, did you know that it was not discussed even once during a Principals Committee meeting until after the October fire fight? Other concerns always seemed more important.

"And don't forget what a turn-over of presidents is like in the White House and NSC. Everything gets taken away. There is no pass down material. We were looking at empty desks, empty computer disks and empty filing cabinets. In retrospect we should have called in experts and gone to the interagency process for background information and continuity."

"I take it that wasn't done?" said Jim.

Colfax shook his head. "No. The experts were all Republicans or had been on the Republicans' teams. How would that look? Take Somalia again. Robert Oakley was the most knowledgeable guy around, but he had been Bush's guy. So no one talked to him until after the October firefight.⁵⁹ And the IWGs were pretty much all swept away. The Clinton leadership wanted a clean sweep. It's not an uncommon attitude among the newly elected. So the Somalia IWG went away and a lot of knowledge went with it.

"If Oakley was too political to consult, why not talk to General Johnston or Zinni?" Jim asked. "Everything I've seen indicates he knew the situation better than anyone except maybe Oakley."

"Ah, well that brings up another first year problem—the relation of President Clinton to the U.S. military. Remember, the president was terribly vulnerable where his military experience was concerned. He had no military service on any kind and his record of avoiding the draft did not win him any friends in the Pentagon.⁶⁰ Another problem, one that cut deeply inside the Clinton security team, concerned gays in the military. Candidate Clinton had vowed to rescind the Executive Order which denied openly gay Americans the ability to serve in the armed forces. This decision infuriated the various service chiefs and General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶¹ Powell felt so strongly about the matter that he arranged a meeting with the president-elect where he spelled out how strongly he and the other Joint Chiefs would fight lifting the ban. The result was a compromise, the policy of 'don't ask, don't tell.' This didn't reduce the Joint Chiefs' fears of being used for a variety of new missions, social experiments and so on. It also did not alleviate the

administration's view that military leadership was reactionary and antagonistic from a political point of view.⁶² Colfax paused.

"And then it got worse. In a chance meeting between Dee Dee Meyers, the White House press secretary and Air Force General Barry McCaffrey, Meyers icily told the general "I don't talk to the military."⁶³ It was a deliberate snub.

"That was Meyers?"

"Indeed it was, although it took a long time before her name came out. From the military's point of view, this was seen as confirmation of their worst nightmares. A senior Clinton official, who by the way was decades younger than the general, who lacked the slightest military experience and who was female, had apparently dismissed and "dissed" all of them, their values and their contribution. Word of the insult flew like wildfire among the flag community. Attitudes hardened. It was clear that the administration had little feel for the military community or culture. The president even had to be taught how to salute properly.⁶⁴ And there were those in the administration who were convinced that the military was not above trying to intentionally embarrass the president.⁶⁵ These may seem like small things; they really were small things, but their cumulative effect was to strain potentially vital relationships."

"Couldn't General Powell have smoothed things over?"

"To answer that, I'll have to talk about a few personalities. Let's start with the president. To his credit, he's brilliant and that's not a term I toss around lightly. He's also got an incredibly forceful personality. Pundits talk about how well he works from a podium—well, multiply that by ten when he's in a more personal situation. He's also quick to anger and has an explosive temper. While president, he hated getting bad news and was prone to flare up at anyone who brought him some. Like most people in the heat of the moment he sometimes forgot if he had been told about a situation earlier or if he had said something that eventually turned out wrong. You know, like when you forget you told your teenager he or she can borrow the car and then yell at them for taking it when you needed to go golfing. To President Clinton's credit most people say that once he blew up at someone, there were no lingering hard feelings. It might simply have been a form of venting. But the rage and the tirades were hard on his staff and anyone who has worked for someone like that will tell you it doesn't make delivering unpleasant information a sought after job.⁶⁶

"And you can't forget that President Clinton was focused strongly on domestic issues. Fixing problems at home was what he viewed as his electoral mandate. Inside the borders was where he wanted to work. His foreign policy team would carry the load outside those borders.

"On paper that team seemed strong enough. Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, had served as deputy secretary of state under Jimmy Carter and had negotiated the return of the Iranian hostages. Madeline Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN was widely regarded in the field of international relations. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had a

reputation for toughness and for principled, ethical behavior. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin came from decades of experience in Congress and was regarded as an expert on military matters. General Powell rounded out this powerful group. Of course, only Powell had any recent experience in the Executive Branch of government.

“While Christopher seemed to prefer a traditional approach to statecraft, Albright and Lake believed in aggressive multi-lateralism. The Clinton policy of engagement and enlargement owed much to their ideas. Where Colin Powell had a rather narrowly defined conception of when military force should be used, Lake, Aspin and Albright believed the U.S. military should be used for a much wider variety of missions, including humanitarian assistance.⁶⁷ Lake and Christopher were also highly competitive when it came to driving foreign policy. Lake was very interested in issues dealing with Africa, where Christopher was oriented more toward Europe and Asia. This at times led to some sparks between them. But that was nothing compared to the friction between Les Aspin and Colin Powell.

“Powell’s actions during the episode over gays in the military did not sit well with Les Aspin, Clinton’s new secretary of defense. Aspin complained that Powell had overstepped the boundaries of his job and had actually been insubordinate. Powell privately thought Aspin was not a good secretary of defense.⁶⁸ Although the two men tried to give an appearance of collegiality, there was a significant underlying personality conflict.⁶⁹

“General Powell was, to put it bluntly, too powerful a political figure. He was beloved by the American people. When it came down to any matter that involved the military, Powell had more credibility than his bosses. The Clinton team was also leery of the power and influence that he and other senior military leaders would be able to exert on Capitol Hill.⁷⁰ From the beginning, political advisors to the president marked Powell as a potential challenger in the 1996 election and began collecting material that could be used to counter a Powell campaign.⁷¹

“To make matters worse, Aspin was encountering friction from more sources than Colin Powell. The new secretary had widely been regarded as a defense expert when he was a congressman on Capitol Hill. But his professorial style, sloppy suits, and meandering meetings did not sit well with the culture of DoD.⁷² Also, Aspin believed the Powell Doctrine was flawed. Rather than using a sledge hammer to crack a walnut, Aspin argued a nut-cracker should suffice. This did not go down well with military leaders who had come to view the Powell doctrine as the best guidelines for the employment of U.S. military muscle.⁷³ Had Aspin been more autocratic, more authoritarian; had he chopped off a few heads, he might have brought the Defense Department to heel. But he did not work that way.⁷⁴

“At first, despite all the differences of personality and the friction, there was no disagreement over what to do about Somalia. That the UN should ‘run Somalia’ was a strong point of agreement between Tony Lake, Madeline Albright and Boutros Boutros Ghali. Each saw Somalia as the first great success story of the administration’s foreign policy and the new role of the UN.⁷⁵ It is doubtful whether Bill Clinton saw the matter in exactly the same light, but it does appear clear that he wanted Somalia to be settled. Having the UN take over the

operation would do just that—especially, if remaining U.S. troops could then be drawn down to a minimum level, or better yet, withdrawn entirely.”

“How informed were these key players about events in Somalia?”

Colfax smiled. “Very informed. Oh, sure, after 3 October everyone was running around denying knowledge, but that isn’t borne out by the facts. U.S. military leaders were filing reports up the chain of command every day.⁷⁶ A status on Somalia was provided Tony Lake on a daily basis. Reports were also flowing to Christopher and a mountain of data was going to the UN Security Council and thus to Ambassador Albright, who voted on each of the resolutions.⁷⁷ So, for example, it’s clear that everyone knew the hunt for Aidid was being stepped up.

“In fact, when Admiral Howe and others began to request additional troops, there was widespread agreement in Washington that this was a good idea. Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher were both in favor of the increase as was the Central Intelligence Agency. The State Department, which had played a key role in the early days of the crisis had largely been pushed aside by DoD.⁷⁸ However, State registered no objections. Interestingly, the three most powerful individuals opposed to the idea were Secretary of Defense Aspin, Chairman Powell and Marine General Joseph Hoar who ran CENTCOM. There were several reasons for their reluctance. Hoar and Powell wanted to avoid ‘mission creep.’⁷⁹ Sending in additional forces would clearly allow for an increased scope of operations. Also, there would be no hiding the fact that U.S. military forces would be chasing Aidid. Hoar was concerned that the introduction of such forces would further erode whatever neutrality remained to the U.S. force. Finally, Powell and Aspin were astute enough to see that Congress was becoming increasingly critical of what seemed now to be an open-ended mission. And the Army was less than thrilled about this new dimension to the Somalia operation.

The troika of Powell, Aspin and Hoar might have been strong enough to carry the issue, but shortly after Howe requested reinforcements Aidid’s forces deliberately attacked an American vehicle, killing the four occupants.⁸⁰ After that, Task Force Ranger was going in.”

“What about the local guys requesting additional tanks? Didn’t Aspin say no?” Jim asked.

Colfax let out a long sigh. “I wondered when you would ask about the request for armor. The short answer is that there was such a request and that Aspin said no to it. But it’s just not that simple. The initial request was not just for four M-1 Abrams tanks. Artillery and four highly advanced Cobra helicopters were also included.”⁸¹

“I didn’t know that. What happened?”

“General Hoar disapproved the artillery request. He and the CENTCOM staff felt it had no utility in the environment of Mogadishu. In this environment it would be an aggressive, not a defensive, weapon and its use would inevitably cause casualties among non-combatants.⁸² He did positively endorse the request for the helicopters and the tanks.

“Somewhere going up the line the helicopters fell off the table. It turned out there were only fifty of these particular helicopters in existence at the time and they were all in Korea. In the words of a friend on the Army staff “Where the real war could break out.”

“My friend also reminded me that there is no such thing as a request for only four tanks or four helicopters. A great big bunch of logistics and material support comes along with them. The Army didn’t like this idea at all. Remember, they wanted to get out of Somalia. There was also an argument made that if the QRF got these additional capabilities they would just be assigned more challenging and difficult missions. The new platforms would facilitate mission creep.⁸³

But the request for tanks did land on Aspin’s desk. General Powell had favorably endorsed it, but didn’t say anything when the secretary said no.”

“That seems odd. Any idea why not?”

“Probably because he was on the eve of retiring. His relief was taking over. Some say the chairman had already checked out.⁸⁴ I don’t know that was the case, but it’s clear that he had a great deal else going on.

“As far as Aspin’s decision, I’ll simply point out a few facts. He was trying to get the United States out of Somalia and was very worried about mission creep. There was already armor assigned to UNISOM forces. These were Pakistani tanks.⁸⁵ They weren’t as advanced as the Abrams, but were certainly up to whatever the Somalis could throw at them. And the Abrams required a big support contingent. The final point I’ll make in this regard is that Aspin said no ten days before 3 October.⁸⁶ Even if he had said yes, it is highly unlikely any armor would have been in Mogadishu in time for the battle. After the fire fight, Aspin was besieged with questions about the tanks. He never really gave a coherent answer as to his reasoning.⁸⁷

“That’s fascinating.” Jim looked pensive. Then he asked a final question. “Okay, I understand about the tanks, now. That was Aspin’s call. But how much information about Somalia as a rule actually got to the president? Did he make the big decisions or was it someone else?”

“It’s clear a lot of information did get to President Clinton. What’s not so clear is how that information was packaged. The answer to your question also depends on what you mean by “decide.” In the Navy you have a concept known as ‘command by negation,’ right? As I understand it, you tell your boss what you are doing and what you are going to do and as long as you aren’t told no, you can do it? If not stopping something is a decision, then yes, the president did make the decisions.”

Now it was time to put the research together. Jim sighed. The situation involving mission creep in Somalia was a lot more complicated and messy than he had assumed it was. He didn’t know how applicable the events of 1994 would be to those of 2002. He didn’t even know if he could explain the events of 1994 by themselves. But he knew he would have to try.

Notes

1. President Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia is the subject of another case study in this volume. See Valerie J. Lofland, "Somalia: U.S. intervention and Operation Restore Hope."
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace*, (United Nations: New York, 1990).
3. United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 30–40.
4. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (ret.), interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 22 September, 1999.
5. Ambassador Richard Oakley, interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 6 December, 2001.
6. Oakley Interview.
7. Oakley Interview, Interview with Major Charles Ikins, USMC, interview with author, Newport, former member Somalia IWG, 9 February 2000.
8. United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 36.
9. Ibid.
10. Oakley Interview.
11. UN, 40.
12. UN, 40.
13. Zinni interview.
14. UN, 44.
15. UN, 44.
16. William Jefferson Clinton, *A National Security Strategy Of Engagement And Enlargement*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 13–14.
17. The following countries participated in UNISOM II: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and Zimbabwe. Only 3,017 U.S. personnel were assigned. UN, 328.
18. Ibid.
19. Oakley Interview.
20. Oakley Interview.
21. Oakley Interview.
22. Oakley Interview; Interview with Dr. Thomas Farer, former legal advisor to Deputy Commander, UNISOM II, interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 2 January 2002.
23. Oakley Interview.
24. UN, 46.
25. UN, 44.
26. Vance J. Nannini, *Decisions In Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention In Somalia*, (Leavenworth: United States Army Command And General Staff College, 1994), 114–118.
27. Casper Interview. Key among these states was Italy, which, due to its past colonial history had unusually deep ties with Somali clan leaders. See also: U.S. Department of Defense, *Somalia After Action Review: Briefing for Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1994) especially slides 11–16.
28. Interview with Colonel Lawrence Casper, United States Army (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division and Commander U.S. Quick Reaction Force, Somalia, 17 December 2001.
29. Farer interview.
30. James C. Dixon, *United Nations Operations In Somalia II: United Nations Unity Of Effort and United States Unity Of Command* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 92.
31. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 144.
32. Although the attack on the Pakistani forces resulted in the largest number of casualties, forces from Morocco and Italy had also been killed by Somali factions. UN, 52. Note: There are multiple spellings of the name "Aidid." This case study uses that adopted by the United Nations.

33. UN, 50.
34. UN, 51. A detailed reading of Professor Farer's report reveals numerous parallels between the strategy and tactics used against the Pakistani forces and those used against U.S. forces later in October. A copy of Professor Farer's report was provided to each member of the Security Council, including Ambassador Albright.
35. UN, 50.
36. UN, 50.
37. Drew, 320.
38. Elizabeth Drew, *On The Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 320.
39. Farer Interview.
30. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 29, Nr. 23, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 14 June 1993), 1098–1101.
41. Drew, 320.
42. Drew, 321.
43. Drew, 322
44. See Department of Defense, *Somalia After Action Review: Briefing For The Secretary Of Defense, 16 June 1994* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), 24.; Also James C. Dixon, *United Nations Operation In Somalia II: United Nations Unity Of Effort and United States Unity Of Command* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), Chapter Five.
45. Drew, 323.
46. Farer Interview.
47. Drew, 323.
48. Farer Interview.
49. Drew, 323.
50. Farer Interview.
51. UN, 55.
52. Casper, 75–76, 89.
53. Casper, 255.
54. Lexus-Nexus search for key word "Somalia," from 1 January 1994 to 4 October 1994.
55. Stephanopoulos, 143–145, 118–120.
56. Drew, 225.
57. Stephanopoulos, 119–120.
58. Stephanopoulos, 117.
59. Oakley interview.
60. Stephanopoulos, 69–70.
61. George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), 123–129.
62. Drew, 48. Oakley interview.
63. Oakley Interview, Drew, 44.
64. Stephanopoulos, 132–133.
65. Drew, 87.
66. Stephanopoulos, 71, 74, 90, 96–98, 176, 217, 286–288.
67. Drew, 139–146.
68. Ibid., 356.
69. Oakley interview.
70. Stephanopoulos, 123.
71. Stephanopoulos, 195–197.
72. Drew, 356–358.
73. Oakley Interview.
74. Drew, 356–358.
75. Oakley Interview.
76. Casper Interview.
77. Oakley Interview.
78. John G. Sommer, *Humanitarian Aid In Somalia: The Role Of The Office Of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: 1990–1994* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 5.
79. Drew, 320–323.
80. UN, 424.
81. Casper Interview.
82. Casper Interview.
83. Oakley Interview.
84. Drew, 221–223.
85. UN, 328.
86. Farer Interview.
87. Drew, 320–323.



Rwanda

RICHARD J. NORTON

The renewal of the Rwandan Civil War in April 1994, and the genocide that accompanied it, presented the Clinton administration with one of the most perplexing and difficult decision-making situations a United States president can be asked to deal with. Should the armed forces of the United States be committed to combat operations when United States values, but not United States interests, are at stake?¹

The Clinton administration never answered this question directly, although a decision to deploy military forces to the region was reached in late July of 1994, after the civil war and genocide in Rwanda had ended. The administration's actions in regard to Rwanda continue to be hotly debated within the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academic and political communities. Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa, but also in other parts of the globe, a study of the events leading to the president's decision could be of unusual utility.

In order to understand the decision-making process involving Rwanda, it is first necessary to provide a brief historical background of the events leading up to and following April 1994.² Rwanda is a small state. Roughly half the size of Maryland, it was a German colonial possession from 1899 until 1916. The Belgians then became Rwanda's colonial rulers and remained in power until 1962.³

Two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, dominate the Rwandan population. The Hutu comprise the numerically larger group. European colonists fostered a sense of superiority among the Tutsi and, in time, the Tutsi became the comprador class of Rwanda.⁴ Devices such as the establishment of a national identity card system in 1933 solidified racial identities, despite a tradition of intermarriage, common language, diet, and cultural heritage.⁵ In time assimilation and elevation became "next to impossible."⁶

In the late 1950s, as independence and national elections drew closer, the Belgians realized a rise in Hutu power was inevitable and as a result the Tutsis were essentially abandoned.⁷ In 1959 rebellion broke out. The Belgians made no move to help their former allies and the result was a bloodbath (while casualty estimates would vary from 10,000 to 100,000, the savagery of the action would serve as an eerie precursor to the mayhem of 1994.)

In contrast to Rwanda, the Tutsi in Burundi remained in power following independence. In Burundi the population distribution was more equal and the Tutsi dominated the military. Ironically, the behaviors of the Hutu elite in Rwanda and the Tutsi elite in Burundi have been very similar.⁸

From 1959 on, Tutsis fled Rwanda. Two great waves of refugees entered Uganda. The first entered in 1959, the second in 1962.⁹ The total numbers of refugees crossing the Uganda border may have reached as high as two-hundred thousand.

Life in Uganda under the Obote and Amin regimes was not easy. The suffering the Rwandan Tutsi Diaspora experienced, increased their prevalent determination to return to Rwanda. As the second generation of Tutsi ex-patriots came of age, enlisting in the revolutionary army of Yoweri Museveni provided them an accelerated opportunity to do just that.¹⁰

Museveni's army was, in comparison with other forces in the region, highly disciplined and professional. In the successful effort to overthrow Obote in 1986, its Rwandan soldiers gained both combat and leadership experience.¹¹ When the war was over the Tutsi fighters would leave Museveni's service and form the core combat cadres of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).¹²

While Tutsi refugees were settling in Uganda, the one-party state in Rwanda was becoming increasingly corrupt and ruled by patronage. Tutsi guerrilla raids brought fierce reprisals and pogroms were common. (Two massive purges occurred in 1963 and 1967.) In 1973 all Tutsis were purged from Rwandan universities as part of an overarching program to drive them from all educational institutions.¹³

Also in 1973 Rwandan military Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana staged a coup under the pretext of restoring social order. Although presenting the appearance of positive social change, Habyarimana simply replaced a corrupt set of Hutu rulers with a new set of corrupt Hutu rulers. These were predominately his friends from the north of Rwanda, traditionally the most chauvinistic of all Hutu nationalists.¹⁴ The new elite was known as the Akazu.¹⁵

Once in power, Habyarimana and his cronies set about draining the country's resources while continuing to blatantly discriminate against the Tutsis. The Tutsis also served as convenient scapegoats. When Hutu complaints were raised, the regime blamed the Tutsis.

But scapegoating had its limits. Eventually crops collapsed. Migration and social upheaval spread. Western donors who had been generous with aid, only to have it siphoned off in a variety of ways, began to demand more stringent accounting.¹⁶ With funding drying up the Akazu found it increasingly difficult to buy the loyalty of the army and the civil service. Suggestions that Rwanda should democratize horrified the elites, as this would mean the end of their system of clients and patronage.¹⁷

By 1990 the RPF staged a significant offensive. As many as 7,000 RPF troops may have attacked into Rwanda.¹⁸ The Habyarimana regime reacted by denouncing Tutsis as fifth columnists and blaming them for any and all government setbacks. Fear and hatred of Tutsis was actively fomented by the Rwandan government in order to direct the people's anger at frustration away from the government. These efforts produced what was to become the most virulent anti Tutsi propaganda in the history of Rwanda. A civilian militia was formed and attacks on Tutsis escalated, although this violence did not reach the level of genocide.¹⁹

However, the violence was not one-sided. Tutsi armed groups were also targeting some elements of the civilian population. Selective killings had, for all purposes, “become part of the common coinage of politics.”²⁰

The Rwandan government’s initial response to RPF success was to dramatically expand the size of its army. Between 1990 and 1992 the Army of Rwanda grew from a force of 5,000 to one of 30,000. In addition, the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) was formed. The CDR, a violently Hutu extremist party was opposed to any dialogue with the RPF.²¹

However, the twin elements of RPF military success and growing international pressure for a peaceful resolution eventually forced Habyarimana to embrace compromise. On 26 October, with the aid of Belgium, a cease-fire was brokered between the Rwandan government and the RPF. Known as the Gbadolite agreement, it was short-lived.²²

In 1991 further political concessions were forced from Habyarimana when he was forced to agree to the principle of multipart politics.²³ Several new political parties sprang into existence, including the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) a true Hutu challenger to the president.²⁴ Other parties, some socialist, some moderate, also emerged. Government and right-wing controlled radio stations and newspapers began an increasingly virulent hate campaign aimed against Tutsis.

On 12 July 1992 significant political progress was at last apparently achieved with the signing of the Arusha Accords. An associated cease-fire went into effect on 31 July. A buffer zone, in Rwanda, between the RPF and Rwandan Army front lines was established.²⁵ The Organization of African Unity (OAU) agreed to provide a “Neutral Military Observer Group” to monitor the zone.” The Accords also called for a Joint Political Commission to help implement the cease-fire and a pledge to reach a final peace agreement within twelve months. A transitional government would take over at this time until new elections could be held.²⁶

The cease-fire held more or less until 8 February 1993 when a new outbreak of fighting occurred. The RPF rapidly seized several objectives in the buffer zone, alleging they were responding to human rights violations committed by the Rwandan government. The RPF closed on Kigali airport but were prevented from seizing it when French troops intervened. The French government, seeing Rwanda as part of Francophone Africa, and being partial to the Habyarimana government deployed forces to Kigali. Having prevented the RPF capture of Kigali, the French continued to maintain a sizeable military mission and detachment of officers in Rwanda.²⁷

By this stage of the conflict six-hundred thousand Rwandans had become displaced persons, prompting calls for help being made to the UN. In response to requests from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda a UN observer mission (UNOMUR) was authorized to deploy along the countries’ mutual 150 kilometer-long border.²⁸ The mission was tasked with reporting and verifying any cross-border provision of assistance to the RPF from Uganda. The efficacy of this force was doubtful at best. Consisting of only fifty-five personnel, UNOMUR was not armed.²⁹ Lacking significant surveillance and transportation assets,

the UNOMUR forces never possessed the ability to adequately monitor the border.³⁰ Whether acting from a sense of obligation, or a desire to ensure the RPF fighters did not return, Uganda continued to provide arms and supplies to the RPF in Rwanda.³¹

On 24 September 1993 Kofi Annan presented an expanded peacekeeping proposal to the Security Council. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR, as the new peace operation would be called, would not only absorb UNOMUR, but would also bring in 2,458 additional military personnel in four, phased increments.³² On 5 October the Security Council approved Annan's proposal, but instructed the secretary-general to "seek economies." The UN requested a Canadian general to command the operation.³³ The first troops landed in Rwanda on October. By December 1,260 were on the ground.³⁴ UNAMIR's mandate was to assist with the delivery of food supplies to the displaced and expatriated. Monitoring of the Ugandan border and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) would continue.³⁵ Cease-fire violations would be investigated and the activities of the gendarmerie and civilian police monitored. Other UNAMIR activities would include mine awareness training, assisting with resettlement initiatives and in the disengagement, disarming and demobilization efforts that would follow the end of the war.³⁶

As UNAMIR was getting established, a military coup took over the government of Burundi. This set a refugee flow of more than 375,000 Hutu moving into Rwanda. As a result, UNAMIR extended its monitoring patrols into the south. By November, UNAMIR was already investigating reports of mass killings. The secretary-general realized that UNAMIR was going to require more troops and more time if it was going to carry out the assigned mandate. He asked for a six-month extension of the mandate and more peacekeepers.³⁷ On 6 January 1994 the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 893, approving the request.

Although UNAMIR has been criticized in the wake of the genocide, the blue helmets were not inactive. Nor were they reluctant to gather and report and intelligence. As early as 11 January UNAMIR was reporting plots by the Interhamwe and the CDR to kill large numbers of Tutsis.³⁸ Guidance was requested from the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). This communication has become known as the genocide telegram.

DPKO responded the same day. UNAMIR was to warn President Habyarimana that he should investigate the charges and prevent any killings. UNAMIR was informed that while it could "assist" in arms recovery operations, it was forbidden from "entering into a course of action which might lead to the use of force and to unanticipated repercussions."³⁹

The next day the UN special representative saw Habyarimana. The ambassadors from the United States, France and Belgium were also briefed by both the special representative and the UNAMIR force commander. The ambassadors were asked to request their governments to encourage the Habyarimana administration to grant the UNAMIR/UN request to prevent killings and confiscate arms. In New York, the UN special advisor briefed the Security Council.⁴⁰

The situation in Kigali continued to grow increasingly tense. On 3 February UNAMIR was authorized to engage in a deeper level of participation on arms recovery operations on a case-by-case basis. By the end of the month the UNAMIR commander had brought an additional two-hundred troops in the capitol from the northern demilitarized zone (DMZ).⁴¹

Violence continued to escalate. Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to pressure Habyarimana to get the transitional government in operation. The special representative continued to meet with the president on a regular basis.

Between 5–7 March additional peace talks were held in Dar Es Salaam. During the talks both sides agreed to continue the cease-fire. On 14 March the Belgian minister of foreign affairs warned Boutros Boutros-Ghali in writing of a predicted explosion of violence if the political deadlock continued. The truce had been renewed on 9 March and the Arusha talks continued on 15 March. It was expected that the talks would be complete by the first week in April.⁴² The agreement called for the removal of all foreign forces, except those that would be deployed to Rwanda.⁴³

Other actions forced upon the Rwandan president by the accords included political power sharing with the RPF, a reduction of presidential powers, and the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan Army. Under heavy international pressure Habyarimana signed what he thought was only a political agreement. It was actually also his death warrant.

By late March, UNAMIR had reached its peak manning level of 2,539 troops as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 893.⁴⁴ There was also an additional component of 60 UN police personnel. Violence continued in Kigali. Despite UN protests, government forces mined the roads out of the capitol. The special representative reported that weapons were being distributed to Hutu civilians. All this information was then reported to the Security Council.⁴⁵ On 5 April 1994 the Security Council extended the duration of UNAMIR. The mission would now run to 29 July. The vote for extension was unanimous.

On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana, Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Rwandan Army Chief of Staff Deogratias Nsabimana were returning to Kigali from the latest round of the Arusha Accords. Their aircraft, a gift from the French, was on final approach to the landing field when it was struck by two surface-to-air missiles. All aboard were killed. Members of Habyarimana's presidential Guard most likely launched the missiles.⁴⁶ More recent reports have suggested that the RPF may have been responsible, but most scholars have discounted this idea.⁴⁷

In the wake of the shootdown, Rwandan authorities acted with speed and well-planned precision. State radio immediately blamed the RPF for the downing of the presidential jet. Militia and Army units moved out of their barracks with lists of enemies and maps of their houses. Roadblocks were set up and manned by Interhamwe gunmen in some cases in less than half an hour.⁴⁸

Thus began 100 days of genocidal fury and renewed civil war. In those one hundred days an estimated one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to death. As might be expected the majority of this number was comprised of noncombatants.⁴⁹

Within a few hours after the shutdown the RPF battalion in Kigali was fully engaged in combat. Within twenty-four hours the civil war had been renewed. The RPF, far more professional and disciplined than its Rwandan Army opponents, sought contact with enemy forces and strove to maintain it.

Among the hundreds of deaths in the first twenty-four hours, several were of extreme consequence. The leaders of three opposition parties were killed. The moderate prime minister, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian UN peacekeepers that were serving as her bodyguards were also assassinated.⁵⁰ Sensing a potential need for rapid UN action, General Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR had tried to create a "quick reaction force" from the soldiers he had been assigned. It was envisioned that this force would be able to respond to a variety of situations. Unfortunately, due to combination of training and equipment problems, the quick reaction force was not ready.⁵¹ The Rwandan Army, their allies, and the Interhamwe essentially decapitated moderate Hutu opposition and dealt what would come to be seen as a deathblow to UNAMIR in the first twenty-four hours of the genocide.⁵²

News of the violence traveled rapidly. On 7 April, President Clinton condemned the murder of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. He also called for a return to the cease-fire.⁵³

Any United States military operation mounted in Rwanda or neighboring countries would fall under the overall command of the United States European Command (EUCOM). EUCOM had been already paying attention to Rwanda and had even created a Rwanda Working Group prior to the shutdown.⁵⁴ EUCOM immediately asked the Joint Staff if Rwanda contingency plans should be made. The answer was an emphatic no for anything other than a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). EUCOM was to simply monitor the situation.⁵⁵ There would be no U.S. involvement. EUCOM followed orders, but expanded the Rwanda Working Group. It was a busy period for EUCOM. Five Joint Task Forces (JTFs) were already in operation in the theater.⁵⁶ Accordingly the apparent decision not to mount an operation in Rwanda was not unwelcome.

In the wake of the violence in Rwanda, UNAMIR was unable to conduct operations in accordance with the mandate. Instead the blue helmets concentrated on establishing safe havens for Rwandan noncombatants. Civilians flocked to the protection offered by the UN peacekeepers. Rwandan Army, Interhamwe, and RPF fighters did test UN resolve to defend these areas.⁵⁷

The secretary-general has stated that he kept the Security Council apprised of all Rwanda developments he was aware of.⁵⁸ On 9 April, the assistant secretary-general for peace keeping operations provided an additional briefing on Rwanda to the Security Council.⁵⁹ The OAU also reported itself ready to fully cooperate with any efforts the UN might initiate.

International response was initially rapid. U.S. personnel (225 total) evacuated themselves from Rwanda via road convoy on 10 April. The ambassador and a number of embassy personnel remained on station. For a period of time the fighting effectively trapped the ambassador in his residence. On 11 April French and Belgian troops landed in Kigali to assist in the evacuation of their nationals.⁶⁰

UNAMIR was also struggling to respond to the situation. UNAMIR troops deployed from the RPF-Rwandan DMZ to the capitol. The next day the Belgian minister for foreign affairs reported that the Belgians were leaving UNAMIR. On the 13th, Belgium recommended suspending UNAMIR. The secretary-general said UNAMIR would remain.⁶¹ The national governments, with the exception of Ghana, made it clear to their UNAMIR contingents that self-protection was of the highest priority.⁶² General Dallaire, commanding UNAMIR, sought to reverse the defensive orientation of the national contingents, obtain reinforcements, stop the genocide and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. It is doubtful whether the latter could have been accomplished under any conditions. Once back on the offensive, the RPF was not inclined to negotiations. Their leaders correctly sensed that they possessed a markedly superior fighting force than the Rwandan Army and that victory could be theirs.⁶³

The United States response was in some ways surprisingly rapid. By 7 April representatives from the United States had clearly stated their opposition to shifting the authority for UNAMIR's mission from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the UN charter. This would have enabled the UNAMIR commander to take bolder and potentially more dangerous actions, including acts of combat to carry out the assignment. However, conducting Chapter VII operations would expose the blue helmets to potentially much higher personal risk and opened the possibility of full-blown combat with both RPF and Rwandan Army forces. During the same week National Security Advisor Anthony Lake became the first western political figure to demand a stop to the killing and to place the blame squarely on Hutu leaders.⁶⁴

President Clinton spoke with reporters in Minneapolis on 8 April. He stated that he been involved with lengthy conversation about the Rwandan situation with Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and National Security Advisor Lake. The subject of utmost concern was the safety of U.S. citizens in Rwanda.⁶⁵ Three days later, on 11 April, the president was able to report that 275 United States Marines had been flown to Bujumbura to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rwanda. However, the Marines had not been required to cross into Rwandan territory. Ambassador Rawson was singled out for his efforts.⁶⁶ The Marines then returned to their ships in the Indian Ocean.

Within a short period of time, the Defense Department had established a Rwandan Task Force.⁶⁷ The task force collected and forwarded intelligence on the situation in Rwanda. Among the data collected was a daily estimate of those killed.⁶⁸ Under National Security Council (NSC) auspices, a Rwanda Interagency Working Group (IWG) was also established. In a short period of time, daily IWG conferences were being held. Some of these were conducted by Video Teleconference (VTC), but most were in the Situation Room in the White House.⁶⁹ Participants in the videoconferences included representatives from State, NSC,

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Defense, CIA, and the Office of the U.S. ambassador to the UN.⁷⁰ The meeting held in person tended to involve only members whose agencies were located in Washington.⁷¹ According to one participant, it was clear that there was no desire to become involved on the ground in Africa.⁷² And while these meetings were supposed to focus on policy, on at least one question the issue of potential impacts on the 1994 elections was specifically raised.⁷³

Although the IWG was drawn from a disparate group of agencies, the membership had, according to one participant, one thing in common. None were experts, or even essentially well versed in the politics of the Great Lakes region of Africa. None understood the historical and political context involving the French and the former colonial powers.⁷⁴ This lack was shared by the major cabinet level actors as well, specifically Secretary Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor (NSA) Tony Lake and Secretary of Defense William Perry.⁷⁵ As the IWG worked out their internal procedures, events continued to move at the UN

Interestingly, although Belgium had been the first state to favor a withdrawal from Rwanda, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes initially pressed for armed intervention by UN forces. He rapidly gave up this idea in the face of French and United States opposition.⁷⁶ Nor did he have unanimous support in Belgium.

On 11 April, the UNAMIR troops, that had been guarding a school where two-thousand refugees were being sheltered, were redeployed to Kigali airport. The refugees remained behind. Almost all were killed shortly thereafter. At this point, the UN had no doubts that widespread killing was going on in Rwanda and that there was a strong ethnic component to some of the shooting.⁷⁷

Still, Dallaire's thought that UNAMIR could provide some stability clearly had merit. With only the UNAMIR troops in the capitol, he was providing security for thousands of displaced persons.⁷⁸ Had he received the five battalions and armored personnel carriers he requested, much more would have been possible.

At the Security Council, the subject of debate was whether UNAMIR should be continued. Now that initial concerns about the safety of their own citizens had been answered, the question was what to do with UNAMIR. Belgium, having abandoned any idea of intervention, pressed hard to withdraw the UN force.⁷⁹

The Belgian argument was easy to follow. Events in Rwanda were developing rapidly and unpredictably. Although the Rwandan Army and the RPF had seemingly embraced a "hands off" policy toward UN safe havens, this had lasted slightly less than a week. On 18 April, displaced persons and UNAMIR forces within UNAMIR havens came under mortar attack. The next day Uganda requested that UNAMIR be retained and reinforced.⁸⁰ On 21 April, Bangladesh threatened to withdraw its forces and the Security Council unanimously voted to make the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda a reality.⁸¹ However, as events unfolded UNAMIR was never completely removed from Rwanda, and 450 UN soldiers remained in Kigali throughout the crisis in order to secure the airport.⁸² Despite their small numbers these troops also managed to provide sanctuary for as many as 20,000 displaced persons.⁸³

Yet they could not cover all the people that UNAMIR had originally sheltered, and when UNAMIR forces left, death inevitably followed.⁸⁴

In the years following the Rwanda crisis, the question, “Did the UN and the United States know genocide was being conducted in Rwanda?” was frequently asked. Obviously the answer is yes, although *when* that fact became known is a tougher question to answer. It was clear; almost at once, that widespread killing was going on, that civilians were being targeted and that the civil war was once again raging. Independent confirmation of these conditions came from evacuated civilians, UNAMIR soldiers, and NGOs such as the Red Cross that reported “tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead” by 21 April.⁸⁵ On 23 April, the killing campaign intensified, reaching into the countryside and rural areas that had previously been unaffected.

Part of the reason the United States was slow to recognize, and even slower to admit, that genocide was ongoing in Rwanda can be traced back to the U.S. experience in Somalia. A common perception among senior U.S. decision makers was that involvement in the Somalia civil war had led to the debacle of Mogadishu. This was especially true in the case of Warren Christopher.⁸⁶

Michael Barnett, a member of the United States mission to the UN in 1994 has stated:

By mid to late April, people in the Security Council knew it was genocide, but refused to call it such because, ultimately, one understood that if you used the term genocide, then you might be forced to act. And when someone suggested that maybe they should call a genocide a genocide, they were quietly reminded that perhaps they should not use such language.⁸⁷

Although other participants differ as to why the term genocide was not used, all agree that a decision was made to not call the widespread killing genocide.⁸⁸ The very fact this discussion was held indicates that there was general knowledge of mass killings going on inside Rwanda.

On 29 April, Boutros Boutros-Ghali went before the Security Council to ask for consideration of sending reinforcements to Rwanda.⁸⁹ Such a force, if approved, would have to be “well equipped, very mobile and able to protect itself.” The secretary-general admitted that he was not sure if even such a force would be able to bring about an end to the massacres.⁹⁰ On that very day, outgoing security council president, Colin Keating of New Zealand, took matters into his own hands and forced the council to approve a resolution. The council had been debating the issue for several days. Some members, such as China were opposed to any recommendation of strong action. Other members, such as the United States, did not want the term genocide used. Keating informed the council that unless they could reach agreement he would declare the meeting an open session.⁹¹ This would have made the wording and positions of the opposing states public. The council rapidly passed a resolution recommending strong action, but refrained from the use of the word genocide.⁹²

On 30 April President Clinton made a radio address. He spoke to the leaders of both the RPF and the Rwandan Army, urging them to stop the killing. The word genocide was not used, nor was there any intimation of U.S. or UN action.⁹³

As the Rwanda IWG continued to attempt to craft policy options, it became apparent that no organization or senior decision maker wanted lead responsibility.⁹⁴ Rwanda was a very hot potato. Of all the organizations represented at the table, the Defense Department was the most reluctant to do anything that might lead to U.S. involvement.⁹⁵ But DoD's reluctance was in many ways indicative of the inability of decision makers to craft a policy that DoD could understand and support.⁹⁶

Officials continued to use the word "chaos" to describe the killings in Rwanda. Some VTC participants saw Rwanda as a failed state; one that had failed from an excess of tribalism. Others thought the strife was of a permanent nature.⁹⁷

Yet, over the course of the crisis, the option of committing United States forces either unilaterally or in conjunction with the OAU, or UN was continually raised. Later, when the French were launching Operation Tourquoise, there was even discussion of the United States militarily joining that effort.⁹⁸ The memory of the perceived failure of U.S. policy in Somalia hung heavy over these discussions, as indeed it did over most U.S. foreign policy deliberations.⁹⁹ Defense Department representatives were also affected by distant memories of Vietnam.¹⁰⁰

Discussions among United States actors were not confined to the IWG level. Rwanda was a standard topic of discussions at informal luncheons of Defense Secretary Perry, Secretary of State Christopher and NSA Tony Lake. These gatherings were referred to as PCL or "pickle" meetings.¹⁰¹ However, there were no NSC Principals meetings being held to discuss Rwanda during the first two months of the crisis.¹⁰²

Whether at the IWG or at the "pickle" level, one component of the crisis stood out clearly. There was no major U.S. public support for involvement in Rwanda. The Congressional Black Caucus had not called for intervention. This fact was not lost on the president who specifically asked if the Congressional Black Caucus was showing a strong interest in the issue.¹⁰³ The *New York Times* twice ran editorials cautioning against providing more than logistic support and financial aid to Rwanda relief. The point was also made that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Rwanda. Both the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* took similar positions.

On 3 May, President Clinton appeared on the Cable Network News (CNN) program "Global Forum with President Clinton." In the course of the show the president was asked what to do about Rwanda. He replied that he, like everyone, was shocked at the "slaughter," but hoped that the recognition of military and political dimensions would lead to avoiding the problems of Somalia. There was no discussion of intervention.¹⁰⁴

Despite the president's appearance on the CNN news show, Rwanda was by no means the "hot" story of 1994 as far as the U.S. press was concerned.¹⁰⁵ Events in Haiti and Bosnia

dominated U.S. stories about the international scene as potential health care and crime bills did the domestic.¹⁰⁶ In part, this lack of coverage was due to a paucity of press assets in Central Africa and the difficulty in getting news crews and reporters into the country. However, reports, primarily in print media, did reach major news markets. In the United States, the *New York Times* gave the most play to stories about Rwanda, but the *Times*' coverage was not extensive, especially compared to Canadian papers. In part, the press' difficulty in getting at the Rwanda story was that neither the Rwandan Army nor the RPF wanted the scrutiny of the world press on their activities.

Congressional attention eventually touched on Rwanda. Secretary of State Albright testified on 5 May to the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. She briefly discussed Rwanda and also took the opportunity to brief the committee on Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which had but recently been signed into force. As Secretary Albright put it, PDD 25 was seen as a way to "make multilateral peace operations more selective and more effective."¹⁰⁷

In reality PDD-25 was designed to make U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations a far more difficult mission into which to enter. The PDD established criteria concerning command and control, funding and the selection of which peacekeeping operations to support. Critics claimed that the president had effectively shut the United States out of the peacekeeping business. Many within government traced the origin of the PDD back to the battle of Mogadishu and the failure of the Clinton administration's Somalia policy. It was, in the words of one ambassador, "emblematic of the times."¹⁰⁸ But the PDD would also make it easier for government organizations opposed to intervention of any sort to advance their position.¹⁰⁹

In discussing Rwanda, Ambassador Albright stated that the OAU had volunteered to contribute forces, but that funding for those forces would have to be provided. The UN did not have the money that was needed and was starting a voluntary fund for Rwanda. The UN secretary-general hoped the United States would pay a portion of that funding. The ambassador referred to the dilemma as a "chicken and egg situation."¹¹⁰ When asked for specifics regarding the killings in Rwanda, Ambassador Albright answered that it was "hard" to get information out of Rwanda, but that while the exact numbers were unknown it seemed that the victims were mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus. The four hundred troops in Kigali were said to be "trying to help with negotiations, protect the UN negotiators there, and trying to provide some protection to Rwandans who sought protection under the UN force."¹¹¹ The prospect of putting more forces into Rwanda was complicated by the fact that the RPF did not want additional peacekeepers in the country. The ambassador also voiced doubt as to whether or not the Rwandan peace operation had "started out properly."¹¹²

These were public statements. Ambassador Albright has since stated that she did not agree with the orders she was receiving from Washington in regard to Rwanda. She claims to have "screamed about the instructions," feeling they were "wrong."¹¹³ However, as an ambassador, she had to "follow" those instructions.¹¹⁴ Her account has been substantiated by one IWG participant.¹¹⁵

Other voices were also heard in Congress on the subject of Rwanda. Kofi Annan, then the under secretary-general of the UN, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa on 2 May 1994. Annan focused on the extent of the crisis. He noted that the situation was so bad that Médecins Sans Frontières and the Red Cross had either suspended operations in Rwanda all together, or confined themselves to Kigali. He noted that Rwanda was “the most violent and virulent of all African challenges” and that the UN was “doing everything within its power to respond to the devastation which is occurring.” He set the casualty figures at 100,000 dead, and 2 million displaced, within fourteen days. Senator Simon (D-IL) asked what the United States could or should do. Annan replied that the United States had the required lift capability, military hardware and speed of action that was desperately needed. Furthermore, he added, even if the United States was unwilling to commit ground forces, it could “lead the international community in mobilizing resources.”¹¹⁶ When Simon asked about the capability of the OAU to be of greater support in helping answer the Rwanda problem Annan replied, “At least they tried.”¹¹⁷

Although it took some time, pictures and video of the devastation and genocide that was sweeping Rwanda began to appear internationally.¹¹⁸ In the United States, many congressional representatives reported themselves horrified at the images. However, while there was support for increased aid for NGOs and UN agencies in Rwanda, there were no calls to send U.S. troops.¹¹⁹

On 4 May George Moose, an assistant secretary of state, was before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. By now congressional representatives were using the terms “genocide,” and “holocaust” to describe the killings in Rwanda. Furthermore Representative Johnston (D-FL) made it clear that the genocide was being carried out by Interhamwe and elements of the Rwandan Army. He further noted that the killing has been carefully planned and deliberately executed. Moose explained the killings had begun in Kigali, then spread to the countryside. The victims were moderate Hutu opposition leaders and Tutsis of every type. Casualties were estimated at 100,000 dead and more than 300,000 refugees.¹²⁰ After running down a long list of actions, the United States was taking to address the situation, Moose noted “In the end only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country. No outside effort can succeed without commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community on internal conflicts of this type is limited.”¹²¹

The committee was hard on Moose. One of the more telling points they raised was that although UNAMIR had been removed out of concern for the soldiers’ safety, the 400 troops in Kigali had been safe since the second day of the fighting. Moose admitted that this was so.¹²² He also made it clear that U.S. and UN missions that were being dispatched to the region were not actually scheduled to enter Rwanda. Moose downplayed the chance of French or Belgian capabilities to “influence the current situation” due to “historical baggage.”¹²³

However, despite the committee’s willingness to put Moose on the spot, only Alcee Hastings (D-FL) was willing to call for U.S. armed intervention.¹²⁴ Others, such as Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) were willing to support a multilateral intervention, as long as U.S. troops were not part of the operation.¹²⁵

Other congressional personalities tried a more direct approach. Personally contacting General Dallaire, Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) were told "If I can get 5,000 to 8,000 troops here quickly we can stop the whole thing." Accordingly the Senators both wrote President Clinton urging rapid action.¹²⁶

In New York, the UN Security Council continued to wrestle with the problem of Rwanda. On 1 May, Tanzania formally protested the decision to draw down UNAMIR. This act, it was argued "demonstrated that the tragedy in Rwanda was of no concern to the international community, and stood in sharp contrast to the peacekeeping efforts of the organization elsewhere."¹²⁷ Unnamed Clinton administration officials stated that they were considering helping organize and fund an African intervention in Rwanda, but that the idea of any direct U.S. intervention had been rejected.¹²⁸ Ambassador Madeline Albright reinforced this the next day during an interview on CNN.¹²⁹

On 3 May, Kofi Annan blamed the lack of support for direct action in Rwanda on two major factors. One was fear of placing national forces at risk.¹³⁰ This fear was fueled by past events in Rwanda and current events in Bosnia. The other factor was the lack of a feeling of "kinship" by the populations of western states for the people of Rwanda.

On 4 May, Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to the killing in Rwanda as genocide.¹³¹ So too did David Breyer, director of the nongovernmental organization Oxfam. He reported that as many as 500,000 Rwandans might have been killed.¹³²

On 13 May, the Security Council was prepared to vote on restoring UNAMIR strength in Rwanda. Ambassador Albright delayed the vote for four days.¹³³ On 17 May, the Council passed Resolution 918 authorizing UNAMIR II, an expanded UNAMIR. UNAMIR II would consist of 5,500 personnel. Its mandate was to provide protection to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk while supporting relief efforts.¹³⁴

Although UNAMIR II boasted an authorized strength of 5,500, the required soldiers could not be found. Ghana immediately volunteered to send in the first of four phased installments, but made it clear their troops would need Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). The UN requested the United States provide the vehicles on 19 May.¹³⁵ Two weeks later the United States publicly agreed to provide the APCs.¹³⁶

Meanwhile the RPF was collecting an impressive string of military successes against the Rwandan Army. They were still not keen on a UN intervention and possible interruption of their campaign.¹³⁷ Despite the arms embargo, both forces were being resupplied throughout the campaign, but the greater war-fighting skill and discipline of the RPF was credited as the most important elements of their victories. However, RPF professionalism only extended so far behind the battle lines. They were "less than precise" when it came to the Geneva protocols invoking the noncombatant status of hospitals and so on.¹³⁸

As the RPF steadily advanced, UNAMIR II continued to be plagued by trouble. The transfer of the APCs came to be seen as an essential component to a successful deployment.

The United States had the vehicles and had publicly agreed to transfer them. However, in reality U.S. actions would cast serious doubts on Washington's commitment to that agreement.

At the best of times, the bureaucratic processes of the UN are cumbersome. Things happen slowly. Paperwork is extensive. When faced with a crisis, this process can be speeded up, but only with the intervention and oversight of an interested, powerful party.¹³⁹ In the past the United States has played such a role. This time the United States did not.¹⁴⁰ Disagreements over the terms of the APC contract were frequent and often focused on such details as taillights and painting the vehicles white.¹⁴¹ United States officials kept asking for clarifying details, slowing down the process.¹⁴² At least one contemporary editorial accused the White House or the NSC as being responsible for the delay in turning over the APCs.¹⁴³ The end result of this slow and cumbersome process was that the APCs would never be transferred from U.S. custody until after an RPF victory was certain.¹⁴⁴ UNAMIR II would never become an effective force.

But the killing continued. By mid-May the International Red Cross estimated that 500,000 people had been killed in Rwanda. The RPF held half of Rwanda and were tightening their hold on the environs of Kigali. Hutu refugees were "streaming" from the capitol to areas still dominated by the Rwandan Army.¹⁴⁵ On 21 May the RPF gained control of the Kigali airport and refused to turn it over to UNAMIR.¹⁴⁶ Yet, within the zone controlled by the RPF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) and the ICRC were active. These agencies were even able to provide what amounted to systemic humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁷ This fact would appear to strengthen the argument that the RPF's aversion to an increased UNAMIR presence was fear of being forced to give up their offensive short of total victory, rather than a general reluctance to deal with the UN and other actors.

In late May the secretary-general began an increasingly anguished cry for support in stopping what he was publicly calling genocide in Rwanda. While recognizing a "general fatigue on the part of the international community regarding peacekeeping," the growth of peacekeeping missions and the difficulties with past operations such as Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali still labeled Rwanda "a failure of the entire international community."¹⁴⁸

During the same time period, President Clinton addressed the topic of United States intervention while giving the keynote commencement speech at the United States Naval Academy. The president's remarks made it clear that it was unlikely sufficient national interests were at stake in Rwanda to warrant United States intervention.¹⁴⁹ The next day the president signed Executive Order 12918, embargoing arms sales and transfers to Rwanda.¹⁵⁰ President Clinton repeated this point about no United States military intervention to the French press on 7 June.¹⁵¹ The United States was willing to help, but would not commit troops. The president pointed out that the United States already had forces committed to Korea, to Europe, and to the blockade of Haiti. Developments in Bosnia and Haiti could place additional demands on the armed forces of the United States. The United States would provide financial assistance and armored support. The president thought that only a modest force, fielded by several African states offered the best hope of success.¹⁵²

On 8 June the Security Council passed Resolution 925, endorsing the immediate deployment of two battalions to Rwanda and also extended the UNAMIR mandate.¹⁵³ Troops for the battalions were not forth coming. The European Command (EUCOM) APCs had yet to be delivered and it was increasingly becoming apparent that no major deployment of UN forces was likely. On 20 June the Security Council voted to extend UNOMUR until 21 September.¹⁵⁴ The day before, 19 June, the secretary-general told the Security Council that the French had informed him of “their willingness to undertake with Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. The U.S.-led United Task Force in Somalia (UNI) was cited as a precedent.”¹⁵⁵

On 20 June the French directly addressed their fellow members of the Security Council. France and Senegal were prepared to deploy troops into Rwanda. They were ready to move “without delay” and wanted Chapter VII authorization.¹⁵⁶ They also insisted that the mandate empower them to use “all means necessary” to carry out their mission.¹⁵⁷

As the Security Council debated the French offer, the RPF continued to make headway against the Rwandan Army. As the RPF advanced the numbers of Hutu refugees continued to grow. UNAMIR’s troop strength in Rwanda had grown from 444 to 503. The Rwandan noncombatant casualty list continued to grow. Any doubts about the existence of genocide had long been dealt with at the IWG. The mood was one of “increasing urgency” and the French offer was appealing.¹⁵⁸ But the problem of a lack of knowledge continued to affect the decision-making process. In the words of one participant, “State assumed the French would stabilize the situation and separate the warring parties. It never occurred to them that the genocidaires would use this as an opportunity to rest, reconsolidate, and then escape across the border. It never occurred to them that the French would allow this, even though many the genocidaires were their former clients.”¹⁵⁹

On 22 June 1994 France’s offer was accepted by the Security Council. Resolution 929 authorized the French to intervene in Rwanda under UN auspices. The operation was to conclude on 21 August.¹⁶⁰ This was only the sixth time that a UN operation had been approved under Chapter VII of the charter. The first elements of what would be known as “Operation Tourquoise” deployed into Uganda that very day. By early July more than 2,000 troops were on the ground.¹⁶¹ On 27 June President Clinton addressed the members of the White House Conference on Africa.¹⁶² United States financial, material and “statistical” support was being provided for the efforts in Rwanda, including more than \$100 million in humanitarian relief. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by “statistical” relief.¹⁶³ The president also expressed support for the French intervention and affirmed that the United States was committed to bringing genocidaires to justice.

The ever-growing numbers of Rwandan cross-border refugees resulted in a shift in the relative interest of the various agencies attempting to come to grips with the problem in Washington. From the beginning of the crisis, USAID, true to its charter, had been anxious to do whatever was possible to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda and in neighboring refugee camps. In fact, it was acknowledged by some participants that USAID was probably the most

“out in front” of all the United States foreign policy community.¹⁶⁴ But USAID had not been able to significantly advance its position with other members of the interagency working group (IWG). Tony Lake was sympathetic, but the president was not.¹⁶⁵

As the numbers of Rwandan refugees crossing into Tanzania and Zaire increased, two major developments ensued. The first was that the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) became progressively more involved in the situation.¹⁶⁶ As the refugees flooded across international borders and pooled in increasingly huge and unhealthy camps, NGOs rapidly found themselves overwhelmed.

The second major effect was that “the CNN effect” which had previously been muted, now became more pronounced.¹⁶⁷ Reporters who had previously found it difficult to enter Rwanda had no such problems in entering the camps.¹⁶⁸ The conditions, death, and suffering were the stuff of powerful news stories and media coverage increased dramatically.¹⁶⁹ This resulted in a further increase in the urgency felt by members of the IWG and a growing sense that some U.S. response was going to be required.¹⁷⁰ Despite State’s increased involvement, at the IWG meetings there was an increasing sense that the State Department, and Warren Christopher, were deferring more and more to the NSC and Tony Lake. Christopher was not an “Africa hand” and was having other diplomatic difficulties. Tony Lake, in contrast, was very interested in Africa.¹⁷¹ Defense Department representatives were still extremely reluctant to support any initiatives that might require the use of military forces in the Great Lakes region. There was a general agreement that there were still no U.S. national interests at stake.¹⁷² The military also had concerns with any deployment’s effect on readiness and budget, as well as potential combat risks to U.S. personnel.¹⁷³

In Rwanda, the RPF continued its string of victories. RPF troops were closing in on Rwandan Army strongholds in both the southwest and north-central portion of Rwanda. Refugee flows in excess of two million people were in motion away from the fighting.¹⁷⁴ Fear of the RPF, fear of being caught up in the general conflict, and the urgings of Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, all incited Hutus to flee.¹⁷⁵ Ostensibly in reaction to these developments the French felt compelled to establish a safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda. French-led forces deployed into the zone on 9 July.¹⁷⁶ Five days later the RPF had taken full control of Kigali and captured Butare, Rwanda’s second largest city.¹⁷⁷ Neither the leaders of the RPF or the Rwandan government were interested in discussing a cease-fire agreement. In the United States, an RPF victory was being increasingly seen as the most likely way to stop the genocide.¹⁷⁸

By 14 July, approximately 1.5 million Rwandans, mostly Hutu, had crossed the border into Zaire. This number included “virtually all the forces of the former Rwandan Governmental Army.” Zaire’s ability to deal with such a flow was nonexistent and the Security Council called on the international community to mobilize all available resources to provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance. As many as 850,000 refugees settled in the vicinity of Goma.¹⁷⁹ Another 350,000 stayed in camps in the South Kivu region. United States-based humanitarian NGOs also began to marshal their forces to deal with the situation.

Among the more active of these groups was the Capitol Hill Hunger Consortium. In addition to serving as a lobbying group for humanitarian programs, the Consortium also provided consulting services to several NGOs and UN agencies.¹⁸⁰ Eugene Dewey directed the Consortium. Mr. Dewey was a former senior official in both the UN and the State Department and he was well connected on Capitol Hill. On 14 July, he phoned contacts on the NSC staff, stressing the need for United States leadership. He did not stop with entreaties. Mr. Dewey also drafted an action plan, which he provided to his contacts on the NSC and certain influential congressmen, such as Tony Hall (D-OH).¹⁸¹ Dewey claims that his proposals were actually presented to the NSC.¹⁸² In the wake of this lobbying effort there were increased numbers of letters from the Congressional Black Caucus to the president requesting increased aid to Rwanda. Black Caucus chairman Donald Payne (D-NJ) penned the strongest of these letters. Sources within the NSC have confirmed that the Dewey proposal was among several plans made available to NSA Lake and other key figures. However, it was just one of several action plans under consideration.¹⁸³

On 15 July President Clinton dispatched USAID's Brian Atwood to Goma in order to assess the severity of the humanitarian crisis. While there, Atwood met with General Dellaire and Charles Petrie, deputy director, United Nations Mission Rwanda Emergency Office. At the meeting Petrie "begged" for additional UNAMIR forces. According to Petrie, "It was fascinating to see how much support, compassion and willingness to help give there was at the time."¹⁸⁴ Shortly after Atwood returned, he personally briefed the president.¹⁸⁵ For what appears to be the first time in the crisis, the possibility that United States was likely to send military forces into the African Great Lakes region became public knowledge. In EUCOM the initial indicator, at the action officer level, that something more than "monitoring" was needed came in the form of White House press release.¹⁸⁶

On 18 July the RPF reached the Zairian frontier and declared a unilateral cease-fire. With the exception of the French "humanitarian zone," the entire country of Rwanda was under RPF control.¹⁸⁷ The RPF formed a "government of national unity."¹⁸⁸ Representatives of all parties named in the Arusha Peace Accords were represented with the exception of the more extreme, Hutu-dominated parties.

On the next day, cholera appeared in the refugee camps of Goma. This was rapidly followed by an outbreak of dysentery.¹⁸⁹ The UNHCR urgently appealed for assistance as stockpiled relief supplies for half a million people had run out.¹⁹⁰ The very nature of the disease placed additional burdens upon the United States decision making apparatus. Cholera is extremely virulent and dangerous. It had broken out in the camps as a result of contaminated water supplies and a lack of sanitation facilities. Water purification equipment and associated hygienic items were needed immediately. Only the United States had the unquestioned ability to lift the required materials into the theater in a timely fashion.¹⁹¹ On 21 July Brian Atwood personally briefed the president on the situation.¹⁹²

The end of the civil war dramatically changed the relative influence among the members of the IWG. Defense Department representatives had lost one of their most compelling arguments against the deployment of United States forces into the region. With the shooting

at an end, United States personnel would be at little or no risk from combat. The Somalia analogy no longer seemed as applicable.¹⁹³

Given the new situation on the ground however, “clear objectives and endpoints” could be identified.¹⁹⁴ This would satisfy at least one condition laid down by PDD-25, although the issue of national interest remained problematic. Furthermore, the diminished risk to United States forces also meant there was less political risk in mounting an operation.¹⁹⁵

On 22 July, President Clinton announced a major increase in United States aid and directed the Department of Defense to commit troops to the relief effort.¹⁹⁶ He noted that prior to making this decision he had met with Brian Atwood to get Atwood’s report on the situation in the refugee camps. The threat of cholera was said to have been an important element in the decision. Interestingly, NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch, USAID Director Atwood, and General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, were charged with conducting the operation.¹⁹⁷ The decision was unilateral, but consistent with calls for international action made by the UN

Once the decision was made, United States response was rapid. Initial airdrops of food from Special Operations C-130 aircraft were being conducted within twelve hours.¹⁹⁸ Led by General John Nix, of European Command, United States troops were on the ground and conducting operations within forty-eight hours.¹⁹⁹ In less than twenty-four hours, following the arrival of United States forces, purified water was being provided to the refugees.²⁰⁰

From late July until early October more than thirty-five hundred United States personnel participated in Operation Support Hope. In addition to water purification, United States forces were involved with aid distribution projects, establishing and maintaining air-field operations, and providing logistic support to UN forces.²⁰¹ The total cost of the operation was evaluated to be \$123.9 million.²⁰² And while Rwanda would continue to attract United States observation and concern for years, the immediate crisis was over.

Notes

1. Interview with Dr. Anthony Lake, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, 18 October 1999.
2. There are numerous publications dealing with the history of Rwanda. Some of the better ones include: For a very good condensed overview, see Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996), 59–70. Also see Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999) for a comprehensive report of the events from April 1994 to November 1997.
3. James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, eds., “Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment,” *National Security, vol. II, Case Studies in US Contingency Operations* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1996), 223.
4. Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey* (New York: Viking, 1995), 16.
5. *Ibid.*, 17.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, 18–19.
8. Keane, 19.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 19–20.
11. Indeed, many of Army’s senior leaders were Tutsi.

12. Keane, 19–20.
13. Ibid., 21.
14. Ibid.
15. Akazu translates to “Little Hut.”
16. Keane, 23.
17. Ibid.
18. United Nations Department of Information, “*The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*,” (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12.
19. Keane, 23.
20. Glynne Evans, *Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes* (Trowbridge, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23.
21. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 12.
22. Ibid., 14.
23. Keane, 22.
24. Ibid., 22–24.
25. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Keane, 26. Negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda continued. As part of the Arusha accords, Tutsi representatives in Kigali were supported by a battalion of fully armed RPF soldiers.
28. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 24.
29. Ibid.
30. Keane, 36.
31. Ibid.
32. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27.
33. Romeo Dallaire and Bruce Pullin, “Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3, spring 1995, 7.
34. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27–28.
35. Ibid., 24.
36. Dallaire and Pullin, 8.
37. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29–30.
38. Ibid., 31.
39. Ibid., 32.
40. Ibid., 32.
41. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 33.
42. Ibid., 37.
43. Ibid.
44. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 36.
45. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 35. The specific national contributions to UNAMIR were: Austria, 15 soldiers, Bangladesh, 942 soldiers, Belgium, 440 soldiers, Botswana, 9 soldiers, Brazil, 13 soldiers, Canada, 2 soldiers, Congo, 26 soldiers, Egypt, 10 soldiers, Fiji, 1 soldier, Ghana, 843 soldiers, Hungary, 4 soldiers, Malawi, 5 soldiers, Netherlands, 9 soldiers, Nigeria, 15 soldiers, Poland, 5 soldiers, Romania, 5 soldiers, The Russian Federation, 1 soldier, Senegal, 35 soldiers, Slovakia, 5 soldiers, Togo, 15 soldiers, Tunisia, 61 soldiers, Uruguay, 25 soldiers, and Zimbabwe, 29 soldiers.
46. Keane, 27; Prunier 221
47. Discussion with Professor Howard Adleman, University of Toronto,
48. Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia Press, 1995), 221–224.
49. Keane, 29.
50. Prunier, 230–231.
51. Assemble Nationale, Mission d’information commune, *Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise 1900–1994* (Brussels: Assemble Nationale, 1998), 138–139.
52. The Interahamwe were lightly armed and largely ill disciplined militia units established by the Rwandan government. At the commencement of the genocide they were called to service and carried out a great deal of the killing.
53. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 14, 737.
54. Interview 6 July 2000 with CDR. Douglas Hancher, former EUCOM J-5 Action Officer and EUCOM Crisis Action Team watchstander, 1994–1996.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. Most of the five involved Bosnia-related operations.

57. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 38.
58. *Ibid.*, 39.
59. John A Berry and Carol Pot Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1999), xxii.
60. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 40.
61. Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 3.
62. Prunier, 270–271.
63. Lake Interview, 18 October 1999; *Assemblée Nationale*, 532.
64. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 15, 752.
65. *Ibid.*, 771 - 72.
66. Yael S. Aronoff, “An Apology Is Not Enough: What will happen in the next case of genocide?”, *Washington Post*, 9 April, 1998, A25.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Interview with Mr. Richard McCall, former USAID Chief of Staff and USAID representative to the Rwanda IWG, 11 July 2000.
69. Miskel and Norton, 227.
70. McCall interview.
71. Nightline, 19. The member was identified as Tony Marley, U.S State Department Military Advisor, 1992–1995.); McCall interview.
72. Alison Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 624.
73. McCall Interview.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Des Forges, 605.
76. *Ibid.*, 623.
77. Feil, 8.
78. ABC News *Dateline* Transcript #1710, “The Triumph of Evil,” air date 26 January 1999. This statement was confirmed by Karel Korvanda of the Czech Republic on the same show.
79. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 41.
80. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 43–44.
81. Feil, 30.
82. Dallaire and Pullin, 9.
83. Feil., 16.
84. Feil, 15.
85. McCall Interview.
86. *Nightline*, 17.
87. Lake interview, Interview with Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Assistant to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former ambassador to Somalia, 6 June 2000; Interview with Mr. George Taft, Attorney, U.S. Department of State, Office of Legal Affairs/Africa, 5 April 2000.
88. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 45.
89. *Ibid.*
90. Des Forges, 639.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, No. 18, 984.
93. McCall interview.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 984.
97. McCall interview.
98. Bogosian interview.
99. McCall interview.
100. Miskel and Norton, 227.
101. Aronoff, A25; McCall interview.
102. Des Forges, 624–625.
103. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 974.
104. Adelman and Suhrke, 211.
105. A review of stories in major newspapers for the period January through August reveals that Bosnia and Haiti stories outnumbered stories on Rwanda by nearly two to one. When only United States papers are examined the ratio is even higher.
106. Ambassador Albright testimony, 5 May 1994, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations for 1995, Part 4: Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives One Hundred Third Congress Second Session,”

- (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 547–622.
107. Bogosian interview.
 108. Des Forges, 625.
 109. Albright testimony,
 110. *Ibid.*,
 111. *Ibid.*
 112. ABC News “This Week,” trans., air date: 10 July 2000, 4-5.
 113. *Ibid.*
 114. McCall interview.
 115. Federal News Service Transcript, “Briefing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” May 2, 1994, 3.
 116. *Ibid.*
 117. Adelmand and Suhrke, 218.
 118. Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 978.
 119. “The Crisis in Rwanda: Hearing Before the Subcommittee In Africa Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, May 4, 1994” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 1.
 120. *Ibid.*, 4.
 121. *Ibid.*, 12.
 122. *Ibid.*
 123. “Crisis In Rwanda,” 44.
 124. *Ibid.*, 50–54.
 125. Testimony of Senator Paul Simon, *Congressional Record*, 103rd Congress 2nd Session, 140 Con Rec S10941, Vol. 140, Nr. 8, S10941, 8 August 1994.
 126. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 46.
 127. Paul Lewis, “U.S. Examines Way To Assist Rwanda Without Troops,” *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, 1.
 128. Ralph Begleiter, “Albright Says U.S. Action Possible in Haiti,” *Cable Network News*, 2 May 1994, Transcript #600-3,
 129. “Many countries ‘reluctant’ to send peace-keepers,” *The Vancouver Sun*, 3 May 1994, A4.
 130. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 51.
 131. “Aid group on Rwanda: It’s ‘genocide’ on a horrific scale; Kigali battered by heavy shelling as fighting surges,” *The Gazette* (Montreal), 4 May 1994, A10.
 132. *Frontline* transcript, 4.
 133. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29.
 134. *Frontline* transcript, 8-9.
 135. *Ibid.*
 136. Paul Lewis, “UN Chief Seeks and African Peace Force for Rwanda,” *New York Times*, 2 May 2000, A3.
 137. Keane, 123–124.
 138. Bogosian interview; interview with Dr. Ronald Senyokoff, Country (Rwanda) Program Officer, Office of Food for Peace, U.S. Agency for International Development, 5 July 2000.
 139. Aronoff, A25.
 140. *Ibid.*; Keane, 124; Prunier 275.
 141. McCall interview. McCall pointed out that such questions were not unique, but rather common when dealing with the United States military. “It’s been my experience that when you work with the military you have to be very precise about what is you want or they will keep coming back to you with questions.”
 142. “Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda,” *New York Times*, 15 June 1994, A24.
 143. Hancher interview. There were other aspects of the APC transfer that escaped the attention of the press. The requirement for transfer essentially required the APCs to be delivered “as is.” No spare parts, support packages or training were to be provided with the vehicles. Perhaps not surprising, less than half the APCs were reported to remain functional within three months of delivery and none within two years.
 144. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 48.
 145. *Ibid.*, 120.
 146. *Ibid.*, 49.
 147. *Ibid.* 50.
 148. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 20, 1161.
 149. *Ibid.*, No. 21, 1171.
 150. *Ibid.*, No. 23, 1252.
 151. *Ibid.*

152. U.N., 52.
153. Ibid., 53.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54.
157. McCall interview.
158. Ibid.
159. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54. Ten Council members voted for the action, none voted against. Brazil, China, New Zealand, Pakistan and Nigeria abstained.
160. Ibid.
161. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, No. 26, 1365.
162. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by “statistical” relief.
163. McCall interview
164. Ibid.; Lake interview. McCall stated that the decision to not intervene more directly was made by the president. Lake has only said that he wanted to “do something.”
165. McCall interview.
166. Ibid.; Adelmand and Suhrke, 221–227.
167. Hancher interview, 6 July 2000.
168. Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, “Soldiers To The Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda,” (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), 15, 111; Hancher interview. In EUCOM, it was only half-jokingly said that the appearance of CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour usually presaged an impending operation. Informally referred to as “the Death Angel” Amanpour always seemed to be where the most compelling stories were to be found.
169. McCall interview.
170. Lake interview
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.; Bogosian interview.
173. Des Forges, 170.
174. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 55.
175. Initially Operation Tourquoise was carried out by French and Senegalese troops. Forces from Chad, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Niger later joined them. Minear and Guillot, 96.
176. Ibid., 56.
177. Des Forges, 670.
178. Ibid.
179. Miskel and Norton, 226.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid., 228.
182. Ibid.
183. Berry and Berry, eds., 151.
184. McCall interview. Although there was a sense that a United States deployment of troops was inevitable the Atwood meeting “clinched” the decision. As a result of this meeting, the president would increasingly look upon Atwood as a personal “asset.”
185. Hancher interview.
186. U.N., 57.
187. Ibid., 121.
188. Ibid., 74.
189. Ibid., 120.
190. McCall interview; interview with Admiral David Jeremiah, former vice-chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
191. *Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, No. 29, 1533.
192. Ibid., 229.
193. Jeremiah interview.
194. Ibid.
195. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, No. 29, 1533.
196. Ibid., 1535.
197. Hancher interview.
198. McCall interview.
199. Minear and Guillot, 112.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.



The Establishment of the Office of Homeland Security

JAMES F. MISKEL

Commander, I know you are new to the job, but our approach to orientation and staff development is baptism by fire. You are about to be immersed in holy water,” Assistant Secretary Arthur Balfour announced with a smile.

It was, indeed, Commander David L. George’s third day on the job at the office of the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs. He hoped that Secretary Balfour’s smile meant that he had a good sense of humor, not that he enjoyed watching new staff squirm.

“Congress is in recess right now, but before they left town several legislative proposals were introduced that would force the president to take a different approach to homeland security. The White House wants the secretary’s evaluation of the proposals before Congress returns from recess in two weeks. The secretary expects us to do the homework. Your piece of the pie will be to review the decision that the president made in his 8 October 2001 executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security. We need a succinct background paper on the considerations and factors that went into the 8 October decision. That will be your job. Some others on the staff will be analyzing the proposals that Congress is considering.

“You’ll probably be able to get much of the information you need from the internet and from interviews with folks who were involved at the time in the decision. Here’s a folder with some helpful websites and points of contacts. A useful starting point might be the transcript of the White House press briefing on 5 October and the 8 October executive order. Both documents are in the folder. I would like your background paper in a week.”

Back at his desk, George quickly scanned the 5 October press briefing transcript and located the pertinent section which read:

QUESTION: Ari, [referring to Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary] there are people on the Hill who want to give Governor Ridge—if he’s still governor—more authority by making the position a confirmable position. Why would the White House oppose something like that?

MR. FLEISCHER: The president just doesn’t see the need for it. It’s just not necessary. The office can get up and running, and will be on Monday, without needing to take that step. Now, Governor Ridge will be a member of the Cabinet and will play a very valuable role in coordinating the various agencies that have been involved in the fight against

terrorism. And it's just not necessary. Similar to the National Security Council (NSC). Dr. Rice has done a very good job, of course, for this country. She's not Senate-confirmed. It is not a necessary prerequisite for a government official to do a good job on behalf of the president and on behalf of the war against terrorism. There is no need for it.

QUESTION: If I can just follow on that, specifically, should Governor Ridge have the power to have control over the spending on terrorism in other agencies' budgets, there's also — that's part of the proposal on the Hill.

MR. FLEISCHER: At the time that the office is formally put in place next week—and I'll get to this in the week ahead—you will receive information about the office and you'll hear more at that time next week. So that will be addressed in time.

QUESTION: Can I follow on that, Ari? The president has to issue some type of executive order though, right, setting up the office and outlining Ridge's responsibilities?

MR. FLEISCHER: As I indicated, there will be additional information forthcoming at the time that the office begins next week.¹

George knew that the executive order was, in fact, issued on 8 October 2001 the Monday after Fleischer's press briefing. As a first step he decided to check with a lawyer buddy to find out exactly what an executive order was. After a quick telephone discussion, he learned that executive orders are "official documents, numbered consecutively, through which the president of the United States manages the operations of the federal government." He also learned that thousands of executive orders have been issued by presidents and that the *Federal Register* has been publishing them since at least the 1930s.² Most of the executive orders that his lawyer buddy was familiar with established organizational structures inside the executive branch and/or dealt with the formal delegation of presidential responsibilities to federal departments and agencies. In other words, there was nothing unusual in using the vehicle of an executive order to establish the Office of Homeland Security.

As he read the executive order, the most pertinent sections seemed to be as follows:

By the authority vested in me as president by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. I hereby establish within the Executive Office of the President an Office of Homeland Security (the "Office") to be headed by the assistant to the president for Homeland Security. . . .

Sec. 2. Mission. The mission of the Office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission, including the functions specified in section 3 of this order. . . .

Sec. 3. Functions. The functions of the Office shall be to coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. . .

Sec. 5. Establishment of Homeland Security Council.

(a) I hereby establish a Homeland Security Council (the "Council"), which shall be responsible for advising and assisting the president with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The Council shall serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

(b) The Council shall have as its members the president, the vice president, the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of defense, the attorney general, the secretary of health and human services, the secretary of transportation, the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the director of Central Intelligence, the assistant to the president for homeland security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the president may from time to time designate. The chief of staff, the chief of staff to the vice president, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the counsel to the president, and the director of the Office of Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. The secretary of state, the secretary of agriculture, the secretary of the interior, the secretary of energy, the secretary of labor, the secretary of commerce, the secretary of veterans affairs, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and the assistant to the president for domestic policy shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior officials shall be invited to attend Council meetings when appropriate.

Sec. 7. Continuing Authorities. This order does not alter the existing authorities of United States Government departments and agencies. All executive departments and agencies are directed to assist the Council and the assistant to the president for homeland security in carrying out the purposes of this order. . . .³

After this telephone call with the lawyer, Commander George went to a meeting that Assistant Secretary Balfour had scheduled for him. The meeting was with Robert Walpole who had worked in the White House as a political adviser during the Clinton administration and who was currently the head of the Washington office of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The Center is a think tank that has been doing research on counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues. Walpole started the discussion by briefly reviewing the steps that had been taken during the Clinton administration on homeland security and counter-terrorism.

According to Walpole, "During the second term of the Clinton administration spending on counter-terrorism was sharply increased. The counter-terrorism budget was \$6 billion for 1998; the last Clinton budget was for 2001 and it allocated more than \$10 billion for counter-terrorism. That's a hefty increase of more than fifty percent in just three years. Not

only that, the Clinton administration ran the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program which identified key infrastructure nodes needing protection; and we created a “national coordinator” for security, infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism in 1998.⁴ The coordinator was a member of the NSC staff—so it was a high profile position.

“The Clinton administration also established an interagency National Domestic Preparedness Office at the Justice Department to improve counter-terrorism coordination among the various federal agencies and between the states and the federal government. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were the lead agencies. FEMA had the lead for the consequence management—dealing with the aftermath of an attack. The general approach in consequence management paralleled FEMA’s approach to disaster relief—states and local governments are the first responders, federal agencies supplement the state response. The FBI had the lead for crisis management and law enforcement—stopping and catching terrorists. As you know, the Defense Department has roles to play in both the crisis management and consequence management functions.

“During the last couple of years of the Clinton administration there was some talk about creating a new Cabinet-level department for homeland security or counter-terrorism, but no one took it all that seriously. Frankly, it was just one of those many ideas that get batted around in Washington. Like many of them, this one never really got any momentum behind it until the terrible attacks on 11 September 2001. By then, of course, the Clinton team was out of office.”

According to Walpole, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies did a study of department and agency budget proposals for counter-terrorism. They found the following breakdown of funding to combat terrorism. The table excluded the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁵

“Mr. Walpole, your table lists some agencies that I am not very familiar with, “George confessed. “What is the General Services Administration (GSA) and why are they and the Social Security Administration (SSA) asking for so much money for counter-terrorism? And why is the FEMA budget so small? I thought FEMA had a major role.”

Walpole replied, “Commander, GSA is the agency that leases and

Department/Agency Budget Proposals	
	<u>FY 2001</u>
State Department	1,300
Justice Department	940
Energy Department	754
Treasury Department	475
Health and Human Services Department . . .	387
Transportation Department.	365
General Services Administration	113
Social Security Administration	71
Agriculture Department	59
Commerce.	55
Federal Emergency Management Agency . . .	35
Commerce Department.	34
Interior Department	10
(Note: Amounts expressed in millions of dollars.)	

oversees most federal office buildings. Most of the money that GSA requested is to improve physical security at federal facilities, like many of the office buildings in the District of Columbia. Now \$113 million may sound like a lot of money, but it really isn't all that much money in comparison to things like the costs of a single destroyer which, as I understand it, costs more than \$400 million. As to SSA, they run the largest federal benefits programs, their computers keep a record of the social security tax payments that most workers make throughout the course of their careers and records of the retirement benefits that workers get after they stop working. SSA generates billions of dollars in retirement benefit checks each month; imagine the effect on the economy if the SSA systems crashed! In fact, SSA's computers are part of our critical financial infrastructure and it costs money to protect them. The FEMA budget is for things like planning, training, exercises and technical assistance to state and local governments. Remember this budget does not cover things like managing the consequences of a WMD incident or a terrorist attack like the one that occurred on 11 September."

Walpole continued, "Commander George, you haven't asked this question directly, but I infer from your remarks that you are surprised there are so many agencies that have pieces of the counter-terrorism/homeland security action. We at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies agree. . . but we are not sure what the president and Congress should do about it. The RAND Corporation, another think tank and one that does a lot of business for the Defense Department, has concluded that the federal agencies and programs devoted to counter-terrorism remain, and I am quoting here, 'pitifully fragmented and uncoordinated, with overlapping responsibilities but no clear focus.'⁶ RAND argued that what we need now is a comprehensive effort to knit together more tightly, with greater organizational guidance, the federal agencies and programs. Again we agree, but how?

"By the way, RAND provided the staff support to the *Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*.⁷ This was the so-called Gilmore Commission that was established by Congress in 1999 to appraise our capabilities to respond to terrorism. It was called the Gilmore commission because it was chaired by the Republican Governor of Virginia, James Gilmore. So the RAND folks are connected and have expert knowledge in this area."

After the meeting with Walpole, George went back to his office at the Pentagon to catch up on his daily emails, organize his notes and prepare for his next few meetings with the other points of contact that Assistant Secretary Balfour had recommended. One was Roberta Peel, a division director at the Office of Management and Budget; the second was Clement Atlee, a Republican member of the staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. The third was William Gladstone, a staffer at FEMA who had recently retired from the Army and had signed onto work on disaster relief programs. The fourth meeting was to be with Edward Health, a policy specialist at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. The meeting with Atlee was first.

Because Atlee was a Republican, George had expected him to toe the White House line with respect to President Bush's approach to the Office of Homeland Security. He was surprised to learn that Atlee was not enthusiastic about the president's decision. Atlee made it clear that at least some Republicans on Capitol Hill believed that a better approach would have been to establish a homeland security agency at the Cabinet level.

Atlee said, "The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has oversight over the organization and reorganization of the executive branch of government. It is chaired by Senator Lieberman of Connecticut. As you know, he was the Democratic nominee for vice president in the last election and is a figure of national prominence. The Democrats have a 9 to 8 majority on the Committee and the majority of the Committee staff is Democratic.

"Senator Lieberman has held Committee hearings on the question of how the government should organize to combat terrorism. On 21 September—more than two weeks before the president issued his executive order, Lieberman called for the establishment of a National Homeland Security Agency which would be a Cabinet agency and would consolidate under one roof many of the counter-terrorism functions of the federal government.⁸ On 11 October only three days after the executive order, Lieberman and Republican Senator Arlen Specter from Pennsylvania introduced a bill that would establish a Department of Homeland Security⁹—so obviously they had been working on this before the executive order was signed and the White House knew that the legislation was going to be introduced.

Atlee continued, "Even before Lieberman and Specter introduced their bill, Senator Graham and several other senators introduced *S. 1499* which would set up a National Office for Combatting Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, but with a couple of twists. The head of the office would be subject to confirmation by the Senate and would be responsible for developing a single budget for all federal counter-terrorism functions.¹⁰ By the way, Senator Graham met with Condoleeza Rice, the national security adviser on 25 September 2001 to try to get the administration's support for making the head of the new office subject to Senate confirmation and to give the office control over the anti-terrorism budgets of the federal departments and agencies.¹¹

"Senator Graham is a Democrat from Florida and he chairs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. So he is a big fish. The co-sponsors for *S. 1499* were Senators Feinstein (D-CA), Bayh (D-IN), Mikulski (D-MD), Durbin (D-IL), Nelson (D-FL), and Rockefeller (D-WV). In other words, *S. 1499* is a partisan bill, but that does not mean that Graham's ideas had then and have now no support from the Republicans in the Senate. Or in the House of Representatives for that matter.

"On 4 October 2001 several House Republicans introduced *H.R. 3026* which has essentially the same provisions as Graham's Senate bill. *H.R. 3026* gives the office a different name, but would make the director of the office subject to Senate confirmation and give him or her control over the homeland security budgets of the federal departments and agencies.¹² This legislation was sponsored by Congressman Gibbons, a Republican from Nevada and co-sponsored by two other Republicans: Lahood (R-IL) and Castle (R-DL).

Two Democrats also were co-sponsors: Congresswoman Harman (D-CA) and Congressman Roemer (D-IN).

“Not only that, there are some pending legislative proposals that were introduced before 11 September. One was *H.R. 1158* which Republican Congressman Thornberry of Texas introduced to transform FEMA into a National Homeland Security Agency which would incorporate the Coast Guard, the Customs Service and the Border Patrol. Another was *H.R. 525* which was introduced by another Republican Congressman, Gilchrest from Maryland. This legislation proposed yet another organizational approach—a White House council on domestic terrorism preparedness. The head of this council would also be subject to Senate confirmation. *H.R. 525* was co-sponsored by a number of other Republicans and Democrats in the House of Representatives.”

At this point George interrupted, “I take it that this means that many Republicans and Democrats had doubts about whether Governor Ridge was being given enough authority and power to get the job done under President Bush’s executive order. All the different legislative proposals make a point of centralizing control over department and agency budgets. I understand that. In Washington what really counts is how money is allocated. But what is all the fuss about Senate confirmation? What difference does it really make whether the director of the homeland security organization is confirmed or not?”

Atlee answered, “Good question. In terms of his getting the job done, it might not matter all that much whether Governor Ridge’s appointment is confirmed by the Senate. But there is a constitutional issue here. The Constitution says that presidential appointments as public ministers will be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Now I am an employee of the Congress, so I may be overly sensitive about this principle—but it really is more than just a fine point of law. Congress has an important role under the Constitution of overseeing the operations of the Executive Branch—the confirmation process is part of the oversight function. I think that any official with centralized control over major parts of the budgets of the federal departments and agencies ought to be subject to confirmation. That is exactly the principle that is being applied with respect to the director of the Office of Management and Budget in the White House. The OMB director controls budgets, thus the appointment of the OMB director is subject to Senate confirmation. The national security advisor does not control budgets and national security advisor appointments are not subject to the Senate’s advice and consent.

“Frankly,” Atlee wrapped up his remarks, “there may be another reason as well. Turf. Some senators might be concerned that this president already has a high number (five) of members of his Cabinet who are not subject to Senate confirmation. This includes, of course, Vice President Dick Cheney and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card. The other three are Governor Ridge, as director of the Office of Homeland Security, the U.S. trade representative and the director of national drug control policy.”

Roberta Peel was the next person that Commander George interviewed. She was a division director at OMB and was widely regarded as one of the most knowledgeable people in the federal government on the subject of budgeting and coordination of multi-agency programs in general, and for counter-terrorism in particular. George had been advised that Peel would be able to give him chapter and verse on these subjects. He also knew that OMB had the power to reject an agency's budget proposal if it regarded that proposal as inconsistent with the president's policies, or if it asked for too much or too little for particular programs. Peel's office was at the New Executive Office Building, a half a block away from the White House.

George started the discussion by asking about the press reports that he had seen which referred to 40 some odd federal agencies with responsibilities in homeland security. The chart he had reviewed with Robert Walpole had only shown 13 agencies. The Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency brought the number to 15 agencies.

Peel responded by informing him that the count depended upon whether you were talking about operating components of departments or only the parent department.

"For example," she continued, "in Department of Transportation there are at least two operating components with major homeland security responsibilities—the Federal Aviation Administration and the Coast Guard. Should this be counted as one entity, or two, or even three? Some of us believe the right number is three: two operating entities (the Coast Guard, the FAA) and one policy making entity (the secretary of transportation and his office).

"I could paint basically the same picture for each and every one of the fourteen Cabinet departments. This is important because not only is coordination between departments a challenge, it is often a challenge inside departments," Peel noted.

"Please don't think that the coordination problems are simply the result of laziness or narrow mindedness on the part of hide-bound bureaucrats, although there is obviously some of that in every large organization. A lot of the problem comes from rules and regulations that were developed in the past under guidelines from the president and Congress, or even from the courts. Sometimes these guidelines were in the form of legislation or language in congressional committee reports that often accompany legislation. Sometimes, too, standard operating procedures have evolved in response to past performance failures or fraud and waste problems. Or they have evolved in certain ways as a result of pressure from constituency groups—for example, the Customs Service needs to be concerned with the views of domestic industries that depend upon imports of components or even finished products like clothing and televisions. The tighter that Customs makes the screening process for imports, the slower trade flows. Thus, American industries have strong interests in highly efficient Customs procedures. If Customs completely ignores those interests as it formulates its regulations and standard operating procedures, industry will lobby Congress for relief and Congress might then force Customs to be more accommodating to industry."

Peel observed that, “The problem is two-fold. Sometimes the standard operating procedures pay less attention to national security than they should. Sometimes, too, the standard operating procedures and the agencies’ informal ways of doing business inadvertently cause roadblocks to interagency coordination. And then there is also interagency and inter-component competition for resources. Agencies want to look good before the White House and Congress—sometimes they try to look good by deliberately minimizing the role of others, in effect by not sharing information or not fully involving them in an operation.

“The persistence of these coordination problems is a big reason why Congress and others have been calling for a homeland security czar with real power. If you get a chance, you might want to review some of the General Accounting Office’s reports on interagency coordination or the reports of the Gilmore commission or the Hart-Rudman Commission.

Since 1997 GAO has issued at least eighteen reports on counter-terrorism and homeland security stating that the government needs to do a better job of coordinating.¹³

“And here’s another complicating factor. Homeland security is not just a federal matter—it’s a federal-state matter and most federal departments and agencies have counterparts at the state level. For example, there is only one FEMA in Washington, but there are more than fifty emergency management agencies at the state level, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc. Each state has its own Department of Transportation, Department of Health, and state police force. All of these state entities have important roles to play. Ensuring that their activities are well coordinated with the federal activities has proven to be difficult in the past. And the National Governors Association had made it clear that the Governors want to remain partners in homeland security and that they want any new federal programs to be coordinated with the relevant state agencies.¹⁴

“From my perspective as an old hand at OMB,” Peel continued, “I think that many observers and commentators have drawn an analogy between the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy—the so-called ‘drug czar’—and Governor Ridge’s job. This is essentially what former Democratic Senator Gary Hart said on the Public Broadcasting System *NewsHour* television show in late October. Hart’s views are worth reflecting upon. Hart and Warren Rudman, a former Republican senator, co-chaired the high profile U.S. Commission on National Security, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, that in early 2001 issued a call for greater attention to the terrorism threat and for the creation of a homeland security department. On television, Hart said that he believes that the ‘czar’ model would not work because the drug czar never really got enough power to resolve inter-agency disputes.¹⁵

“Let me assure you, Commander George, that OMB is convinced that Governor Ridge has all the clout he will need to get the job done. I know that some folks in Congress are worried that he won’t be effective without control over department and agency budgets, but OMB has put itself at Ridge’s disposal. We built a dedicated unit to work with and for him and the Homeland Security Office. And everybody at OMB understands this is really job

one. So we will assist him in every way that we can. We will implement, give effect to his decisions, as the president ratifies them.”¹⁶

William Gladstone welcomed Commander George and quickly started describing his perception of the interagency reactions to the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security.

“I’ve worked in both the military and civilians sides of the aisle. And on both sides of the aisle I’ve worked in the interagency arena. So I think I can give you a balanced account of the interagency reactions to the president’s approach to organizing for homeland security. I’ll also share with you my views about its pros and cons.

“First of all, I think that most people would agree that the ‘czar’ model of coordination works best when the czar has a good relationship with the president and when the president really believes that the czar’s programs are genuinely high priority. The problem is, that these conditions are hard to maintain over long periods of time. Some Republican and Democratic senators have been saying that they think it is unlikely that these conditions can, indeed, be maintained. As Congressman Bereuter (R-NE) said ‘Personalities change, the cooperative thrust of the day may be reduced and the old barriers may return’.¹⁷ Senator Specter (R-PA) said ‘As a practical matter, it is impossible for Governor Ridge to go to the president every time there is a turf battle.’¹⁸ Senator Schumer (D-NY) said that while Ridge’s ‘power would be enormous in the first six months, it would eventually fade’ under the czar model.¹⁹

“I think the history of FEMA bears these concerns out. FEMA is in some respects in a position similar to the position of the Office of Homeland Security. Both are small agencies with important missions (FEMA’s is disaster relief) that can only be carried out through coordination with other, larger and more powerful departments. When the FEMA director had a good relationship with the White House during the Clinton administration and the administration treated disaster relief as a high priority, the interagency system worked pretty well. During the Reagan and first Bush administrations, FEMA was not well connected to the White House and the interagency system functioned less successfully, witness the bad press that FEMA got during Hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and Andrew in 1991.

“The issue for FEMA, as it will be for the Office of Homeland Security, is getting other agencies to invest quality time and resources in missions that are really not their primary mission. FEMA’s main charge is disaster relief, but it has to rely upon agencies like the Defense Department and the Department of Health and Human Services to help it actually help disaster victims—but the Defense Department and the Department of Health and Human Services obviously have other high priority missions. In fact, there are twenty-eight different federal departments and agencies and the Red Cross that FEMA coordinates with during disasters.”

Commander George interjected a question about the kinds of problems that occur in interagency coordination. Gladstone referred to an article that was published in the *Washington Post* in December 2001 and cited a few examples to George.

“According to the *Post* article, the Treasury Department opposed funding for a National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center that the Clinton White House wanted to set up. Treasury also refused to monitor money transfers that took place outside the traditional banking system—even though the NSC staff was pushing for it.”²⁰

“Why?” George asked.

“I think it was because the Treasury Department saw these activities as drawing resources away from other programs that were more important—more important at least from the traditional Treasury Department view of the world. Here’s another example, experts in the terrorism field knew that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were important sources of radical fundamentalism, but the State Department always had more important fish to fry than these two countries and the Energy Department was probably not too enthusiastic about actions that might rock the boat relative to oil production and oil prices in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, according to the *Washington Post*, the FBI was prevented by the Justice Department from opening some criminal cases against groups that were suspected of raising funds in the United States to support terrorists because of concerns about ‘profiling’ Islamic groups.”²¹ *Time* magazine ran a story in October with similar incidents of poor coordination between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service, between the FBI and the federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau, and between FEMA and the FBI.²²

Now I can not swear that the *Washington Post* and *Time* have the facts exactly right, but I am sure that these are typical of the kind of disconnects that caused the president to establish the Office of Homeland Security.

“Did you know that the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the CIA, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Agriculture Department and the Federal Aviation Administration all have different databases with information that would be useful in controlling the borders? I read in the paper that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, itself, has more than fifteen different databases. The intelligence agencies are wary about sharing their databases with other agencies out of fear that classified material will be compromised. Not only that each agency collects different data or formats the data differently—this makes exchanging data more difficult.”²³

“Don’t problems like these argue for consolidating all homeland security functions under a single executive department, instead of relying upon a coordinator in the White House?” Commander George wondered.

“That is what some people think,” Gladstone answered. “But there is another side to the story. Let me give you the other side of the story through a couple of examples. The

Environmental Protection Agency works with hazardous materials on a daily basis. When there is an accidental spill, or someone discovers industrial steel drums buried in a field somewhere, or local authorities discover toxic materials in a factory that was closed five years ago EPA gets involved. The very same hazardous material, or HAZMAT, teams that EPA sends to those sites could have an important contribution to make during a chemical attack, but incorporating them into a homeland security agency might compromise EPA's ability to do its normal job. If the teams were transferred to a homeland security agency, then a different coordination problem would be created. A homeland security agency will never do as good a job of keeping up with the science and meeting 'normal' HAZMAT requirements than the EPA.

Gladstone continued. "The Department of Health and Human Services is another example. Its National Institutes of Health do important research into vaccines. These vaccines could be an important response to a biological threat, but the Institutes are probably better off science-wise where they are, than if they were folded into a homeland security agency.²⁴ Another example is the Coast Guard in the Department of Transportation. They work on maritime safety issues, as well as homeland security, and their maritime safety programs are popular with the public and Congress. If the Coast Guard were rolled into a homeland security department, would maritime safety? In fact, Coast Guard is already being stretched thin trying to do both homeland security and maritime safety²⁵—shifting it to a new department would not solve that problem."

Edward Heath greeted Commander George at the door of his cramped office in the Old Executive Office Building and, after apologizing for the profusion of papers and periodicals on the desk and chairs, suggested that it would be a good idea to discuss how the Office of National Drug Control Policy viewed the organizational issue.

"We here at this office think there really was no good alternative to going with the 'czar' approach at least for the time being. My old boss, General McCaffrey—the former 'drug czar'—said as much in congressional testimony. He made the excellent point that now is not the right time to be shifting functions and transferring people. There is a war to fight now and our energies are best spent fighting that war and on improving our domestic preparedness. Reorganization, if it proves necessary, can come later."²⁶

"By the way, Commander George, my sense is that the media tends to agree with our assessment. There has obviously been lots of media coverage about homeland security since the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The anthrax scare, airline security, the general alerts that Governor Ridge has issued and the actions taken by certain Governors when they received information about threats to the infrastructure of their states have, of course, kept homeland security on the front burner. At some point the press may become critical, but so far they seem positive about the steps that the administration has taken.

“There was an article published in the *Boston Globe* a few days after the president announced his plan to appoint Governor Ridge that, I think, typifies the congressional reaction and, in so doing, may provide another reason why the press has been generally supportive. The article noted that many lawmakers are skeptical that the president’s approach will work, but they are willing to give it a chance.²⁷ As you know, the press loves to cover a fight. As long as Congress isn’t pushing too hard and there are no major coordination failures, the press is likely to be supportive of the president’s approach to organizing for homeland security.

“Another factor is the president’s very high approval ratings. In September and October 2001, the polls clearly indicated that the public was rallying behind the president. A *Gallup Poll* showed that his approval ratings jumped after the attack.²⁸ A *Time* magazine/CNN poll on 8 October indicated that his approval rate was 84%.²⁹

“Given the facts that it is wartime, that the Congress has not been too critical, and the fact that the president has very high public approval ratings, it is entirely understandable that the media has—so far—been relatively quiescent with respect to the Office of Homeland Security.”

“While we are on the subjects of public opinion and the media, do you think there is any significance to the fact that the executive order creating the Office of Homeland Security was signed on the same day that the bombing campaign began in Afghanistan?” Commander George inquired.

Heath responded by reminding George that the president had announced his plans in an address before Congress on 20 September and that there were no surprises in the executive order. Everyone knew what to expect. Thus he felt that there was no particular significance to the date of the executive order, beyond the fact that because they are legal documents executive orders go through exhaustive legal reviews and those reviews take time.

As he started thinking about the background paper that he owed to Secretary Balfour, Commander George found himself thinking about the structure of the government, the complexity of the interagency community, and the size of the challenge facing Governor Ridge.

BIOGRAPHY OF GOVERNOR TOM RIDGE

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

On 8 October 2001, Tom Ridge was sworn in as the first director of the Office of Homeland Security in the history of the United States of America. In the words of President George W. Bush, he had the strength, experience, personal commitment and authority to accomplish this critical mission.

The president established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, following the tragic events of 11 September 2001. His charge to the nation's new director of homeland security was to develop and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to strengthen protections against terrorist threats or attacks in the United States.

Ridge was twice elected Governor of Pennsylvania, serving from 1995 to 2001. He kept his promise to make Pennsylvania "a leader among states and a competitor among nations." Governor Ridge's aggressive technology strategy helped fuel the state's advances in the priority areas of economic development, education, health and the environment.

The Governor Ridge cut taxes every year he was in office. To ensure Pennsylvania was home to the jobs of the future, the Governor created industry-led Greenhouse initiatives in advanced computing technologies and the life sciences.

He signed into law the Education Empowerment Act, to help more than a quarter-million children in Pennsylvania's lowest-performing schools. His education technology initiatives brought anytime, anywhere learning to Pennsylvanians from pre-school to adult education.

During his years in the Governor's office the number of children receiving free or low-cost health care through Pennsylvania's nationally recognized Children's Health Insurance Program increased by 145 percent increase.

Born 26 August 1945, in Pittsburgh's Steel Valley, Gov. Ridge was raised in a working class family in veterans' public housing in Erie. He earned a scholarship to Harvard, graduating with honors in 1967. After his first year at The Dickinson School of Law, he was drafted into the U.S. Army, where he served as an infantry staff sergeant in Vietnam, earning the Bronze Star for Valor. After returning to Pennsylvania, he earned his law degree and was in private practice before becoming assistant district attorney in Erie County. He was elected to Congress in 1982. He was the first enlisted Vietnam combat veteran elected to the U.S. House, and was overwhelmingly re-elected six times.

(Excerpted from Office of Homeland Security Website, available at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ridgebio.html>>, [accessed: 21 December 2001].)

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Part Two:

Leading Implementation of Change



Forward...to the Shipyard: The Case of the USS *Nimitz*

RICHARD J. NORTON

Commander (Captain - Select) Hank Morgan, USN smiled as he watched the last F/A-18 of the evening launch go screaming off the starboard catapult and gracefully bank into the sunset. Hank knew what the pilot was feeling. As an F-14 pilot, (call sign "Cutlass") Hank had launched hundreds of times. As executive officer of the carrier *Nimitz*, he took a special pleasure in that it was his ship doing the launching. He took one last look before heading for his cabin. *Nimitz* and her escorts were three months into an around the world deployment and smack in the middle of the Persian Gulf. They had been sent here in a hurry, actually canceling a scheduled visit to Singapore to speed up their arrival. They had been here ever since and were now waiting for the *George Washington* to join them. Once *GW* was on station, it would at least be possible to arrange some port calls. It was late December 1998 and life in the Gulf was getting to be more than a little boring.

Hank felt a small familiar pang that meant he was missing the cockpit. He loved being a fighter pilot, but he loved carrier duty as well. Which was just as well as he had spent his career flying, teaching others to fly, or running flight operations on carriers. He was honest enough to admit that he wanted to command a carrier of his own, and if the Navy offered him an admiral's job one day he would not say no. He also knew he had a chance. There were no guarantees that he would get command of his own carrier, much less flag rank, but if people bet on such things, Hank's odds would be very good indeed. Hank didn't dwell on the issue, but he was aware of it. His promotion to captain was ten months away and he had more immediate things to be concerned with.

Hank automatically noted the cleanliness of the various passageways he walked through on the way to his quarters. *Nimitz* had the reputation for being the cleanest carrier in the fleet and it was justified. Every day the crew devoted an hour to sweeping, polishing and mopping. As XO, he was the person responsible for ship's cleanliness and keeping something the size of *Nimitz* spotless took a huge chunk of his time. The payoff was worth the effort. *Nimitz* personnel had visited other carriers and always reported that *Nimitz* was cleaner. It was now a point of pride among his crew.

But then morale on the *Nimitz* was high in general, Hank thought, as he opened his door and switched on the light. Many crewmembers had extended their tour of duty so as to be able to make the around the world cruise. Hank was a little bothered that individual sailors tended to identify more heavily with their departments than the carrier as a whole, but on the plus side every department exhibited a deep pride in their capabilities and skills.

When *Nimitz* had deployed into the Persian Gulf, the chance of going into combat had only increased morale. There had been a real feeling of excitement in the Operations Department and the air wing as planning for potential strike operations got underway. But that had been a month or more ago. Morale was still good, but the crew was ready for a port call. After all the “hurry up” nature of their initial tasking, the time in the Gulf had been anti-climatic. At first combat operations seemed imminent. Now, things seemed more like a drill.

Nimitz was a monster. Bigger than any other type of warship afloat, her crew consisted of 3,000 officers and men, assigned to sixteen departments. The air wing added an additional 2,800 sailors and eight squadrons of various aircraft. Her job was power projection and Hank was sure no carrier did it better.

Which was just as well. Rear Admiral Bonnet, commanding the *Nimitz* battle group, was a fierce operator and a natural warrior. In previous tours he had been both *Nimitz*’s XO and CO. He still loved the ship and used it as his principal “prop” in entertaining distinguished visitors (DVs). Of those there was no shortage, and it was Hank’s personal job to be sure those visits went off without a hitch. The admiral and the CO had made that clear. Making it work took up a lot of his time as there were always DVs coming or already aboard, but Hank felt the ship had it down to a science. If there was going to be shooting, Bonnet would be in his element and certain to get as much DV presence on board as possible. At the present time there were no DVs on *Nimitz*, which was good, for Hank needed the time to deal with representatives from both the Newport News shipyard and commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific (AirPac—a Pacific coast three star admiral who administratively “owned” every carrier and airplane homeported from California to Japan).

The shipyard was the reason that *Nimitz* was sailing around the world and changing homeports from Bremerton, Washington to Newport News, Virginia. Once in the Newport News shipyard, refueling and overhaul would begin. The process would take more than two years and would affect every aspect of shipboard life. Furthermore, AirPac was determined to see *Nimitz* return to the Pacific, swearing to avoid “the *Enterprise* disaster.” *Enterprise* had performed a similar port change and overhaul several years earlier. The overhaul went badly over cost and over time. As a result, convinced that the *Enterprise* overhaul had been badly mishandled, the CNO had directed AirLant (AirPac’s East Coast equivalent) to assume command of the ship in order to get it through the yards. He did and then, once the overhaul was finished, AirLant had kept the carrier. The “Big E” never returned to the West Coast. AirPac lost a major asset, had to rearrange carrier schedules and had to bear the embarrassment of having another admiral fix “his” problem. The current AirPac had publicly sworn that such a thing was not going to happen again, especially as common wisdom held that *Enterprise*’s real problem had been a lack of advance planning. The AirPac representatives and the Shipyard people were pushing hard to start the planning process now.

The reactor officer (The CVN equivalent of the “chief engineer,” the senior ranking officer in the Engineering Department.) and the engineer officer (the reactor officer’s principal assistant for non-nuclear engineering equipment, spaces, and so on) joined them in this

recommendation. The two of them had been pushing the XO about this for weeks. Captain John Rackham, the reactor officer, was a senior 0-6 surface nuke, as senior as Captain Wynne, *Nimitz's* CO and much more senior than Hank. Rackham had held 0-5 command at sea, served as a reactor officer on a different carrier and had voluntarily returned for a second tour when he failed to screen for major command. He ruled his department as if it were his kingdom. His junior officers feared his volatile temper as much or more than they respected his engineering knowledge. Commander Charles Vane, the engineer officer, had served in nothing but engineering billets since he was a junior lieutenant and knew his stuff. He and the reactor officer were natural allies, with little concern about the rest of the departments on the ship. That had been painfully obvious in Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong, although most of the ship's company had gone between the ship and the shore by using various commercial ferries and water taxis, the CO and the admiral had relied on their gig and barge (as their personal small boats are called). Luckily, the barge had worked fine, but on the first trip the gig broke down, stranding a very angry captain in the middle of the harbor. Commander Vane and Lieutenant Commander Bart Roberts, the *Nimitz's* First Lieutenant, who was in charge of the Deck Department had each immediately blamed the other's department for the breakdown. According to Roberts the engineers never gave proper attention to the boat engines. Vane had shot back that the Deck Department sailors simply did not know what they were doing and broke the boat. The wrath of the CO ensured that the repairs were quickly made, but the argument continued. Hank also knew the fix was temporary. The boat might work, but the cooperation was still broken. If they were this antagonistic now, Hank wondered, what would they be like in the shipyard?

The issue with the boats was but one of a dozen or more arguments relating to turf. All the departments were ferociously protective of their areas of responsibility and quick to perceive encroachment on "their" terrain. The most recent battle had occurred when the Information Department had become involved with the Combat Systems Department in a rather nasty fight over an electronics lab. Hank had ruled in favor of Combat Systems. The *Nimitz's* combat systems officer was CDR Anne Bonny, who was also the ship's first woman department head. But that had nothing to do with why her department got the lab space. The Information Department didn't need it and Combat Systems did.

Hank thought that gender integration seemed to be working. In addition to Bonny, three other department heads were women, as were at least six hundred of the crew. While there had been some disciplinary infractions, they had not been too serious. Punishment had been swift and consistent. Sure there was still the rare complaint about minor things like a swimsuit calendar but these were easily dealt with. Other than Lieutenant Commander Mary Read, the second senior chaplain, no one seemed to have any problems with the change. If you listened to her, the chaplain corps discriminated against women, sexism was rampant on *Nimitz* and the CO was sitting on a time bomb. The other two chaplains, both men, disagreed.

Another thorny problem was that four of the department heads (Hank thought of them as "the barons") on *Nimitz* were senior to Hank. Although Hank tried to act as though this

didn't make a difference, it did. They and several others had already completed an XO tour. They were never openly disrespectful or dismissive, but it was clear they were not as impressed by his position as more junior department heads were. And each of them had no problem seeing the CO anytime they wanted without going through him.

But the biggest problem that Hank saw was the upcoming yard period and all its associated hassles. Some of these were going to involve personnel. Some sailors had left their families in Washington state, intending to move after the cruise was over. Other families had moved to the Norfolk area as soon as *Nimitz* pulled away from the pier. Some were already experiencing financial problems or domestic difficulties. Hank had just received an E-mail from his wife Kelly that morning. She reported that *Nimitz's* family problems were on the rise. Having a husband—no, a spouse—he corrected himself, gone on deployment was always tough. When you added the burden of trying to manage a coast to coast move it got worse.

Another yard-related problem was that a large number of sailors were going to be leaving *Nimitz* for good within three months of finishing the cruise. Losing a number of sailors was not unusual for most ships entering the yard, but it would be much worse for *Nimitz*, as so many of her crew had extended their tours of duty to make the big cruise. Shipwide, the loss would exceed 30% and in some departments it would be much higher. The Navy was not likely to put the ship's manpower needs at the top of the priority list until near the end of the yard period. By the time *Nimitz* was back at sea, , probably about two years after entering the shipyard, Hank's relief would be lucky if 10% of the crew had been aboard for one day underway.

Once in Virginia the remaining crew would rapidly be scattered all over the Newport News area. Due to all the repairs, the ship would be uninhabitable and a lot of the work would be done in shops, labs and offices that were miles apart. *Nimitz* was going to have to maintain eight geographically separated installations, not counting the married housing areas and the quarters for the more than two thousand sailors who usually lived aboard the ship all the time. If they weren't careful some *Nimitz* sailors might go months without stepping foot on the ship. Maintaining crew unity was going to be more than a little challenging. It would be worst for the young sailors reporting from boot camp. Keen, eager and terribly green, they would be looking for travel and adventure. They would find an industrial work site dominated by noise, dirt and civilians. Their ship, the pride of the Navy's striking forces, would be a stifling steel box, with massive access holes cut into its decks and sides. It was about as far away from the recruiting poster image as you could get.

The results were predictable. Most ships in this environment discovered that discipline incidents ranging from drug usage to theft to spouse abuse rose. Morale fell. Crew cohesion was often strained past the breaking point. Relations between the shipyard workers and ship's force personnel required constant attention and care. Usually these problems intensified as a ship entered the second half of a shipyard stay. The pressure of the schedule, the requirement to test re-installed and new equipment, while at the same time re-stocking the ship and preparing for sea, strained tempers to the utmost. In some cases delays in meeting

deadlines had resulted in legal action. Such pressure often led supervisors to misreport the status of their jobs and to cut corners in a variety of ways. Everyone swore that without good planning, *Nimitz* was going to be a bigger debacle than the *Enterprise*. Hank grimaced. Nuclear overhauls were planned years in advance, required tremendous allocations of budget and personnel resources and their associated milestone dates were cast in stone. Some of the work on *Nimitz* would require months of lead-time.

It was true that there were already numerous plans, plans put together by many of the shipyard shops and some specialized overhaul teams, but these had to be integrated by the ship. In addition, *Nimitz* was going to have to be completely off-loaded in only 60 days after the traditional 30-day post-deployment stand-down period. Every piece of furniture, every spare part and technical manual—in short everything that wasn't welded down was going to have to come off the ship. Sixty days should be enough time—if the off-load was properly planned. But if planning the off-load didn't start soon, the off-load wasn't going to work. If the off-load didn't work, other time-lines would slip. The domino effect could wreck any master plan before the work ever really got started.

Hank found a blank page of his notebook and drew a visual representation of his “overhaul” problem.” (See Appendix One) It seemed simple. The challenge was to take *Nimitz* from the pinnacle of operational readiness, turn it into a repair facility, get good at being a repair facility, and then two years from now, turn it into an operational warship again. The problem was that the operational and repair environments were completely different from one another.

Hank had brought the matter up with the CO earlier that morning. He was surprised by the CO's reaction. “XO, what are you thinking? This is no time to get the crew looking at shipyard issues. We've been in the Gulf for fifty-six days straight. We've gone through two false alarms where we've been ready to launch and then been stood down. I'm really worried about complacency. You get people thinking about Norfolk, and you'll just increase the chance that someone will get sloppy and maybe killed!”

Hank tried to explain about the potential long-term impact if the shipyard preparations were delayed too long, but the CO cut him off. “Look Hank, I understand why you're worried and that you're trying to do your job to your usual high standard. But, I've got a weapons system to run. Going into the shipyard is like being tied to a train track with a locomotive coming at you. It's going to run you over. You can't plan that away. I know. Remember, I was *Enterprise's* XO. We did all the planning and held all the meetings and in the end, it was still a nightmare. So, let's focus on what we can control — keeping the crew ready to take another poke at Saddam Hussein.” As Hank rose to leave, Captain Wynne motioned him back down in his seat. Frowning, he began talking. “Hold on XO. I know you've got a point.” He paused for a moment, obviously struggling with himself. “Okay, here's what we'll do. You take care of the yard preparations. After we leave the Gulf, whenever that is, I'll probably have time to get more involved. But while we're here I can't give the shipyard my personal attention. So you do it. Keep my involvement to the absolute minimum.”

Hank sighed as he headed away from the meeting. He and Captain Wynne had a good relationship. Wynne had begun his career in an ancient fighter called the F-8. He had transitioned to F-4s when the F-8 was removed from service. He had gone nuke, served as XO in *Enterprise*, had command of a large surface ship, been a senior branch chief in the Pentagon and now had *Nimitz*. Hank knew the CO was pleased with *Nimitz* and with him, although Hank had been required to find that out for himself. When he reported to *Nimitz* Hank had expected to spend some time discussing command philosophy with the CO, but the only guidance the boss gave him was short and to the point. "You keep things running, you let me keep focused on making *Nimitz* the lethal machine she is. Morale is high, the ship is clean and we have a great deployment schedule. The admiral loves us and so does AirPac. If anything changes, I'll let you know."

The CO communicated with the crew in a variety of ways. When it came to policy he used "CO-Memos." These were consecutively numbered and dealt with ship-wide issues. *CO-Memo One* explained what he wanted from the ship. *Nimitz* was going to be known for honesty and integrity, a total lack of double standards, and the highest levels of cleanliness. *Nimitz* was going to be the standard by which all carriers would be measured. Based on Hank's interaction with the ship's crew, he felt pretty sure the sailors understood the CO's views. Although his schedule was tight, the CO routinely managed to visit most of the main areas of the ship in person every so often.

The families at home were also kept informed. *Nimitz* had e-mail and a web page

Hank knew the change of homeport would have been much more difficult without the web page. Keeping the families plugged in was another way the Navy had changed. The CO liked the web page and used it to communicate with the families. Unfortunately that meant the families used it to communicate with him. He directed that every message he received had to be answered. The administrative officer was in charge of that job, but Hank was responsible for making sure it was done right.

But that wasn't so bad. Hank was comfortable with the ship's routine. The admiral was delighted with his flagship and the CO gave Hank a lot of room to do his job. Wynne was, however, inclined to jump into things at times, so much so that Hank had learned to be careful in discussing personnel and other matters, least the CO go charging off at full tilt. Hank never hid anything from the boss, but he did take some care in how information was presented. If Wynne had a weak area it was that, in Hank's opinion, he was prone to let the senior department heads cut the XO out of the loop at times. The reactor officer was the worst offender, but the ops and air boss were also guilty. When Hank called them on it, there would be apologies, assurances that it wasn't on purpose and a brief period of improvement, followed by a return to the old way of doing business — unless the CO was in a bad temper. Then the 'barons' suddenly remembered there was a chain of command. (See Appendix 2)

Coming back to the question of the shipyard, Hank was still puzzled. Wynne was said to be up for selection to flag rank. Hank knew the flag board was going to be held during the

first half of *Nimitz*'s overhaul, so if things went really sour Wynne's chances for promotion would be hurt. The CO was currently scheduled to be onboard at least a year after reaching Norfolk, so he wasn't foisting off future problems on the next guy.. Hank wondered if Wynne thought his promotion was a sure thing, and thus didn't have to worry about the overhaul. If he did believe that, whether it was true or false, it could complicate things.

Hank thought about the engineers. Captain Rackham was a pain, but for all his abrasive nature, he had consistently made telling point after telling point at their most recent meeting with AirPac's people. "XO, if we don't get a handle on this now, we will never be able to deconflict shipyard work from ship's force work. That means we'll have high-paid contractors sitting around doing nothing, or our troops will have to work nights and weekends to get our stuff done. There's also no way we'll be able to intelligently manage people going on leave and to school. You've got to get the CO looking at this. I don't care if he hates the shipyard." The AirPac rep chimed in, "I'd hate to have to report back that what happened to *Enterprise* is likely to happen to *Nimitz*." Hank recognized the implications of that statement. And, he admitted, Rackham's point was valid.

Hank also knew the CO had a valid point about focus. There was every chance of prolonged Persian Gulf operations—and possibly even of combat. Hank knew that if there was going to be shooting *Nimitz* was going to shine. But there was no guarantee that there would be shooting, and the way things were going it didn't look like there would be. He remembered similar deployments after the fall of the Shah. Carriers had spent months planning strikes, preparing to fight and maintaining a high level of combat readiness. In one cruise, Hank had been in his plane, on the catapult, ready to fly a combat operation no less than twelve times. Each time the mission had been scrubbed. That could happen again. Still, if there was a chance of combat, didn't he owe the ship, the crew, the CO, even the country, one hundred percent of his attention on fighting the ship? The current high-pitched Navy OPTEMPO was taking a toll on the carriers. There never seemed to be enough of them to meet demand. The result was a dramatic need for increased flexibility and responsiveness. It was surprising in some ways. Hank didn't remember things ever being so unsettled, even during the Cold War. Wasn't the CO simply focusing on the mission? Not that such an argument would carry any water with the powers that be if *Nimitz* wasn't ready for the shipyard.

The refueling and repair dates were simply not going to slip. As the first of her class to be refueled, *Nimitz* was going to be blazing an important pathway. It was also plain that AirPac wanted his favorite carrier back as fast as he could get it. Delay at this end could lead to huge problems on the other side of the Atlantic. And a carrier held over in the shipyard was a long way away from being a national asset. The engineers kept making that point too.

Unlike the reactor officer, the other department heads were focused on the present. A few of them did not have previous shipboard operational tours and that was a problem at times. For instance, the CO wasn't entirely sure he could rely on the combat systems officer (CSO) if it came to war. He told Hank that it was nothing personal, but Commander Bonny was a naval flight officer (NFO) who had commanded a recruiting district. On a cruiser, the CSO would be a master tactician, and given the tumultuous 90s, likely to have combat

experience. That was the type of CSO Wynne wanted, but one that was an aviator of course. Commander Bonny was clearly a competent and committed officer, but she and the Air Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD handles aircraft repair) officer were operational “unknowns.” It wasn’t such a big deal with the AIMD boss. His job was to fix things - and while combat would increase his stress levels, it wasn’t going to change the nature of his existence. The same might not be true for Combat Systems. Hank was absolutely sure the CSO would be fine but he would continue to unobtrusively pay extra attention to the combat systems department. It was another chunk of his time taken away, but it had to be done.

There was never enough time. Hank delegated everything he could, but there was still a great deal left over. He had to spend a certain amount of time both formally and informally inspecting the ship—or at least parts of it—every day. He had to handle most disciplinary matters and de-brief all officer fitness reports. Some COs kept that job to themselves, but Wynne had gladly handed this to Hank. There were daily department head meetings, berthing and messing inspections, eight o’clock reports, zone inspections, material reports, classified material handling issues, damage control, battle and engineering drills to coordinate, a slew of watch standing and functional qualification boards to oversee, preventive maintenance programs, weekly planning meeting and a host of other jobs he was required—usually by instruction or even law—to do. If the CO had been fully active in shipyard preparations, Hank still would have had a major increase in workload. Without the CO, there was no way to guess how much more time he was going to have to commit. And, Hank admitted to himself, the demands of the day were eating him alive as it was.

If the captain wasn’t focused on the shipyard, the command master chief was. Master Aviation Boatswains Mate Chief Kidd was a 28-year Navy veteran and the undisputed lord of the Chief’s Mess. He had invited Hank to the Chief’s Mess for a cup of coffee after lunch. “XO, the master chiefs and I have been talking about the yards.” Hank nodded. “We think the ship can go to eight section duty once we’re home—at least until we’re half-way through the yard period when the workload will increase.” Hank’s eyes widened. A portion of the ship’s crew was always aboard in port, twenty-four hours a day, usually in four watch sections. Usually that meant most sailors—even those with families who lived off the ship—were spending one of every four days onboard the ship for twenty four hours straight when in home port. In most ships getting to five sections was a major achievement. “Wow. How do we manage that?” The master chief pulled out a Palm Pilot and consulted some notes. “Well, the first thing we do is make sure that there is a really aggressive qualification program so that we have the numbers of trained people we need. The Training Department thinks they can make that happen if everybody cooperates. Then, we need to scour the ship to make sure everyone is assigned to a watch section. I’m going to need your help with that, because we’re going to have to go after all the “sacred cows” who claim they don’t or can’t stand watch in port. That means the doctors and the dentists, the chaplain’s assistants, the supply types, in short everyone.” Hank thought about it and slowly asked, “Will those departments go along with the idea?” “Only if we force them. But I think we can. Once we do, the quality of life for the crew will get better.” Hank promised he would sincerely think about it. If the master chief was willing to push hard on this idea, it could probably be made

to work. But Hank wasn't sure if the idea was good or not. For one thing, he thought it would further decrease the sense of command unity when in the shipyard. But eight sections would be wildly popular with the crew and their families. He resolved to discuss it further with the master chief.


The phone rang and Hank answered. It was the supply officer. Captain Worley was a perpetually optimistic man who thought *Nimitz* was more like a family than any ship he had seen. Hank teased him about wearing rose colored glasses, but understood the supply officer's point of view. First, Worley really was an optimist. He was almost unnaturally cheerful. Second, he saw himself as a resource provider and the other departments as customers. He had trained his department to act the same way and the response from the rest of the ship was positive. Finally, the department heads needed to be on the good side of the supply officer and took pains to cultivate a positive rapport. Worley had been at the shipyard meetings that day and now wanted to get on Hank's schedule to talk about some ideas he had to make things easier. Hank penciled him in for a 0930 meeting. Based on past experience, he expected most of Worley's ideas to be impractical, but not all of them would be.

Hank had one more chore to finish before he could catch a few hours sleep. He wanted to be up at 0230 to visit the Combat Direction Center and some of the other warfighting spaces. Although all indications were that the ship was combat ready, Hank wanted to reassure himself, and the early hours were times when attention was prone to slip. But now he needed to see Commander Walt Kennedy, the new assistant air ops. The billet had been empty for months and Kennedy had been scheduled to catch the ship in Singapore. He had flown in that morning with the mail and some critical parts.

"Welcome aboard! Sorry we weren't able to meet you in Singapore." Kennedy smiled, "That's okay XO. I've seen Singapore. I was afraid I was going to miss the ship and any action in the Gulf." Kennedy was a pilot, but Hank knew his experience had been in the Navy's land-based, four engine P-3 aircraft. "I see you were at Naval Air Systems Command. What did you do there?" Kennedy shrugged, "Pretty much hated life. I failed to screen for command and the shore duty environment was a bit stifling. You couldn't do anything big because no one wanted to start anything new. About the only fun thing I got to do was fix some of the command's internal distribution and communication problems." When Hank asked for more information he learned that Commander Kennedy had wound up coordinating major communications upgrades, while at the same time ensuring that no office was disrupted. "That was a tough job," Hank said. "Not really," Kennedy answered, "It was actually a neat challenge. But after shore duty I'm looking forward to working in the real Navy again. Directing the installation of computers and secure phones is nothing compared to keeping flight ops going." Hank signed the check-in sheet and sent Kennedy on his way.

Enjoying a quiet moment, Hank thought briefly about reviewing the proposed plan for next week's training but decided to catch a shower and some sleep instead.


APPENDIX 1



APPENDIX 2

Note:

1. This is a highly simplified depiction of the USS *Nimitz* chain of command as presented in the case study. Among other things, it blends operational and administrative chains of command.
2. Officers listed with an asterisk (*) are senior in rank to Hank Morgan.



Simplified Command Structure

Measuring Results at the NSA

JAMES F. MISKEL

“When I heard that I would be coming to the National Security Agency or NSA, I decided to read the book *Crypto* by Steven Levy because it had been recommended to me as an excellent study of how NSA dealt with technological trends in the 1980s and 1990s. After listening to you describe the recent reorganization at the NSA, it strikes me that we’ve come full circle. This reorganization looks a lot like the structure that the Levy book said the NSA had when it was first established under President Truman,” Captain Bill Basie (USN) observed to the briefer who had been assigned to give him and some other new employees the basic ‘This is NSA’ briefing.

Indeed, as the briefer acknowledged, when the NSA was formed in 1952 the agency had been organized into two major divisions: Communications Security and Communications Intelligence.¹

The focus of communications security or COMSEC was the protection of United States communications through the use of codes that eavesdroppers can’t break. The COMSEC function has changed considerably since then, but the challenge ultimately remains the same—insuring that classified and other important information is protected from potential adversaries, including criminals and hackers. Hence the name of the new division: Information Assurance.

Communications intelligence, or COMINT, involved eavesdropping on the communications of our adversaries and potential adversaries. Sometime between 1952 and the 1980s the term signals intelligence, or SIGINT, displaced COMINT in the national security lexicon, presumably as a result of the digitalization of communications and the development of new communications technologies like satellites and wireless phones. In any event, the name of the second of the two major NSA divisions was Signals Intelligence.

The briefer went on to explain that prior to December 2000, the NSA had been organized into five directorates. In addition to the SIGINT and COMSEC Directorates, there were directorates for Technology, Policy, Budget, and Support. It struck Captain Basie that the five-directorate structure seemed to place core competencies and support functions on a par with each other. He wondered if the new two-directorate structure reflected a judgment that too much emphasis had been placed on support functions and not enough on the principal missions. He decided to do a little research on that topic while he settled in to his new job in the office of the NSA’s chief of staff.

The position of chief of staff was itself a new fixture on the NSA organizational chart. It was located in the Office of the Director and was headed by a Navy admiral, Oscar Peterson. NSA had both civilian and military employees. The director and some other key positions were military, but most of the senior slots were civilian and most of the civilians were long-time employees of the agency.

Basie's first day on the job started with a get-acquainted meeting with Admiral Peterson. Peterson confirmed to Basie that the NSA leadership felt that the old five-division structure had dissipated the focus on the primary missions of information assurance (a.k.a. COMSEC and SIGINT).

"The NSA is facing some serious challenges that we really need to focus on. Some of those challenges are technological; some are political; some are economic," Admiral Peterson explained.²

"The technological challenges exist in both the information assurance and SIGINT realms. It is getting a lot more difficult to protect important communications and data transfer systems from information attack. Here's an example. Hackers shut down Microsoft's internet sites for five hours on January 25, 2001.³ Microsoft has extremely talented programmers and great financial incentives to protect their systems, yet hackers managed to bring them down. Imagine the damage that could be caused if someone brought down a secure Defense Department system during a crisis! Remember the so-called Love Bug virus in 2000 and all the damage it caused? We are trying to shield national security systems from these types of threats. We are also in the business of blocking attempts by other powers to read our mail—to eavesdrop on classified communications or to get access to information in secure databases."

Admiral Peterson paused to pour himself a cup of coffee and to offer Captain Basie one and then continued, "So much of our economy depends upon digitized information that we find ourselves also involved in setting standards for private sector data protection. In the old days we tried to discourage the private sector from getting into the data encryption game. For obvious reasons, NSA did not want sophisticated encryption programs to be exported to countries whose signals we were interested in intercepting. For equally obvious reasons, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supported us in the White House and in Congress. The FBI did not want criminals in the United States to have easy access to leading edge encryption programs. But the reality was that we could not keep the encryption genie in the bottle. And now that the genie is out of the bottle, it's getting a whole lot harder to interpret and analyze the stuff we collect through SIGINT.

"The government did not, much to our surprise," Admiral Peterson intoned with a hint of sarcasm, "have a monopoly on brains—cryptographers in the private sector started inventing and then selling their own solutions to data protection and their solutions were very

good. Some private sector cryptographers have even made their programs available for free by posting them in downloadable form on the internet.⁴ Then as the internet blossomed and electronic fund transfers, credit cards and automated teller machines (ATM) proliferated, corporations started to view encryption as essential to business. And the public started to see encryption as a method of ensuring their right to privacy. Encryption enabled people to withdraw cash from ATM machines, to use their credit cards to buy gasoline and groceries and to purchase books over the Internet without fear of someone stealing their credit card numbers."

"Our political challenges," the admiral continued, "are domestic and foreign. From the SIGINT perspective the end of the Cold War meant that our target set has changed dramatically. There is no Communist bloc to focus on. There instead are numerous terrorist groups, criminal organizations—like the drug cartels—and rogue states like Iraq, North Korea and the rump state of Yugoslavia under Milosevic. And then there are also states that are trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. Domestically, we are finding that Congress is a good deal less enthusiastic about our operations than it used to be. As you may know from reading the papers, NSA has been criticized in Congress for being slow to adapt to the 'brave new world' of high technology and asymmetric threats."⁵

"But enough of the background! Let me tell you about your first assignment. Implementing change in large, complex organizations like NSA is hard. It's real hard. NSA has a very strong culture that has proven to be quite resistant to change. As an agency, we depend heavily on highly talented scientists, linguists, mathematicians and others. If the people in these skill positions don't succeed in designing unbreakable codes or interpreting the encoded communications of our adversaries, we will fail as an agency and our military forces may suffer as a consequence. Yet if the skilled people don't adjust to the challenges NSA faces, the agency's ability to succeed in the future will be compromised.

"We have recently re-organized and we've taken a number of other steps that you'll need to learn about. But what differences will ultimately result?

"I subscribe to the old adage that 'you get what you measure'. I want you to do some research and give me advice about the measures we should use. Specifically, Captain Basie, I want your advice about the measures we should use to influence the performance of our people. What measures should we use to tell us whether we are succeeding in meeting the challenges that we face in information assurance and SIGINT?"

As he walked out of Admiral Peterson's office, Bill Basie decided to schedule appointments with senior staff in the information assurance and SIGINT directorates to get their ideas about measuring success and about measurements that might really influence how the agency operated and perhaps shape its culture. He also decided to learn more about the NSA front office by visiting with colleagues on the eighth floor of the agency headquarters building.

He quickly learned that the front office itself had recently been reorganized. Before December 2000 there really had been no strong Office of the Director structure. Some of the functions that had previously been performed by one of the former five-directorates had been shifted to the Office of the Director. Two examples were the functions performed by the chief financial manager and the chief information officer. The idea evidently was to allow the director to exert more control over “corporate” strategy. (Basie noticed that many of the folks he spoke with used the words “corporate” and “corporation”. The words sounded odd coming from public sector types and military officers, but he surmised that the references were meant to reinforce thinking about NSA as a corporate whole—a single body.)

Another thing he quickly learned was that there had been a rather dramatic turnover in the senior levels of the agency within the past several months. Two things had happened. First, the director had reassigned some senior managers to less lofty posts inside the agency and had obtained “early out” authority for senior executive service (SES) employees. NSA already had early out authority for government service (GS) employees. So a lot of the old hands had left or were expected to leave. The second thing was that the director had brought in outsiders from industry and academia or promoted “young turks” to fill many of the leadership slots in the new organization.

One of the key outsiders was the chief financial manager. She was a former financial officer in the software industry. She was building an NSA-wide business plan and was improving the agency’s cost accounting systems. Previously, the five directorates had formulated separate plans (annual plans about major expenditures) and the agency as a whole did not have a clear idea of how much individual support functions or cross-cutting projects actually cost. The other key outsider was Basie’s own boss, Admiral Peterson who had not had a prior tour at NSA. Together the chief of staff and the chief financial manager were imposing discipline on the way in which the agency reached decisions and formulated its investment strategy.

One of the most dramatic aspects of the investment strategy was the decision by NSA leadership to outsource the upgrading of the agency’s infrastructure—its computers and telecommunications hardware. A contractor or contractors were being hired to manage the ongoing hardware modernization effort for the entire agency—both the Information Assurance and SIGINT Directorates would be affected. It was a big-ticket project with big-ticket risks, although there were presumably risks inherent in any upgrade regardless of whether it was privatized or done in-house.

Basie’s next round of meetings were with the “number twos” in the Information Assurance and SIGINT Directorates. Julian Adderley, the second in command of the Information Assurance outfit, started the interview by recounting the dramatic changes that had taken place in commercial cryptography in the past decade and the effects they had had on NSA.

“Our culture was formed at a time when NSA was the only supplier of information and communications security services. We might even have developed a touch of arrogance and complacency during those years and believe me, those attributes are hard to shake. Because

we were the sole supplier, we got in the mode of reacting to specific customer requests, instead of pushing the envelope aggressively ourselves—educating the customer on what they might need to meet evolving threats,” Adderley confided.

“We were risk averse. Because there was no competition, we could afford to put a high premium on perfection. We did not rush to market. We took our time to make damn sure that our encryption programs and hardware were foolproof. So we invested a lot in marginal improvements. Anyone who knows the software and computer industries today knows that is not consistent with commercial practices. New technologies and new software products are introduced much more quickly today.

“In order to succeed, the Information Assurance Directorate needs to do four things extremely well. The first is to decide what we should make by ourselves and what we should buy from others. The second is to do an outstanding job on the products and services we decide to develop in-house. The third is to set standards for commercial encryption and data protection products. The fourth is to understand where the technology will head in the future.”

“The net result should be that in the future hackers won’t be able to bring down government operating systems—like they did in 1998 when nine NASA field offices were crashed.⁶ Another example of the threats we are trying to fend off involves the Defense Department’s ‘Eligible Receiver’ exercise, in June 1997, in which two individuals simulated an attack in which they got access to data that they could have manipulated in ways that would have disrupted troop movements in a crisis.⁷

At this point in the discussion, Adderley called his military aid, Commander Sarah Vaughn, to join the discussion. Commander Vaughn was working on a project designed to strengthen NSA’s relationships with industry. The relationships had been strained during the 1980s and 1990s because of NSA’s ultimately unsuccessful efforts to prevent the exportation of highly sophisticated encryption technologies.

Vaughn started out by saying that despite past tensions, industry had an incentive to cooperate with NSA—at least the information assurance side of it. “After all, the United States government is the biggest customer for encryption products. Not only that, many other customers of encryption products might be reluctant to buy encryption products that the government is not happy with. For example, defense and aerospace industries might refuse to buy encryption products from a company that has fallen out of grace with the United States government, i.e., with NSA.

“We want to have a collaborative relationship with industry. We can’t count any more on having the smartest cryptographers and mathematicians under the NSA roof. Now that there is a vibrant market for information assurance products, we have to compete with industry for the best brains. What with the differential in private and public sector salaries in some fields, we know that industry will win the competition often enough to ensure that many of the technological breakthroughs in the field will come from the private sector, not from NSA.

“We have started to consciously think of industry as a stakeholder, rather than an unruly competitor. Did Mr. Adderley tell you that we need to decide what things we really need to build ourselves and what things we should rely upon others to build?” After Basie nodded to indicate that Adderley had covered that ground, Vaughn continued.

“This is not just a question of divesting non-core competencies to focus on the highest value functions. Even the products that we don’t build are going to be used by government agencies and by the private sector. If these products don’t work, the results could be catastrophic for the affected agencies and companies. In other words, we have a stake in the success of the products that we decide not to build ourselves. So we try to set standards for the products we don’t make. Here again, though, this is an area where we need to recognize the dissimilarity between government and industry approaches. As you know, industry wants to get products out the door as quickly as possible. Companies that spend too much time on marginal improvements might let the competition beat them to the marketplace. So these companies will not voluntarily comply with NSA standards that seem too demanding relative to the threat that the customer will ultimately face.

“We are evolving a three-tiered approach to the question of standards. For products intended for low risk environments (e.g., office software for an insurance company), NSA would articulate less demanding standards to which the makers of encryption products would be encouraged to adhere. More demanding standards would be articulated for information assurance products designed for the moderate risk environment faced by many government agencies and defense-related industries. For the high risk environment NSA would develop its own information assurance products.

“We also offer to run ‘beta tests’ on private sector products before they are released. For instance, in the past couple of months several of the largest software houses have sent us pre-release copies of the products to ‘beta test’, i.e., use in real world conditions. This is more or less what the makers of computer games do. To help find glitches, they send pre-release copies to some users who check the software out by playing the games.”

The last stops on Basie’s grand tour of the NSA were with the SIGINT deputy director, U.S. Air Force General A.C. Jobim, and one of the key civilian members of the SIGINT staff, Dr. John Coltrane. Jobim started the discussion by conceding that the Information Assurance folks had an easier time getting along with industry than Signals Intelligence folks did.

“Most of the fire that NSA has taken in the press and in Congress has, in recent years anyway, been more at SIGINT than information assurance. We’ve been unfairly criticized for spying on American citizens and our allies in Europe.⁸ We have strict rules and procedures on the issue of intercepting domestic communications. This is an important boundary for us because we recognize how important it is for NSA to keep the trust of the American people and Congress. We don’t have time to go into it now, but let me assure you

that our procedures in this area are vigorously enforced—we’ve gotten great reviews whenever these procedures have been appraised by outside evaluators.”

Basie knew that the SIGINT side of the house had also been criticized for being slow to react to the changes in the world—the new threats, the new technologies. He tried to steer General Jobim in the direction of the strategic challenges in the SIGINT area.

“As you know, our budget is included in the defense account and, like every Defense Department element, NSA has the challenge of balancing current readiness with investments in future capability. By readiness, I mean the ability to satisfy the demands our current customers—e.g., the CINCs, the White House—on an ongoing basis but also during a crisis,” Jobim indicated.

“We think of SIGINT as consisting of three functions: getting important information, analyzing that information, and communicating the analysis to the customer. We need to do all three things well in order to succeed. Dr. Coltrane, one of our civilian PhDs, will tell you how we perform these functions during a crisis; then I’ll discuss the routine, non-crisis functioning of the SIGINT directorate.”

Dr. Coltrane gave Basie a succinct briefing on the National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC) that NSA activates whenever there is a crisis. The NSOC sounded very much like the standard emergency operations center—a team of high-powered action officers with all the right connectivity inside and outside the NSA headquarters. Coltrane concluded the briefing by noting that, like other operations centers, there were always concerns about what happens when a fresh group of action officers is brought in to work on a crisis.

According to Dr. Coltrane, “Action officers who have not been assigned to the NSOC before, or who haven’t been there for a long time, need to get up to speed quickly about procedures for handling information and dealing with requests. NSA has not done as good a job as it could in terms of documenting improvements in the procedures and instituting changes as a result of after action reports. We tend to pull together for a crisis and then pay only *pro forma* attention to the idea of preparing to respond better to the next crisis. We move onto other things after the crisis—these other things are important, but so too is the idea of preparing ourselves for the next NSOC iteration.”

General Jobim thanked Dr. Coltrane and resumed leading the discussion. “In a crisis one of the central challenges is to cull the wheat from the chaff. It’s the same in our daily operations. There is a staggering volume of communications traffic. Much of it is unencrypted; but thanks to our private sector friends in the information assurance business huge amounts of information are encrypted. How much of the encrypted stuff is important and who is it important to? Until we decode it, we probably can’t know for sure.

“What I’m trying to tell you is that we have both a physical and an intellectual challenge. The physical challenge is intercepting signals and getting access to data. To do this we need to keep up with technological advances in computing, data storage and communications. The intellectual challenge is to go through the data and signals to cull out the important

stuff. Often this involves both breaking sophisticated codes and translating foreign languages into English. Code breaking takes time, advanced computers and very smart crypto-analysts and linguists. Then once the codes are broken we need to determine the significance of the information.”

“Right now we are upgrading our computers and communications gear and we have made the corporate decision to hire a contractor to manage the upgrade. Obviously, there is a lot riding on the upgrade. If the upgrade goes well, we should be reasonably well positioned for the future hardware-wise. In addition to hardware we also need to continuously upgrade and refresh our skill and knowledge base. Without smart mathematicians we won’t be able to design the computer programs that break codes; without talented linguists and analysts we won’t be able to make sense out of the information we get. I wish there were a private sector wizard we could hire to manage the upgrading of our people power; but there isn’t.

“The information assurance folks like to tell people the four things that they need to be extremely good at in order to succeed. We in SIGINT also have four things on our ‘must do well’ list. First, we need to be exceptionally good at the physical act of collecting information. Second, because there is a vast flood of information out there, we need to be exceptionally good at sifting through the collected information to find the information that our customers might want. I use the word ‘might’ deliberately. Our customers think they know what they want today, but their needs change as crises evolve etc. Third, we need to be the best in the world at breaking codes. Fourth, we need to be able to convey our analyses to the right people, at the right time and in a manner that truly helps the customer. Of course, we need to be able to do each of these things well today and even better tomorrow.”

After thinking about all of the information he had received during his research and interviews, Captain Basie decided to debrief Admiral Peterson. He thought it would be good to demonstrate to the admiral that he was making progress. He also wanted to make sure that he understood exactly what the admiral was expecting of him.

As the debriefing wound down, Basie sensed that Admiral Peterson was getting impatient. “Captain, it sounds like you have done a pretty good job, yourself, of collecting information. Now you know a lot about our two missions, information assurance and SIGINT. Your briefing has identified the key things the two directorates need to do well in order for the agency as a whole to succeed.

“So far, so good. But what I want you to do is to develop some recommended metrics that would tell us whether we are actually doing those key things as well as we should. I also want to hear your ideas about how we might measure our progress towards improving our capabilities in the future.”

Notes

1. Steven Levy, *Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government Saving Privacy in the Digital Age*, New York: Viking Books, 2001, p. 13-6.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the material presented in dialogue form is drawn from interviews conducted by the author at the NSA in January 2001.
3. Chris Gaither, "Hacker Shuts Down Microsoft Sites", *New York Times*, 26 January 2001.
4. Transcript of CBS News broadcast, "National Security Nightmare", *60 Minutes II*, 13 February 2001, transcript accessed on the Internet on 14 February 2001, <http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,266857-412,00.shtml>.
5. Seymour Hersh, "The Intelligence Gap: How the Digital Age Left Our Spies Out in the Cold," *The New Yorker*, 6 December 1999, p. 60-1.
6. Chuck McCutcheon, "Computer-Reliant U.S. Society Faces Growing Risk of Information War," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reporter*, Vol. 56, No. 11, 14 March 1998, pp. 675-9.
7. Chuck McCutcheon, "Pentagon's Simulated Attacks on Computers Succeed Too Well," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reporter*, Vol. 56, No. 24, 13 June 1998, pp. 1622-3.
8. Kurt Kleiner, "Spies Are US," *New Scientist*, 17 July 1999. Neil King, Jr., "NSA Chief Tries to Dispel Privacy Worries," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 April 2000. John Diamond, "Agency Denies Big Brother Charge; Accused of Spying on American Citizens, NSA takes Case to the Public," *Chicago Tribune*, 13 April 2000.



Embassy Reform

LAURENCE L. MCCABE

Mr. C. T. “Chuck” Phelps took a seat in the soft leather chair in the library of his spacious Georgetown home following the midnight telephone call from his good friend and fellow Iowan, Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA). Senator Harkin had called to inform Chuck that he had finally been confirmed as the new U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) on the final day of business before the Senate adjourned for the Christmas break. It had been a long, sometimes painful nomination process—too long and unnecessarily painful from Chuck’s perspective. Despite the fact that a Democrat had sponsored Chuck at his confirmation hearing, the Democratically controlled Senate had moved very slowly to confirm President Bush’s nominee. Nevertheless, Chuck knew he would have little time to celebrate the novel distinction of being called “Mr. Ambassador” before the somber reality and challenge of leading a very different type of organization descended on him like a ton of bricks.

As a successful executive in the private business sector and as a former Navy lawyer, Chuck was understandably anxious with the prospect of representing his country—not to mention his “appointing authority,” the president of the United States—in a region of such economic and strategic importance. He knew that along with the prestige, pomp, and circumstance of the lifestyle of the overseas diplomat, comes the significant and profound responsibility of leading an eclectic, diverse group of professional diplomats and government agencies in the coordination and execution of United States foreign policy. The new ambassador was anxious to get started.

During the eight months it took to complete the Senate confirmation process, Chuck had already begun to prepare for his new assignment. He had received specific tasking from the president at a White House coffee shortly after his formal nomination. “Chuck,” the president had said, “I need three things accomplished in the Dominican Republic. First, I want a smooth, fair, and democratic presidential election next year—an election no one can question or protest. Second, I want you to stop the drugs moving through the Caribbean—I am going to make counter-drug policy a big part of next year’s State of the Union address and I need some positive numbers to back me up. This also ties into our war on terrorism. If and when we move the war to our backyard, I want cooperation from our neighbors. You need to grease the skids. Third, get our people and the Dominicans ready for another natural disaster—hurricane or earthquake. It is not a question of *if* another disaster will occur, only a question of when. We had a satisfactory response after Hurricane Georges and Mitch in 1998, but I believe we can do better.”

“Oh yeah,” said the president as he smiled and added, “When you finish with all that, have some fun in the sun in the beautiful Caribbean!”

With his assignment and objectives clear, Chuck had begun to prepare for his new job. He began by visiting with the DOMREP country desk officer at the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs in the political affairs section of the State Department. The new ambassador, an accomplished and successful businessman, was already skeptical of an embassy chain-of-command structure before he talked to the desk officer. As a political appointee, he reported to the president through the secretary of state—as such, his responsibility, lines of authority, and accountability with the State Department were clear. Simply put, he worked for the State Department. What was not so clear was his relationship with and authority over the other government agencies and personnel attached as “tenant commands” to the embassy. While other government agencies reported to him as the ambassador, they also received direction from and reported to their respective agency headquarters in Washington. Chuck foresaw potential accountability problems with these fuzzy lines of authority between him and the numerous agencies working at the embassy. Could he fire people? Give them deadlines? What could he do if his priorities differed from those of the Department of Defense or the Department of Agriculture? He was the ambassador, but was he really the boss? Too late to worry about this now, he thought to himself. He would have to figure it out “in country.”

Through the desk officer, Chuck had arranged unofficial consultations and orientation briefs with many of the flagship government agencies that had significant representation at the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. These include various State Department “counselors” assigned to the economic & political section, the public affairs section, the security section, and the administrative section. Other government agencies represented include the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Commerce, the Peace Corps, and the Department of Agriculture among others. To Chuck’s surprise, there would be over twenty-five different agencies, departments, sections, and private contractors to oversee and coordinate in leading the embassy—or “mission”—in accomplishing his goals and objectives. The image of “herding cats” came to mind as Chuck pondered his future in the Caribbean.

More troubling to Chuck than the mission’s multi-agency leadership challenge was the disturbing information he was receiving, albeit unofficially, regarding the reputation, ineffectiveness, and productivity of the mission staff. He was told by the State Department that the problem was not with the quality of personnel—in fact the State Department had been sending only what they termed *A-grade* career diplomats to the country in an attempt to turn *the embassy problem* around. They said the embassy had been without an ambassador for over a year and the lack of strong leadership had taken its toll on performance. The State Department could not—or would not—speak for the quality of personnel from other agencies represented at the embassy. Chuck recalled having been told by the State Department desk officer that he would have to “get those other agencies under control” if he wanted to

make improvements. The other agencies needed to be “brought in line” with State Department’s foreign policy objectives. State had assured Chuck that their people would not cause any problems he encountered in country. Despite the fact that State had the most people assigned to the embassy and had the responsibility to oversee embassy finances, the problem they had said, “lies elsewhere.”

Next, Chuck had met with representatives from the Department of Justice. He had been surprised at the large number of mission personnel in country representing several different Justice Department offices at the mission. Representation included the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the U.S. Marshals Service. These offices, Chuck thought, would provide the lion’s share of the effort in the war on drugs—one of his three big areas of concern.

Chuck had appreciated the honesty of the Justice Department desk officer during their discussions. “Mr. Phelps,” she had said, “Justice people don’t always work well with each other or with other agencies in our overseas embassies. Our agenda ranges from drug interdiction operations, money laundering, and extradition cases, to training, criminal investigations and adjudication of complex policy issues. To be successful, we must work with other agencies, including the State Department’s counter-drug Bureau for International Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the military, and our intelligence agencies—not to mention our relationship with the host country. Embassies in general—and the Justice Department in particular—suffer from the ‘left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing’ syndrome. This problem seems to be particularly acute in DOMREP. Because of the large number of Dominicans in the United States and the correspondingly large population traveling back and forth between our countries, many of our agents view DOMREP as an extension of the United States. We tell our agents to keep the embassy—and each other—informed of their actions, but sometimes they don’t do a very good job. This is particularly true with sharing of intelligence. For example, the DEA might have some information on the whereabouts of a wanted narcotics dealer—a drug dealer for whom the U.S. Marshals are desperately searching. This same drug trafficker might be on an FBI protection list as a “source” in a New York City drug bust! This sort of thing happens more than we would like. We just need to communicate better.”

The desk officer continued, “We want you to know that the Justice Department will support you one hundred percent after you arrive in the Dominican Republic. It is an understatement to say that all law enforcement agencies—including the Defense Department when operating in a counter-drug role overseas—need to do a better job of simply communicating with each other. I would appreciate it if you give us a call after you have had time to assess the situation and let us know how we can do our job better. I will tell you that our people in DOMREP have at times voiced frustration with the level of support received from their State Department ‘landlords.’ The problems vary from having the necessary office space and secure communication lines to effectively do their job to the quality of the private residences provided by the mission housing pool. Our DEA attaché in DOMREP has also indicated during consultations in D.C. that his office was often ‘left out of the loop’ by the

State Department ‘mafia’ as well as the Military Group and the defense attaché. These problems are common in many embassies, but they seem to be worse in DOMREP.”

The Justice officer smiled and concluded, “We are just one cog in a big wheel—a wheel that you have to try to move in the right direction. Every country is different and offers a different set of challenges unique to a country’s culture. Best of luck to you sir.”

Chuck felt a little better after hearing the voice of support and cooperation from the Justice Department. He was concerned with the apparent disconnect between State and Justice Department’s assessment of the mission “problems.” All in good time, he thought to himself. All in good time.

Chuck’s next stop had been at the Pentagon where he met briefly with the Hon. Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy and two action officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Because formal briefings and consultations were not permitted new ambassadors until after Senate confirmation, Secretary Feith had only greeted Chuck and mentioned that, if confirmed, his office would work to help the new ambassador with two of the three mission objectives assigned by President Bush: counter-drug operations and natural disaster mitigation and assistance. With that, Chuck followed the two action officers to a small briefing room where each provided an informal DoD assessment of the situation in the Caribbean.

Army Lieutenant Colonel Ben Hughes, a foreign area officer who recently reported from U.S. Southern Command in Miami, began the conversation, “Mr. Phelps, I will be brief and to the point. The counter-drug effort in the Caribbean is a full time job, but the Defense Department is limited to what we can do by ourselves. We have to work with many different agencies, including DEA, U.S. Coast Guard, State Department, the Europeans—particularly the Dutch, the Brits and the French—as well as the host nation to make anything work. The Defense Department’s “main battery” in the war on drugs in the Caribbean is Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF East) located in Key West, Florida. They actually collect the intelligence and have operational control over some DoD and Coast Guard assets during counter-drug operations. We have had some success, but frankly speaking, we have had too many embarrassments. Simply put, we need to do better than we are doing if we want to make a dent in the drug flow through the Caribbean.”

LTC Hughes continued, “The DoD piece in the Caribbean drug war is small, but significant. We could do better if we received better cooperation and support from the Coast Guard and DEA. There have been times when DEA would be covertly tracking a ‘go-fast’ boat loaded with drugs to see where and who would be at the drop off point, when a USCG helicopter, working with a U.S. Navy ship would—to DEA’s surprise—swoop down for the ‘bust’ and disrupt the entire operation. Sir, I tell you this because the DEA agents, the Defense Department and Coast Guard officers involved in this case all worked ‘together’ at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo. We at the Defense Department become very frustrated with the other agencies that won’t talk to us. Believe it or not we have seen Coast Guard ships and U.S. Navy ships working the same case—but not in coordination—during a

counter-drug operation because different operational commanders, JIATF East and the local Coast Guard command in Puerto Rico were not talking to each other. Another embarrassing example of poor coordination at your prospective embassy was the time the commander in chief's (CINC's) embassy representative, the Military Group commander, had purchased computer hardware and software worth \$20,000 for the Dominican military to use in counter-drug operations. It was discovered only a few days after delivery that the State Department counter-drug section at the embassy, INL, had already purchased the same equipment for the same Dominican office for the same purpose! Unfortunately I could go on and on."

"Mr. Phelps," he concluded, "The Caribbean needs help in coordinating the interagency counter-drug effort. I think I can speak for my boss on this one—if you can provide the leadership from Dominican Republic, you will have the Defense Department's support."

Chuck thanked the officer and thought about this new information. Chuck had taken over dysfunctional companies in the private business sector before and straightened them out in short order. Was the public sector the same? Would "best practices" of the private sector work in a non-profit, government organization? He would soon have a chance to find out.

The other OSD action officer, LTCOL Murray, USMC, continued the discussion, "Mr. Phelps, I want to briefly discuss natural disaster mitigation and relief from a Defense Department perspective. I recently completed a tour as the defense liaison officer with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in Costa Rica. I worked extensively on disasters in Central America and the Caribbean, including Hurricane Georges, which struck Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic in 1998. As you probably know, OFDA is the FEMA equivalent that oversees United States disaster assistance in foreign countries. OFDA actually works for USAID, not the State Department."

LTCOL Murray continued, "Sir, while I will have more detail for you after your confirmation, I want to leave you with a few key 'lessons learned' we put together after the Hurricane Georges relief effort. First, after a natural disaster, there is little the United States military can do to help you without first receiving approval from OFDA. OFDA controls all relief funding, and as such, must decide what relief services are needed and then decide whom they want to pay to provide those services. OFDA might choose to pay the Defense Department to provide assistance or they might choose someone or some organization that can provide the services at a lower cost—it is their call. The commander in chief (CINC)—in this case U.S. Southern Command—will certainly provide emergency assistance in life or death situations if you request it. The more routine, large scale relief efforts, however—like road clearing, bridge repair or the distribution of relief supplies—are significantly more expensive and must be approved, coordinated and funded by OFDA. The Defense Department is sometimes frustrated by this chain of command limitation because our instinct is to help and help fast. We have to remember that the agency holding the purse strings makes the decisions—and in this case it is OFDA."

“Sir,” he continued, “I tell you this because the Defense Department had some coordination problems with other agencies during the Hurricane Georges relief effort—problems might have been avoided if the embassy personnel had been better prepared for the operation. Unfortunately there was a great deal of finger pointing between agencies during and after the operation, each trying to place the ‘unprepared’ label on the other guy. For example, USAID blamed the embassy Military Group for not having a damage-assessment plan ready to implement immediately after the storm. The Military Group’s position was that the damage assessment should have been the responsibility of a special Dominican team trained by USAID personnel! A prepared and rehearsed plan could have clarified the responsibility. Another problem emerged in the process of deciding where the relief goods should be delivered—who has the priority? The CINC and other DoD organizations provided several helicopters (at OFDA expense) to distribute relief supplies to flood-stricken regions of the country. Defense personnel were waiting for direction on where to take the supplies—but USAID had moved on to other problems and was not prepared to tell us exactly where to deliver the relief items. In the end, our helicopter pilots worked with—of all people—the Peace Corps to determine where the relief supplies should be delivered!”

Concluding, LTCOL Murray said, “My only point, sir, is that I think the embassy in DOMREP needs someone to bring the various players together, read them the riot act, and clarify the roles and responsibilities of each group before, during and after a natural disaster. Most embassies do not have these problems. I think your embassy only needs some strong leadership and clear direction. If some don’t like it, give them a plane ticket home.”

LTCOL Murray smiled and added, “Sir, please forgive my bluntness—it comes from my Marine training.”

Chuck laughed and thanked the Marine for his candor. He had used the “my way or the highway” leadership technique before with mixed results. Chuck decided to refrain from judgment until he had a chance to see things for himself and form his own opinion based on the facts on the ground.

Following his Senate confirmation, Ambassador Phelps had three weeks to attend the mandatory ambassador “charm school,” pack his household goods, and tie up the loose ends in his private and professional life before he jetted off to the Caribbean. As a successful businessman, he decided he wanted to visit one more agency in Washington D.C. before his departure—the Department of Commerce. Chuck was a strong believer in the link between strong, healthy democracies and strong, healthy economies. The president of the United States wanted a strong democracy and fair, democratic elections in the Dominican Republic. Chuck thought a strong economy might be the best “weapon” he had to make this happen. He felt he might be able to use the Commerce Department to help build a strong Dominican economy while at the same time help build U.S. overseas markets in the Caribbean. And besides, Chuck wanted to get a “businessman’s” view of the embassy

organizational and operational problems alluded to by the State, Defense and Justice Department representatives.

On the day before his scheduled departure, Chuck arranged a quick visit to the Herbert C. Hoover Commerce building near the White House. Entering through 14th Street foyer, Chuck proceeded to the designated briefing room in the Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security (SIES). Chuck checked his directions twice. SIES seemed like an odd place to conduct his initial Commerce Department brief, but it was the office his secretary had written down on his schedule.

As Chuck entered the large, corner office, a tall man in conservative dress stood and greeted him, “Welcome to the Commerce Department Mr. Ambassador. I am Sandy Martin, SIES director of Latin American operations for the sale of defense articles and services. When I saw Dominican Republic on the docket, I asked to brief you personally so that I can bring to your attention some issues we have in your country. Please sit down.”

Sandy began, “The Dominican Republic has one of the largest militaries in Central America and the Caribbean. We at Commerce believe it is an important, untapped market that offers great opportunity for our defense industry—particularly patrol boats and aircraft. Unfortunately, we are not getting the support we need from either the military or State Department representatives at the embassy. State is the more problematic of the two. The problem with the embassy Military Group is simply that we at Commerce are not a priority for them. They help us when they have time, but our people in DOMREP are pretty much on their own in dealing with the Dominican military. We do the most business in countries where the Defense and Commerce Departments work closely on the same sheet of music. I would appreciate it if you could convince your military staff to place the sale of defense items higher on their priority list.”

“The State Department,” Sandy continued, “is where we really need your help. First, the State people have decided to move our offices from the downtown business sector to a new complex on the embassy grounds, citing security reasons. Please see if you can put a stop to this. We work better if we are close to our customers. Second, and more importantly, the State Department has some officers in country who are very much against arms sales to the Dominican Republic. They cite many of the tired economic arguments such as the ‘struggling, fragile economy’ or that the ‘money would be better spent on social programs’ as reasons to keep the U.S. defense industry out of the country. Mr. Ambassador, as a businessman, I know you will understand that if United States does not sell arms to these countries, then the Europeans will. Let’s be realistic, we want those markets. We need you to go down there and clarify the priorities for the people at Defense and State—it would be most appreciated. They just need a little leadership.”

Chuck was shocked that this was the one issue Commerce Department wanted to discuss with him. He assumed they would want to talk about expanding markets for agricultural products, electronics, tourism or garment manufacturers—areas that might provide jobs for an impoverished population. He was surprised that the sale of weapons seemed to be the

priority of the Commerce Department. Chuck was beginning to realize that some of the problems at the embassy might stem from guidance and direction from the various agency headquarters in D.C. This had been a most enlightening conversation.

Sandy and Chuck continued the conversation for a few more minutes touching on a variety of subjects. Finally, Chuck rose to leave, “Thanks for your insight Sandy. I cannot make any promises as I am still putting together my vision for the embassy and the country—from the United States ambassador’s perspectives. When I decide where the sale of weapons fits in the big picture, you will be the first to know. Thanks for your time.”

Chuck hurried down to 14th Street exit where he hailed a taxi to take him to his home to finish preparing for his flight the next day to Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic.

As Chuck stood in front of the full-length mirror admiring himself in his new, crisp white suit and white fedora—the diplomatic dress required of a new ambassador when presenting his credentials to a head of state—he chuckled to himself as he recalled the first meeting he chaired with his key embassy staff on the day after his arrival in Santo Domingo.

Chuck wanted to start the meeting in his office at 0900 sharp. At 0905, his office still empty, Chuck called his executive officer—or in State Department lingo: the deputy chief of mission (DCM)—to ask, sarcastically, what his staff thought was more important than the first meeting with their new ambassador. He chuckled to himself as he recalled the response.

“Don’t worry,” the DCM said, “These meetings never start on time. Some are late because their offices are so far away from the embassy and the traffic is always a problem. Others have to finish morning phone calls to their Washington headquarters—you know, to get their daily marching orders. I’ll let you know when everyone arrives.”

Stunned, Chuck returned to his office to wait—it was too soon to get mad. He stared at the water stains on the ceiling of his office and thought of the broken and cracked cement curbs along the driveway to the front of the embassy. A baseball fan to the core, Chuck liked to compare his ambassador stint to a nine-inning baseball game. This was only the top of the first inning.

Unfortunately, when the staff finally arrived, the situation only deteriorated. Chuck’s first concern was that only six of the staff showed for the meeting. When queried, the DCM explained that this was the “kitchen cabinet,” a select group chosen to assist the ambassador with the important issues of the day. Of the six present, five were State Department representatives and the other was the defense attaché. Chuck persisted and noted that many of the heads of important agencies were not present—Defense, Justice, and Commerce Departments for example—and as such, it would be difficult to impossible to obtain a full picture of embassy activities. The response was revealing.

“We used to have a bigger group,” the DCM explained, “But more people created too many problems. There was always more to talk about than could fit into the allotted time.

Plus, agency heads would take up too much time discussing schedules and events—that is, whenever they decided to show up. Too many times they would leave the country without letting the front office know. We found it easier to keep the staff meetings small—it makes decisions easier and less painful. We do meet with the entire staff every Monday morning, but that is only for administrative announcements—way too many people to get anything done.”

Not wanting the meeting to be a complete waste of time, Chuck decided to bring up one of his specific tasks as assigned by President Bush—the next Dominican presidential election. He asked Kris Larsen, the economic-political counselor, the State Department representative responsible for all political and economic issues in the country, to brief him on the status of the political parties and their respective platforms.

“I’ll tell you what I know, Mr. Ambassador,” Kris began. “The two mainstream parties have their headquarters here in Santo Domingo. There is not much difference between them. Both patronize the urban poor and make promises that will be very difficult to keep. Both are pro-United States. At least that is what I read in the local newspapers. I have trouble getting the party representatives to come to the embassy to brief me on their platforms.”

The Counselor continued, “There is a third and somewhat vocal political party operating in the northern part of the country—an area rife in poverty. They have a party leader who is trying to get on the ballot for next year’s election. He claims the established parties are trying to keep him from running. Lately, I have read reports that some members of the party are becoming violent and have protested at several of the U.S.-owned clothing factories or “maquiladoras”—sort of a “yankee-go-home” thing. We’ve seen it before. I’m having trouble getting good intelligence and the papers just cover the violence, not the politics. I’m hoping they calm down before the election.”

Chuck asked a few more questions and then adjourned the meeting. He asked his administrative counselor (AC)—the State Department individual responsible for administration, budget, and personnel—to stay behind and answer some questions.

Chuck began, “Give me your three biggest problems that affect your ability to do your job. We can talk details later, just give me the big picture.”

The AC thought for a moment and then replied, “Sir, I’m glad to report that I don’t have any problems. When I arrived at post eight months ago, things were a disaster, but I’ve pretty much fixed things. My biggest problem was insufficient funding. The embassy was trying to do way too much. I reviewed our budget and then cut out the fat to make our programs fit the budget. I reduced the number of automobiles in the embassy carpool—our people were traveling around the country way too much. I also reduced the number of trips to the United States for staff training. I come from embassies that relied upon on the job training for the staff—we can do the same here. I also cut back on the English training for the Dominican employees and cut the building maintenance staff in half. Some of the agencies complained about the cuts, but they will adjust—eventually.”

“It was not all draconian, Mr. Ambassador,” the AC continued. “We did have a large number of the Dominican staff complain about not receiving an award at the last annual award ceremony. I plan to solve this by giving every employee an award at the next ceremony—that will shut them up.”

Chuck was jolted from his daydreaming to the present by the DCM as she entered the room to tell him they had to hurry to make it to the National Palace in time for his first official meeting with the president of the Dominican Republic.

The new ambassador awoke the next morning eager to meet with his embassy law enforcement team—those at the embassy concerned with not only the drug war, but also extradition requests, terrorism, immigration issues, judicial reform, and all the variations of white collar crime including money laundering and political corruption. A full plate for even the most competent experienced professionals.

Chuck had scheduled an hour for the meeting, which was a long time by his standards, but he felt that he had a lot of ground to cover. He was surprised at the “cast of thousands” who attended the meeting. He not only had the usual cast of law enforcement characters—DEA, FBI, Immigration—but also attendees who he had not expected, including the defense attaché, Military Group commander, commerce attaché, public affairs, USAID and several junior counselor and political officers. Chuck wanted to have a meeting, not a circus. What were the security clearances of these people? He assumed they would be discussing some sensitive issues.

Remembering his baseball analogy, Chuck relaxed and let the DCM start the meeting. The meeting began with the USAID representative giving a lengthy summary of his program chartered to help the Dominican government create and train an effective pool of public defenders and prosecutors to improve the administration of the judicial system. The brief continued for over twenty minutes. Chuck could not help but notice the lack of interest and apathy of the other attendees. Understandable, thought Chuck—the USAID program has little to do with chasing down drug runners or capturing terrorists trying to enter the United States.

Following the USAID brief, the DCM asked the public affairs officer to brief the group on the local press response to an extradition of a Dominican citizen to New York City wanted for a murder charge in Queens. This discussion took another twenty minutes. By the time the immigration and naturalization officer briefed the number of Dominicans being exported from the United States back to the DOMREP for criminal activity, the sixty minute meeting was over—and the counter-drug and anti-terrorism programs had yet to be discussed!

After making another mental note in his “things we have to do better” file, Chuck dismissed the group but asked those with a specific counter-drug or counter-terrorism portfolio to stay behind. He had to ask some questions about the second of the three specific

taskings he had received from his boss. He hoped he would get a better answer than he got from his political officer concerning the upcoming presidential election.

When the room cleared, the agency heads from the DEA, FBI, U.S. Marshals, INL, U.S. Coast Guard and the Military Group had stayed behind to discuss the counter-drug program. Finally, Chuck thought, he would see where he stood in the drug war.

“Gentlemen,” Chuck began, “Who is in charge of the embassy’s war on drugs?” A simple question Chuck thought—but silence filled the room. “Let me ask this a different way,” Chuck continued, “Where is the embassy counter-drug plan? How do you coordinate your activities?” The silence was not encouraging.

The DEA attaché sheepishly began to speak, “Sir, my office probably is more directly involved than anyone else in the war on drugs, but my agents don’t have the time to work closely with the other agencies. The only coordination we do is at the law enforcement meeting we just completed and you see how that turned out. Anyway, my office goes directly after drug dealers while the INL and the Military Group focus on training and equipping the Dominican military for the counter-drug war. I don’t feel we can always trust the Dominican military to support the DEA’s operations so we have stopped working with them. The DEA does work with a Dominican special counter-drug police unit but the INL and the regular Dominican military don’t like working with this unit. As such, the DEA—my agents—have gone our own way and mostly work independently. That creates less confrontation between Dominican and United States agencies that way.”

The INL representative interrupted the DEA agent, “Mr. Ambassador, I have my marching orders from the State Department. There are some unsavory characters in this special police counter-drug unit the DEA just mentioned. Until the State Department confirms that none of the Dominican special agents are guilty of human rights abuses, they prohibit me from working with the Dominican unit. This ‘human rights abuse’ screening process can take a long time.”

Frustrated, Chuck commented rhetorically, “I thought we all worked for the same government!” Remembering a fact from his counter-drug briefings in Washington, Chuck next asked, “What about the border with Haiti? I was briefed that it is a crossing point for large amounts of illegal drugs flowing to the Dominican Republic and on to Europe and the United States. What can you tell me about this?”

Silence again. Finally the DEA attaché admitted, “Sir, it takes six hours just to drive to the border. When you get to the border, it is hard to get any information because of the sparse population. The fact is, there is plenty to keep us busy in the city—I don’t think any of us have been to the border area in over a month.” The silence around the table confirmed that no one had been to the border recently.

The ambassador had one more question for the group before he ended the meeting. This time he directed his question to the Coast Guard officer sitting at the far end of the table. “Washington seems to think counter-drug operations in the Caribbean are disorganized,

chaotic, and ineffective. I hope the reality is not as bad as I was briefed. How exactly do we coordinate operations?”

The others at the table—relieved they were not asked the question—all turned to look at the now nervous Coast Guard officer. “Mr. Ambassador, I work with our Coast Guard command in Puerto Rico—the Greater Antilles Section (GANTSEC)—to coordinate operations in the DOMREP. GANTSEC is an 0-6 command and reports to the Coast Guard District 7 commander who is a two-star admiral in Miami. That admiral has responsibility for all Coast Guard activities in the eastern Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic. USCG District 7 in Miami takes direct responsibility for operations in the western Caribbean, including Haiti and Cuba. As we fall in their area of responsibility, GANTSEC lets me know when they want to run a counter-drug operation in or around Dominican territorial waters. I don’t get involved much in District 7 operations in the western Caribbean. Some of the confusion might be caused by the split responsibility for the Caribbean—GANTSEC works for District 7, but operationally speaking, they are really two different commands. Sometimes JIATF East gets involved, but they work for the commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command and are not in my chain of command. We try to coordinate with the DEA when we can, but the DEA people here have to coordinate directly with the DEA office in Puerto Rico and their headquarter in Washington. By the time all of the agency coordination is done, the bad guys have disappeared. Sometimes we operate with insufficient coordination, causing some of the horror stories you might have heard back in D.C.”

The Military Group commander added, “To add to the confusion, my job as the Defense Department representative in the counter-drug war is to provide equipment and training to the Dominican military, and in some instances, operational equipment—like helicopters—to the DEA to help in the counter-drug effort. The DEA also can request specific training by U.S. military forces for Dominican counter-drug units. My planning horizon can be six months or longer to provide the requested counter-drug equipment or provide specific counter-drug training to the DOMREP military. This does not fit well with the DEA’s more immediate operational requirements. When the DEA moves, they move fast. By the time I can answer a DEA request, the requirement has often gone away. This has caused the Military Group and the DEA to go in different operational directions, resulting in a serious disconnect between real time counter-drug operations and the Defense Department’s efforts to provide training and equipment. We need to do better.”

Before Chuck could adjourn the meeting, the FBI representative spoke up, “Sir, we haven’t discussed the war on terrorism yet, but I want to make it clear we have a long way to go in that area also. It is not fair to pick on the INS people when they are not here, but we—the FBI—have an awful time getting information from them regarding their immigration cases. Just last week the embassy INS office had information of three suspicious individuals from Yemen traveling on fake United States passports with student visas through the Dominican airport trying to get to Miami. My office was not aware of this until after the Dominicans had sent the three back to Yemen. The Dominicans did the right thing by

notifying our INS but the INS, from my perspective, dropped the ball by not letting us know immediately. We would have loved to talk to these guys.”

With the FBI getting the last word, Chuck ended the meeting and made a mental note to schedule separate counter-drug and counter terrorism meetings early next week—too much to talk about. This would take some work to fix. He had seen similar problems in the private business sector when the planning, design and manufacturing side of the business was not in synch with the marketing, sales and service operations. One side needed time and patience—the other needed a fast, flexible response. He knew he could overcome the problems, but it would not be an easy fix.

The last meeting on the Friday of Chuck’s first week on the job was with his natural disaster mitigation and relief team, composed of representatives from the State and Defense Departments, USAID, Public Affairs, Peace Corps and Agriculture. An eclectic group Chuck thought, but he was beyond being surprised at what agencies appeared for any particular meeting. For the initial set of meetings, he was resigned to working with whoever showed up, whether it seemed to make sense or not. He wanted to move this meeting along, as he had scheduled a large reception for Dominican baseball players, including Sammy Sosa and Pedro Martinez, at his residence that evening and he needed time to help his wife prepare.

Skipping formalities, Chuck moved quickly to the point, “The president has asked me to take a close look at the U.S. government relief efforts during and after natural disasters. As you know better than I, hurricane season will be here soon. If DOMREP gets hit hard, who is in charge of the relief effort and how is the effort coordinated?”

The large man sitting on Chuck’s right quickly bellowed “USAID is in charge of disaster mitigation and relief. As the USAID director in country, I am responsible for every aspect of the operation.”

Chuck was pleasantly surprised that USAID would step forward and claim responsibility for this important program. Maybe his third task from the president would be an easier or less painful issue to manage. Chuck responded to the USAID comment, “I’m glad to hear it. Please elaborate.”

“As you know, sir, the United States agency responsible for disaster assistance overseas, OFDA, is part of the USAID organization. USAID has a robust program to help train and equip the Dominicans to prepare themselves to respond to a natural disaster. We believe it better to help a country help themselves after a disaster as opposed to the United States trying to do everything for them.

“If a disaster does occur, we quickly bring OFDA representatives into the country to assess the needs of the people and then start to work with the Dominicans to provide the essentials such as food, emergency shelter, and water to the affected populations. The embassy USAID office—my office—works with the OFDA representatives to fund activities

required to provide for the immediate needs of the people. We do not have a full time OFDA representative in country—we fly them in as required. The other U.S. agencies are required to support USAID efforts. Normally USAID does not need much help, but occasionally one of the agencies sitting at this table has a capability that we need so we pay them to provide the service.”

The USAID director continued to elaborate on the extraordinary effectiveness of his organization and assured the ambassador that he had nothing to worry about—USAID was in charge. Chuck was about to ask for independent confirmation of the USAID version of the story when his secretary stuck her head in the room to tell Chuck he had an important phone call from the French ambassador. Chuck excused the group and promised to meet again soon to finish the meeting. He took the phone call then hurried home to prepare for the big Dominican baseball reception at his residence.

The new ambassador was enjoying his first diplomatic reception. Chuck was finally relaxed as he excused himself from a conversation with Bud Selig, professional baseball’s ninth commissioner, to work his way to the bar to refresh his drink. While he had yet to develop the entire picture, he was beginning to understand why this embassy had some problems. As he approached the bar, he greeted the Military Group commander who was also in line for a fresh drink. While ambassadors would normally have “head of the line” privileges, Chuck decided to wait with and pick the mind of the senior defense representative assigned to his country. He started by asking the Navy commander to comment on the rosy picture portrayed by the USAID director during the “disaster relief” meeting held earlier in the day.

The commander rolled his eyes and responded, “Sir, USAID does a great job of coordinating the USAID piece of the operation. They need to do a better job of working with the rest of the world—they need other agencies a lot more than he indicated. For example, after Hurricane Georges in ’98, it took almost three days for the OFDA representative to arrive in country to do battle damage assessment—that is too long. USAID’s ‘plan’ does not include many of the fundamentals required to support disaster relief—things like transportation for damage assessment if roads are washed out, communication capability to support coordinated relief efforts, coordination with other countries providing relief to avoid inefficient redundancy and the building of a data base to determine not only the amount of relief supplies needed but also delivery priorities.

“Mr. Ambassador, no agency, including mine, has done enough to plan for the next disaster. I’m only saying I don’t think USAID has thought through the depth and complexity of “being totally responsible” for a major disaster relief operation. The problem is compounded by the fact that almost everyone at USAID with disaster experience, including the director, has been rotated out of the country. USAID has a culture of working independently from other United States agencies and directly with local Dominican governmental officials and private contractors. They seem to have a ‘go-it-alone’ culture.” The commander smiled, “Sort of like the U.S. Navy. Going alone works okay in peacetime, but in war, or during a natural disaster in the case of USAID, it can be problematic. USAID needs the Defense Department to get the job done. We need to work hard to better align our efforts.”

Chuck responded, “I think I understand. I took a phone call from the French ambassador this afternoon. He has a team of disaster relief specialists coming in next week from Paris. He said his office had called USAID and tried to set up a coordination meeting but our USAID people seemed unsure and not very interested in coordinating with his team. I still need to get our side of the story, but regardless, this does not make us look very professional.”

Chuck finally arrived at the bar and ordered tonic water with a splash of sweet Caribbean rum and a twist of lime. He thanked the commander for his candor and made a mental note to schedule some extra time for his next “natural disaster” staff meeting. He now realized that his tour of duty as an ambassador was going to be anything but a relaxing party in the Caribbean. This embassy needed to fundamentally change the way it did business and he was the guy who could make it happen. The embassy needed many things, not the least of which was a unifying vision—something to focus every agency on the same goal or set of goals. Yes, the embassy needed a change, but not tonight, thought Chuck. As he collected his drink and walked towards Sammy Sosa and Juan Marichal who were autographing baseballs for an appreciative group of guests, he decided the transformation could wait until tomorrow.

The case study, Embassy Reform, is a fictional narrative based loosely on actual events occurring during the author’s tour as the commander, Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to the United States Embassy, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic from 1998 to 2001. While the individuals portrayed (and some events) are fictional, the government agencies, relationships between agencies, and organizational challenges are not. The reader should know that while many of the events depicted in this case are based on actual occurrences, many of the details of the events and their problematic nature have been purposely exaggerated for academic, instructional purposes. The problems associated with this embassy are common to many large organizations and are derived from conversations between the author and representatives from United States government agencies as well representatives from countries with interests in the Caribbean.

Finally, and most importantly, the author wishes to emphasize that the United States personnel representing government agencies at U.S. Embassies overseas, particularly the State Department foreign service officers, are thoroughly professional and should be commended for their extraordinary effort in making a quite difficult—sometimes thankless—task appear routine. The United States Embassy in the Dominican Republic was not the dysfunctional organization depicted in this case though there was a need for constructive change and improvement when the new ambassador arrived in country. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the author that the United States military can learn much from our diplomatic colleagues in the execution of our overseas duties. Working as a team is far more constructive than working alone.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Administrative Counselor
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CINC	Commander in Chief
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DOMREP	Dominican Republic
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GANTSEC	U.S. Coast Guard Greater Antilles Section, San Juan, Puerto Rico
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
SIES	Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida



Naval Surface Group TWO

DAVID A. WILLIAMS

“**S**ee these, Sam?” the new commander of Naval Surface Group TWO said as he pointed at his own collars, “Stars . . . *concepts*.” Now pointing across the desk at his chief of staff’s collars, Rear Admiral Thomas “Fly” Fisher finished: “Eagles . . . *details*.”¹

It had been close to a year since Captain Sam Drum had first heard those words in his welcome aboard meeting as the new Surface Group TWO chief of staff. Now nearing the halfway point in his two-year tour, they still echoed in his mind as he reviewed and updated the admiral’s command briefing that he would take with him on his upcoming trip.

All in all, being chief of staff at Surface Group TWO had turned out to be an interesting job. The admiral, to lead and direct the Group’s day-to-day actions, had given Sam broad authority. That was really a matter of practicality as Admiral Fisher, like most flag officers, was on the road a lot. Most of Fisher’s travel—about 90%—was in his capacity as the deputy to the commander of the newly formed U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command, or USNAVSO, in Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. His USNAVSO duties had the admiral supporting the commander in chief’s theater engagement plan by conducting liaison with the foreign navies of South America, being present for planning and operations of numerous joint exercises, executing the maritime engagement plan, reviewing operational plans, and coordinating a multitude of personnel exchange program assignments. Of late, the *Vieques problem* had only served to focus the admiral more on USNAVSO issues. All this left precious little time for the admiral to “touch the realm” within the Surface Group²—that was left to Sam and the Group staff of thirty-four naval personnel.³

Reviewing the brief, Sam recalled how little he had really known himself about Surface Group TWO when the surface detailer called to “offer” Sam his orders. But, compared to the standard list of captain options—“to sea or overseas...or retire”—it was hard to pass up.

As he thought about the Group’s performance, he noted that their ships were getting on deployment on time and passing fleet-wide inspections with only the normal smattering of discrepancies—not bad really. Sailors were getting advanced at or above the fleet average and the Group had the “normal” number of legal problems—nothing earth shattering. Traveling around on behalf of the admiral he also noted that in general the morale was pretty good. The staff had good people who all got along together fine. In general, the staff performed its oversight functions for its two Destroyer Squadrons (DESRONS)—SIX and FOURTEEN—well, and the staff enjoyed good relationships with the subordinate

commands. All in all, a good command to be part of—maybe even one of those “best kept secrets” that people in the Navy like to talk about.

The history slide in the briefing showed that Surface Group TWO had only come into being in February 2000—a pretty young organization by Navy standards, Sam thought. Perhaps due to its somewhat ad hoc origins, the whole Group organization had the look and feel of a quick, cookie-cutter fix by the Navy to respond to the U.S. Southern Command requirement to stand up USNAVSO.⁴ What made Surface Group TWO a different beast from the other traditional “war fighting” Groups and DESRONs never seemed to be taken into consideration. Sam reflected:

- Carrier Group and Cruiser-Destroyer Group staffs are sea-duty commands. As such, the staffs work up and deploy with their units as part of their battle group; Surface Group TWO staff is a shore-based command that provides oversight but does not deploy.
- Surface Group TWO’s seventeen units train, deploy, and operate mostly independently from other ships in the Group as well as their own DESRON. Other DESRONs work together with the *battle group* serving as the *focus* for their collective efforts.
- Surface Group TWO got all of the “cats and dogs” types of missions like counter-drugs, UNITAS, support to the Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic—a NATO naval force—and the Great Lakes *deployment*—all important but, nonetheless, missions that do not generally evoke the respect and professional envy of fellow surface warriors.

Of these missions, Sam saw counter-drug operations and support to UNITAS as the two major responsibilities placed on Surface Group TWO by its mission statement. As he read the mission statement closely, Sam noted that it didn’t even have the sound or feel of a war fighting mission. Carrier and Cruiser-Destroyer groups trained to “fight” together and brought their units to the fight. Surface Group TWO’s statement had them training units—singular—and providing their units to another organization who would employ them in the fight—it sounded “passive.”

Western Hemisphere Group/Naval Surface Group TWO
History Timeline

- Jun 1995 CWHG as an ISIC and Depolyable Staff (CTF 125)
 - Caribbean and South American contingency support
 - Bilateral exercise support
 - Counter-drug operations
 - UNITAS support
 - Standing Naval Forces Atlantic support
- Feb 1996 Appointed CINCLANTFLT’s Executive Agent to SOUTHCOM
- Oct 1996 CINCLANTFLT expands CWHG role and assigns CWHG operational control of USN ships in SOUTHCOM area of responsibility
- Aug 1998 CWHG operational control expanded to include aircraft
- Aug 1999 DESRON FOURTEEN becomes ISIC for 10 CWHG ships
- Dec 1999 DESRON SIX becomes ISIC for 6 CWHG ships
- Feb 2000 COMUSNAVSO stood up as SOUTHCOM naval component commander.
 - CWHG re-named Naval Surface Group TWO
 - COMNAVSURFGRU TWO assigned as deputy COMUSNAVSO

Mission

COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE GROUP TWO (CNSG-2) SERVES AS IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR-IN-COMMAND FOR COMMANDER, DESTROYER SQUADRON FOURTEEN LOCATED IN MAYPORT, FL AND COMMANDER, DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX LOCATED IN PASCAGOULA, MS. CNSG-2 PROVIDES SUPPORT AND OVERSIGHT OF UNIT LEVEL AND INTEGRATED TRAINING AND READINESS FOR THE GROUP. IN ADDITION, CNSG-2 MAINTAINS ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND MATERIAL READINESS SUPPORT FOR THE SHIPS AND SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO THE GROUP. CNSG-2 REPORTS TO COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

As he finished up the morning business of “keeping the train running,” Sam reviewed the general court-martial docket, and looked ahead to the afternoon line up. Besides an afternoon “planning” meeting with the admiral, only another round of force protection/anti-terrorism meetings with the naval station stood in the way of an evening of fishing. It was funny—maybe really sad—that administrative functions, like court martial convening authority⁵ and those duties stemming from Admiral Fisher’s responsibilities as the senior officer present afloat, or SOPA,⁶ for Mayport, that were not all a part of the official mission statement, actually ate up most of Sam’s day.

“Sam, I looked at the brief you forwarded up and it looks good. But, I’ve been thinking about the organization,” the admiral started. “I’ve been aboard for six months now and from what I can tell, this Surface Group struggles with a real *identity problem*. Let me elaborate a bit on this.”

“The *first of the two identity problems* is a *group-wide* one. It’s probably the product of this most recent reorganization. Surface Group TWO was slapped together as an organization that sometimes seems to operate as many separate parts—the staff, each of the two DESRONs, and the ships. Each of the DESRONs, in turn, have ships that are sent to the four winds to operate independently and do any number of missions. Each DESRON and maybe even the ships has its own measure of success and peculiar resource issues. There is no singular focus on a larger organizational strategy or purpose—just twenty or more separate parts in loose orbit trying to meet the changing schedule. We’re fortunate that we have great people—we’re blessed with an organization that is rich in experience and diversely talented. We do a good job every day satisfying our principal mission. I’d argue that we do our mission as well or better than any other group in the Navy. Generally speaking, we’re doing a fine job getting ships and crews ready to do the same mission that we’ve always done—hot, straight and normal.”

“So, if we’re meeting the schedule and getting the job done well, where is the down side admiral?” Sam interjected.

“Sam, the world is changing, missions are changing, and though Surface Group TWO is doing fine, we are stuck in a rut doing the same things the way that we have always done them—always fine, never better and never worse. To some, that’s good enough. To me, that’s the definition of ‘mediocre.’ And I’m not used to being part of an organization that is not in the van. ‘Good enough’ just isn’t,” the admiral said as he moved out to the edge of his chair. “I suppose I could be a ‘steady as you go’ kind of admiral, but that’s not why I was put here. If you and I don’t give this organization the context and purpose on which to frame the decisions of today and tomorrow, then who will? We owe Surface Group TWO and the Navy better than that.”

Sam was red-faced. He’d been so busy keeping the daily flames down and managing the present that he hadn’t even begun to think about leading the organization toward some future.

“I was thinking,” the admiral continued, “we have a new administration. The White House and Secretary Rumsfeld are focused on the future and transformation of the Defense Department. Out of any new strategy will come new or different force structures, as well as changing roles and missions. The president has got a real eye on improving relations in Central and South America. With the former commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General Pace, moving on to be the next vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our theater of operations has never been so visible. There’s talk of homeland defense—don’t even know what that means to us. Battle groups may or may not see much change in the next five to ten years, but our organization has a history of roles and mission changes to suit the *cause du jour* in this hemisphere. We can count on change and we might be able to take advantage of it to minimize the whiplash for our people by making sure that Surface Group TWO is poised to be the most responsive of any of the nation’s battle groups. Sam, we need to know *where we are headed as an organization*. Not where we’re headed this week or even this year, but five or ten years down the road. I suspect that if I were to ask our staff, the DESRON commodores, or ship commanding officers that question, I would get three different answers, if I got an answer at all.

“The *second identity problem* is really integral to the first and that is this *staff’s function* in the Group. We can’t change the way that Surface Group TWO and all of its parts evolved, but in order to solve this identity problem, we need to decide how active our role can or should be in leading our Group onto deployment.

“I had a strategic plan when I commanded the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes and it worked well for me there. It pulled the separate but interrelated parts of that base and surrounding community together into an organized whole—I want one here. Along those lines, you should know that logically my top five priorities are the same as the CNO’s⁷—current and future readiness, manpower, quality of service and Navy-wide alignment toward a common purpose.⁸ How we define those top five in the context of Surface Group TWO is part of what we need to work out. Our common goal as we move toward that purpose or direction is continuous performance improvement and an ever increasing standard of excellence in satisfying our mission and support to our customers.”⁹

Sam interjected. “Admiral, here’s something that I’ve been thinking about. One thing that is inconsistent in the way business is done is that the Pacific Fleet also provides ship support to SOUTHCOM’s counter-drug efforts. Right now, the Pacific Fleet ship USS *David Ray* (DD-971) is down west of Panama, while our ship, the USS *R. G. Bradley* (FFG-49), is doing counter-drug ops in the Caribbean. There was no connection between their training, readiness, and deployment work-ups and ours. Perhaps our vision might be that Surface Group TWO becomes the Navy’s “battle group” for assets deploying to SOUTHCOM, regardless of whether they are Atlantic or Pacific-based. We could work up and certify all deploying units.¹⁰ Thoughts, admiral?”

“Well that’s a broader vision than I had in mind but it’s not bad. It has distinct rice bowl implications. But, from my deputy USNAVSO hat, it definitely has merit. The Navy should have standardized work-up exercises and manuals for counter-drug operations, but we

don't. We do the whole counter-drug operation on an ad hoc basis. Not that we do things poorly, we're just always reacting vice leading. This ought to get a high level of real interest. My bumper sticker is *that if we're in a war on drugs, then counter-drug ops are a wartime mission*. A lot of people will argue with that statement but we really are shooting at and sinking drug runners down in the Caribbean and if we're going to do that as a mission, then we ought to approach it with the same planning and rigor that we give our other wartime missions.¹¹ And we ought to resource it appropriately, as well. The counter-drug business continues to change and has changed on the edges in terms of the technology that we use too. But there are huge parts of the business that have not changed to keep up. Surface Group TWO has the most experience in this regard. We need to find ways to do our job better, more efficiently, and more effectively. In particular, more effectively in the training and equipping for the South American missions including counter-drug ops."¹²

"We've got plenty of smart folks here Sam—knock it around with them; see what you come up with. As you know, I'm heading off on another trip. I don't know exactly what the right *vision-thing* for Surface Group TWO should be, but I want you to do some research and give me your recommendations on how we ought to go about developing one. If we're going to solve this identity problem, we're going to need to have an organization that clearly knows what it's about, where we are today, and where we're headed tomorrow. We need to be very clear about what this staff does in the organizational chain and for whom. We need to stake out a niche on which to build our organization and lead it in that direction. Any questions?" the admiral concluded.

"Probably more than I know to ask sir," Sam said.

"Maybe so," the admiral responded. "Look, Sam, it took me over a year to develop a strategic plan at Great Lakes, this doesn't happen overnight. I'd like your first brief on the way ahead in three months and we'll take it from there. Remember, Sam," the admiral said as he smiled and pointed across the table at his chief of staff's collars—"*details*."

Back in his office Sam transcribed his cryptic notes from his *wheel book* into a larger steno pad. He figured he would need a bit more space for this project.

"Captain," LCDR Tim Ray interrupted, "I've got the report from the manpower review and I need your signature on the forwarding letter for this updated COMNAVSURFGRUTWO instruction."

LCDR Tim Ray was an outstanding flag secretary who also ran the SURFGRU Administrative Department (N1). As both, he was a pretty busy man but kept the balls in the air better than anybody. Because he also saw all of the group administration and attended meetings with or on behalf of the admiral, he was a wealth of information and a great sounding board. A former second-class machinist mate with an industrial management master's out of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, his LCDR rank belied his maturity and insight. Sam

could count on him to provide a seasoned view. He'd be leaving for his XO ride in a year and that was unfortunate for the organization and the next chief of staff.

"What's your view of Surface Group TWO? What are the big manpower issues? I've got this small strategic planning project and I'd value your opinions," Sam asked.

Tim jumped in: "It's safe to say that the Group staff's manpower will be taking on a different look with these manpower changes. Overall, the staff's manning will be decreasing as we go from 34 officer and enlisted billets down to 32 total billets. That may not sound like much of a loss, but on a small staff like ours, two billets can create challenges. The real change as the command master chief and I see it is the loss of four active duty enlisted billets and the addition of our first two civil servant billets. To Atlantic Fleet manpower gurus, it all boils down to money, and the civilian billets supposedly mean a savings of \$75,391.00.¹³ Some on the staff think the money saved may not justify the gains."

"Where's the bad in that, Tim?" Sam asked. "This may give us some continuity to offset military transfers."

"I'm not saying it's bad—it's just going to be different. We're going to lose watchstanders which means other Sailors will have to pick up the slack. For better or worse, we can call our Sailors in at all hours of the night or on weekends to meet emergent problems, but you can't do that with civilians. You don't have the same control over their leave and the civilian performance reports, pay, and administration is just different. Seems like all you hear is hiring and firing horror stories. Civilian personnel matters are just one more reason to get into long meetings with the naval base. I can work with anyone, sir, but this one could be a challenge. Also, that means two less shore duty billets in Mayport for Sailors to rotate to. I don't know how you put a price tag on all of that.

"On the upside, advancements and retention are doing well group-wide—better than fleet average in some cases. Surface Group TWO has the 'distinction' of being both the best and the worst in the Atlantic Fleet in that regard—Pascagoula still has its struggles . . ." Tim trailed off. "Captain, I've got to rush to get these letters into the admiral for his signature before he heads out of town again. I remember one month where I only saw him three days."¹⁴

"Yeah, I remember all too well, Tim. How's his trip shaping up this time?" Sam asked.

"He'll be spending the next week on a round-robin that takes him to Norfolk for the flag conference, then up to DC, and finally down to Roost Roads. COMUSNAVSO wants to discuss the upcoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff trip to Panama. Admiral Fisher, as USNAVSO's deputy commander, will be representing SOUTHCOM on that trip. With the requisite debriefs following the Panama trip, I don't expect to see the boss back in town for some time. Guess that means you've got the deck and the con again, eh captain?"

"It's good to be king." Sam chuckled. Before he left for the day, Sam made an appointment with his reserve coordinator and material readiness department heads. Sam always

appreciated their candor and thoughts on tough matters. Maybe they'd have an idea how to tackle this tasker.

The car ferry ride across the St. Johns River toward home always gave Sam a welcome chance to reflect on the day and put things in perspective. This Group, he thought, really was a collection of "cats and dogs." The complexity was mind-boggling and the geographic separation of homeports only made it tougher to make the three parts of the organization see themselves as part of a larger whole.

At fifteen years old, the three Ticonderoga-class AEGIS cruisers in Pascagoula were among the oldest in the Navy and were the only non-vertical launch system (VLS)-equipped cruisers on the East Coast. *Yorktown* was the Navy's "Smart Ship" prototype—sort of a floating *skunk works* for efficient crew manning technologies.¹⁵ The "figs" (short for frigates or FFGs) were all Perry-class and fifteen to twenty years old. Of them, *Estocin* and *Morrison* were the oldest and would likely be transferred or decommissioned in the near future.¹⁶ Of the eight naval reserve force (NRF) FFGs in the Navy's inventory, Surface Group TWO had five and the rest were in the Pacific Fleet.¹⁷ Lastly, there was the *O'Bannon*—the only Spruance-class destroyer in the Group. Seeing that "Spru-can" in Mayport spawned fond old memories for both the admiral who commanded *Stump* and Sam who commanded *Ingersoll*. At twenty years old, the *O'Bannon* was the only Tomahawk shooter in the Group.¹⁸

All totaled: three cruisers, thirteen frigates, and one destroyer—undersea warfare capable ships that saw little use of their capabilities in the SOUTHCOM theater except as part of the UNITAS exercise. For the counter-drug mission, armed helos and small boats to assist the Coast Guard law enforcement detachments in making counter-drug arrests at sea replaced the ASW helos.

Though the admiral seemed most focused on the counter-drug mission and UNITAS, the operations and personnel tempos of the force really went beyond that, Sam thought. Surface Group TWO units supported myriad contingency operations through the years, including: alien migration assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, maritime interdiction operations, and foreign disaster ops. If it happened in the Caribbean through the 1990s, they'd certainly been involved and would be again in the future, if a contingency arose.

"The USS *Estocin*, one of our NRF FFGs up in Norfolk, won the CINCLANTFLT 'Golden Anchor' Award for retention again," Captain Rick Trigger, USNR, the Surface Group's reserve coordinator crowed proudly. "She owns the quarterly Fleet-wide Retention Honor Roll! In fact, *Estocin* has won that honor nine consecutive times by re-enlisting 62% of all eligible Sailors—6% above fleet average—how do we bottle that and spread it around the Group?"¹⁹

"I'm working on a strategic planning tasker for the admiral, Rick. Can you give me a refresher on the NRF?" Sam asked.

"Sure Sam." Rick leaned forward in his chair. "NRF ships are different in two significant ways: manning and funding," Rick began.

"Manning-wise, the active FFGs have 13 officers and 210 enlisted always assigned; the NRF figs have a total of 173 active and Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) personnel permanently-assigned who coordinate the ship's reserve augment of about 50 drilling selected reservists (SELRES). The SELRES come from six Reserve Readiness Commands from all around the nation. Sam, these are a very professional group of Sailors—proud of what they do for their two-to-four week drill periods. When they're not doing their active duty for training,²⁰ they're working as highly skilled laborers or executives in industry. That brings better practices and methods to our fleet maintenance. They can be pretty influential, too. I'm not sure if it's true for any of our reservists, but some reservists are in the U.S. or state Congresses. I even knew of one reserve officer who was a millionaire CEO—he just drilled out of pride and wanted to do something for his country.

"Anyway, SELRES also form fifteen FFG Augment Units and six DESRON Maintenance Units. These folks provide our units with a very valuable skilled workforce pool to help active duty units meet their surge upkeep needs. They also fill in for active duty personnel, breaking them free to go off for training or on leave. That's a good deal for commanding officers. I know some may see the reserves as a readiness or manpower challenge, but I think the taxpayer gets their money's worth from the services that the SELRES provide."

"I don't recall any direct organizational connection or responsibility to the commander, Naval Reserve Force, true?" Sam asked.

"No, not directly in our chain of command. It's all part of the manpower resources that we're given to manage. Though I often liaison directly with SELRES units, the manpower determinations are made by SURFLANT and the major manpower claimant up at Atlantic Fleet headquarters.²¹

"The second way we're different is how we are funded. Reserve ships are only funded for fifty-percent of the operating rate that active ships are. That would be fine if they only deployed at a commensurate ratio, but that is not the case. It's 'one Navy'—that's the way the Navy briefs it and that's the way the admiral wants it. So, the admiral employs his five NRF ships interchangeably with his active ships. The training and work-ups are the same and the CINC should expect the same performance regardless of whether its an active or NRF ship on station. That's not always easy. SELRES rotate on and off the ship at two-to-four week intervals and the disparity in operational funding means that Surface Group TWO and his DESRON commodore's have a tough juggling act to ensure that they are ready and safe to deploy. But that's our problem, not the supported CINC's. Suffice it to say that the admiral has taken it on as a personal goal to correct the active/reserve funding delta." Rick concluded.

“Thanks for the primer, Rick. If we are going to improve retention and efficiency of operations in the group, where are some of the bigger challenges as you see them?” Sam probed.

“Reserves aren’t your challenge but Pascagoula definitely is worth looking at. As Tim will tell you, it’s a real conundrum.” Rick pointed to a map and asked rhetorically: “How do you compare duty in P-goula to life in Norfolk or Mayport? You can’t. Simply stated—P-goula is P-goula—it is its own worst problem. I guess I shouldn’t be on their Chamber of Commerce, eh? Having lived there myself I’ve formed a bit of an opinion. Let me just say that it looks a lot better from Mayport.” Rick chuckled.

“For one thing, P-goula doesn’t have the training infrastructure that the other sites have, although the Group staff is working to improve that and we are enjoying some degree of success, I might add. On the down-side, the school systems aren’t the best and entertainment consists mostly of watching mole crickets eat your lawn. As you know from the legal officer’s briefings, legalized gambling and alcohol is a constant source of problems—not much else to do on liberty. Because of its remoteness, it also lacks the availability for follow-on shore-duty assignments that the fleet concentration areas like Norfolk and Mayport have. The families know that moving there only means moving again at the end of the sea tour.²² For the families that go, life across the dinner table can get strained. Some Sailors just choose to go unaccompanied rather than put their family through the hassle. Not exactly a poster child for the CNO’s *quality of service* concept, is it?

“There’s more,” Rick continued. “As a bonus, when ships are at home on their inter-deployment training cycle, they’re not really home. They have to travel to train, unlike Mayport or Norfolk where the operating areas and other playmate ships are just beyond the breakwater. Norfolk and Mayport Sailors can get a lot of their training and schools without leaving their homeport—not the case for P-goula folks. Ingalls Shipyard doesn’t offer an availability site for maintenance so when a ship gets an availability period, it has to move to Mobile, Alabama, forty-three miles to the east. Fifty is the breakpoint for per diem so the daily commute is money out of a ship’s company Sailor’s pocket. Last point, all the personnel support for P-goula is in Gulfport, Mississippi.²³ That’s forty-one miles to the west. You’d think we could make it just a little more comfortable for these families? Can’t wait to see what this new individual personnel tempo, or ITEMPO, turns out to be for the Sailors in P-goula. At least we’ll be paying them for their time on the road.”

“I’m hoping you’re going to get to the upside of this.” Sam said, rolling his eyes in mental pain.

“Well, the DESRON commander and ship captains aren’t moored where the Group commander or SURFLANT can look at or visit them all the time. Distance has a *quality of life* all of its own, my friend.” Rick said with the salty smile of a man who once enjoyed time in WESTPAC.

“Yeah, I see your point Rick, but in the interest of operational and training cost-efficiency as well as maintenance economies of scale and retention, why not just move the

staff, these three cruisers and two frigates to Mayport or Norfolk? That would be clearly aligned with the CNO's top five. Don't CINCLANTFLT and SURFLANT make the call for who is based in Pascagoula, Mississippi?"

"So it would seem, Sam. Though CINCLANTFLT and CNO might have the *organize, train, and equip* responsibility; the man behind the curtain on Pascagoula ship-basing matters is Senator Trent Lott (R-MS). Ever heard of him?" Rick smiled and continued. "On the list of battles for the admiral to take on, I don't think he's got enough time in his career to take that one on. There are better places to spend his professional and political capital, I would think. Now I did hear at a CINCLANTFLT material readiness meeting that the submarine folks up in Connecticut, have a similar problem and partnered commercially with General Dynamics to use Electric Boat's empty graving docks to do some shipyard availabilities there. Maybe we need to do something like that."

"Interesting, certainly worth thinking about," Sam thought out loud. Sam thanked Rick for his time and moved along to his next appointment with LCDR Bill "Lamps" Lamprey, the Surface Group's material readiness department head (N4).

Lamps was new to the job, but as a twelve-year limited duty officer and former enlisted electronics technician, Sam knew he could count on Lamps to have an opinion on force future direction and planning.

"Future direction? You've gotta be kidding me." Lamps scoffed. "I've seen this one before captain—a lot of time and energy spent to produce pretty coffee table pamphlets and little outcome of substance to show for it."

"Lamps, I only know that the Surface Group needs to take a fix and figure out where we are going in the next five-to-ten years. What's your crystal ball telling you about material readiness?" Sam asked.

"It's telling me that these old ships aren't getting any younger and the money pile isn't getting any higher. Look at this ship employment schedule that Commander Bocaccio and the boys over in Operations are dealing with." Lamps said as he slid a schedule over to Sam. "UNITAS demands two ships for five months each year; counter-drug ops requires one 3-D and one 2-D radar-equipped ship on station for a full year; we have one ship devoted to the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic for the year; and Great Lakes cruise keeps one fig on the road for four months.²⁴ To meet those presence rates within the added TAR constraints means that sixteen ships need to be available during the year. Not much breathing room amidst other scheduled maintenance and upgrades. Throw in "bonus underways" and things get tight on these old ships.

"Quite honestly, not sure any of these ships will even be around in fifteen years, cap'n. They're all pretty old. *Estocin* is planned to be part of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. She's one of the older short hulls but she's a keeper compared to some of the other ships in the Group. SURFLANT himself commanded *Estocin*²⁵—a ship with a great

reputation. FFGs are going to be a prime candidate for FMS in the years ahead. *Morrison* is scheduled for decommissioning in 2002. *Doyle* just became an NRF ship in 2001 and *Simpson* becomes an NRF ship in October 2002.²⁶ The whole Surface Group is a moving target and something's gotta give to make it all work. If we want to do something positive in the way of long-range planning, we'll get out in front of this FMS and decommissioning process and drive the train, where we can."

"Thanks for the rundown, Lamps," Sam said. "I've got to get back to the office and see the admiral off on his trip. We'll talk more. I appreciate your straight-forward and common-sense insights."

In all of his time in the Navy, Sam had never been part of a strategic planning process. He didn't know what one was, or really if Surface Group TWO even needed one. He'd made a cursory look around the waterfront and had even made a call up to the Naval War College to see if they had any knowledge of a plan actually being done at a similar operational level—he'd come up dry.

As he sat in *Bogey's*, Sam pondered the task ahead. On his napkin, he jotted three possible futures that the admiral had mentioned that he consider in his planning (he knew there were plenty others—the mind boggled with possibilities):



- The first dealt with *more ships*—a larger CNSG, but most likely in the number of NRF ships. An increase to twelve NRF frigates had certainly been talked about in flag conferences and appeared often in the Navy staff and SURFLANT point papers he had seen. That would be a big change for the group. The current funding issues would only be exacerbated. Their role in reserve advocacy would have to increase.²⁷
- What would happen if the *counter-drug mission went away*? What would Naval Surface Group TWO do?²⁸ How should we change now to be able to move smoothly to a new mission?²⁹ This concern was the premise for the admiral's whole project so he needed to consider that one. What would take its place? What new missions, equipment, or skill sets would that demand?
- Finally, there was the potential that the *total Group might be reduced* to a total of twelve ships as part of a larger force reduction—perhaps as part of the much talked about transformation.³⁰ DoD would need to get the money for transformation from somewhere. Base closures would gain the Defense Department only some of the money needed to fund large research and development programs. Older ships like those assigned to Surface Group TWO had to look like tempting targets. But twelve



ships total? Not a new idea. DESRON SIX had been Surface Group FOUR until 1993 when similar circumstances drove its re-designation.³¹ Would they still need a Group or would that be some sort of a “super-DESRON?”

Just how was he supposed to get his arms around this one? He wondered who should be involved in the Surface Group TWO strategic planning process? Even though he knew that the admiral wasn't demanding anything for some time, Sam wanted to have a draft plan of action to go over with the admiral upon his return in two weeks. He decided he'd ponder the question further in the place where he'd had most of his greatest victories—knee deep in the Jax Beach surf with his fly rod in hand. Which fly tonight, the deceiver or the popper . . . it's all in the *details*, Sam thought.





Notes

1. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, interview by author, Mayport, FL, 19 December 2001.
2. Flag Secretary, Surface Group TWO, interview by author, Mayport, FL, 19 December 2001.
3. CINCLANTFLT Manpower Analysis Team DRAFT Report, "Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Report: Commander, Naval Surface Group TWO, Mayport, FL," 17 April through 19 April 2001, 1.
4. "Surface Group TWO Command Brief" provided to author during site visit, Mayport, FL, 2 April 2001.
5. "Surface Group TWO Command Brief" provided to author during site visit, Mayport, FL, 2 April 2001.
6. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, interview by author, telephone, Newport, RI, 31 December 2001.
7. Commander, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
8. NAVOP 010/00 of August 2000.
9. Commander, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
10. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, interview by author, tape recording, Mayport, FL, 19 December 2001.
11. Commander, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
12. Commander, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
13. CINCLANTFLT Manpower Analysis Team DRAFT Report, 1.
14. Flag Secretary, Surface Group TWO, interview by author, email, Newport, RI, 20 December 2001.
15. Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "US Navy Ships: CG-47 Ticonderoga," Military Analysis Network, available from <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/cg-47.htm>>, [accessed: 27 December 2001].
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23. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, 31 December 2001.
24. "Surface Group TWO Command Brief," 2 April 2001.
25. Chief of Information, Department of the Navy, "Official Biography of RADM John B. Foley, III, USN," available from <<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/biographies/foleyjb.html>>, [accessed: 2 January 2002].
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27. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
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29. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
30. Former CoS, Surface Group TWO, 19 December 2001.
31. "The Mission and History of Destroyer Squadron SIX," available from <<http://www.cnsi.spear.navy.mil/cds6/CDS6%20History.htm>>, [accessed: 21 December 2001].



Naval Air Station North Island Birthplace of Naval Aviation

DOUGLAS A. YESENSKY

As Captain “Mad Man” Lockheed crossed the California border, he could not help but think about where he had been, and where he was headed. His future would be command of NAS North Island in Coronado, California, clearly the crown jewel of naval aviation shore commands. There was no greater prize in his estimation than command of North Island. He was rushing his cross-country trip to take command during the second week of December 1998.

Mad Man reflected back on his memorable career. He was one of the last naval aviators to operationally fly the dated “Stoof” (S-2F), an air-antisubmarine carrier based twin reciprocating engine aircraft, from North Island in the early 70s. Mad Man earned his call sign while tracking a Soviet submarine at night in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, a feat of aviation aggressiveness few Cold War warriors ever experienced.

As a lieutenant, he quickly became one of the pioneers in the new S-3A, Viking community. This modern twin engine jet carrier-based air-antisubmarine aircraft would create many opportunities for Mad Man and his fellow S-3A crews to change their aviation community.

He wondered if North Island would be the same air station he had left over fourteen years ago. Since then he had commanded an East Coast S-3A squadron, been an “air boss” on an aircraft carrier, been “Jointed” and most recently a Naval War College November 1998 graduate. Mad Man was known to his shipmates to be a persistent, in charge and a *never let go* naval officer.

North Island was rich in aviation history and had been the forerunner for many aviation firsts for the navy, army and commercial aviation. The base was established on 8 November 1917. Mr. Glenn Curtis, Lieutenant Ellyson, and aircraft builder Glenn Martin pioneered the aviation industry from Coronado. Charles A. Lindbergh originated the first leg of his historic flight from North Island. The list of aviation firsts was impressive and the list of military pilots trained at North Island reads like a Who’s Who for aviators worldwide.¹

During his research at the War College, Mad Man learned that a lot had changed at North Island. Pier construction had been completed in August 1998 for homeporting nuclear aircraft carriers. He wondered if the environmentalist in the area had accepted homeporting nuclear carriers in the San Diego Bay. His future base hosted six major

military flag staffs (including two three-star type commander staffs), 23 aircraft squadrons with over 235 aircraft, 2 homeported aircraft carriers which are nuclear powered and conventional powered, and 75 additional tenants. The largest tenant is a large industrial facility, the Naval Aviation Depot employing over 3,800 civilians. Mad Man's base hosted 30,000 active duty, reserve and civilian personnel. His 5,000 acres of real property included the recently consolidated Naval Amphibious base Coronado, Outlying Field Imperial Beach, and Naval Auxiliary Landing Facility San Clemente Island, an island located seventy miles northwest of San Diego.² Clearly a vast kingdom, and more than enough for one navy captain to head up. (Appendix 1)

Before checking into North Island, Mad Man made a courtesy visit to his new boss, Rear Admiral Dottie Pratt, commander, Navy Region, Southwest. The admiral was out of town and the chief of staff, Captain "Condor" Gruman, ushered Mad Man into his office. Mad Man knew that Condor Gruman had recently been the commanding officer of a naval air station and that he had turned the air station over to the Marines as a base realignment and closure action. No doubt that Condor was used to the dynamic environment of change. After a cup of coffee and swapping sea stories, Captain Gruman pulled out a PowerPoint presentation on the Navy's Southwest Region and regionalization.

What captured Mad Man's attention was Gruman's discussion of not only the San Diego area and the Southwest Region including California, Arizona, and Nevada, but the appearance of a deliberate exclusion of focus on his future command of North Island. Mad Man truly expected Gruman to raise recent issues and problems at North Island for his in briefing from the staff. Gruman seemed to focus on regional issues. Gruman came right to the point. "Mad Man, the admiral is greatly concerned with this region and the regional consolidation of base operating support functions. She wants her shore installation commanding officers to fully understand regionalization and to move the consolidation of base operating support initiatives forward. Let me explain. As part of a Navy-wide infrastructure cost reduction initiative, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) restructured all Pacific Fleet shore installations. A single commander now has been given the responsibility for management and oversight of all naval shore installations within a geographical region."³

"Before 1996, all naval air station commanding officers reported to their type commander - commander, U.S. Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet (AirPac); naval station commanding officers reported to their type commander - commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SurfPac) and submarine base commanding officers reported to their type commander - commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SubPac) for administration, funding and oversight. Each of these type commanders is a vice admiral. Now Rear Admiral Pratt and Navy Region, Southwest has the responsibility for oversight of base operating support functions for all of the shore installations in this region. This CINCPACFLT initiative reduces management, base support redundancies and duplication of effort.

"Before regionalization each station commander in this region staffed, managed and funded, from a type commander's budget, all base operating support functions such as housing, environmental, food services, security, fire, family services, port/air services,

bachelor quarters (BQ), supply, morale welfare and recreation (MWR), chaplain, legal services, and the list goes on. Yes, there was some sharing between small and large installations, but nothing of the magnitude we envision of the future state for the Southwest Region. Regionalization creates better business practices that seek savings through centralized management and training and the implementation of a centralized operations.”

Gruman paused and then continued. “What this means Mad Man is that instead of five fully staffed MWR activities, we now have one regionalized office headed by an MWR program manager (PM) who is responsible for funding and managing all regional MWR activities. During your turn-over at North Island you will meet with your MWR site manager and Admiral Pratt’s MWR program manager for a more detailed briefing.”

Mad Man accepted Gruman’s explanation as a sound cost savings business practice. He wondered how this change would affect him as a base commander.

“Installation commanders,” Condor went on, “have always been responsible for providing base operating support services. Before our regionalization initiatives, hosting base commanders met the demands of their tenants. Admiral Pratt is expecting her shore commanders to not only lead on their installation, but to manage and lead throughout the region. She has established a regional organization that will provide the highest level of support and quality of life for our sailors and operating forces. By regionalizing services, we can substantially reduce the cost of these services while continuing to meet the demands of the fleet. The Southwest Region now covers eleven major shore installations in California and Nevada, whose commanding officers report to Admiral Pratt (Appendix 2).”⁴

Gruman handed Mad Man a Navy Region, Southwest web-site fact sheet, and he was amazed to see that Southwest Region shore installations supported over sixty surface ships, over 376,600 people with military ties and over 600 aircraft (Appendices 3 and 4). The immensity of this region was almost overwhelming to Mad Man, and he again wondered how he played regionally and inside his North Island fence.

Captain Gruman continued, “Regionalization resulted from declining defense budgets and resources. Navy planners determined that area naval stations needed to reduce their budgets by \$47 million in four years. So the logical place to begin our ‘new look’ at how to embark on this new era of shore management is to start with the dollar. The type commanders used to budget installations with different colors of money for the many functions that bases performed, *i.e.*, facilities maintenance, MWR, utilities and other funding lines. Back then installation commanders possessed a certain amount of personal power and autonomy in moving money around to meet emergent or crisis funding demands. Those days are gone.

“As we regionalized in the Southwest Region, we identified the many base support functions that our shore installations perform. By consolidating a function into a single area of office, the region can provide that same service for all regional commands; thereby, eliminating duplication and cost. We then identified base operating support functional consolidation centers and appointed assistant chiefs of staff (ACOS) and program

managers (PM) to support the ACOSs. Budgets originate with CINCPACFLT, who then task commander, Navy Region, Southwest to provide budget authority to ACOSs for their functional responsibility, in your case Mad Man you are responsible for airport operations in this region.

“You will be the ACOS for airport operations. As an ACOS you will be a member of the Navy Region, Southwest staff, just like all the other ACOSs. As the airport operations ACOS you currently oversee and fund navy air fields in the San Diego area. Soon you will also be responsible for over-the-horizon airport operations at NAF El Centro, California, NAS Lemoore, California and NAS Fallon, Nevada.

“You have three major pier facilities at North Island. The installation commander at Naval Station San Diego is the ACOS for port operations in this region and funds, manages, and maintains port facilities in the region and on your installation.

“Admiral Pratt sees installation commanders as a special selection, and envisions a special regional leadership role from them. Here is an organizational matrix diagram that identifies ACOSs, PMs, and functional responsibility, by the way the troops refer to this diagram as the ‘galactic radiator’ (Appendices 4 and 5). I recommend that as you ramp-up that you keep our mantra in mind:

- No tenant should do what a base can do more cost effectively.
- No base should do what a region can do more cost effectively.
- No Region should do what the surrounding community can do more cost effectively.⁵

“During the past two years, a little over 770 civilian positions have been eliminated in the region. The blow was lessened by offering voluntary early retirement, by other incentives, by not filling billets as they were vacated through normal attrition, and by finding our employees other jobs in the federal and private sector. Twenty-three people were laid off, and we still worry about this. Military billets are now being considered for reductions.⁶

“Well, Mad Man, I have taken up a lot of your time. This process is an evolution. We are now restructuring the Southwest Region and hope to be reengineering by fiscal year 1999.”

As Mad Man departed the headquarters building, he noticed a mission and a vision statement on the bulkhead:

- Mission . . . We are a regional team dedicated to providing the highest level of base operating support and quality of life services for all operating forces and shore activities in the Southwest Region.
 - Vision . . . We will be recognized as the leader in shore installation management. One Team, One Voice, One Mission.⁷
-

While driving across the Coronado Bay Bridge, Mad Man thought that not only was he going to be a base commander, but he was going to be a member of Admiral Pratt's staff, and he would be directing airport operations at several naval air stations. Something was truly going to be different about this major command. There was going to be a full range of issues beyond commanding North Island that he had never considered before. This was not going to be like commanding a shore installation before regionalization.

Mad Man's next stop would be to meet with Captain Dan "db" Bendix, the naval officer he would be relieving as commanding officer of North Island in two weeks. Dan was on the flag promotion list and would be transferring to a Joint command in Europe. Dan and Mad Man had been junior officers together at North Island many years ago flying from the anti-submarine aircraft carrier USS *Ticonderoga* (CVS-14). The airwing and battle group supporting *Ticonderoga* was dedicated to antisubmarine warfare. Dan Bendix was a helicopter pilot and had flown the venerable SH-3D Sea King. Those were the days when entire battle groups were tasked with either antisubmarine warfare or power projection. In the mid 70s following Vietnam, as the aircraft carrier force was reduced, antisubmarine aircraft carriers were retired, and the air-antisubmarine communities were merged with the fighter and attack communities onto one aircraft carrier. Mad Man remembered the culture that had to be overcome and the many innovations that were implemented as the air-antisubmarine communities moved onboard the already crowded flight decks of the "fighting" aircraft carriers. He pondered parallels between that consolidation and today's regionalization.

"Come on in, Mad Man, and welcome aboard," shouted Dan. Helo pilots always seemed to be hard of hearing and spoke too loud, Mad Man thought. Dan's nickname "db" or Decibel was fitting for a helo pilot. "Well, Mad Man, I hope the regionalization train stopped long enough for you to get on, because you are now on this train and we are moving fast. My schedule is full today, tomorrow and everyday, so in a minute or so I will send you in to see our executive officer. Today I take CINCPACFLT out to San Clemente Island. And, tomorrow the CINC and I take the Secretary of the Navy and several British VIPs back out to San Clemente to observe one of their submarines launch a Tomahawk cruise missile that will impact a target on San Clemente. This will be a first for the British Navy. The environmentalists in Southern California will be calling North Island to protest about the event. I must spend seventy percent of my time with environmental issues at San Clemente and with the nuclear carrier now homeported at North Island. In fact, I am meeting with the local Coronado community tonight to once again discuss safety and the impact of homeporting a nuclear carrier in San Diego."

Mad Man asked, "If you spend seventy percent of your time dealing with the environment, what is the role of the Environment ACOS? Does the Environment ACOS just provide funding, people, advice, and technical guidance?"

Captain Bendix continued, "You and the ACOS for the environment, Captain Bob Convair, the commanding officer at the submarine base across the bay, will get to know each other real well. He is the Environment and Public Safety ACOS. You will get the phone calls about a near extinct bird, the Loggerhead Shrike, on San Clemente Island. Captain

Convair can explain the impact on operational readiness if we lose access to the San Clemente range (Appendix 6). Basically we need to safeguard the Loggerhead Shrike, or if we don't, we could lose use of the range. To keep regionalization in the forefront of your mind, the ACOS for ranges is the commanding officer of NAS Fallon Nevada. The three of you will be working San Clemente Island issues with fleet and type commanders, who are greatly concerned over any loss of target areas and range time on the island.

"Mad Man you will be busy here at North Island. A trip to San Clemente Island is an all day affair for the commanding officer. Flights to the island leave in the morning and return in the late afternoon. Two years ago Naval Amphibious Base Coronado (NAB) merged into North Island. This is not a small base. It hosts a three star's staff - commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet - plus all of the special warfare and special boat operations people are homeported at NAB for the Pacific Fleet. Further south about ten miles you also have Outlying Field Imperial Beach. This is a lot of property that you are responsible and accountable for Mad Man. It is virtually impossible to visit all of your property each day.

"Before I dash off, I want to mention a concern of regional base commanding officers. As during the past hundred years, we have been responsible and accountable to provide shore installation tenants with quality support, and the operational commanders will not tolerate degradation in services or embarrassing incidents. Like the base commanders before us, you will get that late night phone call when someone is unhappy. Our base commander's cultural baggage of sole autonomous control, accountability, and responsibility while in command has been instilled in us. Each base commander is now more dependent on a dynamic surrounding external environment. Before, chaplains, security, fire, MWR, legal services, and the many other base operating support functions were attached to the base, and reported solely to shore installation commanding officers. This is not the case with regionalization. You will now be working with ACOSs and their program managers from outside your base for most of your base operating support functional areas. Most of the personnel in base operating support functions will now be attached to ACOSs at other naval stations. I recommend that you study and understand these functional relationships. As you see from our briefing chart (Appendix 7), the relationships resemble the "galactic radiator" chart for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process.


"Well I need to run and pick up the CINC for his tour of San Clemente Island. Welcome aboard and see you on the podium at the Change-of-Command."

Mad Man walked down the passageway to the executive officer's office. The executive officer, Commander Rob Whitney, introduced himself and offered Mad Man a cup of hot coffee on a typically warm sunny Southern California afternoon. Passing on the coffee, Mad Man came right to the point.

"Rob, let me pose a question, and you enlighten me. Do I have a base security officer and is he or she located on this base?"

Rob smiled and readied himself for more than one follow-up question. This was a typical question from new arrivals—the command relationships under regionalization. "Yes sir

and no sir. Base security for San Diego bases was one of our first services to be regionalized. However, it has not been exported over-the-horizon to Fallon, Lemoore, or El Centro. Let me explain using the blackboard,” Rob said, and drew the diagram below.



“Captain, you have a base security officer on North Island with a team of security officers. North Island’s security officer reports to you and to the security program manager over in the Security Command and Control Center in San Diego. The security program manager in turn reports to the ACOS for Public Safety, Captain Bob Convair, the commanding officer of the submarine base. Captain Convair writes our security officer’s fitness report and provides us with funding, resources and manning for North Island’s security function. Only ACOSs and program managers have total and accountable budget authority. Base commanding officers provide the security program manager an input for their security officer’s evaluation.

“If we have an issue regarding base security, we call our security officer. The issue is usually resolved by our security officer. However if not resolved, and for instance you want to open more base access gates to reduce automobile grid-lock in the city of Coronado which requires an increase in security personnel, our security officer would then request the increase in manning through the regional security program manager. Traffic congestion in the City of Coronado generates many phone calls to this office. If we are still stuck, then you would contact the regional ACOS, Captain Convair, to get permission for more personnel beyond our assigned fair share.”

Mad Man interrupted Rob, “I can now understand what Captain Bendix was talking about when he mentioned a dynamic surrounding external environment. Is this basically how it works regionally for all base operating support functional areas?”

“Yes Sir,” responded the executive officer. “We are just now putting together a regional MWR office. October 1998 was the target month to begin implementing regionalization of

base operating support functions in the local San Diego area. Chaplains, legal services, security, fire, family housing and bachelor quarters are several of the functions, which are fully implemented. The next implementation milestone for these functions will be to include Fallon, Lemoore and El Centro.”

“Excuse me, Rob,” Mad Man commented, “as these functions expand over-the-horizon, to the out of area bases, will we lose services?”

“Of course that possibility exists,” Rob responded. “But, the functional program managers and ACOSs (assistant chief of staffs) will have to work issues as they arise. Admiral Pratt hosts a monthly executive steering committee (ESC). Each ACOS is not only a member of the admiral’s staff, but is also an ESC member. The scheduled ESC meeting next week has an agenda item that will determine if base commanding officers will submit additional duty (ADDU) concurrent performance evaluations for civilian and military members assigned by ACOSs and program managers to the various bases. Captain, this would provide a concurrent written evaluation from you on the senior people leading the many base operating functions on your base.

“I also recommend that you raise the issue of nonjudicial punishment (NJP) and court-martials for military personnel working in base operating support functions on your base. The policy is that ACOSs, program managers, and base commanders huddle and decide who will hold NJP. Captain, many people will look to you as the responsible and accountable officer for good order and discipline on your base.

“Captain, I have been the executive officer for two years and personally involved with every regionalization action at North Island. Today my detailer called and indicated that I will be reporting to the Naval War College for the March 1999 class, with a follow on Joint tour. That means that I will have to transfer in about eight weeks to make the class convening date. Sorry that I will not be here longer to aid your takeover of North Island and especially with exporting airport operations over-the-horizon.”

Mad Man thought, “Welcome aboard, captain. There goes my expertise!”

As Mad Man drove around North Island, he noted a lot of aircraft in the local flying pattern. Helicopters were mixed with the fixed-winged S-3A jets, and all of them were either airborne or moving on the runways and taxiways. It all seemed orderly, but how could the pattern possibly hold one more aircraft? It was clear that North Island was a lot busier then in the 70s. His airport operations officer must really be busy orchestrating this airborne ballet at North Island.

Commander Dave Curtis, North Island’s airport operations officer, invited Mad Man into to his office overlooking runways 09-27. Before Commander Curtis finished with introducing his staff, three F/A-18Cs had landed and gone to full power for another trip around the pattern and more touch-and-go landings.

“Yes, sir,” Dave said, “North Island is operating at just about maximum tempo. We do get our share of noise complaints. But, air operations departments are used to dealing with these issues. Presently, my Airport Operations Department manages North Island’s airfield, the outlying airfield at Imperial Beach, and San Clemente Island’s airfield. We did this before regionalization. What concerns me is the over-the-horizon regionalization that is supposed to take place this fiscal year. Managing the airfields at El Centro, Fallon, and Lemoore from here in San Diego will add a dynamic that has not been completely accepted or planned. The commanding officers of those naval air stations must also be wondering what control they will be losing. Just operating North Island and our two outlying fields takes the majority of my time. I really wonder what my role will be as your program manager for airport operations when we go over-the-horizon. I guess that is why you are here, captain!”

Dave Curtis continued, “From my experience here, I do not see what efficiencies and cost reductions will be gained by consolidating airport management here at North Island. It takes a lot of people to operate and maintain a naval airport facility. I have been speaking with the air operations officers from the other air stations. Possibly the best we could do is to centralize budgeting and customer charging here at North Island. As your program manager, I look forward to your policy and implementation guidance.

“Captain, there is an issue that we need to resolve soon after you take command. We have two C-12 aircraft (twin engine turboprop) for logistical support and six pilots assigned to fly them. Four of the pilots, including me, are assigned to North Island’s Airport Operations Department and it is easy for me to schedule them for the daily support flights that we provide. But, the other two pilots are assigned to base operating support functions that are now led by ACOSs from outside the base. I am starting to get word from these two pilots that their new bosses expect them to work on support functions first, and to fly second. Captain this will really complicate my scheduling if I have to go to an ACOS every time I want fly these two pilots. Our station C-12 pilots fly a lot to meet North Island’s air-movement scheduling demands. Seems like I am in the air more than on the ground. By the way, I retire in one year. Captain, you are also on flying orders. You will get to fly the C-12 whenever you let me know that you will be free. We have you set up with a mandatory two week C-12 ground school in Wichita, Kansas in January, followed by training flights here at North Island. I hope to see you on the schedule.”

“Dave, I will have to get back with you on our role as ACOS and program manager for airport operations in the Southwest Region,” Mad Man stated as he headed for the door.

Mad Man’s next stop was at North Island’s ordnance magazine area for his meeting with the weapons officer, Commander Chester Winchester. Mad Man knew that Chester began his naval career as an enlisted aviation ordnance man during Vietnam. Chester had worked his way up through the ranks and had been selected for the limited duty officer commissioning program. He was known as the best ordnance officer in the Pacific Fleet.

“Captain, welcome aboard, it has been a long time since I loaded a MK-46 torpedo onto your airplane. Please have a seat and let me describe your Weapons Department and how North Island will fit into the Southwest Region.

“The ACOS for weapons is the commanding officer of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, a naval base adjacent to Long Beach’s harbor, about 120 miles north of here. I am the ACOSs program manager for all ordnance, and weapons issues in the Southwest Region and also North Island’s weapons officer. As the weapons program manager, I fund, train, coordinate all ordnance movements and inspect all ordnance programs here in the county. If two surface ships over at the Naval Station are directed to cross-deck some ordnance, I now orchestrate that action. We call ourselves the 1-800 number for all weapons actions in this region.

“The ACOS writes my fitness report. Sir, two years ago North Island consolidated with the Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) here in Coronado. Here at North Island we finally have NAB and San Clemente Island working on the same sheet of music. In fact, I lost one personnel billet when we consolidated. I am now working the San Diego regionalization of the submarine base and surface ship base over at the Naval Station. We have not yet gone over-the-horizon to Fallon, Lemoore, and El Centro. That action will add a dynamic that is being planned in Seal Beach and here. Creating a regional base operating support function will eliminate duplication, but weapons regionalization will take a lot of my personal time as we ramp-up.

“In about four months North Island will have its three-year weapons and magazine inspection. This is a comprehensive CINCPAC Fleet directed inspection that the Weapons ACOS in Seal Beach conducts.

“Sir, I hate to run off, but I have to observe a ship to ship movement of ordnance over at the Naval Station. My office is usually empty during the working day as we train and move weapons, however, I am on a beeper and cell-phone. Again, it is super to have you aboard sir.”

As Mad Man walked out to his staff car, he was thinking about his weapons officer who clearly had many responsibilities outside the fence of North Island, and responsibilities beyond what Mad Man considered Commander Winchester’s primary duty as North Island’s weapons officer. He wondered how he, as the commanding officer, would fit this command relationship together.

Mad Man left North Island and drove back across the Coronado Bay Bridge and made the turn off of I-5 for the Naval Station. He was scheduled to meet with Captain Wilhelm Krupp, the new regional program manager for MWR. Mad Man’s executive officer had briefed him that North Island’s MWR site manager had just been selected by Captain Krupp.

“Come on in and have a seat, Captain, and welcome aboard,” said Captain Krupp. “Let me explain what is going on in the regional MWR world and over at North Island. We are

implementing MWR regionalization for the San Diego bay area during December 1998. I am the program manager for MWR. The Support Services ACOS has this function plus three other base operating support functional areas.

“There was a tremendous amount of MWR duplication throughout San Diego. If any base operations support functional area was ripe for regionalization—it was MWR. Every base in this region had its own MWR director and support staff. Now there is just one MWR director, me, and we have consolidated all of the staffs here at the Naval Station. All payroll, marketing, personnel and contracting functions for MWR are now run from my office. By regionalizing we reduced our MWR billets by twenty-seven this fiscal year. I expect to create further manning reductions. I just discovered that we have a pro and Pro Shop manager at every golf course. Too much overhead, but we’ll change that. Yes, these personnel reductions create turmoil among employees, but we try to reduce the apprehension by offering various incentives and transfer options. I just completed the hiring process for North Island’s site manager. North Island still has the employee manning to operate the many MWR activities for our Sailors; however, the site manager no longer has a personal staff. North Island’s site manager reports to me, and I oversee his management of your MWR programs.”

“Excuse me,” Mad Man interrupted. “What will my relationship be with my site manager?”

Captain Krupp continued, “I would expect the site manager to attend your department head meetings and be attentive to customer demands at North Island. I would expect North Island’s MWR Department to continue monthly tenant MWR meetings. Your site manager’s mission is to provide quality MWR programs at North Island. Captain, you and your staff, and base tenants are my on-site quality control representatives.”

Mad Man again interrupted. “What if we identify the need to build a car wash for our sailors and marines at North Island? Can I authorize this action? Or, if we sponsor a special event and expertly manage our programs, do we get to keep the profits we generate?”

“In answer to your first question, the answer is no, you cannot authorize building the car wash. If I see that we have a profit margin exceeding expenses, I could authorize North Island’s MWR site manager to build your car wash. But, to be honest, I would first have to look at regional projects and fit yours into a prioritized list of projects to do. We are looking to balance MWR programs throughout the regional area. North Island traditionally makes money because you have a large customer base. The remote bases lose money. Admiral Pratt and I are committed to providing equal or better service for our sailors and marines at all of our shore installations.

“If you and I cannot agree, then we have the opportunity to raise our MWR concerns at Admiral Pratt’s executive steering committee meetings. North Island’s tenants have the opportunity to raise their concerns at the monthly commander, Navy Region, Southwest Customer Advisory Board (CAB) meetings regarding all regionalization issues.

"We are developing a regional MWR plan, one master plan that consolidates many of the redundancies and improves quality of life for our personnel. With the savings we realize we should be able to build your car wash Captain. I can only parrot the vision, *One Team, One Voice, One Mission.*"

Mad Man bid Captain Krupp good-bye and headed for the base's fast food geedunk and a quick lunch before his meeting at the Public Works Center. While standing in line he overheard two chief petty officers complaining about regionalization and MWR. The gist of their complaint seemed to be that it was impossible to checkout baseball equipment from the Fitness Center. They seemed convinced that regionalization was the reason for their difficulties. But Mad Man knew from his briefing that MWR regionalization had not even been implemented yet at the Naval Station. He wondered if regionalization was as big of a mystery for the crews of homeported ships as it was for him a few days ago.

Mad Man was welcomed into Captain Douglas McDonald's office. Captain McDonald was the commanding officer Public Works Center, located at the Naval Station, and he was also the ACOS for Public Works for all of the regional bases.

Captain McDonald started, "I know that you are short on time, so let me quickly explain how this command will support North Island. I have a public works officer assigned to North Island, and your installation is manned to provide the tenants with support. Mad Man, your public works officer works for you and me. Each shore installation used to have an entire Public Works Department. This created a lot of redundancies and inefficiencies throughout this region. Regionalization of public works makes great business sense. We base-lined public works personnel manning for the entire region in 1996, and through fiscal year 1999 we reduced 130 jobs by consolidating many redundant public works base operating support functions. I estimate that we saved about 7.5 million dollars in facilities and infrastructure cost by consolidating base operating support functions. Since 1 October 1998, Admiral Pratt owns all Class I (land) and Class II (buildings) real property. If you look at the 'galactic radiator' (Appendix 6) you will see that as the ACOS for Public Works I am responsible for facility maintenance, vehicles/support equipment and utilities. I have program managers assigned to each of these base operating support functions. Your public works officer at North Island would use these program managers to work issues. If not resolvable at that level, then you and I would reach a resolution or take it to Admiral Pratt's monthly ESC meeting."

"OK," Mad Man stated. "I understand that I have a fully up and operating base public works officer that reports to your program managers and passes my concerns. But as I look at the 'galactic radiator' I noticed that BQs and housing belongs to another ACOS and not Public Works. If a BQs roof leaks or the exterior needs painting, who funds that job?"

"As I see it, Mad Man, the BQ/housing ACOS would fund that job, and we would do the work," Captain McDonald replied. "However, these are what we refer to as 'white space' issues. The ACOS for BQs may believe that I have that funding responsibility since I am responsible for maintenance. There are many 'white space' issues out there that will have to be

identified. Regionalization will have to be a malleable process as we determine ACOS base operating support cross functional responsibilities.”

The day after the change of command, Mad Man finally had a chance to sit down with Admiral Pratt.

“Well, Mad Man, welcome aboard, and I hope that you have had a chance to get acquainted with many of your ACOS counterparts,” Admiral Pratt stated. “Here in the San Diego area we are on the cutting edge for streamlining base operating support functions. We want to take advantage of new technologies and business practices. Therefore, Mad Man, I will be expecting you to know your command and to provide the leadership that this shore installation regional transformation is going to require.

“As the base commander you are responsible for good order, discipline, and the safety and welfare of personnel and property. You are the on-scene advocate for fleet units and your tenants. While in command of North Island, you will be coordinating functions, events and responding to each crisis.⁸ Your responsibility, authority, and accountability as the commanding officer of North Island has not changed.”

Lieutenant Commander Wesson stuck her head in the door. “Excuse me admiral, there has been an incident on San Clemente Island. It appears that some of the environmentalists assigned to the island were counting Loggerhead Shrikes in one of the ordnance impact areas and were fired on by one of our surface ships. We do not know the extent of injuries yet.”

“Mad Man, you and the Range ACOS in Fallon and the Environmental ACOS over at the submarine base had better get right on this,” the admiral stated. “We can not have the environmentalists shut us down at San Clemente Island; that would cause a major impact on fleet readiness.”


Notes

1. Naval Air Station North Island web page, 24 November 98, <<http://www.nasni.navy.mil/welcome.htm>.>
2. Navy Region Southwest web page, 24 November 98, <<http://www.cnbsd.navy.mil/Mission/mission.htm>.>
3. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, quotes represent paraphrased material based on interviews with military and civilian personnel while conducting research for this case study during November 1998.
4. Navy Region Southwest web page, 24 November 98, <<http://www.snbsd.navy.mil/Mission/mission.htm>.>
5. Commander Navy Region, Southwest power point presentation, presented by Captain B. Rollins, chief of staff, 16 October 1998, to NSDM Department, Naval War College.
6. James, W. Crawley, “Navy Restructuring Deemed a Success,” *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 29 July 1998, sec. B, 1.
7. Commander Navy Region, Southwest power point presentation, presented by Captain B. Rollins, chief of staff, 16 October 1998, to NSDM Department, Naval War College.
8. Ibid, 24.




APPENDIX 1

NAVAL REGION SOUTHWEST - SAN DIEGO COUNTY



CD-98-NSDM-4 (JRN)

APPENDIX 2





APPENDIX 3

Navy Region Southwest Information

NAVY BASES IN SOUTHWEST REGION:

- NAS North Island/NAB Coronado
- Naval Station San Diego
- Naval Submarine Base Pt. Loma/SPAWAR
- Naval Regional Medical Center
- NAS Lemoore
- NAS Fallon
- NAS Pt. Mugu
- NAF El Centro
- CBC Port Hueneme
- NWS Seal Beach (10/1)
- NWS Falibrook (10/1)

REGIONAL PERSONNEL STATS:

- Navy: 85,900
- Civilian: 37,800
- Military Family: 198,600
- Retirees: over 85,000
- Reserves: 9000

REGIONAL PAYROLL (U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & CIVILIAN TOTAL): \$3.93 BILLION

- Regional Operational Stats:
- Aircraft Squadrons: 58
- Aircraft: 626
- Ships: 46 Surface Combatants
- PCs: 4
- CV/CVNs: 2
- Submarines: 6
- MSC (Military Sealift Command): 4



APPENDIX 4

SAN DIEGO NAVY-CURRENT FACTS Updated: 10 August 1998

THE NAVY IN SAN DIEGO INCLUDES HOMEPORTS FOR:

- 46 Surface ships
- 6 Submarines
- 4 Coastal Patrol Boats for our SEALs
- 2 Aircraft Carriers - CONSTELLATION and JOHN C. STENNIS
- 5 USNS ships, USNS MERCY, 2 Oilers and 2 Fleet Tugs

THE NAVY IN SAN DIEGO INCLUDES:

- 67,380 Sailors
- 58,680 Male, 8,700 Female
- 40,000 Marines, (30 K Camp P, 2 K MCRD, 3K MCAS)
- 4,630 Naval Reservists
- 36,000 Civilian workers
- 57,900 Military retirees
- 170,000+ Family members
- Total of 376,600 people in the county with military ties.

CURRENT CHANGES UNDERWAY HERE INCLUDE:

- Marine F/A 18S and helos moving from MCAS El Toro and Tustin to Miramar
- 2000 Marine personnel moving into San Diego
- All F-14 squadrons have moved to NAS Oceana
- E-2CS moving off Miramar to Point Mugu
- Top gun moved to NSA WC at NAS Fallon

OTHER CHANGES:

- At least one NIMITZ class carrier: USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN-74) to NAS North Island August 26, 1998
- Dredging of San Diego Bay and carrier turning basin to accommodate larger ships completed August, 1998
- Navy partnering with the state of California to replenish sand with remaining project funds for dredging



APPENDIX 4 (CONT.)

- THE NAVAL TRAINING CENTER (N.T.C.) closed in 1997, and the land was divided between the navy and the city of San Diego

87 acres at N.T.C. will be kept by the U.S. Marine Corps


500 new housing units proposed

- \$15 million for new medical and dental facilities
- Fire fighting training area for San Diego Fire Department
- Commercial property for hotels, convention centers
- Expansion of Lindbergh Field
- SPAWARS moved into town from D.C. in 1997

\$3 billion in annual contracts

800 Navy and civilian personnel and positions moved to San Diego


REGIONALIZATION




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APPENDIX 5


APPENDIX 6



APPENDIX 7



APPENDIX 8



Naval Submarine Support Facility: Submarine Base New London (A)

DOUGLAS A. YESENSKY

On a beautiful 1999 New England summer day, while driving north on I-95, Captain Jack Pine crossed the Thames River above Groton, Connecticut, and glanced down at the east bank and the New London Submarine Base. It had been a little over six years since he had commanded the attack submarine USS *Boise* (SSN 764), homeported in New London. From this distance the sub base looked the same—old. The waterfront remained the Atlantic fleet’s leading industrial repair center for attack submarines.

Jack realized that he would be commanding that major industrial facility in just five days. Command of Naval Submarine Support Facility (NSSF), New London, was not the command of the submarine squadron (SUBRON) he coveted. But, in this austere downsizing era, a major command in New London was something to be excited about in Jack’s book. During his twenty-seven years in the “silent service” he had always been a customer of submarine repair facilities. Like all waterfront customers he believed that repair facilities could do a better job.

Jack had spent most of his career on various submarines prior to command of the *Boise*, and he had been an instructor at the Submarine School in New London. After command of *Boise*, Jack spent a year at the Naval War College, three years with the commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), working regional policy issues, and, most recently, two years in the five-sided building working Navy Pacific Rim policy.

Jack recalled a recent *Boston Globe* article about the submarine force that indicated operations tempo (OPTEMPO) was still a critical issue. The David Abel article stated,

According to the U.S. Navy, the number of missions demanded of its submarine force has doubled since 1990, with espionage, reconnaissance, and attack missions focusing not just on Russia but also on more than 600 subs owned by nations such as Iran, North Korea, and China. With the U.S. submarine fleet 40 percent smaller than in 1990, the Navy says it can no longer carry out all the missions the Pentagon would like. ‘We are already saying no to important requirements,’ said, Vice Admiral Giambastiani, head of Atlantic Fleet submarine forces. ‘We are saying no because we flat out have less resources.’¹

As Jack drove through the main gate he remembered the first time he had come through this gate. He was a Sailor, designated as a nuclear electricians mate, and just promoted to

petty officer third class, on his way to the Submarine School along with thirty-three others. After his first deployment on a fast attack submarine, he was selected for the Navy's Enlisted Commissioning Program at Purdue University. Hard work, attention to detail and pursuit of excellence got him through command and promotion to captain. Jack was known to operationally press the undersea environment and to be demanding of his crew.

Jack noticed that the Sub Base had remained unchanged, the "lower base" being the waterfront and industrial complex; and the "upper base" being the administration buildings, the Submarine School, and the Hospital. The submarine base remained crowded, with little parking and the lower base still looked like a large complex industrial morass. Jack remembered that the base was established in 1868 on 112 acres of farmland. Starting in 1881, the Base was used as a Coaling Station. In 1915 the Coaling Station became Naval Submarine Base New London. Since then, Naval Submarine Base New London has been an icon in U.S. Navy submarine culture and history.

Many of the waterfront buildings were constructed during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Buildings 1 and 2 were built around 1873, and are the headquarters of the SUBRONs. Over ten thousand active duty personnel and over two thousand civilians are employed on the sub base. Of note, the base has over 1,750 buildings; with only 170 buildings constructed since World War II.²

One had to wonder if anyone was thinking of replacing old buildings with new ones. The impact was obvious; there was no vacant land to build on. For every building that was to be built, one would first have to be demolished. Jack asked himself, where would tenants go while construction was ongoing, and how would a military construction project affect submarine maintenance?

After spending fifteen minutes looking for a parking spot, Jack walked into his future headquarters at Building 89. Knowing that navy buildings are numbered sequentially, Jack guessed that his building was constructed well before World War II.

Jack was greeted by the commanding officer's receptionist, and then quickly ushered into Captain Doug Tamarack's office. "Welcome to your future command, NSSF," Captain Tamarack stated. "Leading this complex industrial submarine repair facility will be unlike any other command you have ever been in Jack, (Actors are listed at Appendix A).

"The concept behind submarine maintenance hasn't changed since your days in command Jack. Lower level, less complex maintenance and repair, often called organizational level maintenance, is still the responsibility of each submarine and its crew. Major repairs of propulsion systems and weapons systems, called depot level maintenance, are the responsibility of the shipyards. The NSSF is the intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) for the base. Intermediate repairs are either accomplished by the NSSF or contracted out to the private sector.

“Jack we have undergone a huge change since you commanded *Boise*. The SUBRONs have been reorganized. Also, how submarine maintenance is brokered has changed a lot. New London used to have two SUBRONs of about nine to twelve submarines each. Both squadrons had personnel for operations, maintenance scheduling, admin, training, and safety. So Jack, when you commanded *Boise* you went to the squadron for everything. Not any longer! Now there are three SUBRONs, each with six submarines. When the third squadron was being established, senior leadership recognized that a support staff for that squadron was not attainable. A support staff was created to serve all three squadrons (see Appendix B). This new unit is commanded by an O-5 commander, and is designated as the Submarine Squadron Support Unit (SSSU). Now the three SUBRON commanders (Navy captains) oversee operational tasking of their six submarines and the SSSU provides admin, maintenance job screening, supply, and a plethora of other functions for the commanding officers of the submarines. Submarine commanding officers now forward their proposed repair packages to the SSSU, not to the squadron commanders.

“The people over at the SUBRONs and SSSU will tell you that the new system works pretty well but, for me, here at the NSSF, it is just another layer that I have to work with. What really upsets me is the fact that the SSSU outsources work to other repair facilities without consulting us (Appendix C). This may cause us to lose work and money here at the NSSF.

“Furthermore, the three SUBRON commanders have not really empowered the SSSU. If the SSSU rejects maintenance requirements from a submarine, for instance, because the maintenance is lower level and could be performed by the submarine itself, that submarine’s squadron must approve the SSSU’s rejection. So you have three squadron commanders closely watching the SSSU and competing for services for their submarines.

“The leadership in the submarine force has recognized the requirement for dedicated intermediate maintenance availability periods. But, operational and other scheduling conflicts still crop up.

“Each submarine nominally adheres to a twenty-four month schedule (Appendix D). Six months are forward deployed and eighteen months here in her homeport. NSSF, as the lead intermediate maintenance activity (IMA), is tasked with establishing two five-week dedicated maintenance periods during the eighteen-month homeport period. Jack, this command, the SSSU, the submarine, and the SUBRON commanders establish a four-week planning period followed by five-weeks of intensive IMA.

“Our process works efficiently when these schedules are honored. Problems arise when operational tasking interrupts the two maintenance periods. In today’s climate, repair resources are thin, and we really pay a price when efficiency suffers.”

Jack remembered the *Boston Globe* article and wondered if operational leadership would adhere to the schedule. After all, Jack thought, submarines are national assets, subject to quick tasking.

Captain Tamarack continued. "Let me quickly discuss some of the daily issues nipping at our heels. NSSF employs one thousand people. Eighty percent are Sailors, and they work in the various repair shops. This is their shore duty. These shore duty billets enable our Sailors to improve their maintenance and repair expertise and skills. Upon return to a submarine, these newly acquired skills can be used to improve onboard submarine maintenance and troubleshooting. A great benefit to the captain, crew, and Navy."

Jack thought that another side benefit might be an increased permeability between the NSSF and submarines.

"However," Captain Tamarack went on, "most of these eight hundred Sailors are not submariners. Many are surface warfare enlisted personnel who transport these skills back to the surface fleet. Our submariners can roll from sea to shore duty and stay in the New London area. The surface warriors only remain in the area for their shore duty and then are transferred out of area to a surface warfare naval station. Added to this, is the high cost of living in this area. Nuclear submariners get a bonus, but surface designated Sailors do not. Therefore, surface warfare Sailors are financially strapped and have to transfer and relocate out of area after shore duty. Jack you can guess how this affects morale?"

"Regarding personnel at the NSSF, the big picture of where the Navy is going is an initiative called the New England Maintenance Manpower Initiative (NEMMI); which involves privatization—basically shifting jobs to the private sector. The formula provides .63 civilian employees for each Sailor. Next fiscal year 270 civilians from Electric Boat, a sub-division of General Dynamics, will replace about 430 Sailors here at NSSF. You and your staff will have to consider the consequences of this move. Integrating Navy female and male surface warriors, civilians, unions, vendors and contractors will be a challenge to your already full plate. Civilian night work is very costly. Working your Sailors at night will create a second order effect. They are on shore duty and may get out of the Navy. You will still have base operating support functions to fill, duty sections will have to be manned and you will have to provide Sailors to the sub base for the auxiliary security force.

"Well Jack I have a meeting with our ombudsman," Captain Tamarack stated, "seems like the families believe that we are working our Sailors too hard and NSSF is not what they thought shore duty would be like. See you on the podium for the change of command on Friday."


As Jack walked toward Building 1, and his meeting with the commanding officer of the SSSU, he recalled that many of the War College case studies reflected many of the problems he was facing.

Commander Dave Larch greeted Jack at the door and offered him a cup of coffee. Like Jack, Dave had been an enlisted submariner. He had been selected for commissioning through the limited duty officer (LDO) program. Although he had not commanded a submarine, Dave was in command of the SSSU. Quite an achievement Jack thought.

“Well captain,” Dave said, “I broker and schedule all maintenance, provide technical support, supply assistance, admin support, berthing plans, port services, and any other support the eighteen submarines assigned to SUBRONs TWO, FOUR and TWELVE need. Think of my organization as the support unit for those squadrons. I am manned with all the support personnel who used to be assigned to SUBRONs TWO and TWELVE, before the reorganization and establishment of SUBRON FOUR.”

Jack interrupted, “Tell me Dave, how does my command, NSSF, relate to the SSSU?”

“Take a look at my blackboard while I explain,” Dave said.³



“After I have a submarine’s maintenance package ready for intermediate or depot level maintenance, I direct the work to your command, contractors, shipyards, and vendors, (Appendix C). The submarines are my customers, and NSSF is a repair resource. I know Captain Tamarack, your predecessor, does not like the authority I have to divert work away from the NSSF. However, I need to schedule the work to best serve my customers.

“We do not want to send a submarine to an out-of-area shipyard. That takes the crew away from their families and homeport during the turn-around cycle. Nor, do we want to hold maintenance awaiting availability of a particular maintenance facility.

“The cost of repair or availability of a repair facility may require me to reject or defer a submarine’s work request. This does not sit well with the chain of command. Moreover, squadron commodores and submarine force flag officers were used to having support functions attached to their SUBRONs, so that they could better control their squadron. The three squadron commodores closely monitor the SSSU, their submarines, and all three then compete for SSSU services. Although the admiral signs my annual fitness report, I am sure that each commodore has an opportunity to make his input.

“Captain Pine, NSSF is just one of the many organizations that the SSSU has to work with to ensure those eighteen submarines are fully systems capable and ready for sea.”

Jack’s next appointment was with Captain Mac Manzanita, one of the SUBRON commodores. The other two commodores were in Millington, Tennessee, sitting on the line commander promotion board.

“Welcome aboard,” Mac said, as Jack walked into the SUBRON’s spaces, “and congratulations on command of the NSSF Jack, a great accomplishment considering your start as an enlisted man.

“In the old days NSSF was a nonstop, twenty-four hour by seven day, maintenance and repair facility. Now NSSF works Monday through Friday from 0800 to 1600, with no night, weekend, or holiday work. It used to be everything was fixed on our nuclear submarines. Our boss, Admiral Alder, commander, Submarine Group (SUBGRU) TWO (Appendix C), remembers those days when the NSSF worked around the clock and fixed everything. I have to answer the tough phone calls from him when I report that all systems on a submarine are not fully operational.

“The NSSF no longer has the time or work force to accept all the work that is generated by squadron submarines. Therefore, repair cost is rising because NSSF now outsources more repair work to other facilities. Contractors win with low bids, and low bids do not always assure the best maintenance for our submarines. NSSF used to fix almost everything. Now NSSF will not take all the repair jobs we used to send it.

“Sending one of my submarines to another facility from this sub base does not support OPTEMPO/personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) policy, and I lose training days at sea.

“The average age of the highly skilled submarine civilian laborer at the Portsmouth naval shipyard, in New Hampshire, as well as over at Electric Boat, is fifty-four. The workers from Portsmouth are no longer willing to come down here. Electric Boat is only building one new submarine, and cannot afford to retain and train a large work force. Young workers are looking for jobs elsewhere. The “big six” commercial shipyards have reduced their work force by one-third, dropping from 82,000 employees to 55,000 since 1991. They have been taking on ever more Navy repair and overhaul work, but state that they are at about half production capacity.⁴

“Our concern as operational SUBRON commanders is how will your loss of 430 Sailors, that will be replaced by 270 civilian laborers under the NEMMI plan, affect NSSF’s ability to surge for operational tasking by the fleet commander? Will outsourcing repair jobs to contractors, shipyards, and vendors raise costs to a level that prohibits fixing all the maintenance discrepancies a submarine documents?

“The admiral’s staff wants to look at the entire process of performing regional submarine maintenance. He understands that maintenance equals submarines at sea.”

“I just have to interrupt,” Jack said. “Thanks for raising so many issues. But, I am really curious, what do you believe NSSF’s working relationship is with your squadron and the SSSU?”

Mac continued. “The SSSU serves the three squadrons. It gives the submarine force another command billet. The three squadrons now compete for services we used to have imbedded in our own organization. In fact, Commander Larch worked for my squadron before the standup of the SSSU. However, problem solving and decision-making is just a phone call away. The other two squadron commanders, your predecessor at the NSSF, Doug Tamarack, and I are all Naval Academy classmates. We solve most issues together.

“Jack, I hate to raise issues without solutions, but I have a meeting with the admiral in fifteen minutes so I must fight the traffic to the upper base.”

As Mac departed, Jack decided it was time to discuss his new command with some of the leadership at NSSF.

Jack’s next meeting was with Commander Stanley Tupelo. Stan was the production management assistant for NSSF’s Repair Department. This would be Jack’s largest department. It included eleven divisions and over 750 employees.

Stan welcomed his new commanding officer and began to describe the submarine repair world as he saw it.

“Captain, I am responsible for scheduling and managing all the repair work that is done when the submarine is at our piers. We have a spider web of customers outside of NSSF. Not only are there eighteen submarines to repair, but also we have demands from the SSSU, shipyards, contractors like Electric Boat, and many vendors to consider. While a submarine is undergoing its five-weeks of dedicated maintenance availability someone has to coordinate the repair jobs by each of these organizations. We here at NSSF are the lead activity. Having a maintenance crew standing around waiting on another maintenance crew from another organization to finish a job is not efficient. Piers are not always compatible with certain work, crane service is a nightmare - too few cranes for too many jobs. Weapons loading can shut down an entire pier.

“With the NEMMI, someone needs to consider creating a three to five year regional plan that would integrate private industry, piers, cranes, and submarine scheduling for the five-week maintenance availability. Building a vision from here in the middle, at NSSF, may jump-start the process. What is the demand for future outsourcing, what will outsourcing cost the Navy, how can we improve efficiency and effectiveness, what are the capabilities of regional Navy repair facilities, and to what level will civilian skilled laborer decrease? Creating a New England regional maintenance team may provide the answers to these and many more questions. You will find that most of the real critical players in all of this don’t work for you, some are your peers and some are your seniors. I often find myself lobbying

various commands for cooperation, people, and work. Everybody has different time lines and priorities that they are following.”

“Stan thank you for your insights,” Jack stated. “Your observations focus on many of my new founded concerns. Yesterday I was thinking of only NSSF and our role in repairing submarines. Clearly there is more to do.”

Jack next met with his weapons officer, Lieutenant Commander Socrates Hemlock. “Tell me Soc, what do I need to do as the future commanding officer to improve NSSF?”

“Captain that is easy,” Soc replied, “get me some cranes. There are not enough cranes on this base to support repairing submarines and loading weapons. Sub base public works owns the cranes and they never attend the SSSU maintenance planning conferences. The crane operators and crane schedulers are civilian employees and they do not have a clue about the importance of my people getting weapons off the trucks and onto the submarines. The SSSU schedules our weapons moves, but weapons loading often interferes with maintenance on submarines tied up to the same pier. I end up having seventy of my people stand around with weapons on trucks while we sort out cranes, piers, and maintenance. Loading a weapon shuts down a large area of a pier and adjacent areas, precluding maintenance on pier-side submarines.”

“Thanks Soc,” Jack said. “It is time for me to meet with the Sub Base Public Works Officer.”

The sub base public works officer (PWO) works for the commanding officer of the base. Jack knew that NSSF was a huge industrial complex that the PWO and Jack were responsible for maintaining and operating. Submarine intermediate maintenance could not be accomplished without the machine shops. Jack looked at his buildings, while he waited for the PWO, and he wondered how much longer these old buildings would hold together.

Commander Sandi Tanoak saluted and introduced herself to Jack.

Sandi stated: “ I have a Sub Base demolition master plan and I have identified buildings for demolition based on two simple criteria—condition and cost to operate. Captain, most of your buildings are cost prohibitive to operate, especially in the winter. NSSF’s heating bill alone takes more from Ft. Knox than Goldfinger tried to steal!”

Jack interrupted, “Sandi I understand that the SSSU is heading up a pier rehabilitation plan.”

“Yes Sir,” Sandi responded, “That is another facility problem this region must get its arms around. I cannot demolish a building until someone moves out, and there is nowhere

to build on the lower base without first demolishing a building. Sir lets walk through all of your buildings and I will recite the deficiencies of each building. NSSF's buildings are old, tired and tremendous abusers of utilities."

While sitting in the commanding officers outer office, his future secretary told Jack that he had a phone call from Commodore Mac Manzanita.

Jack offered, "Mac, how can I help you."

"Sorry, I hate to break the news, but this will happen next week after you have taken command. USS *Indianapolis* (SSN 697) will not be able to be inducted into her five week scheduled maintenance availability period next week. Operational commitments require her to be at sea. I need you to find a period that will not interfere with future at sea periods that I have scheduled, but still accomplish the repair package. Thanks a lot Jack."

So much for uninterrupted maintenance Jack thought as he hung up the phone.

Notes

1. David Abel, "Some Say US Sub Force is Spread Too Thin," *Boston Globe*, 27 June 1998, sec. A, p. 5.
2. Commander, Navy Region Northeast, "Naval Submarine Base New London," available from <<http://www.cner.navy.mil/>>.
3. SSSU Command Presentation, Interview by author, June 1999, Groton, Connecticut.
4. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Competition Dry Docked," *National Journal*, DEFENSE: vol. 31, no. 26, p. 1886 (26 June 1999).




APPENDIX A


The Actors

Captain Jack Pine	NSSF incoming commanding officer
Captain Doug Tamarack	NSSF outgoing commanding officer
Commander Tupelo	NSSF production mgt. assistant, Repair Division
LCDR Socrates Hemlock	NSSF weapons officer
Commander Dave Larch	SSSU commanding officer
Captain Mac Manzanita	Commodore, Submarine Squadron TWO
Commander Sandi Tanoak	NAVSTA public works officer
Admiral Alder	Commander, Submarine Group TWO

APPENDIX B




APPENDIX C



APPENDIX D

Submarine

Turn Around Training/Maintenance Cycle



Naval Submarine Support Facility: Submarine Base New London (B)

DAVID A. WILLIAMS

As he slumped into his chair, Captain Rafael “Raf” Cochino unhooked the stiff collar of his *choker whites* (Navy slang for the service dress white uniform made famous by Richard Gere in the movie: *An Officer and a Gentleman*). He’d just finished the change of command ceremony where he had relieved Captain Jack Pine. “Whew. The easy part is over,” he thought. “Now, what’s next?”

The turnover of the Naval Submarine Support Facility (NSSF) had been abbreviated as Jack Pine, his predecessor, needed to get to that five-sided wind tunnel they call the Pentagon to take his job as military assistant to one of those civilian “suits.” The fire hose had been on full force and Raf just needed time to collect his thoughts, assess the situation, and figure out what he could do to lead this organization through the next few years. He wasn’t without his own ideas of how to make the maintenance organization work better. Now, he was going to have his chance in an influential position that afforded him a direct shot at Admiral Alder, who was the commander of Submarine Group TWO (COMSUBGRU TWO).

Raf reflected on the week that went before. The issues seemed so new to him. It was a whole new language, in many respects. Concepts like *workforce* and *workload* took on a whole new meaning when managing civilians came into the equation. It was easy to figure out how to lead a tube full of *nukes* (Navy slang for nuclear trained personnel)—he’d done that his whole life. But what about these folks from Electric Boat (EB) who were assigned to NSSF under the New England Maintenance Manpower Initiative (NEMMI)? What were their particular needs and expectations? Labor unions; contract negotiations; Occupational, Safety, and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations; women laborers? His mind started to reel at the thought of leading this large, complex organization. Profit and loss—that’s a corporate world problem, isn’t it? He was beginning to feel like Gulliver, lost in a foreign land.

There was an upside to all of this though. Assignment to major command was certainly an honor, and an opportunity. The NSSF, in New London, was an exceptional opportunity for a hard charging, proven leader like himself. He was the *King* again. Not just some staff guy or Pentagon action officer. Additionally, a third tour in Groton was just too good a deal for the family. His wife could keep her job, and his daughter could finish up high school with her friends. Heaven knows, they’d had their share of moves and separations in his twenty-one plus years of submarine service. They deserved this time together.

Compared to Jack Pine and his predecessors, Raf was a different sort to get command of the NSSF. Shore maintenance facilities, like the NSSF, had always been the bastion of the officers with former enlisted time, known in the Navy as *mustangs*. Raf was a graduate out of the Academy in Annapolis. A bachelor's degree in physics, master's out of the Naval War College, and command of the USS *Miami* – Raf had worked hard and enjoyed the fast track throughout his career. This was the next big step on his way to flag officer. A standout performance here could make him very competitive.

His thoughts drifted to the *Miami*. Those were great times. Nothing could live up to the pure joy of commanding a submarine. He missed the crew of the *Miami*. They went through a lot together. Nobody knew the newest 688s better than Raf. And, operationally, he'd let the Meritorious Unit Citation and Battle "E" that they earned together serve as testament to the quality of the team with which he had prowled the northern Atlantic. Receipt of the Jack N. Darby award for inspirational leadership and excellence in command were nice, but they were really only icing on the cake. It was the Sailors that Raf would always remember.

Bzzzzt.....the intercom snapped him out of his trance.

"Captain, I've got Commander Tupelo here for the first of your 'howgozit' meetings," Petty Officer Jones reported. "Ah, my repair department guy," Raf thought. "Send him in," he told Jonesy.

"Tup', now that I'm in the saddle, I need another primer on the current status of the NEMMI, EB workforce, and where you think our challenges lie. Before I left the Submarine Development Squadron, I promised I would use my time here to fix some of the issues that Jack wasn't able to get his arms around. By the end of my tour, I'd like to see those piers working smoothly. Basically, it would be nice to have the weapons department and the crane operator's 'union' working for the fleet, instead of the other way around. Been waiting a long time to make some changes and I'm finally in the position to do that. Let's get started." Raf said.

Raf listened intently as Tup' covered the waterfront with him. Civilian EB workers were a challenge with a lot of plusses. Civilians work between EB and NSSF based upon where the available work is. There's usefulness in this in the current economy. The EB workload draws unevenly on skilled labor pools. A couple of Virginia class submarines do not keep workers fully employed at all times.¹ Skills, if not used, lapse or become rusty and therefore quality may suffer. Allowing workforce to flow to where the work is has obvious advantages. There's great training benefit derived by the NEMMI, as well. Civilians can cross train into areas of maintenance that they would not otherwise experience in new construction. Better, smarter ways to get the job done are exchanged. And, they also provide some stability to offset the losses of a rotating military workforce.²

"So, that's some of the good stuff, captain," Tup' said. "But, there's a downside, at times," Tup' continued. "EB civilians are contracted, therefore, you can't call on them to work

24 by 7, like you do the enlisted, unless you pay them overtime or renegotiate the contract. Also, the EB folks don't belong to NSSF directly, so we have to learn new management methods and skills to influence performance. When there's a work-quality issue with an NSSF employee (military or government service (GS)), we can stop work and hold a review board, with little to no loss in production time. Because EB civilians are contracted, it's harder to challenge work quality. It's like a red flag. A union worker will almost always demand that their union representative be present for any review and that can tie up the work production schedule.⁴

Tup' went on. "The Sailors are keenly aware of the pay differential between themselves and their civilian counterparts, who's performing precisely the same job. Contracted workforce are job specific hires. Welders weld, electricians do electrical work, and plumbers plumb. If you want to get stuff lugged down to the piers, you need to find a *stuff lugger*. That equates to a young Sailor, by definition. And, when the whistle blows, the civilians hit the bricks. This has impacted our retention in the past and shows up time and again as a dissatisfier in surveys we conduct."

"Got it, Tup'. How's things with the triple-S-U?" (Submarine Squadron Support Unit (SSSU))

"Better," Tup' said. "We get first right of refusal now on all work that goes to the SSSU. If our workload/workforce permits, we accept the job. Otherwise, we recommend that SSSU assign the work to another maintenance organization in the region."⁵

"Sounds good," Raf said. "So, Tup', what should I be losing sleep over?"

Tup' sat up on the edge of his chair. "We do have a problem with the dry dock (ARDM) leaving this year.⁶ Unless we get the Navy to keep the ARDM in Groton, we'll need to find alternatives. Without alternatives, we've got real schedule problems."

"Any chance we can slow the ARDM issue down a bit?" Raf asked.

"Perhaps, Cap'n," Tup' said. "But, manning for the ARDM *Oakridge* has already been terminated. The Sailors I have on board right now will be sufficient to man the dock until the last SSN undocks this summer. After that, I'll have just enough bodies to take her into inactivation with final crew release at the end of September 2001. Don't know what the COMSUBLANT and CINCLANTFLT plan is, but the cost of using EB's graving docks, and the need for docking space, create a tension that exceeds the area's capacity on a couple of occasions in the future. These are things that should be taken into account as they implement their ARDM plan. If we can't delay *Oakridge*, perhaps we can find a dock that is underutilized that we could bring up here. *Resolute* is in overhaul down in Norfolk, captain. Maybe we can make a grab for her?"

"Well thanks for that bit of sunshine, Tup'. I'll put that on my 'easy to do' list." Raf grimaced. "What are the issues with the ebb and flow that I need to know?"

“The ARDM issue sure does exacerbate the ebb and flow problem of the workload, captain. Right now, we only have three subs in port, with zero in upkeep. Good news for now, with the low sub repair tempo - a lot of buildings are getting painted. But, looking down range on the schedule, there are times where we anticipate eight to ten subs in upkeep. So, the ebb and flow is primarily a manpower employment efficiency issue for NSSF. We need sufficient workers to handle the load when we are at peak periods of upkeep, but we need to keep people gainfully employed when there’s only one sub to work on. With a pure Sailor workforce, I can shift to facility maintenance, authorized liberal leave, sign people up for schools, etcetera. However, with the shift towards EB workers, the need for efficient management of personnel is more critical and complex. We have some leeway in the numbers of people that can be sent back up the street, but that is somewhat dependent upon EB’s ability to find other employment for those workers. The other approach is to spread out the workforce – like we just recently did with the establishment of a second work shift. Now, rather than paying overtime to work a critical job into the evening, we use a dedicated shift of Sailors and EB workers that work from 1530 until about 2300.”

“How’s that working?” Raf asked.

“It seems to be working out okay. Don’t have a lot of data points – still too soon to tell, really. It does require us to be particularly careful which jobs we schedule for the second shift – not a good idea to be breaking into seawater systems or doing major hot work late at night when there is only a skeleton duty section on board to respond to casualties.”

Bzzzzzzzzzzt.....

“COMSUBGRU TWOs office is on the line, captain,” Jonesy announced. “Once you pick up, they’ll put Admiral Alder on the line. Probably just a congratulations call or something, eh sir?”

Raf picked up the phone and waited for the admiral to pick up the phone.

“Raf,” the admiral barked. “I’ve just returned from the November predecisional briefing of the northeast maintenance vision for the submarine force. I’ve got a copy of the briefing and I’m sending some slides over to you for review and comment. I need to hear your thoughts on the plan, in particular where NSSF is concerned. Let’s see, it’s Thursday now...how about you get on my calendar for Monday?”

“Aye aye, Sir” Raf snapped back.

“Good,” the admiral responded. “NSSF has gotten another great captain to lead it. Jack did a great job. Things are changing in the Navy and in the northeast region. Regionalization brings a whole new corporate view to the way we do business. We’re all going to get some resistance from well meaning folks who just can’t, or won’t, see the way ahead. It’s going to demand a lot of the leadership to learn better ways to do business. We’re looking forward to nothing but the best things from you, Raf. Congratulations again.”

As Raf reviewed the prediscisional briefing (Appendix A), he couldn't help noticing that on 30 March, Admiral Alder had hosted a Northeast Regional Maintenance Executive Working Group at Naval Reactors. In the meeting, it was decided that the three primary providers in the northeast would remain separate activities, with each retaining their core missions. For NSSF, that was intermediate-level (or "I"-Level) work. EB would continue to focus on new construction, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNS) would conduct overhauls.⁷

In addition, NSSF would be used as a neutral site for PNS and EB to develop efficiencies and share critical trade skill manpower. The CINCLANTFLT vision calls for a corporate effort, vice trying to consolidate maintenance organizations as directed in the other Atlantic/Pacific regions.⁸ This, it postulated, would keep maintenance affordable, level the imbalances in the *workforce to workload* equation, optimize Sailor manning and training concerns, and achieve economies of scale by optimizing the use of public and private drydocking resources in the region.⁹ In a nutshell, they would form a partnering venture that would share civilian and military regional resources to capitalize on the best industry business practices.¹⁰

The NEMMI data seemed about right. By FY-03, if everything followed the plan, NSSF would have 270 contractor civilians to replace the 431 surface-designated enlisted billets.¹¹

Raf pondered the organizational wiring diagram for the Proposed Regional Support Group (RSG) for Groton to see where he and NSSF would fit into the picture. In it, he noticed, the officer in charge of the new Nuclear Regional Maintenance Department (NRMD) Military Detachment would report to him. This was good news. It gave him some control over a new manpower base to get the delicate work of reactor maintenance completed. "What's this?" Raf was astonished.

There, on the PowerPoint slide, Raf learned that, organizationally, NSSF would now fall under another, new organization, called the Regional Support Group (RSG), that would be commanded by an O-6 submariner. The CO of the RSG would, in turn, report to COMSUGRU TWO (Admiral Alder), who would be the Regional Maintenance Center commander. As NSSF's ISIC (immediate superior in the chain of command), the RSG commanding officer would broker the maintenance of New London homeported submarines between SSSU, NSSF, and the floating drydocks. It was a new echelon between him and Admiral Alder, and he would be told what his workload would be, instead of managing it himself.¹²

Then it dawned on him.

He'd always looked forward to major command. He was ready to make the big decisions, to really have an impact on the way business got done in the submarine force. But now, with the RSG, he had been pushed into the middle of an organization. No real voice at the table. "Just carry out the plan of the day," Raf muttered under his breath. "Instead of being a commanding officer, I feel more like a department head again." What would his

contribution be for the next several years? A “care taker” commanding officer? What kind of leadership role was he going to play? A rebel ISTJ nuke without a cause, he reflected.

“What a great first day in command,” he thought. Raf picked up his pencil and began to organize his thoughts to address the admiral’s questions.


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APPENDIX A


Figure 1



DRAFT - PREDECISIONAL

Source: CINCLANTFLT, "Northeast Maintenance Vision (Submarines)," available at: <http://www.spear.navy.mil/RegionalMaintenance/RMIB_2000_11/ReadAhead/7 NE_11-14-00 RMIB Brief.ppt>, [accessed: 14 January 2001], p. 2.


Figure 2



Source: CINCLANTFLT, "Northeast Maintenance Vision (Submarines)," available at: <http://www.spear.navy.mil/RegionalMaintenance/RMIB_2000_11/ReadAhead/7 NE_11-14-00 RMIB Brief.ppt>, [accessed: 14 January 2001], p. 11.

APPENDIX A (CONT.)

Figure 3



Source: CINCLANTFLT, "Northeast Maintenance Vision (Submarines)," available at: <http://www.spear.navy.mil/RegionalMaintenance/RMIB_2000_11/ReadAhead/7_NE_11-14-00_RMIB_Brief.ppt>, [accessed: 14 January 2001], p. 9.

The Chairman's Dilemma

RONALD E. RATCLIFF AND BRIAN W. STORCK

Captain Bill Jones, U.S. Navy, fidgeted as he sat in the well-appointed waiting room of the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). A recent graduate of the Naval War College (NWC), he had felt well prepared to handle his duties in J-5 in helping develop national military strategy. Most of his service life had been spent on ships and major naval staffs, but he was confident that he had a good grasp of the larger security issues that confronted the Joint Staff. He had been taken aback by the phone call directing him to a one-on-one meeting with the new chairman. Bill was more than a little daunted as he was ushered across the hall and into the chairman's office.

The chairman, well known for his no-nonsense personality, came right to the point. "Bill, as you know I'm new here and I've got a problem. For the first time in my professional life, I feel like I'm in an organization that has lost the confidence of its rank and file." Captain Jones was shocked by the general's candor and more than a little uncomfortable with his revelation. What had caused the chairman to say that, and where was he headed?

"Bill," the chairman continued, "Have you read the piece in the September issue of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* that took some hard shots at the previous chairman and Joint Chiefs over their 1998 testimony to Congress on readiness? The author, a bit sanctimoniously I might add, tore into the chiefs for not highlighting our readiness problems until they were forced to by Congress.¹ But his article is similar to what I've seen in a lot of the major newspapers. Now, I just read a news article that Army officers are turning down command at the battalion and brigade level at record levels. It said the number of lieutenant colonels declining command had gone from 15 in 1997 to 32 in 1999 and the number of colonels had gone from 4 in 1997 to 23 in 1999.² I've asked the Army chief of staff to provide me some information about the reasons those officers have declined command. Added to all of that is the continuing refusal of officers and enlisted to take the anthrax vaccination because they don't feel the chain of command has been leveling with them about the real risks. I know the numbers are relatively small, but I can't remember the last time this number of troops have refused a direct order over a single issue. The feedback from our recent congressional testimony clearly indicates that many of our troops believe we were less than candid in our portrayal of readiness and funding levels."

"You know Bill," the chairman continued, "I started my career during the Vietnam War and experienced the frustrations of having to execute a military strategy that my superiors knew was fatally flawed. Yet, they still acquiesced to political pressure to continue a defective strategy. I vowed then that I would never do the same if I were in put in a similar position."

I've just read a survey taken at one of the war colleges where mid-grade officers stated senior leaders today would throw their subordinates under a bus to protect or advance their careers. They also asserted the service chiefs should resign rather than accept the inadequate military budgets they're being given.³

"Bill, this situation is simply unacceptable. I am one of those joint chiefs the troops are referring to! The time has come to do something to restore the faith and trust that we at the top have lost. But, maybe I've been away from the troops too long to really understand what's at the core of this disenchantment with the officers who run this outfit. So that's why I asked you in here.

"Captain, my task for you is not easy. In fact, it's going to be tough. Simply put, what do I need to do to get our people back behind the senior leadership? If I can't solve this problem, I doubt I can be effective in taking this military where it needs to go during my term as chairman. I know you're just coming out of the field and that's why I want your thoughts about how I might proceed. Get on my schedule first thing tomorrow. See you in the morning."

As he walked down the corridor, Bill had to chuckle at the irony of his tasking. He had been one of those officers at the Naval War College who had railed loudest about the Joint Chiefs' congressional testimony. He felt strongly that they had not been forthright in the past about just how bad readiness was in the fleet, particularly in naval aviation. He recalled the Navy Inspector General's report, which had been made public just three days prior to the Joint Chiefs' congressional testimony in 1998. It had detailed how personnel shortages and spare parts cannibalization had placed naval aviation safety "on the ragged edge." But even more telling were the Sailors' comments that showed their depth of frustration.⁴

"We have a 15 aircraft carrier (CV/CVN) requirement, a 12 carrier navy, and a 10 carrier budget."

"We need to be willing to say NO more often—we are stretched too thin."

"Even if you gave me all the parts I need, I don't have the people and the talent to install them."

"If people are so important, why can't we get the things we need to do our jobs?"

Fortunately for Bill, one of his former NWC seminar mates, Colonel Renee Walker, was currently assigned to the Joint Staff Legislative Affairs office. Her office was just down the corridor from the chairman's suite. Although busy, she agreed to join Bill for lunch at the Pentagon food court.

As they sat down with their trays, Renee said the chairman's tasking came as no surprise to her. "Bill, all of the Joint Chiefs are concerned about these reports of poor credibility with the troops. They accept that a certain level of grousing is normal, but some of these latest reports have really gotten their attention. I think there are several factors which are driving the problem.

“First,” she stated, “is simply the recent pace of operations. Despite America’s military being forty percent smaller, deployments had increased sixteen-fold since 1991. Between 1945 and 1990, the U.S. military was deployed overseas 50 times. Since 1990, it’s been deployed 60 times and by 1999, the Clinton administration had deployed U.S. forces 48 times on peacekeeping and combat missions.⁵ And, it’s not just the pace, it’s what they’re doing. For instance, many of the rank and file feel betrayed because Defense Department leaders acquiesced to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo that many believed were poorly designed and risky. They felt their senior leaders should have objected more vigorously and resigned rather than accept missions that threatened the welfare of the troops.⁶

“The anthrax vaccination program has been another source for attacks on senior leadership credibility,” she continued. “The latest figures show that over four hundred service members, including officers, have refused the vaccine.⁷ Now we’ve just had the first military doctor refuse to take the vaccine. He cited his concerns about the vaccine’s efficacy and its potential for long-term health risks.⁸ A lot of this can be traced to serious gaps in the Pentagon’s credibility over the Gulf War syndrome. Senior civilian and uniformed military leaders had steadfastly denied for several years there was any cause for the health problems claimed by many Gulf War veterans. Not too long ago, the Defense Department finally acknowledged Iraqi chemical munitions and drugs, given to many troops to protect them from bio-chemical weapons, may be responsible for some of those health problems.⁹ That admission was a serious blow to the leadership’s credibility and has given greater credence to charges that senior leadership is now ignoring valid concerns about the anthrax vaccine.

“But what really galled the Joint Chiefs,” Renee said, “was the flak they took over their readiness testimony on the Hill in 1998. Several took personal affront at accusations that called their honesty and integrity into question. To a man they felt their testimony was forthcoming and truthful. Remember, they are expected to support administration policy and their testimony reflects that fact. Did we really expect them to discard the two-Major Theater War (MTW) strategy in front of a congressional committee? Instead, they accurately addressed the risks of that strategy.”

“I can agree with you to a certain point, Renee,” Bill interjected, “but, there was a general feeling in the ranks and in Congress that the chiefs were not being sufficiently candid about the military’s problems. Do you remember Senator Santorum’s comments? He’s a Republican from Pennsylvania and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). I’ve got a copy of his remarks right here. He was pretty explicit in his criticism,”

My concern is the forthrightness by which you gentlemen have come and testified before this committee . . . you’re at the top of the chain of command and you have a responsibility to represent the Soldiers and Sailors and Airmen that are beneath you . . . you have an obligation to represent the needs of those people and be forthright in advocating for them. And from what I’ve seen in my time that I have been on this committee is, I think, a lack of that zealous representation of the people you represent.¹⁰

"So while the JCS may have felt their reputations had been impugned unfairly," Bill continued, "the perception out in the field and fleet is that Congress hit the nail squarely on the head."

"But that's exactly what I'm talking about!" Renee exclaimed. "Republican members of the SASC and their House counterparts used their hearings to bash the president by criticizing the JCS. Did you know the JCS are required to adhere to a policy document called a SAP – that stands for a Statement of Administration Policy? The SAP for defense issues expresses, in concise form, the administration's position on contentious issues and the JCS are expected to adhere to those policy definitions. Every administration does this and Congress knows it! Only when a congressman asks for a service chief's personal opinion, can he express his own views that may diverge with administration policy. You'll note from the testimony they're not asked to do that very often."

Renee continued, "Frankly, most of the JCS' critics don't seem to understand that honest people can see things differently. I know those who raise the issue of ethics every time they disagree with a policy position particularly frustrate the JCS. Remember, these guys were in Vietnam and they suffered first hand the consequences of leaders who accepted a compromised military strategy. Comparison of these service chiefs to those Vietnam-era leaders is way off base. They're expected to give the president and Congress their best opinion about how to provide for the common good, of which national security is only one piece. The rank and file naturally assumes that that means unequivocal advocacy for the military. But that's not their real duty. They have an obligation to balance legitimate national security needs against all of the other requirements of the common 'national good.' Unfortunately, when they do so, it's translated as abrogating their responsibility to the military.

"Anyway, that's enough lecturing and I'm late for a meeting," she said, pushing a folder across the table to Bill. "Here's my personal file on the JCS testimony and the issues that were raised during the hearing. I want it back, okay? Good luck with the chairman."

Back in his office, Bill reviewed Renee's file and his own notes. During their testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the JCS insistence that the U.S. military was capable of fighting and winning two Gulf War-sized conflicts opened them up to second-guessing. How could they make such claims when it took the Army several weeks just to move a single platoon of attack helicopters from Germany to Kosovo? Further, the Navy had to denude the Western Pacific of aircraft carriers for the first time since 1943 to support the aerial campaign against Serbia.¹¹ Bill noted, however, the service chiefs carefully highlighted the significant risk involved in adhering to the two MTW strategy, a point that was lost in the criticism of their remarks.

It hadn't helped the JCS credibility either when, during the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing on 27 September 2000, the chairman of the HASC detailed a litany of readiness problems facing the military: The Air Force was experiencing its lowest readiness levels in fifteen years, with only sixty-seven percent of its combat units reporting C-1 or C-2—the highest ratings; the Army faced serious ammunition shortages and several of its

training commands were at C-4—the lowest possible readiness rating. All of the services faced serious ammunition shortages: the Army was short \$3.3 billion in basic ammunition, the Navy had only half of the four thousand land-attack Tomahawk cruise missiles required to meet a two war contingency, and the Air Force had less than ten percent of its air-launched cruise missiles required in a two-war scenario.¹²

Renee's file also included several *Early Bird* articles by retired senior military officers that disputed the JCS readiness claims. General George Joulwan, the former NATO commander, stated in a Fox News interview that the United States would be hard pressed to fight another Desert Storm with today's forces.¹³ General Zinni, former commander of Persian Gulf forces, warned about the growing strain on U.S. forces and the military's aging equipment that was stretched to the breaking point.¹⁴

Even Republicans in Congress, nominally strong supporters of the military, were going on record with their criticisms of the JCS testimony on readiness. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) was reported as saying, "The JCS have not been willing to disagree publicly with this president even when we ask them in a closed, nonpublic environment and, to me, that is a mistake." He continued, "I want to hear from the service chiefs what they think is the best for our warfighters and for our Soldiers—not what they think is best based on the sanitization of spin masters at the White House."¹⁵ Bill reminded himself, however, that these comments were made just prior to the 2000 presidential elections and wondered how much politics played in these kinds of statements.

As Bill reflected on the issues, particularly readiness, he began to better appreciate the JCS position. These guys had lived through the draconian budget cuts of the 1970's and they knew what a real hollow force looked like. From that perspective, the current readiness situation didn't seem nearly as dire as the critics portrayed it. They understood that the military could live with lower readiness rates, particularly when one considered the nebulous nature of readiness reporting. In fact many insightful observers were beginning to ask the more relevant question, "Ready for what?" From the JCS standpoint, while higher readiness rates were certainly preferred, they had to balance readiness against personnel accounts, current operations, and future requirements. They had no easy choices and any position they took opened them to criticism on many fronts.

Bill closed the file. How would he advise the chairman to address the issue of credibility and loss of confidence among the rank and file? Were the leadership problems real, or only a matter of perception? Either way, something obviously had to be done. While he had gained a much better appreciation for the politics and compromises involved in complex national security issues, he was also equally aware that ninety percent of the armed forces didn't understand or care. To them, the issues were pretty much black and white and any attempt to introduce shades of gray immediately called into question the integrity and ethics of those involved. He remembered an article he had clipped out during his days at NWC that said in part,

It may be hard for civilians to comprehend that professional Soldiers are inspired by the ideals of selfless service and noble sacrifice. . . They seek in daily life those values that sound corny to civilians but held highly by military professionals: honor, duty, courage, [and] honesty. Doing the right thing when no one's watching. And that is why they are quick to detect political correctness, shading of the truth and sliding ethical standards in themselves, their colleagues and especially in their senior officers.¹⁶

The chairman understood the Joint Chiefs had lost a good bit of credibility with the rank and file. He was committed to restoring their faith in the chain of command. And it was Bill's job to come up with some insights and ideas on just how to do that. Before turning to his computer, Bill called home and told his wife he wouldn't be home for dinner.

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CNO and OPNAV Reorganization

RONALD E. RATCLIFF

Captain Lynn Stull reflected on the changes he'd seen at the Naval Operations Staff (OPNAV) since reporting in the summer of 2000. One thing that was certain, 11 September 2001 had wrought the most abrupt and traumatic of changes. The Navy Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate (N-3/5) had been devastated by the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. But, life had gone on and despite the gaping hole in the Pentagon. The Navy had picked up and was back up to full speed helping fight the nation's war on terrorism. While the fleet was doing a great job carrying out its role in combat operations, the Navy staff was struggling with two key problems: defining the Navy's role in homeland security and implementing organizational changes directed by the chief of naval operations (CNO) nearly two years earlier. Although separated in time, they were interwoven. Both required not just new skill sets, but new ways of thinking and doing business.

The United States Navy, perhaps the most tradition-bound of all of the services, was grappling mightily with these changes. The new administration's efforts to start a "revolutionary transformation" of the Defense Department undeniably had altered the staff's focus from internal process changes to issues about the role of the Navy in the future of military operations. The issues had ultimately boiled down to a debate about the utility of aircraft carrier battle groups in future warfare. The greater national debate, however, resided in how to achieve a more affordable, yet still powerful military that better fit the nation's security needs. Inherent in that debate was the clearly indicated challenge issued by the Bush administration for the services to get smaller and more agile while remaining as lethal as the current force. The events of 11 September also added the requirement for all services to better provide for Homeland Security.

All of this had led to an uncomfortable discussion with the Chief of Naval Operations this morning. The CNO had left no doubt in Lynn's mind that he wanted him to rekindle the staff's efforts in implementing the changes he directed some eighteen months earlier. Current readiness was still a major priority for the CNO and the latest Navy program submission had shown there were substantive problems with the way the Navy identified its requirements and developed its programs. The CNO was getting more and more frustrated with the lack of progress that the OPNAV staff had shown in implementing the changes he'd directed upon assuming command of the Navy.

Lynn remembered his first days upon returning to OPNAV. He had recently left his major command and had embarked on his biggest professional challenge ever, Executive Assistant to the CNO. While this assignment portended great things personally, the

magnitude of the job was daunting and recent changes to the Navy Staff had promised to make the job even more exciting. Admiral Vern Clark had just taken over as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and had placed fleet readiness at the top of his priority list. In support of that priority, one of his first official acts was to order a major change to the organization of the Naval Operations Staff OPNAV staff.

In his first conversation with the CNO, Admiral Clark had come right to the point explaining that the major organizational changes he'd made to the Navy staff were intended to achieve a better focus on the fleet's current needs. He felt strongly that the Navy staff absolutely had to get a better grip on the fleet's readiness posture and the Navy's war fighting requirements. He also made it clear that he was going to demand a greater emphasis on those elements because they'd been shortchanged in the past and were hurting the fleet. The CNO felt that if the Navy staff did its job right, we'd see a marked improvement in fleet readiness. He was, however, very concerned that his intent was not well understood and expected significant resistance from the organization. He knew the building was infamous for its ability to delay, derail or wait out real change and was intent that did not happen to him. Admiral Clark had then handed Lynn a short note that succinctly outlined his thoughts on how he viewed the Navy and where he intended to take it:

My vision for our Navy is simple. We are the greatest navy in the world, and we are going to get even better. . . . To focus our efforts, we must keep in mind, the Navy starts with the Fleet. Although there is more to the Navy than the Fleet, the Fleet must be the center of our thinking and action. . . . That forces us to think about alignment.¹

The note had continued,

OPNAV will be realigned to provide a strong advocate for war fighting and readiness. I want a formal and open decision making methodology that provides clear and unambiguous results, so that our people can see the results and make our direction clear to all. To help achieve better Navy-wide alignment the OPNAV staff will be reorganized to:²

- Establish a strong advocate for fleet readiness;
- Increase visibility of warfare programs, while acknowledging resource constraints;
- Provide the CNO a "Navy-wide corporate perspective" vice a series of parochial views;
- Better integrate Navy training with Fleet Readiness and Manpower requirements.

Concern for future readiness cannot distract us from current readiness. We must take care of the Navy that our nation has already invested in. We need to know what our readiness requirements really are and make strategic decisions that support those requirements, not just react to fiscal constraints . . . we need to get this right!³

The CNO's emphasis on fleet readiness had come as no surprise to Lynn. He'd also experienced personnel and materiel shortages first hand in his last assignment. It wasn't just the Navy either. Every *Early Bird* had carried a slew of articles that essentially said the same thing—the U.S. military was running out of parts, people and money. The Office of the

Navy Inspector General's September 2000 report on the status of naval aviation had been particularly telling. It pointed out in bleak terms that "the Navy was wearing out its aviation fleet. . . . airplane inventory was older than at any other time in the history of naval aviation. . . . Budget cuts had decimated the logistics needed to sustain aging aircraft. Aviation safety was on the ragged edge and the thresholds of acceptable risk had been exceeded."⁴ Although the report spoke specifically to naval aviation, it had echoed what Lynn knew to be true in the surface navy and probably in the other services as well.

Lynn remembered his thoughts when he'd finished reading the CNO's note. He'd realized that nothing had been said about the demands being placed on the Navy prior to "9-11" by the National Command Authority. He'd felt strongly at the time that non-essential missions were causing a killer operations tempo that was wearing out the Navy. The real impact and cost of the current war on terror were yet to be fully understood, but it was clear to him that things hadn't gotten better. The Defense Department was looking at all the services to come up with funds to pay for current combat operations and the most likely source was going to be from modernization and future requirements.

Lynn had taken his concerns to the officer he was replacing. He'd listened to his concerns and given his personal opinion about what he thought was driving the changes directed by the CNO. He was convinced that the changes were an effort by Admiral Clark to take back the strategic leadership of the Navy. Over the past several years, that role has been surrendered, in large part, not to another individual or office, but to the Navy's programming and resource allocation process. In the CNO's eyes, that process had usurped the prerogatives of the Navy's senior leadership and was largely responsible for many of the Navy's current readiness problems. His predecessor was also sure that was why he intended to exert much greater influence on where and how the Navy directs its resources.

Given that insight, Lynn had decided to visit a few "wise old hands" in the building. He'd started with a visit to his old buddy, Captain "Whispering Jack" Carson, a helo pilot and an old hand in OPNAV. Carson saw the changes as a clear attempt to separate the development of warfare requirements from concerns about how to pay for them. He saw the CNO's changes as a way to establish "constructive tension" between the operating fleet and those who managed the Navy's resources.⁵ Carson had further opined that the Navy's programs are driven mostly by budgetary bottom lines imposed by "bean-counters" rather than the fleet which focused on combat capability. Carson had also explained what the changes really meant to the organization. Under the old organization:

- N-8 (a three-star billet) was responsible both for making the threat and capability assessments that defined the Navy's warfare requirements and then for deciding how the Navy's resources would be allocated to meet those requirements. While consolidation of those two roles under one hat may have made some sense in theory, the process had left much to be desired in practice.
- Under the old system, the "warfare barons," who represented the interests of the surface, submarine and aviation communities, wielded immense power and influence. They had a good understanding of the fiscal constraints that defined what was

achievable and what was not. They also kept a sharp parochial and highly protective eye on their respective platforms (ships, subs and aircraft) and made sure they got their share of the Navy's budget.

With the three-star, the barons had dominated the Navy's budget process. It left the operating forces without a strong voice and skewed the process in favor of future requirements at the expense of current readiness. While the Navy staff didn't blatantly ignore fleet readiness, when push came to shove, they defaulted in favor of protecting future requirements. There simply wasn't a balanced exchange between the requirements generators and those who had to make hard allocation choices forced by our limited resources. Many believed that process was largely responsible for the crisis in current readiness.

Captain Carson had further explained that Admiral Clark had decided that in order to redress those problems he would divide requirements generation and resource allocation responsibilities among three separate OPNAV directorates that:⁶

- Refocused the Navy's logistics directorate (N4) to be an advocate for fleet readiness as well as logistics. N4 will also define all warfare area (air, surface, and sub-surface) readiness requirements (less manpower & training). In effect, N4 is to be the "strong advocate or shrill voice" for fleet readiness that "vectors" problems to "solution makers" within the Navy staff.
- Established a Warfare Requirements and Programs Directorate (N7), also led by a three-star, that focuses on warfare requirements. The warfare barons (air, surface, submarine, etc.) were moved here from N-8 and will continue to: define and develop warfare requirements, recommend what and how many platforms and systems the Navy will need; recommend program priorities; and advise the CNO on resource allocation decisions for warfare areas.
- Refocused the Resources, Requirements and Assessments Directorate (N8) on its role as the honest broker in deciding where to allocate the Navy's limited resources based on *their* assessment of current and future warfare requirements.

The revised organization (see Appendix 2) was intended to create a natural tension between the people who defined and developed current and future Navy warfare requirements (N4 and N7) and those who had to balance the competing requirements (N8) given the limited resources available to the Navy. Said more simply, N4 and N7 would identify what the Navy needed, but N8 was responsible for telling the CNO what the Navy can afford.

According to Carson, these changes were also an effort to generate greater horizontal integration at lower levels within the Navy staff. By encouraging more horizontal integration at lower levels, the CNO hoped to create greater permeability between the various warfare stovepipes that had grown up over the years in OPNAV. He wanted a process that identified warfare requirements and solutions that focused on warfare functions and not on platforms or systems. His challenge was to find the right "carrots" and "sticks" to make this new approach work.

Lynn had immediately recognized that this “tension” would lead inevitably to issues that couldn’t be resolved at the lower levels of the organization. There simply weren’t enough resources to cover all of the requirements the fleet and OPNAV would identify. Plus there would be honest differences of opinion about what was needed. He saw a new version of the same old fights that had always plagued the process.

Carson had responded that the CNO had already thought of that and had made allowances. The reorganization made the vice-CNO (VCNO) the final arbiter responsible for reconciling the differences between the requirements generators and the resource providers. To help him tackle this extremely complex job, the CNO resurrected the CNO’s Executive Board (CEB), comprised of senior officers from the various directorates. Their job was to advise the VCNO on the key issues of requirements and funding. The CEB got its technical support from another new group called the Naval Requirements Oversight Council (NROC). Their role was analogous to the role played by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that assisted the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating DoD programs.⁷

In order to assist them in their decision making, the NROC uses a cross-cutting assessment process called the “integrated warfare architecture,” or IWARs for short. N-8 programmers use this process to evaluate Navy warfare and support requirements with a *functional* focus, vice the traditional platform-based one. In simpler terms, the IWARs attempt to answer the question, how much is enough, both in terms of quantity and quality, today and in the future, for all Navy systems and programs?

Captain Carson had also pointed out that by emphasizing horizontal integration at lower levels in OPNAV, the CNO was trying to streamline the process so that it pushed the really big issues up to his level early enough so that he could make a difference. Too often in the past, his predecessors had been presented with a fait accompli or too few options. Streamlining the process was something the warfare barons and others were likely to resist because it took away a great deal of the power they’d traditionally wielded over the process. The CNO’s changes directly threatened their ability to protect parochial platform interests. The warfare specialties, represented by the Barons, measured the worth of their communities directly by the capability of their platforms. That was why aviators fought so tenaciously for the next generation of aircraft and the other guys fought hard for their next class of ship or sub.

Carson had finished his tutorial by warning Jack that OPNAV and the Pentagon had seen a lot of changes over the years. Most of them felt this latest list of changes was either going to end up as cosmetic change or that they would simply manipulate the changes in such a way as to have no real impact.

That last statement had made a lasting impression on Lynn and he’d decided to see his old civilian buddy, Jeff Welker, who’d worked for years on the Navy staff. He valued his opinion because he’d seen a lot of changes over the years in the way the Navy staff did business. If anyone could offer insight into the way things worked, it would be Jeff. Lynn had

gotten right to the point and Welker had been characteristically blunt. He felt the CNO was facing an uphill battle given the number of nasty issues he faced. Current readiness problem was an immediate problem, but he also had to maintain current force levels. The Congressional Budget Office had just produced a report that stated DoD's FY2000 budget required an additional \$51 billion annually just to maintain the current force levels. The Navy's share was around \$23 billion annually.⁸ None of that, however, even began to address the big-ticket items that lurked just around the corner such as the new generation of destroyers, submarines, aircraft carriers, and the Joint Strike Fighter. In Welker's opinion, the CNO couldn't afford to focus solely on current fleet readiness and personnel shortages no matter how important they were.

As for the reorganization of the Navy Staff, Welker felt the changes the CNO had made to the Navy staff weren't going to work. The political reality of the defense budget process was that hard choices were deferred to the last possible moment. There were myriad reasons, not the least of which, was waiting for SecDef's people to make up their minds about the priorities. There was also the other Navy four-stars who wielded incredible influence inside and outside of the Navy. Welker admonished Jack not to make the mistake of thinking that they were all pulling in the same direction as the CNO. Keeping them aligned had frustrated many a CNO. They had their own personal perspectives on how the Navy fit into the larger national security picture and, despite their best efforts, were not immune to their warfare community biases.

Welker also reminded Jack that there were many players outside the Navy that impacted its requirements and resource decisions. The Joint Staff was assuming an ever greater role in helping the Navy to define its requirements. Although the Navy had managed to keep *Joint Vision 2020* relatively toothless, that was going to change. Congress was also getting more impatient with DoD's progress towards jointness and the Navy was seen as being the worst offender. To make matters even more complicated, Congress had its own ideas about requirements that were based, at least in part, on where platforms and systems were built. If that didn't muddy up the waters enough, the whole debate on readiness was now clouded by questions like, "Ready for What?" and "Ready for Whom?"⁹ The attack on USS *Cole* in Yemen had added further fuel to debate about asymmetric threats. Jack realized that the events of "9-11" had not yet caused much debate in Congress, but hard questions lay ahead about the Navy's vision of a high-tech, highly capable and hugely expensive Navy with the reality of elusive and dedicated enemies that use simple means to kill thousands and nearly sink a billion-dollar ship.

Welker had continued, pointing out that the CNO faced significant challenges in meeting the requirements of the Marine Corps. The Navy had a proclivity to sacrifice Marine Corps high-interest programs in order to keep other Navy programs healthy. He also reminded Jack about the tremendous influence exercised by the "beltway" on all defense resource allocation decisions. Admiral Clark also received a lot of unsolicited advice from the retired four-star community who now work for the defense industry and cannot be ignored. And finally, there was intense resource competition coming from the other services that

were going through their own transformations and working hard to stave off their own train wrecks.

Welker had concluded that by reorganizing the Navy staff, the CNO made a strategic bet that he could gain control of the issues driving current and future readiness of the Navy by changing the process that works them. On the one hand, if he were to actually be successful in creating a staff with new competencies, he'd achieve the agility and responsiveness he sought to implement through his vision for the Navy. On the other hand, if he was unable to fundamentally change the process, he risked wasting a great deal of time and energy to the possible detriment of the very goals he was attempting to achieve.

Welker's final words had been more prophetic than he'd feared. The reorganization of OPNAV had not gone smoothly, not that it was expected to. The requirements generation process was becoming mired in a turf war between the old N-8 and the new N-7. It was no secret that N-8 had run roughshod over the rest of the Navy staff in formulating the Navy's submission. N-7 was still seriously undermanned and working hard to put in place the processes that would (in N-7's opinion) achieve the changes sought by the CNO. Lynn knew most of the issues but decided it was time to call in a trusted confidant, and current OPNAV warrior to review the problems that had plagued the last budget cycle. If he was going to get the reorganization project back on track, he needed a better appreciation of what had happened over the past year and a half.

Commander Jill McClendon had been part of the OPNAV reorganization from the beginning. She had been one of the small cadre of officers who had been assigned to the new N-7 organization and experienced first hand the resistance to the CNO's changes. She'd also served as one of Lynn's executive officers in his previous command. He knew she'd be candid as well as professional and that's what he needed at the moment.

When Jill arrived, Lynn quickly explained why she'd been summoned. He briefly described his concerns about his perceived lack of progress in making real change to the way the Navy staff was doing business as evidenced by the Navy's latest budget submission. "Jill," he finished, "it's pretty apparent that while a lot of good people have put a great amount of effort into the changes directed by the CNO, we are still a long way from his vision of a quick and agile staff that has got a real handle on our real warfare requirements. What do *you* think is wrong?"

After hearing why she'd been summoned to the executive assistant's office, Jill came directly to the point. "Captain, if I understand what you've just asked, you're asking for my *personal* opinion about the OPNAV changes based on my experience in N-7. That's important for both of us to understand, because my professional opinion may or may not reflect the perceptions of my superiors. Although, I'm pretty sure they'd agree with what I have to say." Lynn confirmed for Jill that was what he was looking for. She responded, "Ok, sir, you've got it. Where do you want to begin?"

"Let's start with what's wrong with the process," he answered. Jill replied, "I'm sure you've heard this before, but it's worth repeating because it goes to the heart of the

problem. OPNAV faces a basic dilemma. We're trying to build a complex, highly networked, integrated, joint, multi-platform, multi-system Navy without a top-level design within a patchwork of stove piped, non-integrated processes. By that I mean, we have a process that:

- Still focuses on platforms and systems instead of capabilities,
- Is uncoordinated and not synchronized, and employs inconsistent analytical frameworks and metrics,
- Uses different or inconsistent information sources, data bases, and produces differing decision products,
- There's confusion over 'who's in charge' and many of the key stakeholders are not linked to or involved in key processes and decisions.¹⁰

All of which has led to confusion, delayed or errant decisions, longer not shorter planning cycles and execution timelines, and a great deal of consternation about what really are the Navy's warfare requirements.

"Captain, N-7 looks at warfare requirements," she continued, "from a mission-driven perspective in an effort to determine what is required for *war fighting wholeness*. We view the requirements generation process as a holistic endeavor that looks at capability packages not single systems or platforms. By war fighting wholeness, we mean a product where no one owns any one program, where good enough is good enough and we have an end state in mind. We feel that a *Single Program Proposal* (SPP) should be submitted to N-8 that provides a balanced requirements package across all mission areas. Our counterparts in N-8, however, have not bought into this concept and prefer to remain focused on individual programs. From their viewpoint, the SPP is too confining when they have to make quick budget decisions or respond to last minute DoD directives or cuts.

"N-7's dilemma is how to 'get traction' with N-8 and the CNO in accepting this alternative view of the programming and budgeting process. That they don't buy it was made abundantly clear when N-8 made substantive changes to programs in the last budget cycle without even consulting N-7 on the rationale behind the requirements we identified. From our perspective, N-8 made some bad calls in the final budget submission. Until we resolve this basic difference in perspective about how the Navy's program is put together, the organizational changes that the CNO directed when he arrived won't get him where he wants to go."

"Okay Commander," Lynn responded, "what would you suggest we do to get this process working the way that the CNO originally intended?"

Notes

1. NAVOP 009/00, July 2000.
2. NAVOP 010/00, August 2000.
3. CNO Personal For Message to Senior Naval Leadership, August 2000.
4. Robert J. Caldwell, "Navy's Woes Reflect Risks of Years of Underfunding Defense," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 24 September 2000, available at <<http://www.infowar.com/>>

- mil_c4i/00/mil_c4i_092900a_j.shtml>, [accessed: 7 January 2002].
5. Hunter Keeter, "Navy Alignment to Foster Tension Among Requirements, Resources," *Defense Daily*, 29 September 2000, p.8, available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2000/s20000929alignment.htm>>, [accessed: 2 October 2000].
6. OPNAV Alignment Working Group Report to CNO, 17 August 2000.
7. Dale Eisman, "Navy Reassigns Top Duties, Cites Need for Fleet Readiness," *The Virginian-Pilot*, 2 September 2000.
8. Congressional Budget Office, "Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today's Forces," September 2000.
9. Tom Allen, "Ask Right Questions About Military Readiness," *Bangor Daily News*, 30 September 2000, available from <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_anasset=GeHauKO-EWERMSEW...>, [accessed: 3 January 2002].
10. OPNAV - N70 Briefing "Battle Force Capability/Mission Capabilities Packages", 28 March 2000, available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2001/yurchak.pdf>> [accessed: 6 January 2002].



APPENDIX ONE

ADMIRAL VERN CLARK, U.S. NAVY

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Born in Sioux City, Iowa, and raised in the midwestern states of Nebraska, Missouri and Illinois, Admiral Clark graduated from Evangel College and earned a master's degree in business administration (MBA) from the University of Arkansas. He attended Officer Candidate School and received his commission in August 1968.

Admiral Clark served aboard the destroyers USS *John W. Weeks* (DD 701) and USS *Gearing* (DD 710). As a lieutenant, he commanded USS *Grand Rapids* (PG 98). He subsequently commanded USS *McCloy* (FF 1038), USS *Spruance* (DD 963), the Atlantic Fleet's Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center, Destroyer Squadron Seventeen, and Destroyer Squadron Five. After being selected for flag rank, Admiral Clark commanded the *Carl Vinson* Battle Group/Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, the Second Fleet, and the United States Atlantic Fleet.


Ashore, Admiral Clark first served as special assistant to the director of the Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He later completed assignments as the administrative assistant to the deputy chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) and as the administrative aide to the vice chief of Naval Operations. He served as head of the Cruiser-Destroyer Combat Systems Requirements Section, and Force Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer for the commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and he directed the Joint Staff's crisis action (CAT) teams for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Admiral Clark's first flag assignment was at the U.S. Transportation Command where he was director of both Plans and Policy (J5), and Financial Management and Analysis (J8). While commanding the *Carl Vinson* Battle Group, he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and later served as the deputy commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. Admiral Clark has also served as the deputy and chief of staff, United States Atlantic Fleet; the director of operations (J3), and subsequently director (DJS), of the Joint Staff.

Admiral Clark became the 27th Chief of Naval Operations on 21 July 2000.

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